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ABSTRACT.
2
This study attenpts to investigate Turkish-Syrian 
relations in the period 1908-14, and to trace thoir role 
in the origins and developnent of the Arab nationalist 
movement. The Revolution of July 1908 put the Ottoman 
Empire under the rule of the Young Turks. In 1914- the 
Empire entered the First World War, a step which was to 
bring about its ultimate defeat and destruction. During 
this dynamic period Turco-Syrian relations underwent va­
rious stages of developnent, and the effective Arab move­
ment began.
However, signs of such a movement, incoherent and 
half-conscious, nay be seen in the literary and political 
writings of some Syrians throughout the second half of 
the nineteenth and the ea^y years of the twentieth cen­
tury. This is discussed in the introduction which also 
gives definitions of terns such as "Syria" and 'the 
Syrians". Chapter I analyses the events between July 
1908 and the counter-coup of April 1909« From those 
events stemmed the Syrian opposition to the Young Turk 
regime. This opposition grew throughout the period 
under consideration, and several phases in its growth 
may be discerned. Chapter II deals with the increasing 
dissatisfaction of the Syrian Arabs with the policies of 
the Young Turk regime and examines the attempt of the
5leading Syrians to enumerate and redress their grievances 
against that regime in the years 1909-12. drab societies 
in Istanbul as well as tne Arab parliamentary lobby 
played a significant, but often overlooked, role in 
affecting the relations of the Syrian Arabs with the 
Young lurk governments. The assessment of this role is 
the subject matter of Charter III*
Perhaps the most important phase of the Syrian- 
Turkish controversy was the agitation of the Syrians for 
the introduction of a decentralised form of government 
in their vilayets. The origins, nature and development 
of this agitation are investigated in Chapter IV* The 
attempt of the Syrians to secure their political rights 
within the framework of the Ottoman Empire reached their 
climax with the convening of Paris Congress in June, 1913* 
This Congress and the events following it are examined 
in the fifth and last chapter* The study ends with a 
conclusion in which some general views about the subject 
are ventured„
4*
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NOTES 0N TILINSLITERATI OF AND REFERENCES.
Arabic has been transcribed according to the 
system adopted in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia
of Islam, with slight variations:
(i) n j" has been used in place of M<3_31 *
(ii) » ci" " " " fTkM •
(iii) the diagraph ’ay" has been used in place of ,!aiM.
(iv) the diagraphs dh, gh, kh, sh, th, have not been 
underlined*
Names of Arab authors who have written in languages other 
than Arabic were spelt as they themselves have spelt them* 
Turkish has been transcribed according to the 
official modern Turkish orthography, except when quoting 
from foreign sources. Names of all members of non-Turkish 
ethnic groups (except Arabs) have been rendered according 
to the same orthography* Modern Turkish place names are 
used, thus Istanbul and not Constantinople, again except 
when quoting. Anglicized forms of Turkish titles and of 
Araoic place names are adopted throughout this study.
All dates are standardised using the Gregorian calendar. 
Einally, for convenience of typing no distinction has 
been made between the dotted and undotted Turkish "i"•
First references to any publication or document 
in the footnotes have been given in full but subsequent 
references have been given in a shortened form.
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8IN1P0DUCTI ON
It is important to define the terms "Syria" and 
"Syrians" as used in tlie title and text of this study* Con­
fusion has often arisen from the use of "both terms and in 
particular of "Syria" in several different senses, Syria, 
in its broadest acceptance, is the country that lies between
the eastern shore of the Mediterranean and the deserts of 
1Arabia, While it stretches from the Taurus Mountains in
the north to the Sinai Peninsula, it has no fixed boundary
on the east. Its frontier 011 that side is the limit of.
cultivation which fluctuates according to whether the Beduins
or the sedentary population is stronger. Generally speaking,
2ho we vex1, it is taken to be the Syrian .Desert, This area 
constitutes a single geographical unit, and Is usually re­
ferred to as geographical Syria, Its Inhabitants form In a 
sense a single people. After the First World War the term 
Syria came to denote the northern part of this geographical 
unit. This usage which excludes Palestine Is the regular 
French one for Syria. Under the Ottoman government Syria 
(Suriya) was the official name of the vilayet of Damascus,
1* A Handbook of Syria (Including Palestine), prepared by the 
geographical section of the NavaTIntelligence Division, 
Naval Staff, Admiralty, London (n,d.), p.9- (Henceforth 
Handbook of Syria).
2. A.H. Ecarani, Syria and Lebanon, a Political Essay, London,
m s ,  p. a , ~ ---- — — — — —
3. Ibid.
previously known as the Vilayot or Eyalet^ ' of Sham, which 
lay along the eastern border of the country from the extreme 
south to as far north c^s latitude^ 35 25' • Nowadays the
term Syria denotes the present Republic of Syria, which 
constitutes a small part of geographical Syria,
fhe Syrians referred to in this study were the 
inhabitants of an area, which was more or less the equivalent 
of that of geographical Syria* This area comprised the 
vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus (or1 Syria), Beirut and the 
nut as arrifliks of Jerusalem and Lebanon. Until the civil war 
in Hount Lebanon and Damascus in 1860, the vilayet of Damascus 
included the Lebanon, But after that dace and according to 
its Protocol , Lebanon was detached from the vilayet of 
Damascus and made into an autonomous mutasarriflik (or sanjak) 
ruled by a non-Lebanese Catholic Christian, appointed by the 
Porte and responsible directly to Istanbul. The mutasarrif 
had to be an Ottoman subject end his appointment had to be 
approved by the Powers that signed the Protocol of the 
Lebanon,^
d. The term TEyaletf has the same meaning as vilaj^ et and is 
older than 1/65 ?or it was the term in use afte:FT>ultan Se- 
lim’s conquest of Syria and Egypt. Vilayet is the term 
used in modern Turkish sources. See™SaTname (Suriyya) 
1305 A.H. / 1887* -
5* Handbook of Syria, p* 9*
6. Por the full text of the Protocol see, G* Young, Corps 
de Droit Ottoman, Oxford, 1905s Trol.l, pp. 139-154-•
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In 18879 in view of tlie growing importance of
Jerusalem, tlie Porte created a new nutasarrif1 in of Jerusalem
n
which was also made responsible directly to Istanbul. Pre­
viously the area of the mutasarriflik was a part of the viiayet 
of Damascus. In 1888, because of the increasing commercial 
and political importance of the town of Beirut, the Porte
Q
decided to establish the new vilayet of Beirut. Each of 
these vilayets were divided into several mut as arr i f 1 iks (or 
s any ales or liwas) , the mutasarriflik into kazas (Arabic 
Qag.a* ) and the latter into nahiyes and _m_azjaric. At the 
head of the vilayet was the vali, the mut as arri f1ik was
governed by a mutasarrif, the kaza by a qaim&uqiiEi and the
c 9nahiye and mazari by a mudir and muhtar^respectively.
Though no accurate official statistics of the po­
pulation of the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire are 
available, rough estimates put the figure for that population
7. Z. N. Seine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, Beirut, 
1966, p. 29. " U S E a m m a D a m a s c u s ,  
1927, vol. 3, p. 236.
8. Z. N* Zeine, The Emergence, p.29*
9. For a detailed account of the administrative divisions 
of the provinces of Syria in the period under study, see 
Salname (Suriyya), 1305 A.E. pp. 48-68, also Salname, 
TJTBT^p.Trarrr. Salname, (Lubnan), 1307, pp7“35"TT.
Also Salname, (I eirut)T"T518, pp. 146 ff. Salname,
(Halep - AleppoTT 1326, pp. 227 ff-
10at just under three millions. [Religiously the population 
was divided into a multitude of denominations: Muslims who
_ Q ^
were themselves divided into Sunnis and a variety of Shi I 
sects; Christians similarly divided among various churches, 
and a small minority of Jews. Furthermore, the Syrians 
could he divded between the dwellers in towns and the se­
dentary section of the population, and the Beduins. However, 
the Sunni Muslims were the majority among the Syrian popu­
lation and in a sense they dominated and infltxenced the 
political affairs of the country during the period under 
study. ‘The politically articulate among them had led the 
pre- World 'War Arab movement, a movement that was born 
from and nourished by the controversy between the leaders 
of the Syrian Arabs and the Young lurks which marked the 
years 1908 - 14. This is not to say the Christians were 
not active in that movement. On the contrary, they, together 
with other religious and social minorities, left their 
imprint on the Syrian Arab movement of that period, but 
their activities were those of a minority group. More­
over, the Christian nationalists were more active and
10. The reasons behind the lack of such statistics are 
probably to be found in the occupation of the local 
governments with other pressing local and political 
problems as well as in the difficulty of making the 
Christians and ;he Beduins of Syria register themselves 
for both groups evaded doing so in fear of the military 
service and the prescription of more taxes. The Muslims 
had probably also avoided registrations for the same 
reagons- For an estimate of the population, see aCL-Lajna 
al-'Ulyya li gizb al-Lamarkaziyya, al-Mu9 tammar al ArabI 
al-Awwal, Cairo, 1913* pp*86-87, where SEaykh A^ ma'd' fabba- 
ra gives the estimated population of all the Syrian
/3?n. cont....
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effective in the embryonic krab movement of the late 
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth 
century; that is to say in the period preceding the 
1908 -14 one.
It is clear, therefore, that any study of a 
subject such as the Turkish - Syrian, relations, vihether in 
the 1908 - 14 period or the one preceding it, would essen­
tially be mainly concerned with the activities and reactions 
of a minority group of ’enlightened' Syrians to the policies 
of another elite group of Turks, in this case the Young 
Turks, Uliile the tern "Young Turks" is used throughout 
this study to mean solely the loaders of the Committee of 
Union Progress (CUP), often referred to as the Unionists, 
and the various governments which came under their domina­
tion, the torn fenlightened' Syrians is used to mean a 
variety of groups and personalities. They were a small 
group of educated Muslims and Christians who had either 
received their education in the government schools or in 
foreign and missionary schools in Syria , and who by virtue 
of their education and general political awareness came to 
take marked interest in the politics of the Empire and in 
the destiny of their country - Syria. The Muslims, more than
Fn. 10 cont. from previous p,
vilayets and 1 rutasarrifliks. In p. 84 he gives the area 
of such provinces. See further, al -Huga1jam? no#5880, of 
31 July I9O8, for a different set oi numbers. Compare this 
with the figures given in C. Ernest Dawn's article, 'The 
Pise of Arabism in Syria,' in, The Middle East Journal, 
Vol. 16, 1962, 11.8, in p. 149. — — — —— —  -- —
the Christians, cano iron prominent families such as that of 
the 'Azms and a1-3ha m 1 a of Danascus and in sone cases from 
rich land owners and wealthy notables. They were educe,ted 
in a more traditional way than their Christian compatriots 
who received a more sophisticated education that was to 
leave its impression on their approach and understanding 
of the Syrian Arab movement.
By profession, both the Muslim and Christian 
leaders of that movement were predominantly editors and 
proprietors of newspapers,^ writers and professional men. 
Unlike the Young Turks,few of them were army officers. 
Students, who viewed themselves as p.rospectivo leaders of 
the Syrian movement, played an instrumental role in propaga­
ting the cause of those nationalists. Two factors, however, 
made the activities of this elite group of Muslims and 
Christians of critical importance in the history of Turkish- 
Syrian relations, and consequently in the history of Arab 
nationalism. The first and most important factor was the 
lack of a Syrian public opinion. The great masses of the 
population were too ignorant to take interest in political
11, Famous_among those papers were: al-Ahram, a1-Mugaftam, 
al-Hanar, al-Ikdam, (all of Cairo and Alexandria,
Li sail al-Eal, al-Iiuf id, al -11 i had al -1U thma.nl, al--Isalh, 
"(all of ^ Beirut 7 al-Muqtabas I ul-Sabas, Tof" Damascus); 
Failaatrn (Jaffa) ; al-karma!, XTlaifaJY Kalinat al- 
gag q, a 1-Haidar a, Majjallat Lisan al - ' AratT7"Tal 1 of 
Istanbul). A number of other dejiTias, periodicals 
appeared in Aleppo end other? Syrian towns.
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events in either Syria or Istanbul. Their ignorance 
and in ome cases their indifference to what was going on 
in Syria and the rest of the Empire meant that the elite 
was the only group among the population that could claim, 
with some justification, to speak on its behalf. It further 
mean't that this group was able, through their large number 
of novrspapers, to influence and lead, if not to create, a 
public opinion favourable to their cause: hence the important
role which the journalists played in the formation of a 
Syrian Arab movement. The second factor which made the 
activities of those Syrians important in the emergence of 
Arab nationalism was that all of them were fully aware of 
being Tyrians and of being Arabs. This national conscious­
ness was the result of a general movement for the revival 
of the national feeling of the Syrian Arabs which swept 
through Beirut and the Lebanon in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth 
century.
This movement took a cultural aspect before it 
matured into a political national movement. In both its 
cultural and political phases the Syrian Christians excelled 
their Muslim counterparts0 Because of their culture and 
general ideas which 'hey derived from the mission schools, 
the Christians were probably the first to experience a
14-
1 2national political enlightnent. Indeed it lias been claimed
that the emergence of the idea 1 of a Syrian nationality
which transcended religious end sectarian identities and
could, therefore, include the Arabic-speaking Hoslens of
Syria along with the Christians, n was entirely the
creation of a group of Christian Syrian nationalists, who
continued to propagate ^hcir cause throughout the second
15half of the nineteenth century. The emergence of such
a version of nationalism was closely connected with the 
Arabic cultural revival which was taking place at the time 
in Beirut. :-*ith few oreceptions the pioneers of that litera­
ry revival were Christians who showed a marked awareness 
of an 'Arab culture' which they claimed to revive.1^  They 
were proud of that culture and their writings expressed 
such pride.
One of the early exponents of this literary revival
was Bufrus al-Bustani, a Haronite convert to Presbyterianism
15who lived from 1819 to 1883,  ^ His literary and linguistic
12. 31. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, Loudon, 1965? 
pp. 127-14-8. I*No Zeine, The 3murgon.ee, pp. 46-52 
challenges the view that missionary"schools played a 
very important role in national political enlightnent 
of the Arab youth in the second half of 19th century.
13. I[. Salibi, p. 154-,
14-. A. Hourani, Ar a oic flip ught In the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 
Oxford University ’Press”, 19*52, p. 2773 (llereof ter Arabic 
Thought.)
15. Por more detailed information on al-Bustani, see
biblical yphy ited in S. Lavan, 'Pour Christian Arab 
Nationalists: A Compare,tive Study,1 The Muslin World,
No,2, April, 1967? Note 1, p. 114-.
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works vie re monumental, and when he died in 1883 he was
considered "the most learned, industrious and successful,
16as well as the nost influential nan of nodern Syria. 51 
In his dictionary Mui^ I^  al-Mufrlfr (Beirut 1870} , an outstand­
ing; work, al-Bustanl demonstrated how various nationalistic* 
terns wore used at his time. His main concern was to 
attempt and reawaken the drab nind and heart to a better 
way of life within the framework of the Ottoman Empire 
He never advocated the formation of an Arab state. On the 
contrary he uphold the cause of Ottonanisn, and by so doing
he indirectly upheld Islam as the offioial.religion of the
18Ottoman state. He further preached the avoidance of
religious fanaticism and the promotion of tolerance, The
founding of his school, al-Nadrasa al-Wafraniyya, was a step
in this direction. His kind of national consciousness
assumed a secular character, and in his periodical al-Jinan
he appealed for fraternity between the Huslims and the
Christians of Syria. Al-Jinan had it as its motto that
"Love of the fatherland (wayan) is part of the faith". To
iq
him the fatherland was Syria. y
16. Ii. Salibi, p. 145♦
17* S. Lavan, The j-aislim dp rid, April, 1967* p. 121,
18. Ibid., p. 117.
19o Ibid., pp. 117 - 120. Also, Hourani, Arabic Thought,
p. 274.
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The coning of the Syrian Christians to national
political consciousness was further shown by the formation
in 1875 of a secret society by c. few young Christians in 
20Beirut. This group which nay have had connections with
Ilidhut pasha, the vuli of Syria at the; time (who wan often
accused of planning to establish an autonomous regime in
21Syria on the no .el of the khediviate of Egypt, went as
far as to hang placards on the Weills of Beirut in 1880 - 81
denouncing the evils of the Turkish nisgove-rnncnt and calling
on the people to overthrow it. This society to which Anto-
nius attaches great importance, has been shown to be of
23little significance. This society aimed at the eviction 
of the Ottomans from Syria, an aim which its founders 
realised could not be achieved without the cooperation of 
the Muslins. The Christian was conscious all the time that 
he was one of the ra1iyya, as the Christian subjects of the 
Sultan were thm known, and that a Muslin Ottoman government 
could not bo his government. Thus the Christian nationalists 
became keen to develop a Syrian secular nationalism, based
20. Hourani, Arabic Thought, p.274. G. Antonius, The Arab
Awakening, **Tho Story of the Arab National Movement,
  —   --------
21o This accusation was made several times against Midhat
and is worthy of farther investigation. See for example, 
Lady Ann Blunt, A Pilgrimage to Hejd, London, 1881, 
vol.l, p.18.
22. Bor a detailed account of those placards see, S.IT. Seine,
The Emergence, pp.62-66. Antonius, pp. 7 9 ~ 85.
23. See Ini review of Baris Ninr, one of the founders of this
society, by Zc-ine in The Ernergence, pp. 59“*62. See _
further, S.G. Haim, 'The Arab Awakening: A Source for the 
Historian? 'Die nit des Islams, r.s., 11, 1953> no.4,
pp. 238-250. ~ ~  “ "
24. Z.N. Zeine, The 'Em rgenco , p.61.
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on the ..'-r&bic language and cultural tradition in which all
Syrians Muslins and non-Muslims, shared. Because of their
position as a minority in Syria the Christians had always
sheught the cooperation of their Muslim compatriots, al-
BustanI tried to achieve such cooperation, so did the
secret society of Beirut after him, and Shaykh Ibrahim al-
idzijl attempted to do exactly the sane thing in his famous
poen in which he called on the Arabs to remember their past
26greatness and awake. The Muslins remained indifferent to 
such calls.
In such an atmosphere it was not surprising that
tie Lebanese nationalists adopted a nationalism of their own
which was essentially separatist in character. To free
themselves from Muslin domination, whether that of the Turks
or of their fellow Muslim Syrians, the Lebanese nationalists
dreamt of an independent Lebanon with extended frontiers and
26under the protection of France* They believed that the
Re glen ent Organ iqus of Lebanon could be and should be the
25- Poem in Am3ad al-Trabulsi , Nufc-adrat can Shi 1 r al~Hanasa 
walcUrubba fi Bllud ol"Shan7",Cai^TT,^5? > ppTTTJ^lS^
This book cites similar poems in pp. Id- ff. doe also,
S .G. Haim, Arab Hationalisn, An Anthology, Univ0rsity of 
California Press, T9'527~P~*~5* Hourani, Arabic Thought, 
p.277. “ “ “
26. Pop a brief account of Lebanese nationalism in this 
period, see, h. Balibi, Ch. VII, pp. 120 ff. also, 
pp. 118 119. Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 275-276.
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stepping stone t on nr els its independence. This Lebanese 
nationalism lived side by side with the rising Syr inn drab 
novo-no lit and it had in a sense influenced the developnent 
of that movevent. bh.ile the Muslins were ce.utious not to 
get involved with the Lebanese separatist tendencies, the 
Lebanese, or at least some of them, more than once threw 
in their lot with the Muslin nationalists in the struggle 
against the Young Turks.
The drab Muslim nationalists in Syria stood to gain 
little by opposing their Sultan - Caliph, d strong reli­
gious bond bound both the nationalists and the Muslim masses 
to the Ottoman throne. Indeed it has been asserted with 
some force that Islam was the whole undeidying factor in the 
question of the Turkish-drab relations during the period of 
the Ottoman rule in the drab lands. Zoine wrote in his 
Emergence of drab Nationalism, uif the Turkish rule lasted 
for four hundred years in drab lands and if the drabs 
acqaiesced in that rule most of that tine, it is essentially 
because the Turks were Muslims. The Ottoman Sultans as 
Ghazis continued the ear)ansion of Islam .... The Turks 
carried the banner of Islam to the very gates of Vienna. ... 
The drabs as Muslins were proud 0f Turkish power and prestige*
The Ottoman Empire was their Empire as much as it was the 
27Turks' .u ( This view which represented the attitude of some
27* Z.Ib reixxO, The -^ norgenc0, pp. 14-1-14-2.
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sophisticated leading Muslin ayrio.no such as Hashid Hi^ La 
was untypical of other Muslin nationalists who advanced a 
more secular and racial theory of drMb nationalism such as 
dbd al-da\'naan al-Kawakibl .
Uni ill o dashid Ri^ la, a faithful disciple of Janal 
al-Dan al dfghani and Muhammad ’dbduh, who in the interests 
of Islam defended drab Inlan end by so doing showed a clear 
partiality to the drabs, ^  ul-Kawakibl (184-9-1902) declared
hinself "without ambiguity, as the champion of the drabs
29 - -against the Turks.” J al-Kawakibi, a native of dloppo who
left his native town for Cairo because he fell foul of the
Turkish authorities in 1898, left us two books which con­
tained his political and religious views. Those were Taba9 i' 
al-Istibdad wa Musari' al-lsti’bad, which recent research has
shown to be largely a borrowing fron dlfieri’s Dc-lla
SO -derannrde, ^ and Urn al-dura, which S.G. Eaim assertsm-i
28. For a brief account of Side's viowos on the subject see,
S.G. Haim, drab Nationalism, pp.20-25• dlso, al-Manor, 
Vol. 5 , partHB and*lT> oFTkiy -June, 1900, pp. 169-T72~and
pp. 290 ff.
29* S.G. Haim, drab ITationalisn, p. 27« For further details 
on his life" and activitiesT see, S.G. Haim, 'dlfieri and 
al-Kawakibi 1 in Orientoe Modemo, vol.34-, no.75 1954-, 
note 2 in p. 521.
50. S.G. Haim, Oriente Modemo, 54-, 1954-, pp. 521 ■-534-♦
"to have been adapted iron a book by v/.S. Blunt called Tlie 
ff tit up e >£ I s 1 an, published in 1881 Briefly al-Ilawakibi
believed that the regeneration of Islam could only be ef­
fected by the drabs fron amongst whom a caliph should be 
chosen. Such a caliph should reside in Mecca and should 
act as spiritual head of an Islamic union and should under
~7 Q
no circumstances hold temporal power.0 It was this dis­
tinction between spiritual and temporal power, a feature 
completely alien to Muslin notions, which gave al-Kavdkibl 
his uniqueness, and made him to be considered nas the first
33true intellectual precursor of modern secular Pun-drabisn".
Nevertheless, it was not al-Kawalcibi who demanded 
an drab Empire, but a Syrian Christian by the name of Negib 
dsoury (d. 1916). dzoury was once an Ottoman official in 
Jerusalera who left his post in 1904- in suspicious circumstan­
ces and went to Paris and later to Cairo, whore he lived until 
his death in 1916. He published a book in Paris in 1905}
Le Heveil de la Nation draba, in which he exposed his poli­
tical views. He also founded in 1904- the Ligue de la Partie 
.irabe, which probably had no other "embers beside himself,
and he further published a monthly periodical of vaxich only
✓ 34-few numbers appeared entitled, L1 Independence drabe.
31. S.G. Eaim, Blunt 'and al-Kawakibi' , Orient cModemp, 
Vol. 35} 1955} p p. 132-14-3. _ _ _ _  •
32. S.G. Haim, ...rab Nationalism, pp. 26-27* Hourani, drabic 
Thought, 272.
33. S.G. Haim, Ibid., p.27.
34-. Hourani, drabic Thought, pp* 277-279* Haim, Ibid., pp* 
29-30. — —  -
hzoury accepted al-Ekndkibl ’ s idea of an drab spiritual
35caliphue and enunere.ted his own theory of art .irah Empire. ^
This was tho first public demand f^r the sopor? hi on of tho
.drab lands from tho Ottoman b: pine. It is significant that
-zoury recanted his views when he returned to Jerusalem
after the 1308 -Involution to seek election for the Ottoman
Parliament. He claimed that he advocated such views in
order to frighten Sultan hbdulhamid into restoring hiahat1s
V c
constitution.^ This could well bo true of both al-Kawakibl 
and .noury, .aid as such could bo counted as one act of the 
Syrian hrab opposition to the despotism of hbdulhamid.
The struggle during the reign of hbdulhamid (1876- 
1909) was not so much one of hrabs against Turks as a strug­
gle of both hrab and Turkish Liberals to bring to an end the 
absolute rule of hbdulhamid, hs long as hbdulhamid ruled 
the differences between the Turkish liberals on one hand 
and those of the hrabs on the other as well as of the other 
nationalities were held in check both on account of their 
common interest in changing the regime end of the difficulty
35. For a short account of hsnury's ideas see, Iiouruui,
Ibid., and Haim, Ibid.
36. al-Kuqa^ t;an, no. 584-2 of 12 Gct^ 1908,
‘hdil al-3ulh, Su^ur min al-Risala, Beirut, 1966, gives 
details of a secret novenent^Tn’'Damascus aiming at the 
detachment of hqria from the Empire. The movement was 
dated 1877? and tho author so.aued to rely on verbal and 
heresay evidence in his book.
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67of organising and acting freely. (
ifiilo the Sultan sen.; xl to h...vc sue co ode cl in 
winning tho sympathies of his Iluslin subjects in Syria, 
hoth on account of his Pan-Islanic propaganda and his sur­
rounding hiuself with Syrian hrabs, such as 1Isznt Pasha
u.;l“’kbit, kbu'l-Hudu al-Jayyadf and tho brothers Sal'in and
asrajib Halhara, he had no control ov^r .oyriui exiles and 
Cnigres in Cairo and Paris who continued to propagate con­
stitutional ideas openly, Prominent among such Syrians were
non litre Khalil Chanin, the former deputy of Beirut to the
first Ottoman Chanbor of Deputies who since his flight to 
30
paras y had :aade hanself fa:ecus as one of the uncompromising 
Ottonan liberals* Together with hhuod Riza he edited tho 
Young Turh Kesveret and persistently worked for the resto­
ration of tho 1876 constitution. Equally inport ant was 
knln hrsidn, another Syrian exile to Paris, who besides 
editing an krabic newspaper entitled ICa shf al -Hi gab, colla­
borated with Ghanin and a. certain Hhatlb and luihoan provider 
of funds to torn the "Tu^ co - Syrian Committoe of Reform",
37* -i* Hourani, krabic Thought, p. 280.
38, The whole question of kbdulhanid policies towards the 
.-drabs is being now investigated by a research student 
at St, kntuy's college, Oxford. The work is nearing 
its end now.
39* Per the importert, though overlooked, role of Syrian hrab 
deputies in 1878 parliament see, R. Deveroun, The hirst 
Ottoman Constitutional Period, Baltimore, 19637" PP* TB£> 
ff",, also, pp. 2fp7k25oT“  "
40, Tor Glide in's a c t i vi t i e s , see, Hans nun, The Young Turks, 
Beirut, 19653 pp. 22-2d, 379 4-3, 52, 647*^53 Hourani, 
krab i c Tho ugh t, pp. 264-265*
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aii orgc.nisc.tion which, c-.in.ed at securin . cortain reforscs for
h "I
Syria. within the fr mower?,: of the dispiro . Sal In the
son of dlmad Paris i.l~3hidiyaq, the owiiur and editor of the 
famous al~Javra_\ib, was also one of the pi one or Syrians to
h p
ftfly a libertarian fl^g frwi fnropo”, ” Though ho was gygh-
tu^lly bribed by tlio nnlt.ni int 3 discontinuing his activities,
ho rmain^d an inport ant figure in the struggle fox* the re-
stor.- tion of the I iidhatr s constitution.*’*^
In Cairo, the Lobonese-ownod newspapers, ol-
Iluqatfran and al-dhran, as well as the Islamic periodical of
HashId Hi $5, al-Hanar, attacked the Sultan ceaselessly and
agitated for the restoration of the constitution. Kore-
ove::, Has hid Hi<Ja, Hafig al-h'.zn and IJaqql al-'dgsn, all
Iiuslin nationalist,s who wei\j to play an inport ant role in
the Syrian drab movement after the 1908 revolution, worked
together with other Turkish, drr.oninn and Circassian Liberals
for the reactivation of the constitution. They founded the
Ottomn Party of the Constitution - Jan' igpat eh-Shura- al-
'Uthiianiyyai. This society, which prior to 1908 refused to
ar.alganate with the Connittee of Union and Progress,
hi* Ransaur, pp. 63-64. id so, Serif drif Hardin, 1 Li­
lian tend m  iiovenonts in the Ottoman ‘aspire 1378-1895?
The middle Last Journal, vol. 16, 110.2, soring 1962,
—
42* Serif d.rif Hair din, The ^ Hi d dl e La s t Jo um  al, 1962, p.
174. For Fanis ax- S h i c f f y a q V ^ s e .
43. §erif haif Hardin, Ibid., p. 175*
/I/I
withered away after? duly 1908. ' r
In Damnscu;g which fid not iwperi nice such a
literary and national revival as Beirut had done, a secret
society composed of civilians and military officers working
for tim termination of the Hanidian despotic rule, was
reported to bo in existence in tlio early years of the
twoiitietn century.  ^ The society h .d Turks end drabs among
its nonbors, and secret connections with tlio Go mitt go of
Union and Progress. According to Paris al-IHiuri, one of
its drab nonbGrs, they - the drabs -- had a plan of their
own to secure for their fellow drabs their rights but within
46the frame wo rk of the Empire.
This society also had close connections with what 
was known In the drabic sources as the ’circle of Shaykh 
Jahir ul-Jaza*irl’. ohaykh Tahir, an dlgorian 8nigre who 
settled in toascus, was a man of learning who did much to 
facilitate private education in Davaasc.us and in making many 
of the young Damscones who gathered around him aware of the
44. For details of this society seo,_H. Rashid Rida, preface 
to ’Utlimon ml-’dsn, Ilajnu’at vthan Rafiq al-rlzn, Cairo, 
1926, p.v♦ dlso, IIaim, ma5" IhrfchoTo’v r, p.924. Burn, al- 
’drab wal Turk, Cairo, I960, pp. 51-52.
45. mar Mustafa al-3hihabi, al-lawniyya al-hdrabiyya, Cairo, 
1961, pp. pl-52,is tlio only source to mention rhis 
society - ho gives no ch.,to for its formation. His 
account is of in' crest for he was a contemporary of
tlio events in^the period 1908-14. (Henceforth referred 
to as ul-Shihabi.)
46. al-Shihabi, _  ~ Ibid,
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great literary P--5t of the drabs.^ Pearly all the hue 1 in 
Damascene nationalists, who wore closely associated vritli 
the .Syrian drab no valient of 1908-14 wore ren who frecjuented 
the study circle of Shaykh Jahir. Haflq al-’d^n, riu^ iamiad 
third 1 l.li, ITuhib al-Din al-irtiajib, Bhukri al~1 do all, Mbd al-
r[anlx. al-ZahrawI and others wore all at one tine regular
„  48attendants of the Sliaykh Jahir1 s circle. ..'mother sociery
which energed fror: this circle and which devoted its energies
to the study of drabic language „aid literature was JanT iyat
49al -IT ninja al - 1 dr ab iyyn - the drab Renascence Society* y The 
society which was founded by Ilu\iib al-Din al-Kha^Ib and 
others clainea to h .ve nade tangible contributions to the 
literary and national revival of the Syrian drabs in the 
period before 1908.
It was against this background of a gradually 
enorging Sjorian nationalism typified by the efforts of uen 
such as al-Bustani, Pdd.d^  al-Kawakibi and dzoury that the
47« The activities of Skayldi Jahir are wo11 described in,
he a
pp. r-~> 
author in Cai.ro.
48. liuhib al-Din al-EliuJib, Slrat Jll, pp. 7-8*
49* Bor a detailed account of this society, which was often 
neglected by the majority of the drabic sources, sec, 
Huhibt al-Din al-QiaJib, (ed.), al~Duktur gal ah al-Din 
al-gas ini, 1305-1334, dtharuhu, ,S"df ahuB nixi 'T^ arlSi'lxl- 
SaB.dc, > fj ‘al-tarn al-' I shrin'^ Cdiro,
I93e? 'pp."'3-16V dlsd3 MuhXb d l - D i n I T T ,  birat Jll, 
pp. 9“18. Mustafa al-Shihabl, pp. 52-56.
Tb
Syrian drab opposition to tlio Young Turds developed in the 
period ±908 - 14. The ostdolishi'iont of tha constitution 
and the ensuing freedoms of speech said association was the 
one factor that lay behind th- force and the vigour with 
which the 3yrian-Turdish controversy was to bo caroressed*
CHAPTER I
THE 1908 INVOLUTION AHD THE 
REACTION OR 1909«
On the 23/24tli July 1908, tlie Ottoman Empire 
entered upon the most crucial decade in its history; a 
decade that was to end m  the destruction of that Empire.
On that date Sultan Abdulhanid unexpectedly capitulated to
I
the demands of the military rebels in Macedonia, and re­
stored the Constitution of 1876 generally known as Midhat's
2Constitution. The Imperial decree also called for elections 
for the Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan) to be commenced 
A general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles was
1. For a brief account of the military revolution and biblio­
graphy, see B« Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, London, 
1968, pp. 296-209. F*0V 371/544' has numerous reports on 
the revolution and the first days of the Constitution in 
the Empire. Bee also, Sir Edwin Pears, Life of Abdul 
Hamid, London 1917? pp. 286-291*
2. Text of Hatt-i Humayun In Dustur, Tertib sani, Vol.l, 
Istanbul, 1329 A.H. (1913/14")/'pp• 11-14, also pp* 1-3.
See also, F. Regit Unat, Ikinci Mesrutiyetin Ilani ve 
Otuzbir Mart Hadisesi, Ankara/ pp. T 5-Iff/' Trans -
iation enclosed in Barclay to Grey, Ho. 179? ‘kelg*, conf*, 
Const. 24 July 1908, F.O. 371/544/25753*
3. Dustur, Vol. 1, pp. 1-3 and 14-16. Ikdan, Ho. 5087, 
oiT^4july, 1908, reproducer text of IracTe. al-Muqaitam, 
Ho. 5876, of 27. 7. 1908. ~
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granted Toy the Sultan , and the spy system, which gave the
5Bamidian regine its notoriety, was abolished. Thus started 
the second constitutional regine of the Ottoman Empire, and 
with it a new chapter in the history of the Turkish - Syrian 
relations opened. Until July 1908 the interests and the po­
litical activities of rhoso Syrian Arabs, who by virtue of 
their education and background, came to participate xn the 
political affairs of the Empire were channelled in the gene­
ral struggle of the Ottoman liberals to end the despotism
8of Abdulhanid, Those who called for the end of the Turkish 
rule in Syria and dreamt of an Arab nation and an independent 
Arab State were mainly Syrian Christians, but such calls and 
dr e ams we re spo radi c,individuali sti c and utopian one s and 
failed to appeal to the leading Muslins of Syria, As long 
as the Muslins remained aloof and uncooperative, any
4# DUsttlr, Vol. 1, pp*5~6 fox' text, Ikdam, Ho* 5088, of
5* Pustur, Vol. 1, pp.9-10 for text. Arabic translation in 
TjjLsan.. al-galL no*577d- of 28.7.1908. al-Abram, no,9232, 
of 30c7.1908. P.O. 371/544/26307 no.199TBarclay to 
Grey, 29.7.1908.
6. A. Hoursni, Arabic Thought, p.262-264*, for a discussion 
of the role oFTEe ChrxslTiari Syrians - Hourani believes 
that they played a greater part than the Muslims* Eor 
Muslim activities, see: Mu^amnad^Bashld Ri$a, preface 
t o * Uthman al - 1A zm, Ma (jnu1 at At liar Hafiq al -1A gm, _ C air o , 
1926, pp,3-5* (Henceforth ref. to as Maonu * a t Athar. )
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nationalist call in Syria was doomed to failure, Tlie Syrian 
Christian nationalists must have realised this fact, for 
they concerned themselves, during the latter part of the
V\ i Y14. f“j£-C « Hv.
twesttfeth century, with trying to secure the cooperation of 
those Muslins.1'7 However, the majority of the Syrian Arabs 
had little cause to complain about the rule of Abdulhamid, 
which apart from its reruessive measures, had probably 
benefited Syria on account of the railways which it built
O
there. Consequently all the tentative attempts at creating 
a Syrian national Arab movement were isolated, and limited 
to a snail number of Syrian Christian, intellectuals, who 
probably cared more for their co-religionists than for the 
interests of Syria as a whole. The stxccess of the Young 
Turk Revolution in July 1908, however, brought drastic 
changes to these aspects of the Turkish-Syrian relations.
The Muslims became more and more interested in 
political events and problems generated by the Young Turk 
Revolution, The revolution which was mainly"the patriotic 
movement of Muslim. Turks, mostly soldiers",^ and which
7. Ror a brief account see: C. Antonius, pp. 79 ff* For a 
different view see: Z.iT. Zeine, The Emergence, pp.58-72. 
Also, S* Haim's introduction, AraB Nationalism, an
Los Angeles, 1962, ppTp^riD-SoTTTSalibi,
” ? PP * i51 f f«
8. A. Houroni, Arabic Thought, p. 262, Handbook of P.O., 
Syria, pp. 45^^
9* B , Lewis, Emergence, p . 212.
i i i i i h t m u  i .V n i i i . iM !  -■ -■ ■ - - * '
30
concerned itself with the ihna&anontnl issue of saving the 
Ottoman state was hound to create a feeling of sympathy and 
enthusiasm, among the naiority of the Muslims of the empire*
In Syria, the press which formed and led rather than re­
flected the public opinion, was on important factor behind 
the appearance of a new tendency among the Muslims to take 
more interest in what was going on in Istanbul* The few 
Syrian Muslim journalists, writers and professional men, both 
inside and outside Syria, who, rightly or wrongly, considered 
themselves as the spokesmen of the whole Syrian Muslim com­
munity, were to assume a dominant role in the development 
of the embryonic Arab movement, a movement that had Its 
origins in the events produced by the Young Turk Revolution* 
The Syrian Christians, who, no less than the 
Muslins were jubilant over the advent of the Young Turk 
regime, found themselves relegated to the background of the 
Arab movement which had acquired a strong Muslim colouring 
and as a result became non-separatist. Apart from the 
Lebanese Christians, v/ho continued to work for the achieve­
ment of an independent Lebanon,*^ the Syrian Christians 
were content to accept their role* as a minority group in 
the Arab movement* However, the fact that the Young Tank 
revolution had produced these far reaching repercussions, 
did not mean it had no immediate political, social and 
economic eff rats r.n Syria.
10. K 0 Salibi, pp. 151 ff. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought, 
pp. 286-287. ..
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The proclamation of the constitution caue as a
surprise to all, including the leaders of the Young Turks who
11did not expect the sudden acquiescence of Sultan Abdulhauid, 
The attitude of both the local authorities and the inhabi­
tants of Syria reflected this surprise. The local authori­
ties, probably out of lack of confidence in the ultimate 
success of the Young Turk Revolution and hoping that the 
old regime night be restored, showed reluctance to declare 
the news of the establishment of the constitution* The fact 
that all the officials of the aciaini strati on in Syria, from 
the vali downwards, were creatures cf the Hanidian regime, 
and held that regime in considerable awe, may account for 
this fact. Consequently the constitution was declared in 
tlio Syrian vilayets days later, and in some cases weeks 
later than its promulgation in Istanbul and European Turkey. 
The mutasarrif of the Sen jak of Jerusalem, for instance, was 
forced by the growing discontent among the military officers 
to declare the establishment of the constitution on the 10th
IP
of Augusc, The valis of Beirut and Damascus were reminded
11* Alfred de Belinski, "The Turkish Revolution", in the 
19tli Century and After, LIZIV, 1908, p. 353* Also H. 
CTahid Yalgin, Tala't~T?asanin Hatiralari, pp. 10 ff.
12. Consul Biech to Sir G. Lowther, Bo. 4-1, Jerusalem, 10 
July 1908, P.O. 195/2237.
by Istanbul to announce tlio grant of the constitution,
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and when they finally did so they merely published the tele-
14-graia of the news in the local press. In other Arab vilayets
such as the Yemen and the gijaz, the valis had practically
been forced into declaring the constitution by military
officers and civilians who were in sympathy with the
15triumphant Young Turk lb solution.
In all parts of Syria the general public was
astonished end incredulous at the nows of the proclamation
16of the constitution. This won particularly true of the
big towns. Beirutis wore reported to be "whispering the
news ox the constitution to each other as if they were still
ITfearing the spies" f of the Hanidian regime. The Damascenes
18simply thought the news as a more ’trick1 by the sultan.
In Jerusalem, the public was convinced of the reality of 
the change to constitutional rule only after the detained 
ex-Patriarch of the Gregorian Armenians, he Id A in
lb * eA-Ahran, ITo, 9234-, of 1st August, 1908.
14-. I bide Also, Bo. 9232, of 30 July, 1908.
15* Bee Lowtlior to Grey, Ho. 5171 confidential, Const, 7 Sept., 
1908, P.P.371/54-6, for Hijazn Muhib al-Din al-Khajlb told 
me in a personal interview of his efforts and other Otto­
man liberals in the Yemen in declaring the constitution. 
This is confirmed in his unpublished memoirs entitled,
"Birat Jll", p.
16. Annual Report for Turkey 1903, encl. in Lowther to Grey,
Ho. 105,' conf., Pera, 17 Peb. 1909, P.0.371/768/7053* Also 
Pisan al-gal, Ho„6780, of-4- Aug., 1908. al-Muqattam, Ho. 
58967“oT"22“Aug., 1908. al-Atoan, No.9232 of 30 July, 1908.
17. al-lhr7'^ , No 923-4- of 1st Aug., 1908.
18. Lisin, No, £780 of 4- Aug., 1908.
19Jerusalem was given permission to leave. It goes without 
saying ’hat certain sections of the society, such as tho 
nomads end the peasants living in remote parts of Syria, 
in most cases, remained unaware of the change.
It was the Syrian Snigr&s in Egypt, however, 
who were the first to celebrate tlio promulgation of tho con­
stitution. They sent a telegram of congratulations to the 
Grand Yesirate and to Prince Sabahuddin who was still in
0 AParis. There was some argument as to whether to send an- 
>
21other telegram to the Sultan or not. This attitude is 
significant because it was contradictory to the grateful 
attitude to the Sultan prevailing in the rest of the Empire.
In their speeches delivered, tho loaders of the Syrian com­
munity in Egypt expressed their faith in end support for the
22constitutional regime and for the ideals it stood for.
In particular they honied the old ideal of Ottonnnisn which
the Young Turks had now adopted. According to this doctrine,
the subjects of the sultan were to bo the members of one
Ipr Consul Biooh to Lowther* No®39* conf., Jerusalem; 6 Aug. 
1908, !E\,0,195/2287* Also, Lowther to Grey, Ho. 517? conf., 
Grist* 7 S.pt, 1908, P.O.371/506.
20. Details in al~Ahran, Hos. 9231? of 29 July 1908, and 9235 
ox 3 -Aug. l^ jQSTTl Aiiuqatfn, Ho s. 5876, and 5873, of 27 and 
29 July, 1908. al-Hanar, VoI, II, part 6, 28 July 1908, 
pp.4*65“6 o
21. al-Manar, Vol. II, part 6, 28 July 1908, p.4*65? Pi£a do. - 
scribocr~the celebrations of Cairo and stated that ho sug­
gested sending e, message of thanks to the sultan for capi­
tulating to the army and granting tho constitution without 
bloodshed . m d  that most of the Syrians present e.groed with 
him, but that most of the Turks and the Armenians present 
disagreed, arguing that the sultan was forced into declaring 
the constitution.See also, al-Ahram-Ho.9229?of 27 July 1908.
22. See for example al-Muqa^an, Ho.5878, of 29 July 1908//con^^
Ottoman nation enjoying equality without distinction, of creed
or race, endowed with the sane rights and charged with the
sane duties. Because of its secular undertones, the Christians
found this doctrine appealing. Both al-Ahran and al-Iluq attain,
the two loading newspapers which were owned and edited by
Lebanese Christians, wrote lengthy editorials in praise of
23the doctrine* x
The news of the celebrations of the Syrians in 
Egypt and of others in Istanbul and elsewhere, played a con­
siderable role in making the .Syrians at hone realise tho 
depth of the change that had taken place. Consequently the 
feeling of incredulity gave way to a feeling of delirious
joy* All the big towns of Syria celebrated the establish-
oll
ment of the constitution. Speeches were delivered overy-
25
where welcoming the now era of "liberty, justice end equality," 
praising the Turkish arny and thanking the sultan for granting
E/note 22 cont._..
and al-j.hram, 9235? of 3 Aug. 1908, al-Manar, Vol.II, 
part’*6, 28 July 1906, pp. 4-65-4-68
23. Soe al-Abram, Nos. 9228, and 9229? of 25 and 27 July 1908. 
al-Jfaqattan, No. 5875? of 25 July 1908.
24-. P.O. 371/54-6 contains considerable number of despatches de­
scribing these celebrationsThe sane applies to the press. 
As an oxamgle see Lisan al-gal, No.5777 of 31 July, 1908, 
an<^  al-Ahran, No * 9238 of 6 Atug. 1908.
See also, H.H. Jessup, Eifty years in Syria, Vol.II,
New York, 1910, 785-78?. “
25. Anlr M ug'fafa al-Shihabl, al - Qawniyya a 1 - Arab iyy a, Cairo, 
1961, p.62. See also as an example, Lrsan,~ASfoT5778, of 
3 Aug. :908o
tho constitution, Much to the annoyance of sone Syrian 
Christians in Egypt, the grant of the constitution was con­
sidered by tho majority of Muslins and Christians in Syria
26as a charitable act of the sultan towards his subjects,
27is a result the- popularity of tho sultan shot up, and 
Rashid Rida, the founder and editor of the Islamic periodi­
cal al-Manar , thought it appropriate to warn the Young lurks
28not to insult the sultan, "the head of the Unria 
Ihis is riot to say that the Young lurks were showing dis­
respect or hostility towards the sultan, but to suggest the 
important place which the sultan held and dontinUed , to 
hold in the Ottoman Umpire, a fact which the Young lurks 
never overlooked. Io the Muslim drabs, and indeed to the 
Muslins as a whole, both inside and outside the Empire, the 
suit on represented tho head of the last great Islamic empire 
to uphold the cause of Islam, Sultan Ahdulhamid had ex­
ploited this feeling end benefited by it. With the advent 
of the constitutional era, the period in which Islam played 
a major role in keeping the Muslin Syrians, and for that
26, Lis on Ibid, Also, No. 6730 of d Aug. 1908. Nazim Pasha, 
tho new va'li of Beirut told the Beirutis in a speech 
that the Sultan granted the constitution as a gift, see 
Abram, No.9268, of 10 Sept. 1908. Also, Levey to Lowther, 
corUT, no:39? Sept* 1908, F,0.195/2277* Cuaberbatch to 
Lowether, conf., no.51? Beirut, 1st Aug.1908, F,0.195/2277 
For an article by a Syrian Christian, Lr. Shiblr Shunayyj1 
303 nl-Muqqattam, No.5882, of 3*Aug* 1908.
27* Z.N. Zcine, The Emergence, p.80,
28* al-Manar, Vol. II, No.6, of 28 July 1908, p.d20.
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natter the Mug lira .drabs, loyal to the Ottoman throne, cone 
pq
to a close,  ^ This, in ny opinion, was not due to any 
neglect or disregard on tho part of the Young Tunics of that 
Islanic hoxid, which began to wo ale on through the spread of 
national ideas among the various ethnic groups throughout 
the latter part of dbdulhanid ’ s reign, Tho indifference to 
Islam and to religion as such, of which the Young Turks were 
accused, and of which they nay liavo shown nonifestations 
at a later stage, was certainly an important factor in 
stirring dornant national feelings anong the educated 
leading Syrian Muslins. It is indeed doubtful if such 
feelings would have remained dormant for nuch longer. How­
ever, the Husline, no less than the Christians, showed re­
markable optimism about the future of the empire, now the 
ago of freedom and brotherhood had cone*
The acts of fraternisation that took place 
between Muslin and no 11-Muslins in all major towns of Syria 
following the declaration of the constitution, had sustained
hopes in the advent of the Young Turk regime. Those events,
30much talked about in tho local press and consular reports,
29< dnln Sa'Id, al-lhawra al-hlrabiyya al-Kubra, Cairo, 1934*, 
vol. I, p.2."^Henceforth referred to a0"al-Tliawra 
al 'drabiyya.)
30. See for instance, al-Muqqattan, Ho.5886 of 11 -lug, 1908, 
p.4, narrating the” incident where a priest and a Muslin 
shaykh shook hands while a Turkish soldier stood behind 
then with a drawn sword (to signify the revolution) and 
made then take tho oath of fidelity to the constitution 
and to rive brothers for ever. See also Lowther to Grey, 
conf,, Ho.4-88, Const. 24- dug. 1903. Bee further, Lioan,Hos, 
5778, of 3 dug. 1908, and 5777, of 31 Jnly 1908.
/cont...
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were soon at tho tine as proof of tho workability of the 
ideal of Ottonanisn. If in a town like Beirut, notorious 
for religious onnity between its Muslin and non-Mcislin po­
pulation, religious hostility could cease and the principle 
of equality could be accepted, then the high hopes pinned on 
a prosperous Ottoman future so.nod warranted. But not all 
Syrian towns had rhe sane degree of readiness nor tho willing­
ness of Beirut to abandon tho traditional higher status of 
their Muslin population in favour of the now constitutional 
precept of equality. And much to the disnay of the Syrian 
Christian press and indeed to the Christians as a whole in 
Syria, incidents between the Iluslins and the Christians were 
reported fron IJons, here, Nablus and Aleppo in as early as 
August 1908.^ In all these places the Muslins had rejected 
the principle of equality between themselves and the Christi­
ans, and by so doing demonstrated the unworkability of tho 
doctrine of Ottomanisn. Tho biggest incident took place in 
^ons, where the Muslin youths, on the instigation of sone
shaykhs, had not only prevented tho Christian youths fron
F/nb'o'e’^IJ^  coht.. .. —  —  — -
al-Ahran, No.9238 of 6 hug. 1908. Cunborbatch to Lowther,
c o n f .7 H o .5 1 )  Beirut, 1 hug. 1908, F.0 .1 9 5 /2 2 7 7 .
31. It is to bo noted that incidents of this nature were not 
reported fron Syria as happening against Jews. Attacks on 
sone Jewish set ;lonents occured, but these were reflective 
of the state of administrative anarchy which accompanied 
the early days of the constitution in Syria. For such in­
cidents see al-Muqqatfran, No.5973* of 19 Nov. 1908. Also, 
N. Mandel, "Turlcs, hrabs and Jewish Immigration into Pa« 
leskLiic .882-191dn, in St, Antony1 s papers, No#17» Middle 
Eastern Affairs (No .4) edited by A. Hourejii, Oxford^ 1955» 
pp792“53. ’"Note- incidents between Muslins & Jews were re­
ported fron Iraq. See Muqattan, No.5933 of 1/10/1908, also
F . 0 .1 9 5 /2 2 7 5 .
joining then in celebrating tho constitution, hut had attacked
then wounding eight of then. The shaykhs incited the Muslins
5?to, "kill tho infidels"* Though the Christians were con­
ciliated, al-Muqqafrtam conplainod that tho local authorities 
of Jons showed sone reluctance to punish the instigators.^
A large part of the Muslin population of here was reported 
to he angered because the eighty year old naqib al-Asliraf of 
that town, who insulted the constitution, was tried by a 
court whose prosecutor was a Christian. The local autho­
rities were again said to be weak and helpless and were not 
able to convict the naqxb in whose support about a thousand
Muslins gathered and started shouting "long live the nation
x z l
of Muhannad and the sultan". In Aleppo the Christian 
quarter of *Ashur was attacked by a crowd of Muslins causing 
slight damage to sone Christians1 property, but the authori- 
ties were able to deal with them.  ^ Even in Beirut itself 
and only one month after the occurrence of tho spectacular 
scenes of fraternisation between Muslins and Christians, 
an anti-Christian demonstration by a crowd of 500 Muslins 
was reported. It took place after a Muslin youth and a 
Christian woman had quarrelled and abused each othr*s reli-
32. al-Muqqattam, Mo.5898 of 21 Aug. 1908. Ahran, Mo.9249 of 
19 Aug^ 1905.
53* al-Muqattam, ibid»
34. A.0.Abo-a to Cuberbatch, conf. No.61, Haifa, 17 Aug.1908, 
F.0.371/546.
35* Ferdinand Taoutel, Watha’iq Tarikhiyya *an galap, Vo1.4, 
Beirut, 1964, p. 96. (Hence f o r W  "rief erro 5 to as watha* iq.)
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gion Only tlio goodwill of tho Muslins in Syria could
37enable their follow Christians to livo in peace with then,
*1110 30 incidents x^ ere, norcovcr, indicative of tho rosentncnt 
which the introduction of such alien and rather heretical con­
cepts as that of equality 'between Muslins and non-Muslims could 
cause in a place like Syria where traditional concepts and 
loyalites prevailed* L regime that propagated such concepts 
was bound to be unpopular among tho Muslins of Syria, a fact 
that the Christian as well tho Muslin press played down. It 
must have been painful and unflattering for the press to 
admit thet Syria was unprepared for constitutional rule.
This unreadiness for constitutional rule, which 
was to tho disadvantage of tho Young Turk regime, in Syria, 
could further bo soon in tho wrong interpretation given by 
the peasants, nonads and illiterate townsfolk to the very 
word constitution and what it stood for. They thought that
freedom (gurriyya) meant the general abolition of taxes,
38T,fj ee licence",  ^ and in some cases tho end of all law and 
order.
In the village of Beitna, some 20 miles south of 
Damascus, the peasants thought that the establishment of the
36. Lowther to Grey- conf. Wo.705? Therapia, 24 Oct. 1908,
P.O. 371/560.
37. Shaykh Rashid gi£La who toured the vilayets of Beirut and 
Damascus credited the fraternisation In Beirut to the good 
will of the Muslins, see al-Mauay* Vol.II, part 9* of
25 Oct. 1908, p. 706. ~
38. Sir P. Pears, Porty years in Constantinople, London, 1916, 
pp. 248-49, for incidents of this nature in other parts of 
the empire. (Hereafter, Porty Years .)
40
constitution noant that they now owned their land, and night
withhold the fifth of tho produce which they used to pay to
the proprietor, A riot developed in tho course of which a
peasant was killed, and further trouble in that village, and
others nearby,was only averted on the arrival of a detachment
of 50 soldiers. ' The peasants in Jerusalen regoxced because
they thought liberty implied the general abolition of all 
40taxes. Those in the north of Palestine becane riotous and
attached estates of large landowners as well as some Jewish 
41settlenents* The constitution was poorly understood by the
— 4? i 43Druses of gauran and the nonnds of Kerak and Saxf who
refused to register their nanes for tho elections for fear
that the lists would be used for calling then up for military
service, a duty fron which they had been exenpt under the
Hanidian rogine. The Hauran, however, ronainod a disturbed
39. Consul Devey to Lowther, conf. No.53? Damascus, 8 Oct. 
1908, P.O. L 195/2277* 41so Lowther to Grey, No. 705? 
conf., Therapia, 24. Oct. 1908.
40. Consul Blech to Lowther, No.45? Conf., Jerusalem, 8 Sept. 
1908, P.O. 195/2287
41. N. Handel, Turks, hrabs, in St. intony1s papers, No.4, 
1965? P*93 for further details.
42. al-Nxiqqattan, No.5953 of 24 Oct, 1908- the Druses peti­
tioned the vilayet of Syria to leave then as they wore 
before the constitution.
^3. al-Huqattan, No.5924 of 21 Sept. 1908- also for an 
ahnx Stance by 'he shay kb. of the Beni gakhr irabs 
that he did not know what tho constitution meant, 
when asked to take the oath of fidelity to it.
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region whore the Mujil bedouins, oblivious or unaware of
the advent of the constitutional ora, continued to raid the
Druses, who in their turn harassed their Muslin and
Chr i s t i an ne i glib our s. ^
The situation was getting so serious that the
Ministry of the Interior found it necessary to instruct the
vali of Syria to appoint a connission of three nenbors of
the provincial adninistrative council whose job would be
to tour the gauran region and the eastern frontiers of the
vilayet, in order to explain to the Druses, Bedouins and the
peas suits there the neaning and the advantages of the const i«
46tution so as they night keep quiet. Coupled with these
official efforts were the attempts of the local press and
public speakers to explain to the townsfolk the essence of
change to constitutional rule and the true neaning of "libcr- 
47ty11. f But the people were too intoxicated with what they 
thought was the constitution to take any notice, Evon prisoners 
in Tripoli (Syria) demanded that they should be set free
44. Devoy to Lowther, No.44, conf., Damascus, 15 Sept. 1908,
IP. 0. 195/2277.
45. Ibid, No.41, conf., Damascus, 7 1908, F.0.195/2277*
46. Devey to Birt, No.45, conf., Damascus, 1? Sept. 1908,
F,0. 195/2277*
47. Li sail, No.5778 cf 1 Aug. 1908 for an editorial entitled, 
'H'/hat Is liberty?”. Also Abram, No. 9229 of 27 duly 1908- 
editorial. al-Manar, Vol.il, part 7> 27 July 1908, pp. 
54554-8, for tlie text of a speech delivered in Beirut about 
"How to use liberty". See also vol.12, part 2 of 22 Feb. 
1909> P '.115-117* al-Muqafrtam, No.5998 of IS Dec. 1908.
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48■because of tho constitution. They argued that prisoners
49 —in Salonica and Istanbul were sot free. J In Nablus prisoners
50took the natter in their hands and set thenselves free.
In the seme way the railwaynen in Beirut, Danascus
51and Aleppo pressed for better pay and working conditions*
The employees of the gas company in Beirut, and the porters
of the harbour of Beirut wont on strike when thoir demands
were not not.^ The butchers of Beirut and Danas cus agitated
54for the reduction of the high slaughter-tax. These incidents
though unprecedented in Syrian history, did not assume
disturbing proportions, though the local authorities complained
of their recurrence and threatened legal action against any
55more strikes.^ Their importance, however, lies in the fact
48. al-Muqattan, No.5930 of 28 Sept. 1908. al-Ahran, 9290 
of 6 Ocr! 1908.
Z}*9* al-Huqattan, No.5930 of 28 Sept. 1908. See Sir E. Pears, 
Forty Years, p.243.
50. al-Muqattan, No.5933 of 1 Oct. 1908.
51* For fuller details of demands see al-Huq.a^tan, No.5933 
of 1st Oct. 1908. F. Taoutal, Watha*iq,'vo1. 4, p.96.
52. al-Hucjatfran, No.5939, 8 Oct. 1908.
53* Ibid., No.5909, 3 Sept. 1908.
54. For Beirut butchers see al-Ahram, No. 9267 of 9 Sept. 1908. 
For those of Danascus see Devey to Lowther, No. 18, conf., 
Damascus, 3 April 1909, F.O. 371/707* Sir E. Pears,
Forty years, p.249, writes of similar strikes in Istanbul. 
So hoosAjowther to Grey, No. 105, conf., Pera, 17 Feb.
1909, F.O. 371/768.
55- Lisan, No.5834 of 6 Oct. 1908, p.2. Also al-Muqattan, 
1575345 Of 15 Oct. 1908.---------------- ----
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that they were indicative of the extravagant expectations 
to which the advent of the constitutional era had given rise, 
and the non-fulfilment of which caused disillusion anong 
many Syrians. This disillusionment ultimately developed 
into a crisis of confidence in the Young Turk regime.
The confusion and the dislocation of the local 
administration as a result of the sudden establishment of 
the constitution was yet another reason that deprived the 
new regime of the respect and awe, paid to its predecessor.
In an effort to reform the administration a great many of­
ficials who were associated with the corruption of the old 
regime were dismissed in Istanbul and the provinces. In
some cases the people decided to take the matter in their
56own hands and punish members of the old regime. Syria
had its share of both occurrences. High officials, including
presidents of the various municipalities, the heads of police
and gendarmerie and directors of post offices, were either
dismissed or forced to resign. Numerous reports of sxich
incidents appeared in the press and other sources.^ Valis
were constantly shifted from one place to the other, and
56. Sec for example Consul Doughty-v/ylee to Barclay, IConia,
27 July, 1908, P.O. 195/2280.
57* See Devey to Leather, No. 51, conf., Damascus, 1 Oct. 1908, 
F.O. 195/2277* File No. F.O. 371/780 contains a lot of 
despatches on the subject. Lisan, No.5780 of 4 Aug. 1908. 
Ahran, No.9247 of 17 Aug. 19(98". al-Muqafrtan, No.5§90 
of 12 Aug. 1908, and ff. Nos.
44
58suffice it to say that Beirut had two valis in two weeks*
Its first vali who arrived on 27 July 1908, and who was un-
cerenonially dismissed on 11th August 1908, was put to flight
59"by the hostile and disrespectful attitude of the Beirutis«  ^
Petitions, and in sone cases, direct action against nuta- 
garrifs, qifc-nnaqams aaid other officials in Syria was not an 
unconnon feature* These events which added to the prevail­
ing adninistrative confusion, were mostly caused A "by lack 
of proper understanding of the neaning of the constitution, 
and partly inspired by the example of the local Committees 
of Union and Progress who by their constant interference in 
the business of local administration had greatly helped 
to demoralise and bring down the prestige of that administra­
tion, and of the whole constitutional regi?me.
The central Committee of Union and Progress, whose 
headquarters were in Salonica, had no branches in .Syria in 
the period preceding the July revolution. Following that 
revolution, however, committees adopting the politically
58. al-Arhan* Ho.9256 of 27 Aug. 1908. Also Basvekalet Argivi
1stt-mbul, Iradelor, Dahiliye, trade Ho • 12
SajaV 152^7IT Aug. 1908, ancf Ho• 1718/12 of 2 Bh1 aban 
1526/1 Sept. 1908.
59. al-Ahr.am, Ho.9250 of 20 Aug. 1908.
60. For instances see al-Ahram* Ho.9257 of 28 Aug. 1908, where
a petition from Beqa1 conpls.ining of its oa^imraaaan was 
addressed to this paper. See further Ho. 9264 of 5 Sept* 
1908 for another complaint. See also al-Huqatfan, No.5S85 
of 6 Aug. 1908. al Muqattan, Ho <>5933 of 1" Oct7 T908, and 
al~Ahr^m, Ho.9290 of b Oct. 1908 reported the^incident 
wE.ere a" crowd of 5000 had forced the qa1 irmaqan of *Aintab 
in the vilayet of Aleppo, to dismiss some members of the 
adninj strative council.
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convenient name of the GUP and claiming to be branches of
the Satonican GUP nushrooned all over Syria. Their appearance
was another nanif estc.tion of the jubilation felt at the tine
on the restoration of the constitution. Teirkish officers in
Syria as well as civilians sympathetic to the cause of the
Young Turks who were behind the formation of such committees.
They emerged independently of the Central GUP which was able
61at a later date to reorganise then and consequently to 
exercise a more direct control over then. These local OUPs 
took it upon themselves to safeguard the constitution, ensure
61. Cunberbatch to Lowther, No.?7!, conf,, Beirut, 7 Oct. 1908, 
P.O. 195/2277 - reported that a commission fron the 
Central CUP had visited Syria and had among other things 
abolished sone local CUPs and reorganised others. The 
Consul did not exceed these remarks. In fact it is not 
easy to ascertain the organisation of these local 
branches of the CUP, partly because of the indifference 
of the local press, and partly because these branches were 
later re-established on a secret basis; but sone informa­
tion is available. Before it was reorganised the CUP in 
Beirut was said to consist of over a hundred officers and 
civilians who elected an executive committee of twelve 
- six officers and six civilians, hfter its reorgani­
sation strict secrecy was maintained as to the identity 
of its very limited members - probably 2-5. This was 
the sane to all the other branches in .Syria. The branches 
could conduct their public business and negotiatons with 
other bodies through an intermediary generally known as 
rehber, a Turkish word meaning guide. The branches were 
totally under the control of the Central CUP. Por the 
above information see: Cunberbatch to Lowther, No.2,
conf., Beirut, 7 Lon. 190?* P.O. 571/766. See also 
al-Huqattan, 5°5d of 2 Oct. 1908, Por remarks about the 
branch^TTIataI.iya see Yusuf al-gakln, Suriyya wa* al-!Ahd 
al-1 Uthnani, Beirut, 1966, p. 160. al-palcim1 's ' account
ect because ho lived in Latakiya during 
that period and was politically active there as well as 
elsewhere, he was a member of the local CUP in Latakiya.
d6
6 Ptho application of its precepts, ami to watch over tho 
local a ch :nni s t r :k i on * ^  It was In this last capacity that 
tho local hranchos of tho GUI in Syria causal ruck resent­
ment against tho Young lurk regime both among local official 
circles and also those sections of tho population who wore 
affected by its acts*
In Damascus, for instance, the local CUP went as 
far as to ask tho vali to dismiss a number of officials, 
unong whom wore tho mufti, accused of being a reactionary, 
the director of the post office, tho chief clerk of tho Sha­
ri1 a court as well as the qa’irxiaqans of Zabadonl and Busra
•r - 64- 65Sski - Shan. The vali gave in and dismissed then. ^
The some thing happened in Beirut where th . authority of the 
vali was greatly diminished owing to tlie constant inter­
ference of the GUP there in the administrative affairs of the 
vilayet. In Jaffa the representative of the CUP attended 
the mooting of the administrative council in which the dis- 
niisal of soaio officials was decided upon. In this case the 
Ministry of the Interior found it necessary to instruct the
qd’irmaqan of Jaffa to retain, at least temporarily, the
67services of those officials. ( Cases of persistent neddlxng
62. Lison, No.5610 of 9 Sept. 1908. Y. al-^akln, Surjlyya, p. 
16C'.1 ral-Plug at to a, 6000 of 21 Doc. 1908.
63. iUirar, 9251 of 21 hug. 1908. al-Muqntfran, No.5918 of
Id Sept. 1908.
64*• al-hhran, No.9251 of 21 1-ug. 1908.
65o Ibid-
66. a 1 -Ijuga11an, 5910 of 2 Sept. 1908. hlso No *5885 of 6 -lug.
19"0S. Lowther to Grey, No.650, corf., Therapia, 9 Oct.
1908, P.O. 371/560 - reported that GUP in Beirut in 
direct_control of police.
67• al-hhran, No.9257 of 28 .lug. 1908.
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ill tlie adnini strati on by tlie loc el CUPs were reported fron
68all over Syria• In sone of these casco dismissal of of­
ficials was sought not because of their corruption or in­
competence, but out of personal motives. In a telegran to
the vilayet of Beirut tho* Minister of the Interior warned
69against such tendencies. ' In other cases sone of the local
CUPs actod in a manner that was contrary to the wishes of
the inhabitants and harmful to the cause of good government.
In Latakiya, for instance, tho CUP1 after some discussion and
division over the question, nn&o the nutagarrif *db& al-Latif
Pasha resign his post despite his integrity and uprightness
which commended aim to tho local inhabitants. The only fault
which some members of the CUP found with him was that he was
a relative end a friend of dbu*l Huda, tin dismissed drab
adviser and supporter of Sultan libdulhonid, which nade hin
70a danger to the now regime.' In disapproval of the dismissal 
of the nutagarrif, the judge of the Shari*a court resigned 
his post and I--ft Latakiya for the capital.^ On the advice 
of tho local CUP in Jaffa, the Salonican Central CUP,
68. Por some examples sec al-hhran, No.9251 of 21 -Lug. 1908.
-11 so al-Huqat j an, No . 5^ 08~-cTf^ 2 Sept, 1908, and No. 5927 
of 24- Sept. -£§0H.
69. Bor contG2.its of telegram sgj al-hliram, No.924-7 of 17 bug.
1908. lb so gakln, Surr i7/a, ppTKTibPT?”
70. Y. al-Jakln, Suriyya, pp. 160-161.
71. Ibid., p.161.
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inturf or ins in the administration of that place, dismissed
the QaVru lagan there-, inspito of his good work mad character,
and regardless of the appeals of the inhabitants of Jaffa
72to lot lain stay in office.( A similar incident in comae c-
75
tion with the- head of the post office in Beirut, was recorded*
The ucaaiiaistimtiori of the country was suffering to such an
extent that on the 20th hunch IS09 ? the Grand Vezirato,
probably in reply to the co:'.plaints of the various valis in
Syria and elsewhere, ordered the Ministry of the Interior
to instruct all valis not to allow any interference by un-
authorised bodies especially the local CUPs.• This telegram
was the last effort of the cabinet of HiIni lasha, which was
facing growing opposition and discontent particularly in 
75Istanbul, to put an end to the administrative confusion
prevailing in the provinces. In Syria, this confusion had
so nucli wocdcenoG the authority of government that a state of
76insecurity was reported to be widespread, 1 end comparisons
72* Ho.5914 of 9 Sept. 1908.
75* al-dhrfan, No.9256 of 27 f.ug. 1908.
74, font of t~lo gra:*. in TeJnrir ~i Vehayi, No . 158, of 21 March
1909. Summary in Lowtlmr to Grey*T No. 21?9 conf ., Peru, 25 
March 1909» P.O.571/761. Nor c. similar but earlier tele­
gram, see Ramsy to Government of India, 110.95) Gonf., 
Bagdad, 14 Sept. 1908, N.0.371/560.
75* Nor the problems of HiIni1s cabinet see Herozuddin fdonad, 
The 00rmittoo of Union and Irogross in Turkish Bo1itics, 
l^SfTJ^air^unpuBXrshed^Ha.D ^thesis , London, T9SST PP*~~ 
72-STTnov: in the press mb Clarendon).
76. See for example al-fhiram, No.9572 of 15 Jan. 1909* al-
Maqabtai™, Nos 607>4~”of 3 Neb. 1909 and 6035 of 4 Heb.1909.
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were already made in tlie press between the Young Turk regine
riry
and the old regine which, were dot nine ntal to tlie former. ' '
It was not surprising that hostility to the Young Turk 
regine felt by sone of the 1 Ulana* and the majority of land­
owning not cables which dared not show itself in the early 
days of the, regine began to cone into the open now.
It nust bo enphasisod that though the personal be­
haviour of sone nonbors of the GUP had given offence to sone
Muslins, as for instance, in Damascus, where sone of then
-  73were said to be not keeping the feast of Ramadan, f the ma­
jority of the * Ulana* in Syria had as yet no genuine reason 
to oppose the Youug Turk regine. The 1Ulana*, as an import­
ant class that had nucla influence on the Syrian Muslin com­
munity, were particularly influential in Damascus, a, tra­
ditional centre of Islamic learning end culture and not with­
out reason often referred to as al-Shan a1-Sharif« The 1Ulana* 
there, though their name and a small group of then was ex­
ploited by the notables (ajyan) of Damscus in their opposition 
of the now regime, had generally supported that regime* Apart 
from a minor dispute concerning the dress of women - gi jab -,
77. Goo al-Muqattam, Nos. 6079 of 27 March 1909, P  *4, and 
6080~oT*-?9MaFch, 1909.
78. 41“Manor, vol.II, part 12 of 22 Jan. 1909, pp.936-37 where 
Enpr narrated how his visitors in Damascus complained 
that some members of the CUP there did not fast in 
Ramadan. The sane religious laxity was reported fron 
Baghdad see Leut. Ool. J. Bamsay to secretary of Govorn- 
men'“ of India, No.942, Gonf *, Baghdad, 19 Oct* 1908,
P.C.195/2275.
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79which was finally settled, no clash wo.s reported between 
the 'Ulana* of Damascus end the CUP there. Those ’Ulana’ 
who joined the cause of the cPyaii were driven to by per­
sonal and mundane rather then by religious reasons. Such 
was the case of Shaykh Salih al-MaghribI, a Tunisian con­
nected with Abu’l-Huda, who led the anti-CUP demonstra­
tion of 24 October 1908 in Damascus, generally known as the 
D ana s c us Pitna.^
The Pitna which started in the Unnayyad mosque, 
following a talk by Shaykh Rashid Rida on some aspects of 
Islam /began as an argument between Shaykh ,§alih al-Me,ghribI 
and Rashid Ri£La. Because his attack on Rida caused excite­
ment among the audience, who showed some hostility to RicLa
81
forcing him to cut short his talk, Shaykh §ali:i was arrested.
Op
No convincing reason was given for his arrest. The situa­
tion was, however, exploited by some a' yan who incited their 
supporters and a great many ordinary non into believing that
the arrest of Shaykh §ali^ L was but one example of the hostility
83of the Young Turks towards Islam. y Thousands of armed men
79. Dovoy to Louthor, No.51? conf. , Damascus, 1 Oct, 1908,
P.O. 195/2277. -Iso, al-Muqat^ aii, No.5956, 30 Oct. 1908, 
reporting that a deputation of The CUP in Damascus visi­
ted Hons and advised the 'Ulana* there not to let the 
question of gj^ qlib cause trouble,
80. Details of Pitna in al-Manar, Vol.II, part 12 of 22 Jan.
. 1909, pp.94-1-953. al-MugaWai-'W ITo.5956 of 30 0ct.l908,p.'-l-.
81. al-Manar, ibid. , p. 946. al-Huqatf an., ibid.
82. dll the sources give no reason for the arrest. The only 
possible reason seems to have been that Ri£a was then a 
strong supporter of CUP end Asad Bey saw in the attack, 
quite rightly an attack on CUP.
83. al-Manar, ibid, p.950.
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gathered in front of the administrative building cud suc-
84cessful_y domended the release of the arrested ohaykh.
They further intimidated the vali Shukrx Pasha, who in view
85of the weakness over the incident was dismissed later on,  ^
to transfer ds1 ad Bey the commander of the C-ondamerio res­
ponsible for the arrest of Shaykh Salih, ds'ad, together 
with Major Sal in c 1- Jazahr’i, the grandson of one of the 
dlgerian exiles who had acconpanied 1dbd al-^adir of dlgeria 
to Damascus, and a certain Dr. IJaydar wum the leading 
menbors of the GUP of Damascus whom the Committee intended
8£to nominate as its candidates for the forthcoming elections. 
The notables resented this fact as well as the power and in­
fluence which the members of the CUP in Damascus caw.e to en­
joy after the granting of the constitution. Such men had no 
social standing and wore therefore not qualified to assume 
position and influence in a city like Damascus where, prior 
to the advent of the new era, the notables had a monopoly^ 
of both. They \rero the power in the Damascene society be­
fore the establishment of the constitution and they intended 
to remain so. Hence their hostility to the now regime and 
their successful endeavour to oppose and ultimately defeat
S-l-Manar, ibid0 aI~Muqay1;an, ibid.
85* Chukri Pasha was replaced by Nazim Pasha the vali of
Beirut, who was replaced by Edhom Bey. see: B..1. Istanbul 
Iradeler, Dahi1iye, Irado Ho.2832/46 - 11 D*
-ikiqaltam, ibid.
87* al-hanax, ibi/ ., p.948.
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the represent,.tivos of that regime, "ith the transfer of
hs 'ad and Salim. Boy, the former to Istanbul and the latter 
nc
to .Idana, ' the victory of the notables over the CUP scorned
complete. The opponents of the CUP were reported to be in
control of Damascus and of tlie CUP itself whose prestige had
by now sunk low. Damascus was branded by the supporters of
8°the Young Turk regime ro tin, seat of reaction in Syria* y 
Tho Damascus Pitna was, however, reactionary in 
as much as it was an anti-CUP movement, for the CUP stood 
out as the custodians of the constitution, and all opposi­
tion to them was considered anti-constitutional and there­
fore reactionary. Moreover the promoters of the Pitna 
were men associated with the old regime, who significantly 
enough used religion as their weapon in the battle a,gainst 
the CUP, Both of these factors strengthened the case against 
them as being reactionaries. Furthermore the Damascus crisis 
cane at a tine when similar incidents were reported from 
Istanbul in October 1 9 0 8 , The first was that of Nor dli
88* al-dhran, lTo.9320 of 12 Nov. 1908.
89- See for instance articles in al-Shram, Ho.9320 of 12 Xfov. 
1908, and Ho.9334 of 3 Dec. lffiT£TT'oX^Huqatjan, 5956 of 
50 Oct. 1908, and ITo.5984 of 3 DccTMhJOJT.
90. For an account of these acts see, P. d^ imad, The CUP 
in Turkish Politics, 1908-1913? Unmiblishcd PE7D, 
T ^ o £ — l ^ r T i  *35-56.
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- blind .111 - who after a religious tail; one HanacLar night 
in the Latih mosque, spoke against the constitution, liberty, 
equality and tbs ChnrSmr of deputies. He then lad a donor- 
stimtion to Tildis .Bar ay elaae sia.ilar speeches v/esu rado.
Q1
Lor *JLi was later arrested and tried. " Lao inportance of 
Lis :aononent was that it, like ttat of Darascus, used reli­
gion as its tool. It preceded tbat of Lanascus, for it 
took place on 7 October, and it bad none far-reaching ains. 
Hanover there is no evidence t ;> indicate any link botaaoon
Ci
either the novonent of Kor Lli or that of Niznnci Hurad, ^2
both of which were anti-constitutional, and that of Daaiascu... • 
It is possible that the Pecans cone notables -aero one our aged 
by both those siovenorts. There is no question of any link 
between the Daioascnae Pitna and the third incident in Istan­
bul, which was a rutiny at Taskisla barracks caused by the 
transfer of sone of the troops to JoGda*^ The existen.ee 
of a reactionary party called Hashwar vjl\s reported fron
OIL
Baghdad, ' 1 but again no connection could be established
91. Lor retails see Yak in Tnidhinis, Vol.I, po.156-157* .11 so 
Lov/ther to Grey,'hTo7570, corf,, Thor., l^Oot. 1908,
H.C. 371/560/36131.
92. Lor that of Hiaanci ilurad see h. L^aaG, Th^OHP, p.53.
93. Bee Hajor Surtees to Lowtlmr, Ho.59- 111, conf., Const.,
2 Hov. 1908, P.O. 195/2290. .113 o, knight, The ^wakening 
of -furkeg;, London, 1909? p* 269-,
99-• Lieut. Col. Pans ay to the Govt, of India, Luc. 1 in Ho* 
7? Conf., Baghdad, 19 Oct. 1908, forv/arded by Leather 
to Grey in Desp. Ho.796, conf., Const., 23 Hov. 1908, 
F.O. 37’ /560/G1699*.
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boyond the fact thv.t all t;mse novomts ware different 
nanifcstations of a growing opposition to the new regine.
By October 1908 the exuberance over the new constitution 
began to wear off and scoptician and antipathy to creep in,
By than the external problems of the no or regime had bo gun*
On the 5th October 1908, Bulgaria declared its independence.
1* day after that, Austria. - Hungary annexed Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, .1 few days later Greta announced her decision 
to unite with Greece.  ^ In view of all this it was not 
surprising that opposition to the now regime began to gather 
momentum,
A cormission sent by the Bale nicer. Central CUP 
to the Syrian provinces to explain the nature of their 
movement and to set up organisations in preparation for the 
parliamentary elections, had reported after touring those 
provinces, that the population as a ’whole was indifferent, 
if not apathetic, to the constitution. The report which was 
made in October stated that this apathy was particularly true 
of the 1 ended proprietors of the Aleppo vilayet* ^  In 
Palestine, V7bm.ro largo landowners were to be found, aversion
95* Biles l.C. 371/550-556 dealt with the Bulgarian inde­
pendence and Bosnia - Herzegovina. P.O. 195/2276, Cir­
cular to Consul?, Croteodeo.lt with the Cretan problem. 
Bee also B.C.371/74-7 ££.
96. Curb orb at ch to Lowther, ITo .74-, conf., Beirut, 7 Oct. 
1908, P.O. 195/2277* Also, Lowther to Grey, lTo.705> 
conf., Therapia, 24 Oct. 1908. P.0*371/560.
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to tho constitution which in som c-o^s duv eloped into
hostility to tho non robins, manifested itself on several
occasirs. Deports of those nanifest it ions won- :iado fr vi
on
rasaroth, ....crc, ijaifa mod liooron, ' to mention only a fan.
an 1,ablus cn effort u• is sure "G"’. orpraise the Opposition to
the OIL?, and a certuin jgcjj ?anaA.L Tawflo. foundsd 0, society
-C*J- 0r the purno-i- a. s . which d e s: ire a rS secular The Pntrio--
tic Lociety - al—<Ta !iyya al-bra^ aniyp a; — tri^d t~ us0 r--
liGious propaou“‘tauu' e. to its mans jy0 -L fiyhtiiia g attt;UUx .
98
mnore 1a amourers in t h 0 n 0 i y fo 0 urhood of Hablus supporated
thas s ^ cioty. y ^ Th0 landoinors -5 --'1. the ha:ua of Haifa ion leO.
fx CO- ..i ii c 0 0 0f tv/onh a:on whose •norpose was the protection
of their lands fro:..; any interference by the authorities in
~  100i! C^l X m 4
Thus tho underlying reason behind the hostility 
of tho Imdouners to tho non repine m s  concern over thoir 
pensoral interests, which an, re thro atoned by tho new concepts 
of tho now constitution, and by tho way tho peasants inter­
preted th-ou Cwir.g to their : \i sunders tan liny of tho leaning
97* for uaarplo, al-Ihicnfrtar, lies. 5992 of 11 Doc, 1S03 
and 5997 of 17 Doc7T?5o£ (for al-Ha^ira). 5958 of 18 
Doc, 1906, p.3 (Haifa), and 5594- of 14- Doc, 1908 (Hebron) 
5973 of 19 Hov. 1908 (hero), 3ee also Lisan, Ho,5308 of 
7 8opt, 1908, Her on excellent doscripdTon 'of tho dif­
ficulties of tho OIL? in Syria, and tho activities of 
notables soo ed-Ihipaptar, Ho.6000 of 21 Dec. 1908, p.l.
93. al^ IIugatta:;, Ho.5939 of 8 Oct. 190S.
99* Ibid,
100. aaoor; on Bo i rut f J L , Dnct. in Cumborbatch to
Lovrbhoxn Ho"/ 30( conf.", Beirut, 12 dpril 1909? 3.0.371/ 
766.
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of the constitution, the peasants became no re turbulent
and more difficult t: uana.gc. i:i sone instances they bo cane
101riotous and attached the property of their landlords.
In Beitra, as wo have soon, they withhold the duos which
*1 no __
ahoy used to pay to tho proprietor.” In h,intab they nslmd
!°3
tho aairno.aqan to confiscate tho property of thoir landlords,
while in gens they presented impossible donands such as
returning sc:to of tho lands and property long since usurped
104by the landoimors. In addition to this turbulent atti­
tude which tho constitution created among the peasants, and 
which formed a major economic throat to the landowners, 
there was the danger that the now r-egino would be loss le­
nient than its predecessor in collecting overdue taxes, 
assessing new ones end in allowing their :aany privileges.
The power which they held over their docile peasants was 
already undermined. Thus driven by tho desire to preserve 
thoir personal interests, and encouraged by the weahness of 
the local authorities, tho landowners opposed the nm: regime. 
They showed no respect fbr the much discussed concepts of
justice and liberty, and continued to oppress tho peasants
105living on their land.  ^ Thoir hostility to the constitution
101. hs in Berth Palestine, soo abovm, p. 4o.
102. See above, p*w '3 ^ - 4o *
103. al-rluQafrfran, Ho*5953 of 1 Oct. 1908. J.lso al-.lhram,
Ilo/^O of 6 Oct. 1908.
104. ul-I-uq htan Ho.5926 of 23 Sept., 1908.
105- Per some incidents soo al-Iluqa^ tam, 5992 of 11 Doc.
1308, al-dhron, 9268 of~HSopt. 1906. Lis an, Ho. 5808 of 
7 SeptTT^CBT' —
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and their disregard for its precepts further lorered the 
already waning prestige of the Young Turk regime.
Like that of the eg*yan of Damascus, the hostile 
attitude of the landowners to the nee* era was not motivated 
by national considerations. In Damascus the reasons were 
social and political rather than national. All the three 
members of the GUP there whose rise to power and influence
1 Of-*
the a 1yan resented were Arabs, The objection was to their
lack of social standing, which to the a (yam was the only pre­
requisite for power ana influence. There was no evidence 
that the Damascene notables entertained any grudges against 
the Young Turk regime as being a Turkish regime which 
ignored the rights of the Arabs as such, an argument that 
was to be used by the emerging Arab nationalists in the fol­
lowing years. Both the a * y an and the landowners were con­
cerned with preserving their social and economic privileges. 
The existence of such hostile attitudes was to provide the 
nationalists later on with an effective weapon against the 
different GUP governments, homeover, it offered the nationa­
lists the chance of establishing a working basis with these 
adyan and the landowners, a chance that the nationalists ’were 
to make use of to a limited extent, more important 
still, the new regime was deprived of the support of an
106, As1 ad Bey, the Commander of the Gendarmerie was from 
Tripol'- (Syria) Salim al-Jaza’irl from Algeria, and 
Dr. jjayd&r from Damascus.
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important class ox the population that carried much weight 
and influence. The Young 'Turks were young men who lacked 
the social distinction generally associated with the ruling
classes in the Ottoman Bmpire. This lack of a social stand­
ing and their being young and inexperienced was behind 
much of the opposition which they faced in the different 
parts of the Bmpire. They, and their adherents in the Syrian
provinces, were to leave a poor impression on the landowners 
- 107 ~and the a1 yan. { it must be added however that though
the majority of the members of those classes opposed the new 
regime, some supported it end continued to do so until the 
outbreak of the First orld war* It was the opposition of 
the first group more than the support of the second which 
affected the Turkish-Syrian relations during the constitu­
tional period.
A second factor which further affected those re­
lations, and is usually overlooked, was the indifference and 
scepticism with which the Lebanese greeted the establishment 
of the constitution. This attitude, together with the 
ultimate refusal of the Lebanese to elect deputies to the 
new Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, increased the suspicion that 
the Lebanese, the majority of whom were haronites, were se­
paratists at heart and cared more for the Lebanon than for
107. Hostility to the Young Turks based on social reasons 
had beer, reported from Iraq as well, see, Ramsay to 
injxa k  verm ent, ICnc.l in No.l, in India Office to 
Foreign Office, dated Baghdad, 12 Oct. 1308, F.0.371/ 
561. Fox* Young Turks social shortcomings see Lowther 
to Grey, Ho. 151? conf., Pera, 3 Larch 1903? P.O. 
371/761/8914* Also, A. Mandelstam, Le Sort de I’Skrpire 
Ottoman, Paris, 1917? p*24-.
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the integrity of the Empire. The Young Turks became sus­
picious of the intentions of the Lebanese because of the con­
siderable and emotional concern which they showed over their 
privileged status, grunted to then by the Reglement Crgunlque 
of 1831, while the Lebanese always subjected the Ottoman 
state of desiring to abolish those privileges. This mutual 
suspicion had developed in the years following 1908, end 
had left its impress on Turkish-Syrian relations. However, 
it was the anxiety of the Lebanese to preserve their semi- 
autonomous status that made them adopt a reserved and in­
different attitude towards the new regime.
The British Consul at Beirut wrote that the pro­
clamation of the constitution was received in the Lebanon 
with gratisication, :tbut with less shou) of enthusiasm as
It Is not known to what extent the mountain will benefit
10 8
by the change."" Moreover, the leading Lebanese ware not 
Impressed by the delirious joy expressed over the now con­
stitutional precepts of liberty, equality and justice in 
other parts of the empire fur they regarded such precepts 
as already granted to the Lebanese by their Statute. al~
Urz, a Lebanese newspaper owned by Philip al-Khazin, a 
member of the ancient Shaykhly family, put forward such an 
argument as early as August 1908^^ and other writers often
108. Cumborbatch to Lowther, Ho.51? conf., Beirut, 1 Aug. 
1908, -RbO. 195/2277.
103o As quoted by* sA-Ahram, Bo.9238 of 6 Aug. 1908.
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110repeated it. But the real issue was not whether Lehanon
had enjoyed the blessings of liberty, equality and justice
in its Organic Statute or not. It was whether Lebanon would
this time elect deputies to the Chamber of Deputies as order-
111ed by the Grand Veziratey or would refrain from doing so 
as slie did in 1876.112
The immediate reaction of the Lebanese was un­
certainty as to whether to elect deputies or not, and whether
113
election would affect their statute as a privileged province, 
for if if did the majority opposed participation in the elec­
tions. However three groups emerged. The first group, 
which styled itself the Liberals, it as in favour of the Le­
banon tairing part in tho elections. They argued that the 
privileged status of the Lebanon did not set it apart from 
the rest of the Empire, that Lebanon was a mere province of 
the empire, and as such subject to the general laws of the 
empire. They saw no contradicition between the right of the 
Lebanon to elect deputies and its Organic Statute, nor did
11/Lthey see any danger to that Statute in the elections.
110. Bulus I his* ad, Lubnan w_al_ Dusturyal- fUthnan7 Cairo 
(n.d,), pp.AL-S*;
111. For order see Lisan alggal, ITo.6778, 3 Lug. 1908. 
al-Ahram, ITo. 9?3S™6'f IT Aug. 1908. Also, Dixstur, Vo 1.1,
pp. 1-2o
112. For the Lebanese attitude in 18&7^  soo Lis an., Ho. 5776 of 
30 July 1308. ' “
113. For_a di-;tailed description of this uncertainty see 
Trysail, to.6778 of 3 Aug. 1908. Also al-Ahram, Ho.924-5 
of T4 Aug. 1908.
114-. for_the full arguments see artic1rs by Shaklb Arslan in 
ids an, I'To.5791 of 17 Aug. 1908, and Ho. 5803 of 31 Aug. 
1908, and also in al-MuqaJJjnm, Ho*5914- of 9 Sept. 1908.
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This group had so completely overshadowed its opponents in 
the days Immediately following the declaration of the consti­
tution that it looked for a moment as if the Lebanon was 
going to elect its deputies to the Ottoman Chamber of De­
puties . However, the group being a minority one, supported
it
and led by the Druses of the Lebanon/ had no chance of
ultimate success. Thou0h its leaders, such as Amir Shaklb
Arslan and his uncle Amir Mug'fafa Arslan, we re accused by
their opponents of being men of the old regime who, in
desperation to clear their names and to ciarry favour with
the Young Turks had actively supported tho campaign for
115Lebanese representation,  ^it seemed possible that those 
leaders were motivated by other motives as well. As a mi­
nority in the predominantly Christian Lebanon, the Druses had
throughout the nut a s arr i f at e period maintained a close
116cooperation with the mutagarrif and his government.
In the same spirit, since the mutagarrif Yusuf Franco 
rasha (1907-12) was in favour of Lebanon tding part in the 
parliamentary elections, the Druse leaders supported the 
same idea. Moreover they were discontented with the secon­
dary position alloted to them by the Maronite nationalists 
whose nationalism, with its strongly Christian tones end 
French sympathies, they stronger suspected,1*^ and. were
115. See for example al-Ahram. Ho.9298 of 15 Oct* 1908. The 
Times' of 13 April 1909 echoed these accusations.
116. E. ,8alibi, p. 118.
117. Ibid*? P*P 118-19.
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seeking to end tlie hegemony of the 1 lax*onites in Lebanon by 
bringing the Lebanon into closer contact with the rest of 
the empire* The .'Druse leaders having realised that the 
statute of the Lebanon was in the interest of the Christians 
decided to associate and cooperate:, with the Muslim Young 
Turks. They did this despite the fact that they were 
extreme shi1 is whose beliefs were frowned upon by some 
of the Sunni Muslims, but such doctrinal differences seemed 
not to matter in the circumstances. In fact Amir Shakib Ar­
slan continued to support the Young Turk regime thr~'Ugh- 
out the period 1908-14-* He did so out of religious con- 
side :c obi oris , and he held on to his views even at a time when 
men like Rashid LicLa, who had always supported the conti­
nuance of the empire on a purely Islamic basis, had ceased
-[TO
to support the new regime." However this zeal for elec­
tions was not shared by either the second or the third 
group of Lebanese, who between them had won tho battle, and 
made the Lebanon refrain from electing deputies*
The second group, composed mainly of the Creek 
Orthodox, who though they were Christians were in the mino­
rity compared to the liaronites, started by maintaining an
liq
attitude of apprehensive indifferonce, " went a step further
118. For an elaboration of his reasons f :'r supporting the 
Young Turks and his differences with Ri<Ja end the oth 
see Amir Baakib Arslan, al-Sayid Rashid Lida aw Akha’ 
Arb Vain Sana, Lama s cus, P • pTTTf’7-15*5 • „
See also his book, Ila al- ’Arab, Bayan 15il!ITmma al~ 
‘Arabiyya ’an gizb
H9. al-Ahrdm, 924-5 of 14- Aug. 1908.
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and supported tho call for r op rose nt,. t i o n on condition
that the .Statute of tho Lebanon should bo not only preserved
but also thoroughly reformed. Not really anxious fully to
supwort the Druses, who were ready to coiuyrorii.se over the 
the
privileges of/Lebanon or oven to forsake then, the leaders
of this second group joined j?orces with the third end most
powerful group, that of the liaronites, whose sole aim was
to maintain the status quo in the Lebanon by opposing the
IPOmovement for representation* After the leaders of the
second group joined them, the liaronites begen to advocate
a thorough reform of the Lebanese Statute as well as the
the -.p-j
administration of/Lebanon.
Tho basic argument of the liaronites was that Le­
banon was ranch happier with its Reglomont Organ iyuij which 
had given it peace and prosperity since its establishment 
in 1861, Eence the Lebanese had 110 intention of forsaking 
their privileges granted by that Statute by taking pai't in 
the coming parliamentary elections. This argument which was 
no more than a mere cover for tho reluctance of the leaders 
of the Maronites, namely the clergy and a1yan, to participate 
in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire, was streng­
thened by the fact that the orders sent by the Grand Ve zirate 
to the mutasarrif of the Lebanon to start elections included
120. Oumberbatch to Lowther, ho.51, conf., Beirut, 1 Aug. 
1908, E.G. 195/2277.
121. Bulas Hus*ad, Lubnan wal Dustur..,., pp. 6-7. Ahram, No. 
9262 of 3 Beyt. T90o7 e557F!uq"a^ tam,' No.5925 of 22TTTept. 
!908. “ — —  —
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no assurances that the Statute of Lebanon would not be inter- 
122fored with. The Ifaronite leaders must have realised
that the nev: regime had no power to change or cancel the 
privileges of the Lebanon without the consent of tho six 
signatory powers. Iloroover assurances were given twice
1 07y
that tho btatute would be kept intact, " However the 
argument e/as persistently put forward by those leaders, 
probably in an attempt to play on the fears of the Lebanese 
masses. This, it seemed they successfully accomplished, 
for by October 1SGG it became apparent to the mutasarrif 
that public opinion was hardening against participation in 
the election*
Petitions presented by the Lebanese expressing
their desire not to send deputies to the Turkish Chamber of
Deputies - in tho interest of their privileges - began to
pour into the rnutasarrifate as v/ell as into tho consulates
124of the signatory powers throughout October 1908. Until 
the end of the month the British Consulate alone* received 
175 petitions with total signature of about 25»000.^^
122. 1 or telegram ordering elections see Lis an, ITo ,6778 of 
of 3 Aug. 1908. Sec further ed-jiupayjara, "Ho *5937 of
6 Oct. 1908.
123. See B. I .us1ad, Lubnan wal Dustur, p.p.18-19. Also,
Lowther to Gre^, H0.S95? conf., Pera, 29 Dec. 1908.
P.O. 371/762 - reported that the minister of the Interior 
assured him thut tho Porte had no intention of altering 
tho statute of Lebanon without the consent of tho 
powors c one 0rne d.
124. al-Ahram, Ho.9286 of 1 Oct. 1908. al-Huaattam, Ho.5936 
of iTOct. 1908. ~
125* Cunberbatch to Lowther, Ho.77? conf., Beirut, 30 Oct. 
1908, P.O. 371/561.
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The activities of the Union Libanaise society, the organ
- 126through which the opponents of the electron operated,
seemed to have been justified when tho Attain! strativo
Council of the Lebanon decreed on the 12th of October 1908
127not to send deputies to Istanbul. ( This decision by the 
Council narked the victory of the liaronites over the Druses. 
Their hegemony over the minorities of the Lebanon seemed un- 
Shalceable •
As far as the Ottoman government was concerned 
the matter did not end at this juncture, for on 10 December 
1908, the cabinet of Hilmi Pasha, after consultation with 
the Council of the State, had taken a further decision re­
quiring the Lebanon to elect deputies^the Chamber of 
Dep)uties. The decision which was communica.ted telegraphi­
cally to the mutasarrif stated that since Lebanon was an 
integral part of the Imperial dominions and had no powers 
of legislation but was subject to the laws of the empire, 
it must therefore send deputies to assist in the making of
"I p Q
those laws. This decision hod no effect on the situation
126. Por this society, see Cuinberbatch to Lo^ rbher, Qp.clt. 
Also, al-Ahram, Ho.9315 of 6 ITov. 1908. “
127. Text of decree in Lisan, Ho.5840 of 13 Oct. 1908. Also 
_al-A.hram, Ho.9602 oTHS3 Oct. 1908. English translation 
111 Cumberbatch to Lowther, Ho.7% conf., Beirut, 30 
Oct. 1908, P.0.371/561.
128. Turkish text in 3 a §vokalet Argivi, He c1i s-i Vukla 
flazbatesi, n0 .122/123 dated 3 Dec.* 1 ^Oh^ ArAAcaTc trans— 
lation in al-Ahram, Ho.9253 of 19 Dec. 1908. Lnglish 
ti an slat 1 on" jjT™Cumb e rb a t ch to Lowther, ITo. 90, con., 
Beirut, 15 Dec. 1903, P.0.371/762 - forwarded to Grey 
by Lowthor in ITo.895» conf., Pens, 29 Dec. 1908,
P.0.371/762.
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and tho Lebanese Administrative Council stood by its early 
129decree. ^
The opponents of elections in the Lebanon from 
this point onwards directed their efforts to reforming and 
democratising the Statute of the Lebanon. In short they 
wanted more powers for a democratically elected Administra­
tive Council and less powers for the mutasarrif. Several 
demonstrations and deputations backed by demands for reform 
were received by the mutasarrif..in fact this whole 
movement came to no important result since it ended in the 
dismissal of a few officials whose posts were taken over
131
by their rivals, that is some of the leaders of the movement, 
(Though it was discredited by some office seekers, this 
movement was important in that it was the first concerted 
effort by Lebanese leading men to secure some benefits for 
the Lebanon alone. Its importance lay also in the fact 
that it was indicative of a distinct Lebanese movement, whose 
aim was advancement of the Lebanon only with disregard for 
the interests of the other parts of the Empire. It was this 
feeling of being more Lebanese than Ottoman that the leaders 
of the CUP found difficult to tolerate. The entry of the 
Empire in the First World War offered the Unionists their
129.Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.93> Conf., Beirut, 24 Dec. 
1908, F.0.371/762.
130. Cunberbatch to Lowther, No.2, conf., Beirut, 7 Jan. 1908, 
F.)• 371/706, Repeated in F.O. 195/2311.
131. The Times of 13 April 1909.
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best chynce to aTbalish the Roglcnent Organique,which they
took in 1915*
In tho rest of Syria, however, parliamentary
elections wore- conducted in accordance with tho I87S ole- 
152ctoral lav, whereby a deputy should bo elected by
ewey 50,000 male Ottoman taxpayers between tho ages of 25 
and 60 years. Except in the case of high army officers and 
officials of tho state who could vote in whatever electoral 
district they night happen to be during the elections, 
electors must have lived a year in the district in which 
they intended to exercise thoir right of vote. A man would 
be disqualified from voting if he had been convicted of a 
crime, if he was an undischarged bankrupt, if his character 
was notoriously bad or if he did not possess ottoman na­
tionality, A deputy was to be over 50 years of age,with a 
knowledge of the Turkish language and should possess all 
the qualifications of an elector. A deputy would represent, 
not only his constituency, but all the Ottomans of the 
empire. So could be nominated either by a petition .signed by 
himself and addressed to the vali, or by another petition 
signed by not less than 300 persons, or by his party. The 
election was to be ly secret ballot and In two stages,
132. For the Turkish text of the electoral law see Pustin?, 
Vo 1„1, p.p. 18-39* A1 so, rlacmuat Qayanini Codlde 
Osmaniye, Istanbul, 1327? p.p For'an Arabic
rrahslation see Lisan. No.5775 of 29 July 1908, For a
sumiic.ry in English see, S.F. Anight, The Awakening of the 
Turkish Revolution, London, 1909? p*
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primary end secondary. Every 300 primary doctors would
elect one secondary elector. The secondary electors in their
turn would elect the deputies. 'The electoral lair specified
133heavy punishments for intimidation and corrupt practices.
flie CUP was the only organised party that contested
the elections in Syria. The other political party, the
Liberal Party - Osmanli Ahrar Pirkasi - founded on 14 Septern- 
134her 1908,  ^ had little time to establish branches in Syria,
and for that matter had little time to organise itself for
133the elections. By the time the elections started^the CUP
had well organised local branches in Syria that wore ready
to support and secure the election of its candidates -
thanks to the delegates whom it sent there in October and
to the prevailing enthusiasm for the cause of the Committee
136among the majority of tho Syrians. Apart from the
134. See funaya, lurkiyede siyasr partiler, 1859-1952,
1st anbul, 195*?? P • P • . <5To re’a ft el? ifeejfErler. )
135* Ibid., |?.241. See lunoya, “Elections in furbish
hi .story;t, in Middle has torn Affairs, April, 1954*, p. 117
136. Cumbercbatch t:> Lowther, lTo.74, conf., Beirut, 7 Oct. 
1908, P.O. 195/2277* Also Dovey to Lowther, No.l, 
conf., Damascus, 2 Jan. 1909» forwarded to Grey by 
Lowther, l'To.53, P.0.571/767* See also, Xusuf ul-galdlm, 
Suriyy a, p. 160. al-Huqattam, No.5943 of 13 Oct, 1908, 
end No*76000 of 21 Dec. ’ISO?, p.l.
■ A r k a d i  i%~ ~l~l ; 5 5 - 3 ^ .
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refusal of the Lebanese to participate In the elections and. 
the hostile attitude of the a1 yan and landowners in Danascus 
and parts of Aleppo, the Committee seined to he- confident 
of the loyalty of the Syrians to its cause. Unlike the 
Armenians, the Greeks and the Bulgurs, the Syrians, mho were 
predominantly Muslims and therefore had a vested interest in 
the survive,! of the Empire, did not yet show disturbing 
signs of a well organised national movement. The CUP were 
not worried about the loyalties of the Syrians nor about the 
supremacy of their parts7* there, Thus when the CUP tried 
to reach agreements with the Armenians, Greeks and Bulgurs
■j 7 0
on their candidates for election,”^0 it did not attempt to
do so with the Syrians, or for that matter with the rest of 
169the Arabs. Phis is an indication of the spirit of goodwill
which marked the relations of the Syrians and the lurks in
137* fhc CUP had won, with considerable majorities, all
three elections held in Syria in the period 1908-14*.
138* For its agreement with the Greeks see Lowther to Grey, 
No*535> conf., Ihorapia, 1 Sept. 1908, P.O.371/54-6/ 
30971. For the Armenian decision to cooperate with the 
CUP see Fitsmaurice to Lowther, No.54*D, conf., 30 Nov. 
1908, P.O. 195/2281. For agreements in Macedonia see 
Lowther to Grey, ITo.647, conf,, Therapia, 9 Oct. 1908, 
P.O. 371/5^6/36109.
139* All sources, Arabic as well as Turkish and English or 
French did not mention any such attempt.
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the e^rly days of the c'institution, and which not only in­
sured the peaceful completion of the elections in Ayr!a but
secured the election of two lurks by two Syrian constituent 
140cies. But the elections were not fought on national or
political issues, for such issues hardly enistod at the time* 
ITor were they fought in the usual democratic 
way of presenting programmes and counter pro;;puuames to the 
electorate by the various candidates. This is a nodern
A-
phumowenon which T.;ould have appealed to i^ ae reasonably
educated electorate, but not to the Syrian masses at the
time * Their ignorance and lack of proper understanding of
the meaning of the constitution prevented them fro:,- realising
the importunee of the elections, end had consecjuently :nude
141the elections colourless, The fact that the election
was conducted in two stages further lessened the interest 
of the popule.ee in them. For the candidates as well as for 
the electors, the approval and the support of tho CUP 
was enough. In fact in Syria as ov nay.hero it was difficult 
to win a seat without that support. In Nablus, for onanplo, 
tho support of the CUP had won Shaykh iJyaad al-ICaane.sk his 
seat in face of strong opposition from three wealthy and 
influoncial candidates, two of whom belonged to the famous
140. They were Fu’ad IQiulusI for Tripoli and Mil Jinani for 
Aleppo.
141. Cor ry s paid o nee d* Orient, 1st Xear, 17 o. 3 of 1 IT ov .,1908,p  ^ _
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1 Abd al-Ha&i family vhilo the third belonged to tlie 
Jawgan family, In Hons tlie CUP lu.d 1 Abel alPgumxd al-
■ L Jahrawi (v/ho in 1916 was to Do orecured by Oenal Pasha on
e.ixC’i'ecL
tlio charge of be inn an Arab national is t) ^ from among three 
other candidates, all of whom wore reported to be n n  of 
good standing and repute. ’ ^ m  Latakiya rear iiu^ ammad 
Arslan owed his SGcrb oo the CUP and to the interference
]  Z.UL
o f th e vevli of Pei rut, P a sin Pa s ■ .a. ’ Only in th i s ins t an c e
was official interference recorded. In no other instance 
did tho CUP use objectionable neons to secure election of 
its nominees. Only the- correspondent of al-Iiuciattan in 
$aifa criticised the alleged corrupt mars which the CUP used
14-5
to secure the oloction of Shaykh As1 ad al~3huqayri in Acre.
Another complaint was made from Damascus. Phis was the only
place in Syria whero a deputy who was not a nominee of the
14-6CUP was electod despite that party’s opposition. He was 
Shaflq. al-diu’ ayyad al-’A^n who bo cane a bitter opponent of 
the CUP in the Chamber of Deputies. Ihe coup leant concerned 
the interference of local authorities in the Damascus
14-2. al~IIuqattam,' No. 5959 of 3 Oct. 1908,
14-3. al-Kuqafrfrafli? ITo.5927 of 24- Dept. 1908. hi so, Dovoy to 
Lowther, lid. 4-2, co f., Danas cus, 8 Sept, 1908, P.O.
195/2275.
14-4-. Cuifoorbatch to Lowther* Ho.82, conf., Beirut, 12 Nov. 
1908, P.O. 195/2277- Ho other source mentioned this 
int e r f e r e 11c e .
14-5. Lor the detailed account see a 1-IluqapPU? Ho.5963 of 
6 ITov. 1908.
146. Por elections in Damascus see ol-Ahran, No.9332 of 26 
Eov.1908, al-rluciattain, Ho.5978 cT 2?T Uov. 1908. Also 
Tavrf ig 1A1 iHluHf7 alP* Arab Wal lurk fi al-A'hd a] ~ 
Dusturi al - ’ Uthmanl^ ^  ,
and 0.114-. "
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elections, an allegation the Ministry of the Interior hastened 
to deny, Tho CUP, however, raw: not charged at the time 
of rigging the elections of .Syria or of the rest of the 
Arab pr o vin c e s ♦
148Despite rhe lack of election manifestos 
and tho fact that the electors attached more importance to 
the wealth and fame of the candidates the Syrian elections 
featured some competition among tho contestants. Ihe elec­
tions of Haifa, for instance, were marked with controvory and 
14-9envision.  ^ (Devon candidates contested the two seats of 
150Beirut,  ^ while 18 candidates stood for election in the
whole vilayet of B e i r u t . S i x  of those wore to represent
that vilayet. Lxcept in tho case of the gauran, where no
election took place and the deputy was chosen by the Shaykhs
152
of tho Druses, no candidate in Syria was elected unanimously.
155
In at least two cases candidates 'were elected in absentia*
14-7. Tggvi.m--i Vekayi, No *4-5 of 12 Nov. 1908.
148. al-Muqa^tam, No.5922 of 18 Sept, 1908 gives the contents 
oTTfhe “'only election manifesto in Syria - of a certain 
^as^akl HImpi seeking election in Aleppo. However he 
did not win,
14-9. al-liuqattam, No.5963 of 6 Nov. 1908.
150. Seo Curfoerbatch to Lowther, No.72, conf., Beirut, 16 
Oct. 1908, L.O. 195/2277. al-Huqattam, 5967 of 12 Nov. 
!908.
151. Lis an, No. 5811 of 10 Sept. 1908.
152. Lisan, 5881 of 30 Nov. 1908. Also Devey to Lowther, No, 
4fT/~Lonf,, Damascus, 8 Sept. 1908, N.O. 195/2275*
153* I1 hey were Ruhr ul-IChaldl of Jerusalem and al -’Asm 
of Damascus.
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The Bcduins of Korak ware ho sit ant to elect 3, deputy and 
it was not until January 1909 that they elected Tawflp al- 
liajall as their deputy.1^*
The Syrians finally elected twenty* seven deputies, 
twenty five of whom were Muslins, one a Druse and one a 
Christian. The vilayet of Aleppo was represented hy ten 
deputies, Beirut by shp Syria by eight and the Kutasarrifate 
of Jerusalem by three deputies.Dxcopt for one all those 
deputies were elected as nominees of the CUP whose programme 
they uncritically a dopted.They wore from different 
social and educational backgrounds, and the majority of them 
bud served the state in different capacities. Host of them 
came from prominent nuslim families, especially those of 
Damascus end Jerusalem. The landowners dominated the body 
of the dloppan deputies. Four of the Syrian deputies were 
turhamied shayidis, tiro from the vilayet of Syria and two 
from Beirut. On the whole they were either 'Ulama’, land­
owners or professional men from the towns, The last cate­
gory included ex- government officials. fhore was no common 
tie to bind this heterogeneous group of deputies except
194. Dovey to Lowtlier, No.18, Damascus, 3 April 1909? F.O. 
371/767*
155* List of names for Aleppans in lakvim-i Vokayi ho.61, 
of 13 Dec. 190c- , and No. 59 of S^fovTTr^OS’rTTamGs of 
Beirut deputies in Cumborbatch to Lowthor, No.82,
Beyrut, 12 Nov. 1908, 51.0.195/2277. Those of Syria 
in Dovey to Lowthor, No.65? Damascus, 2A Nov. 1908,
F.0,195/2277. Those of Jerusalem in Blech to Lovrthcr,
No.55? Jerusalem, 26 Nov. 1008, F.O. 195/2287.
156. For that programme see Ikdam, No>5197 of 13 Nov. 1908, 
p. 4*. B. Nnight, Awakening, “pp.291-293.
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•' . their loyalty to the ON?. During 1 ’ the period 1908-12 
whon the par 1inmon tary session ended, they never acted as one 
body.
The Syrian leaders seemed to bo satisfied with the 
way the elections were conducted and with the number of de­
puties alioted to Syria. Apart from feeble complaints by
157the Christians that they wore under represented, no other 
complaint was hoard from Syria, ill on some Christian 
dignitaries telegraphed their objection to the Ministry of the 
Interior, namely that in Aleppo no Christian was elected, 
the ministry reminded them that the elections wore not con­
ducted on the basis of nuslim and Christian, but on the basis 
that all were Ottomans. The Ministry, however, added that 
the number of the Christians in Aleppo was one seventh of 
the population of Aleppo, and would not warrant them to 
elect a deputy since Aleppo elected six deputies only. Al- 
Ifuqattam. which reproduced the text of the telegram did not
158challenge its arguments.  ^ Thus in view of the absence of 
genuine grievances caused by the elections it would be 
erroneous to claim that the beginning of the Turkish - Arab 
question dated from these parliamentary elections,
157* See for instance al-Iiuqattam, Ho.5990 of 9 Dec., 1908.
158. al-Iluqattam, No.5991 of 10 Dec., 1908,
159. For this claim, see, G* Antonius, pp.l0;5~d*
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There wore no national issues involved in the elections, end 
it was cha.racteristic ox the elections that ardent Arab 
separatists, such as ITajlb Azoury who returned from Paris to 
stand as a candidate in Jaffa, had renounced his strong na- 
tionalist views and adopted more moderate ones. The
elections had given Syria some strong future supporters of 
its cause, which came to he identified as the Arab cause 
vis-a-vis the Young Turks. From the time parliament was 
opened on 17 December 1908 until the counter-revolution of 
April 1909 the Syrian deputies as well as the rest of the 
Arab deputies adopted an attitude of deep and embarrassed
161
silence over all important issues discussed in the Chamber.
However they took little or no part in the events which
followed the downfall of Kamil Pasha, and which ultimately
162precipitated the reaction of Ip April 1909*
O11 the night of 12/13 April the troops of the 
first Army Corps mutinied and led by some Ilollahs and theolo­
gical students marched to Ay as of ye. square, near parliament,
-domuTidxng rho restoration of the shari* at. The reaction 
was an anti-Cup movement which had completely routed the
160. For such views see al-Iluqa11am, No.594-3 of 12 Oct.1908.
161. The Activities of the Arab deputies were dealt with in 
Ch. 3, below.
162. For the fall of Kamil Pasha and events before the coup 
see F. Ahmad, The CUP, pp. 70-81• Also 3. Lev/is,
Amor gen co, pp.2I4--37i For Bibl. on reaction see,
3. Lewis," Ibid., p.216. P.C. 371/770 ff, dealt with 
re action in"* do t ai 1.
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163Cup regime in the capital, J The mownDnt was by no moans 
confined to Istanbul, end sinultaneous outbreaks of dis­
orders and even massacres wore reported from many parts of 
the Asiatic provinces of thEmpire. Particularly had among 
those were the massacre of thousands of Armenians in the 
vilayet of Adana. Theso massacres spread to the northern 
parts of the vilayet of Aleppo whore some minorities of 
Armenians were living among a mixed population of Turks,
Kurds and Arabs. Disturbances were repo3?tod from Alexandret-
ta region, from Aintab, Antioch, Kessab as well as from
ISAMar ash whore 18 Armenians wore massacred. In the town
of Aleppo itself, though tension was said to be mounting
between the Muslims and the Christians, no disorders occurred
owing to the fact that the interests of many Muslin and
Christian merchants wo re so closely Irnit together that any
165pillage eras bound to affect bothy  ^ however a reactionary 
party using religion s^s its platform existed in Aleppo, and 
though it -was weak and ineffective, some- of its leaders were 
arrested aft.r the cri:shing of the coup in Istanbul and 
were sent to Istanbul for trial.166
165. Lowthor to Groy, No. 107, conf., teleg. Const., 13 April, 
1909, 2*0*371/776. Also, FA fears, Forty years, p.260. 
al-Iianar, vol.15, part 10, 2 Nov. l9K7, ]?*"?'9ST
164-, Fontana to Lowthor, No. 12, Aleppo, 2? May 1909, F.O. 
195/2306. Also, 11. C. C atoni to Font ana, No.Id,
A1exandr011a, 22 May 1909, F.O, 195/8306. Also, Y. 
al-Jakim, Suriyya, pp. 177-181.
165* Fontana to Lowthor, No.13, Aleppo, 27 May,1909, F.O. 
371/773* al-M.uaattam, No.6103 of 27 April, 1909*
166. al-Muaattam, 6099 of 22 Aoril, Tabakh, 1Alam al bubalaI 
VoT77Tpr573 and 576. * ----------- -
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The events of the vilayets of Adana and Aleppo
had greatly alarmed the Christians in the interior of Syria,
and a number of their families sought refuge in either
Beirut or even in the Lebanon. Some families left horns,
167Hama and Tripoli for Beirut, others for the Lebanon.
These apprehensions died out with the deposition of Sultan
Abdulhorn id. In the town of Beirut, where a large Christian
population resided and who-re the murder of Amir rmhammud
Arslan - shot by the m b  el troops in Istanbul by mist alee of
168
his resemblance to the Unionist Huseyin Cahid - had caused
considerable excitement, no incidents of reaction were
reported, thanks to the prompt action of th ;• CUP there*
Together with the army officers, who wore supporters of the
new regime, they established quick control over the town,
160and prevented reaction from sotting in." Only in .here
did the reaction party show some activity* Some 200 Muslims 
shouting slogans against the Committee and cheering Sultan 
AbduLhamid tried to capture the president of the local CUP,
167* f A for an, 9460 of 1 Hay 1909-
168. P. Hcullagh, Fall of_Abd~ul-Hamid, London 1910, p.113 
claimed that alLBustaiiT^ assufeel Him that Arslan was 
killed because ho was one of the 20 Young Turk deputies 
al-Ahram, 94-53, 23 April 1909-
169- Cuiaberbatch to Lowthor, No *32, Beirut, 28 April 1909, 
F.O. 195/2311-
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but the mob dispo.rsod when troops wore called in.^^ In 
Haifa and Cidon thorc wore fo«u?s and an undorcurrent of 
unrest lest massacres might break out there. In Nablus, 
however, the local CUP got the majority of the people behind 
them that some Muslims volunteered to go to Istanbul and 
fight in support of the CUP. This zeal was unparallelled
In other parts of Syria. In the region of Jerusalem the 
local CUPs were in complete control of the situation, and 
in places like Jaffa and the town of Jerusalem, the CUP 
succeeded in inciting the populace to hold demonstrations 
in support of the constitution and of the- deposed cabinet 
of Hi Ini Pasha, Thus the CUPs of Syria, with the
exception of Damascus whore the reactionary party was in 
control, rallied the inhabitants to its side on the plea 
that the counter-revolution in Istanbul was a blow directed 
not against the CUP, which it was, but a blow to tho con­
stitution and an attempt to restore the old regime. Alarmed 
at this prospect tho people, even when they showed some 
hostility to the CUP earlier on such as In Nablus, supported 
the CUP. Its alliance with the military authorities was a 
blessing that saved it.
1?0. Cumberbatch to norther, ho.32, Beirut, 28 April 1909*
F.O. 195/2511.
!71. Ibid.
172. al^-riuqaffiam, No.6099 of 22 April 1909.
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The reaction of April 1909 had strong reprecussions 
in Damascus which during tho days of its Fitna became noto­
rious^ known for its narked hostility to the CUP* Moreover, 
Damascus was the only place in Syria where the authority of 
the local OUP was practically non existent. Bitter Arab 
opponents of the policies of the CUP had always come from 
Damascus - men such as Shafiq al-ilu’ ayyad, Bushdl al-ShaSa' 
and Bhuhri al-'Asall who dominated Arab opposition to the 
CUP regimo in tho Chamber of Deputies. Prominent notable 
families such as that of Izzat Pasha a IB Ahid, the disgraced 
second secretary of Sultan Abdul hariid, and of al-Bai:ri - tlie 
close friends of al-’Ibid as well that of TAbd al-Qadir 
al-JaaaJiri, tho famous Algerian Amir and. many others were 
declared enemies of the CUP and they made no secret of this 
fact. Moreover such powerful families carried much weight 
and influence in the Damascene society. They had a groat 
many followers among the lower classes of Damascus, who out 
of ignorance and of the propaganda of some 1Ulama9 came 
to be strong opponents of tho Young Turks. It was such 
notables working with the lower classes who formed a strong 
Huh amii a dan society*news of which the v ?J_i Hazim Pasha sent
to Istanbul 25 days before the counter revolution took
n -j ^ 173place taere. (
No massacres of tho Christians took place in
173. Bee :Tanin, No.261 of 25 May 1909* and of 19 March* 1909*
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Danascus. The reaction there took tho form of celebrations 
end speeches on the arrival ox th^  nows of tho success of 
coup in Istanbul. For throe days Damascus celebrated that 
success. Avon the municipality' was forced into displaying 
decorations and lights. Some speakers went as far as to 
incite the mob to Aumolish the courts of law now 
the age of the Sharia1 had come. Only thro sobs from the 
commandant of the police averted such action. However, 
the officials of those courts were for throe days apprehen­
sive of going to their offices. Similar suggestions were 
xie.de with regard to the Medical school of Damascus and the 
military club, both of which were associated with tho cause
17 4
of the OUP, ( The reaction in Danascus was wholly organised 
and led by/ some Arab notables, and there was no question of 
their trying to secure or work in collaboration with the 
troops of the Fifth Amy Corps stationed in Damascus, since 
they had no contact with those troops. Moreover tho problem 
of language ruled out any cooperation, for the troops v/ere 
predominantly Turkish. The notables used different 
techniques from those of tho loader's of reaction in 
Istanbul, but their aim was the same, namely to abolish the 
regime of the CUP,
174. Details of reaction in Damascus in al-Ahram, 9458 of
29 April 1909- al-Huqattam, 6145 of 15 June 1909.
Tanin Nos. 253 oFT7“May 1909 and 266 of 30 Hay 1909.
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•vitli the crushing of the Coup in Istanbul, and
1 nc
tne deposition of dbdulhayaid, ~(' an event that ux-s
176favourably received in all parts of Syria, ' the Damascene 
reaction faded out and its loaders were sent to Istanbul 
to bo court-martlulled. Moreover with the victory of the 
CUP over its enemies the Ottoman Empire had entered a new 
phase in Its history.
175* 'Text of fetva of deposition In Takvim-i Vekayi, No. 
194 of ,29 April 1909. Diistur, Vol.l, pTXoS and p. 167.
176 Detailed, despatches on this in ShO. 195/2311.
See also al Ho.106 of 28 ..'.pril 1909.
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CHAOT3R_II
0?. E YOUNG- TEEES .ETS TEE A2A3S 
1909 - 1912
The period 1909-1912 holds an inportant place in 
the history of the Turkish-Arab relations. It narked the 
beginning of the end of four centuries of Ottoman rule in 
the Arab lands. From 1909 until 1911 the CUP remained in 
effective control of the Ottoman Empire, and the centralist 
and repressive policies which its leaders tried to impose 
0x1 the subject peoples of the Empire, created a considerable 
amount of dissatisfaction among those peoples and led some 
of them to seek other alternatives to the Ottoman rule,
The Syrian grievances against the Young Turk regime origi­
nated from the pursuit of such policies. The agitation of 
the Syrian leaders to redress these grievances was to de- 
velop into a wider agitation for reforms in their provinces, 
a process which was to culminate in the demend for a decentra­
lised form of govexnment * The frustration of the decentra- 
lisers was ultimately to lead to the appearance of a separa­
tist movement among the leaders of the Syrians. The Young 
Turks have been blemed for the pursuit of such policies,
which, coupled with other ones, led directly to the "destruc-
1tion of the Empire”. hence the importance of the years 
1909-1912.
1. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Kodern Turkey, London, 1968, 
p. 227. — — — — —— —  — —  —
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2V/ith the crushing of the April countsr-rovoluti on, 
the deposition of Sultan Abdullianid and the accession of 
his brother flehnod Ho^ad,^ the CUP assumed more dixxect 
responsibility in the government of the country. In June 
1909 Cavid became Minister of Finance. Cavid was a Bonne
.  A
(a Judaeo-Islamic sect founded in the seventeenth century)
and one of the members of the CUP. Talat, another ardent
member of tho CUP was to replace Ferid Pasha as Minister of
the Interior, Ferid being somewhat arbitrarily removed by
the CUP in favour of their nominee. The Committee, moreover,
introduced in the Chamber of Derjuties a scheme for placing
tlioir partisans as under-secretaries in the various govern-
6mental departments* The measure was, however, rejected.
Until then, and probably because of their being young and 
inexperienced, the members of the CUP had refrained from 
assuming direct responsibility in the government of the 
Empire, and loft men of the old regime such as Kamil Pasha, 
hiIni Pasha and Hakki Bey to rule the country. Their clash 
with Kamil Pasha,'which resulted in his downfall and which
2. F.O.371/771? Ho.287 Lowthor to Grey, Pora, 20th April 
1909# Also al-Huqattan, Uos.6102 and 6103 of 26th and 27th 
April ,1909*
3. Iakvir_~i Vekayi of 28th April 1909- Also al-Ahran, Ho.
April ,1909. * -------
4* On the origin of the Donne see: Sncycloipaedia of Is 1 an,
2nd edition, article on Donne (a nd’uTETIIicTgvcyhiyJA 'Bee 
also The Times, Ho.39583 of 12th Hay, 19U.
5. F.O. 371/124-9/19795 > Memo rand ua respecting the Hew pLegine 
in Turkey, by KnatchbulT Hugossen, F. OTTy^IT Hay, “T^l1 
(piuntod for use of P.O.).
6. Ibid.
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generated a sequence of events that contributed in no snail 
neasure to the outbreak of the April counter revolution 
taught then the lesson of not giving his successors a free 
hand in the administration of the country*
On the pretext of suppressing reaction, and assisted 
by tho declaration of ‘ martial law in tho capital and its 
neighbourhood in April 1909, ? the Oil? was able to purge 
the city of its political opponents and to secure its 
ascendancy in the Empire. A further increase in the power 
of the Committee was derived from the for nation in the 
Chanber of the party of Union and Progress which was the
Q
only really organised party at the tine* The Connittee of
Union and Progress was now firnly in the saddle, and took
9care not to be unseated again. Their nain concern was to 
check and to prevent any further territorial disintegra­
tion of the Ottoman Snpire. Because of this they fought the 
ideas of Prince Sabaheddin who advocated a policy of decentra­
lisation and personal initiative, and desired to get rid of 
the Macedonian and Armenian questions by sone system of 
autonomy.^ The annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia
7- i>akvin-i Yekayi, No.200 of 5 May, 1909*
8. P.O.371/124-9/19765, Memorandum, P.O. 16th May, 1911.
9. B. Lev/is, Siiorgenco, pp. 217-218.
10. P.O. 371/1249/19795, Memorandum, 16th May 1911. Bor a 
short resume of SabahecTdlnrs" 1 deas see: Ikdan, No.5142 
of 17th Sept. 1908, p.2. Also± Tawfiq Ali_Buru, al-Turk 
wa ’ 1-1 Arab f I al- ' Ahd al-Dusturx al-* Uthnanx, Cairo”
v m r w :  *
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and Herzegovina in October 1908, and tho simultaneous seces­
sion of Bulgaria had convinced the Young Buries that unless 
a connon bond of unity nere adopted the Ottoman Empire would 
soon core to an end. Thus they advocated their doctrine of 
"Ottonanisn1 ♦ They proclaimed, "equal, rights for all the 
cl os sas of Ottonan subject a” , and announced, 1 the brotherhood 
of all nations under the Ottonan flag.1 Though the subject 
peoples of the Empire, including tho Arabs, welcomed the 
adoption of such a doctrine, it soon became apparent that 
its application was causing distress anong those peoples.
The doctrine was Hartificial and had no roots in the country.
It could appeal to nobodyfs loyalties, which went as before 
to the family, clan and the religious cennunity* To establish 
and run the new order on it, as tho Young Turks attcr.ptod,
I P
was to burld on sand”. Perhaps it is tlu spread of nationa­
lism anong the subjects of the Empire, end among tho Turks 
themselves, which rendered tho ideal of Cttonanisn unworkable. 
The Young Turks were aware of this fact, though they never 
ceased to advocate their strong belief in tho doctrine of
Ottonanism, and they invariably accused those who doubted its
13
adequacy of either unpatiotic notivc-s or seuaratist tendencies.
11. P.O.371/124-5/19795> Honorcndun, 16th Hay, 1911.
12. E. Kedourie, England and the Middle East, London, 1958,p.59.
13. See for example Bonin, Nos.762 of 16 Oct.,1910 and ?&3 of 
1? Oct.,1910 and~5I9 of 12 Dec.,1910 and 8?2 of 6 April » 
1911.
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Tho loaders of the Committee more too conscious of the 
defects of the doctrine to believe these accusations. In 
fact the politically conscious among tho Syrians as well as 
anong the other nationalities of the Empire had, since the 
coning of the CUP to power, shown a narked scepticism as 
to the sincerity of the Unionists in their belief in the
lii
doc mine of Ottoman! sn. It was in this atmosphere of mis­
trust and resentment that the relations between tho Arabs 
and the Turks developed.
In fact, the whole question of Turkish-Arab rela­
tions started as merely a suspicion of the CUP government 
among a few Arab journalists, notables, professiomALs and
students. Among this heterogeneous group of Arabs, the
15Syrians naturally loomed large; " and they led and domina­
ted the whole of tho Arab novemont against the nationoAist 
tendencies of the CUP. Each side doubted the intentions of 
the other and throughout the years 1909-12, they remained 
thoroughly suspicious of each other. This suspicion was to 
regenerate what the Arabic, press came to call na misunder­
standing between the Arabs and some of tho extremists of the
CUP" . ^  Rafla al~fAsn in a revealing o.rticlc in al-Ahran
I^r^3~!^obib press'^^rtE^’*^ Iuj TU*lhriI~AJI^ ~uelf^  s
see for example: al-Huqthbas (daily) Ho.677/28 of 28 Aug. 
1911* al-Iiuqattan, 11975776 of 12 Jul.,1911, p.4. oi-Ilanar, 
Vol. 16, part I, pp.57-63-
15* S^e above (introduction) pf. \\ - w*.In fact any study of Arab 
affairs during this period is nothing but a study of 
Syrian affairs. Zeino in his book Emergence of Arab Na­
tionalism, deals with no more than tho affairs of Syrians. 
B oe p * fir.,
16. al-Ahram, No.94*22 0f 15 Mar. ,1909.
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stated tiamb tho main reason behind the suspicion and the
rd sunder standing between the Arabs and tho CUP was tlr, CUP ’ s
mistrust of the Arabs and the advocacy of Turkish national
17ascendency by some members of the Committee A { Al-’A^n 
insisted that the whole question of Arabs .-and Turks was con­
fined to some of the leaders of both peoples. The masses 
were not yet contaminated by the virus. He then asked his 
follow Arabs not to defend their cause by resorting to the 
doctrine of ’Arab nationalism1, for in the rise of national­
isms lay tho destruction of the Cttonan Empire. Tho Union­
ists, he concluded, nust trust the Arabs and treat then with
justice and equality, and both they and tho Arabs should
*1 °guard against the disintegration of the Empire * ° The reluc­
tance of al-'Ajsn to admit the existence of a controversy
19between the CUP and the politically conscious Arabs, is 
typical of tho attitude of tho majority of the Christian 
Syrians and of all Syrian Muslims towards tho Ottoman Empire 
during tho period 1909-1911• They entertained no idea of 
separation from the Empire. Their main emphasis was on re­
forms which wore of a very limited nature, such as the
3-7* al-Ahran, Ho.94-22 of 15 March, 1909*
18. Ibid.
19* The politically conscious Arabs were a small group who 
consisted of a few notables from tho families which 
traditionally supplied the local community with its 
leadership, a handful of journalists, men of letters, 
professionals in the big towns and some Arab students 
in Istanbul and abroad. This group led and directed the 
Arab Movement before 1914-*
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construction of roads, the encouragement of the .Arabic
language, the improvement of agriculture and noans of trans-
20port and the reforms of certain aspects of taxation. There 
were no demands for any form of adrdnistrativo decentrali­
sation during this period. In fact when Rashid Matron and
Nakhla Matron, in collaboration with some of their country-
_ 21 men in i-aris, formed the "Conit§ Syrian" there, and issued
a manifesto in which they ashed for administrative autonomy 
for Syria, both the Muslin and Christian leading Syrians 
hastened to condemn the Majrans! call as separatist aiming 
at destruction of the Empire. Both Shukri Ghanim, a pro­
minent Lebanese residing in Paid s, ana Sulaynan al-Bustani, 
the Christian deputy of Beirut, attacked and deprecated 
the call of tho Oonite Syrion and assured tin government of
pp
the loyalty of tho Syrians to the Ottoman throne.  ^ Through­
out Syria tho proposal was received with disapproval, and men
who wore to lead tho decentralisation movement at a later
25stage, criticised it. v The Syrians were not ready yet to
20. al-Ahran, No.9684* of 22 Jan. ,1909. Al-Hanar, Vol. 12, part 
^r'STEarch ,190?. “ —
21. For the formation and activity of this society sec: 
al-Huqaftan, No.6028 of 27 Jan. ,1909*
22. See: Corros'oondonce d*Oriont, No.8 of 15 Jan. 1909?
p.229 fTT"Ilso al-^hfam, No.9385 of 30 Jan. ,1909? p.l*
23 * For iPi o Rafiq and Hsiqqi al- Agm criticised it in
al-Ahran, No.9374- of 18 Jan. 1909, and No.9377 of 21 Jan., 
1969, "p.l. For reaction in Syria see: F.O.197/2511? No*
7, Dovcy to Lovruhor, Danasc. 21 Jen. ,1909* Also Buru, 
pp .91-94*.
ej
respond to any demand for aduinis trntivo do contrails v..ti on.
All that tlioy wanted was a fair share in tho government of
the country and tho redress of certain grievances which.
wero the by-product of the CUP centralist policies. 'The
Syrian Arab leaders probably failed to realise the extent
of such policies and their implication for their embryonic
national movement until 1913* While declaring their loy&lty
to the doctrine of Ottonanism, the Arab leaders resented the
way the Young Turks attempted to apply that doctrine. For
example: when tho CUP tried to make tho Turkish language,
which the Ottoman Constitution recognised as the solo official
onlanguage of the state,"- the medium of instruction in all
the government schools, the Arabic press objected vehemently
25to this deliberate attempt to ’turkify' the Arabs.  ^The 
.Arabic press as well as the .Arab leaders were intentionally 
obstrcucting the efforts of the Young Turks to create an 
Ottoman nation in which tho .Arabs and their language would 
not dominate.
The Arabs in general, and the Syrians in p a r t i c u l a r ,
had, long before the advent of tho constitutional era, become
conscious of their Arab identity that set them apart from the
24-. Article 18 of the Constitution, See Kanun-u Esasi in 
Mecn.ua Kavanin Cedid-i , Istanbul 13 277*"*p767" AALso P.O.
371/l464y/204-56? Enel in No.404-, Lowthor to Grey, Const.
10 Iiay, 1912 (for a translation of Const.)
25* This is tho theme of every article written on the subject, 
see for instance, al-Hilal, part 3? Dec. 1909? pp*160- 
6^4-. al-Muqtabas Xhaily)'7 No . 392 of 9 June 51910, p. 2.
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rost of tlie subjects of tho bnpirj . To put a specific date
p.c
for tho bo ginning of the drab national movement ° is virtual­
ly impossible, for like other national movements its appeFr­
ance was a gradual process. 'The Young Turks, on the other 
hand, were- not oblivious to the existence of such national 
fooling anong the drdbs and tho other ethnic groups of the 
Empire. In fact their doctrine of Ottonanisn was an attempt 
to reconcile tho aspirations of the various nationalities of 
the Empire with the general interests of the Empire as a 
whole. The Young Turks wore to fail miserably in this 
attempt, for they soon realised that the other peoples of 
the Empire, including the drabs, were not ready to sacrifice 
their national interests for that of the Empire. Thus it 
would be erroneous to suggest that the chauvinistic policies 
of the Young Turks during tho period 1909-11 had caused the 
appear once of the drab national movement. That movement had 
manifested itself on several occasions during the roign of
Sultan dbdulhanid, who, by showering favours on drab notables,
27succeeded in keeping them reconciled to his rule. f dftor the
26. Tor example while G. dntonius in his book The drab dwaken­
ing, London 194-5* sac manifestations of drab movement 'iix "" 
tho Vahabi movement of 174-7* and in Muhammad hill's 
attempt to found a Hiddlc Eastern Empire (3cm pp.21-34-), 
S.G-. Haim in her drab Nationalisn, argues against such an 
early date for the drab immbi^ naX^ ’movenont, though she 
does not specify a date. She is inclined to consider the 
movement as a recent growth, see pp.5-15* Tor a different 
view of dntonius1s interpretation of drab national awaken­
ing , see: Z. IT. Zeino, The Eno rg enco, pp • 14-6-151 •
27 • Through drabs like 11 scat Pasha al-’Jibid, Shaykh dbu’l- 
Huda and the brothers La jib and Salim. Mul^ana, Sultan 
dbdulhanid was able to win tho support of an important 
section of the Syrian population, sec Buru, pp.34— 36.
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Constitution, Turkish nationalism classhed with drab nation­
alism, and as a result both the Turks and tho drubs continued 
to draw apart fron each other.
Throughout tho year 1909 the GUP continued to 
consolidate thoir power which reached its height by the 
autunn of that year. ±noy were masters of the army, the
cabinet, tho sultan and the chamber, and had a strong hold
28on the press. Nevertheless, the policies of the C'UP 
during 1909 created considerable dissatisfaction anong the 
various peoples of the Empire. Even before its publication 
in dugust 1909 the press law net with opposition fron a wide 
range of Turkish andmn-Turkish journalists. A telegram of 
protest, addressed to Tanin, the soni-official organ of the 
CUP, and signed by the Muslin and Christian proprietors of 
twelve newspapers in Beirut, objected to the proposed appli­
cation of "'this law which would kill tho Ottoman nation by 
robbing it of Its freedom of expression.1 ^  Compared with 
the degree of the press censorship which existed under the 
reign of kbdulhanid, this press law tended to be more liberal. 
However, it included clauses which night be used to suppress 
legitimate criticism of the government.
28. P.0.371/1249/19795* Memorandum, F.O. 16 May 1911.
29* For text of telegram and names see: Panin, No.300 of 3 
July 1909, p.3. — —
30. For the complete Turkish text of the law see: Dustur, 1 
Tertib Sani, Istanbul 1329 N.H., Vol.l, pp.395-^03» Also, 
Hecnu-a Havanan Cedldi Istanbul 1327 h.H., pp.1-15. See 
aTscCP'.Oo57T779^ J? Besp. No.655? Lowthor to Grey, Const.
11 hug.1909 (minute to).
92
Further discontent was created by tho publication 
of the new Lao; of -Association on 23 August and tho Lav; for 
the Prevention of Brigandage and .Sedition on 27 September 
1909. The first of these nrohibited the formation of clubs
51
and societies bearing the names of ethnic or national groups. 
Consequently, the Greek, Bulgarian, .Libanion and Lrab clubs, 
which were founded eater the establishment of the consti­
tution in both tho capital and the provinces, wore closed. 
This measure caused much discontent anong the non-Turkish 
elements of the Empire, and contributed considerably to the 
increase of the mistrust and suspicion that characterised 
the relation of the CUP with tho subject peoples. The second
law provided for the disarming and repression of armed bands 
32in Macedonia* Moreover, the martial lav; which was declared 
in Istanbul and its neighbourhood after the crushing of the
short lived April counter-revolution, was prolonged until
33 34-March 1911. A lav; regulating public meetings^ in the
capital as well as in the provinces was also passed. The
Commission, which was sot up after the promulgation of the
constitution, to look into the reorganisation of the various
31. See: Dustur, pp.604—608. Also, Meemu-a, pp. 1-5*
B. Lewis, 'nnorgonce, p.217.
32. For tho text see: Meemu-a, Nunara 23? pp.3-16. B. Lewis, 
Emergence, pp.217 FFT
33* P.O. 371/779? No.654-, Lowthor to Grey, Const. 11 Lug., 
1909.
34. For text see Meemu-a, pp.1-5*
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go v o Lament a 1 departments, had caused a further complaint
anong the Arabs; nanely, that its decision to pension some
27?000 superflous officials and officers,^ was biased against
Arab officials. Tho Syrian press claimed that this bias
was a calculatod novo by the CUP against tho Arabs, whon
they wanted to exclude fron tho offices of the state on
account of the collaboration of certain Arabs, such as "Izzat
al-'lbid, with the old regime.^ This, and similar arguments,
37wore sonatinas carried to undignified proportions. Never­
theless, numerous articles continued to appear in the Syrian 
press in Cairo end Syria complaining bitterly that the Tories
had excluded the Arabs from high office, and had made govern-
38nont their monopoly.
These complaints were more representative of a 
snail class of Syrians whon tho Turkish press had described, 
and not without good reason, as "office seekers",^9 wore
in no way representative of the demands of the Syrians in 
general, but vie re den ends more likely to be Made b j young and 
educated Syrians who had been suspicious of tho intentions
35* P.O. 371/124-9/19795? Memorandum, P.O. 16 May, 19H* It 
seons that this round figure‘"of 27? 000 dismissed of­
ficials is exaggeratod.
36. See for example: al-Ahran, No.9497 of 11 June*1909•
al^Muqatten, No.61*92' of 7 -Aug.J909. al-Hilal, Dec. 1909,
p7I54.
37* Lis an al-gal, No *6134 of 30 Sept., 1909. -Arabs claimed 
that Turks Hated then, and often called then ‘dirty 
Arabs' and other nanes.
38. al^Ahran, No.9426 of 19 Mar., 1909, and No.9424 of 17 
March ,T909«
39. Sec: Tanin, No.585 of 19 Apr.,1910, p.2.
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of the Young (Turks towards then and otlior ambitious drabs.
Tho Muslim drabs folt hurt to sou such powerful drabs as 
’Izzat al-f7-bid, dbu*l-Huda al-§ayyadi and others, who hold 
strong; positions undor dbdulhanid, disgraced and removed 
fron their positions* The dismissal of the brothers 
and Sal In Mai liana, tho two Christian Lobanose whon Abdulhanid 
allowed to attain high positions in the Palace, and the sub­
sequent trial and imprisonment of lajib, had given offence 
to the Syrian and drab Christians* Tho drabs felt that in 
denouncing such non the Young Turks "nay have denounced 
drabs in general, as reactionary tools of dbdul Eanid".
Still more, they felt that the drabs had lost influence in 
the Palace, and were not gaining any new positions in other 
departments of the government* A non-drab was appointed
Minister of dwqaf, a ministry that consisted mainly of
41drab pious foundations, they complained. In fact the 
complaints of the drabs were of such a minor nature that the 
Young Turks ignored then; a fact which the drabs interpreted
40 * S. G * Haim, drab Nationalism, p.31 *
41. Hajnu* at^dthir daf Iq al-*dzm, collected by Uthnan al- 
*dpa1 Cairo7 19257 PP * 133-154• dlso, Thawrat al-f drab, 
(dnonymous), Cairo, 1916, pp.53* The ’author of thus book 
has been established to bo As*ad Daghir, who was the 
correspondent of cd-Muqatfram in Istanbul during most of 
the years 1908-1937F7 see Buru, pp.8-9*_ It is of signi­
ficance that Thawrat al-dlrab and TIajmu1 at athar, almost 
copy each other in most of thoir facts and interpreta­
tions of these farts. It is possible that they either 
used the press of the time particularly al-Huqattam, as 
thoir common source, or al-TIaju1 mat used Thawrat as its 
source. It should bo notocTTjhat Thawrat al- * drab copies, 
sometimes word by word, the reports of al-Muqafrtan at the 
tihe,a fact_which supports tho finding that its author 
is * ds1 ad Daghir.
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as a furthor sign of tho regime's mistrust of the drabs.
The drabs, no re than the Turks, had always empha-^
sised the fact that the Young lurks suspected that the drab
leaders wanted and worked fox4 the revival of an drab cali­
phate. Raflq al-’d^ n, who had joined the CXJP after the
ZLOduly revolution, was convinced of this. In his unfinished
Ll 'Zjessay on Ottonan Unity and Turkish Panaticisn he is at
pains to explain the appearance of this ’’runour of the drab
caliphate”, and tho role It played in the enstrangonent bc-
tween the _,rabs and the CUP. Like other drab writers he
attempted to soothe the fears of the Young lurks by reminding
then that it was a Young lurk, Murad al-Daghistani, who
escaped to dgypt in 1894, and together, with other Young
Turks, created the plot of the drab caliphate in order to
45intimidate the sultan into restoring the- constitution,
One finds this explanation absurd end unconvincing.
42., Ms.jnu1 at athar, p. 122, dlso, liain drab Nationalism, p.31.
43. This essay Is included in Kajriu’at athar, pp,118-145. The 
collector added that RafIq"U3Tid not 3T£nlsh the essay be­
cause “ ho good would cone out of It, for refections 
between the drabs mad the Turks had reached the breaking 
point. This fact indicates that Raflq night have written 
his essay sonatina just before 1914,
44* See J.iajnuf at athar, p. 122, Por a discussion of the al­
leged connection between tho Khedive end the plot of drab 
caliphate, see S, Hain, dr ab Is at i o nal i sn, pp. 27-29#
5^* Ha j au1 at athar, p. 122. liain drab, p. 29# See also, 
alddhran, ITo,9495 of 11 June~T9S9? editorial, J.lso,
Ihawrat aI-fdrab, p,48•
al-1dlaxx newspaper, the organ of the nationalist 
party iiT^ ggnrfcT had played an important role in the re­
vival of the rumour of drab caliphate, and had often ac­
cused certain Syrians of conspiring to restore tho cali­
phate to the drabs. Tor examples of this see: al-ilanar,
P/n cont.<
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It could bo argued that by reviving ond debating 
this question of an drab caliphate, tho drab loaders wore 
trying to alarn the Young Turks into taking their complaints 
and don ends none seriously. It was as if tho drabs wonted 
to remind tho Young Turks that they could still cause sono 
anxiety end. division in tho Empire over this question. Tho 
Unionists nust have realised tho emptiness of tho throat 
and therefore never paid it much attention. Every now and 
then, the CUP press would pick on the question of tho .nab 
caliphate either in an attempt to neot some accusations fron 
sono anti-CUP Syrian, newspapers, or in an effort to divert 
attention fron burning questions in Istanbul, such as the 
heated debates which took place in the Chamber of Deputies 
between the Unionists and thoir opponents.
Perhaps tho most manifest indication of the growing 
Syrian national movement was the attempt of the Syrian Arabs 
to defend and preserve thoir language against what they con­
sidered to be xi calculated novo by tho CUP to impose their 
Turkish nationality on the Jn?abs by the gradual repression 
of krabic. This question of language become the first and
one of the most irritating and persistent of all drab
grievances against the Young Turks. Moreover, it showed the 
artificiality and tho impossibility of trying to apply the 
doctrine of 1 Ottonanism'” * It then dawned upon the Young 
P/n. 45 cent,.
Vol.14, part 1 of 30 Jan.1911, pp.36-40. al-Hilal of Doc.1909, 
p.156. al-Huqatfran, Nos.6620 and 6621 of 18 and 20 Jan.1911,
replies to rhe accusations of al-'Alam.
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Turks that any attempt to apply that doctrine- could not but 
bo resanted and resisted. Confronted with this opposition 
fron the drabs, the Young Turks realised that to achieve 
their ideal of 1 unity and progress' they had to rely on the 
lurks alone. The various subject nationalities in European 
Turkov bad long demonstrated their strong dislike of Turkish 
rule, and the Young Turks had no illusions about their sepa­
ratist tendencies. How the drabs showed a strong hostility 
towards the application of the doctrine of Ottomanism, the 
Young Turks bocame more and more convinced of tho necessity 
of resorting to more forceful policies towards the seibject 
peoples of the Empire. Hence the adoption of their 'turki- 
fication1 policies.
In their attempt to achieve their dreon of creating
one unified Ottoman nation, the Young Turks decided to give
to all Ottoman subjects a uniform educational system* By
making the study of tho Turkish language compulsory in all
schools run by tho government, and insisting that it should
remain the medium of Instruction in those schools, and that
all official correspondence, including the proceedings of
judicial courts should be conducted In Turkish^, they wished
into
to make their heterogeneous subjects/na nation which would
46. Political programme of GUP in Ikdan, No.5197 of 13 Nov.*
1908. Tunaya, Partilor, pp.209-512. The Times, No* 
36761 of 25 Sept'. V-
bo one in language.rf ' In trying to do this, it should be
emphasiseds that the Young lurks wore within their constitu
48tional rights, and uero only attempting to carry the
doctrine of Ottonanisn to its logical conclusion, The drabs 
had indeed repeatedly declared their loyalty to that 
doctrine, but were not prepared to go beyond paying such lip
a particularly strong reaction among the drabs.
The drabs have always shown an emotional attach­
ment to their language* Throughout their history, the .drabs 
had held the drabic language in almost religious respect.
It formed, and still forms, the most important factor in 
the ideology of drab nationalism. It was natural, therefore, 
for the politically conscious Syrians to make the drabic 
language the focal point of their opposition to the Young 
Turks' regime.
Zeino, The -emerge
48. drticle 18 of Constitution makes Turkish official langu­
age of the* state. See above p. 89 ? note 24,
service. However, these measures of the Young Turks caused
Fully aware of their numerical superiority within 
the Umpire, end of the cultural significance of their 
language, the leading Syrians saw in the attempt of the* Young
Turks to disseminate their language a deliberate attempt to 
!lTurkify the d r a b s . T h e  Muslin and the Christian papers 
47. Sir Sdwin dears,
49. al-Manar, Vol.12, part 7 of 16 dug.*L909, pp.509-510.
dlso, Dr, d. Shahbandar, al-Thawra a3L~Wa$aniyyah, 
Damascus 1933* pp.2-3* Z.ST”'Zexne, The ^mergence,  
98-100.
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in botli Cairo and Syria were unniino us>yhi opposing this
policy of tho Young Turks, which they Allodgod, aimed at the
systematic repression of tho /.ruble language* Lisan al-gal,
a pro-CLP Christian paper, summarised tho objections of other
Syrian papers when it stated, “nary drabs have no objections
to reading the Turkish language the official language of the
Empire, nor do they object to making it an obligatory subject 
the
in all/government1 s schools. But they disagree with the 
government over its decision to nake Turkish the nediua of
instruction, because such a decision is a blow to the drabic
50 -language, and will nake it soon die out"* Lis an al-IJal
then went on to criticise the use of Turkish in the law 
courts of the drab vilayets. The ignorance of the great 
majority of tho drabs of the Turkish language, and the- con­
duct of legal cases through the nodiun of a translator 
would result in gross injustice. The paper finally con­
cluded with a friendly advice to the government to respect 
the languages of its various subjects, and allow each race 
(’IJngur) to bo educated in its own language • By this means 
the government would "eradicate fanaticism, win over tho 
support of its subjects", and achiova hotter understand ing 
and lasting unity among the peoples of the Empire Being
a, supporter of tho CUP, Lis an a I-ha I, perhaps, was understa­
ting the resentment which tho Muslin journalists felt over 
this problem of language.
50. ids an al-jial, Mo.6195 of 10 Dec., 1909*
51. Ibid.
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“./hilo Li sjm_ 0.1-gal, cd-lliran end aJL-Hilal, al 1 of 
which wore edited by Lebanese Christians, took a relatively 
nild attitude in opposing the language policies ox the Young 
Turks, papers and periodicals owned by Muslim Syrians took 
a very strong view, Nashid Bi$a, for instance, argued in 
s. revealing .article in al-Manar that had it not been for 
tho nationalist reasons which would prevent the Turks fron 
accepting the- sensible proposal of making Arabic the offi­
cial language of the Ottoman Empire, such a proposal would 
have been the ideal solution for the Empire’s ethnic pro­
blems. Bi<Ja saw in the attempt of so no of the Young Turks 
to make their language the medium of instruction in the 
schools as well as the official language in all departments 
of the government an apparent attempt to turkify the Jacobs
by eradicating their language, and in so doing striking a
52deliberate blow at Islam. Though other papers, including 
al-Ahran, which was owned and edited by Syrian Christians, 
kept reminding the Young Turks that Arabic was the language, 
and still is, the language of Islam and of Its prophet 
Muhammad, none of then went as far as al-Manar when it 
suggested that any attack on Arabic would be also considered
52* al-Hanar, Vol. 12, port 7 of 16 bug.,1909, pp.504-505, 
tLe~LirtTcle is entitled, "The Ottoman Nationalities arm 
the Turkish and irabic languages". .6eo: pp.501-512.
53* al-Ahran, No.9572 of 9 Sept.1909* See also No.9759
of 22Apr.^910.
101
54 -an attack on Islan. But Shaykh It I da \ras always reminding
his Traders of the religious Imnity of the'loaders of the
GUP.
Ri<Ja put forward the view of noaiy leading Syrian 
I ms 1 ins xdien he not only equated the Turkish and Arabic 
languages In Importance, but placed brabic a step higher 
"because it is the language of the biggest el orient in the 
Empire [the Arabs], and f^ tho religion of all Muslins 
within and without the Trip ire who are bound to the Caliphate 
with the strongest of ties11,^ This was ,porhaps, the first 
attempt to stress tho usefulness of the Arabic language in 
any pun-Islamic propaganda that the CUP government night 
adopt. Kida was a faithful disciple of Muhammad 1 Abdula 
who was hinself a disciple of Janal al-Dln al-Afghani, 
the alleged founder of the Pan-Islamic movement.^  No 
wonder then if Ri<Ja thought it proper to remind the Young 
Turks of their duty towards other Muslins outside the Empire.
pLida stated that sono Arabs motivated by religious 
reasons end some by nationalistic reasons believed that the 
Ottoman governnont "should rake the Arabic language tho me­
dium of instruction in all its schools, and after its spread,
5^ * al~kanar, Vol. 12, part 7 of 16 Aug.,1909> p.504 
55* Ibid.
56. The literature on al-Afghanl is voluminous, for two re­
cent and upt- date' works' she t E. he do uric, Afaghanx and 
Abduh, London, 196 i N*R. Keddie, An Islamic Response 
to^  Imp or ialisn, Berkeley, 1968.
ioa
the official language of tlie state, because it is the language
57of the bigger element in the llipire ny( 8one inpartial
observers, he saicl, were of the opinion that in order to
solve the controversy about language in the Empire without
affecting the national interests of either the drabs or
the Turks, it would be necessary to reorganise the Empire
58on the dustro-Hungarian model. drabic and Turkish would 
then be of equal standing. This suggestion is the nore
important because in 1913 the secret military drab society
. 59al-1Ahd was to nake it the cardinal point in its programme,
dnother solution which the majority of the leading
Syrian drabs found acceptable but the Xoung Turks rejected,
was that drabic should be the medium of instruction in the
drab vilayets, and Turkish in the rest of the Empire.
Primary and intermediate education for the drabs and the
Turks should be in drabic and Turkish respectively. Both
languages should be made obligatory subjects in the secondary
and higher schools. The business of governnien.t' should be
in drabic in the drab provinces, and a translation bureau
should be set up in order to translate from and to drabic
57* al-Hanar, Vol.12, part 7 of 16 dug.? 1909, p.504. 
58. Ibid., p.506.
59* On al-Tdhd society and other drab societies see 
ChapteFIII, pp. | 43, , r.
adopted sone of tho adiainictr-tivo practices that were in 
use before tho time of hultan dbdulhunid, and which would have 
no ant a greater measure of doceirbiv,lisation in the adminis­
tration of the drab vilayets, was totally unacceptable to 
the Young Turks. The application of such a solution 'could 
have been the negation of the Young Turks* centralist poli­
cies. Haturally all those drab notables end dignitaries 
who had vested Interests In the return of old administrative 
practices supported this suggestion.
d compromise proposed by 'Ubaidallah, an ardent 
Young Turk, and later the editor of the drabic newspaper, 
Jarldat al-!drab in Istanbul, was equally unacceptable to 
the Young Turks, He suggested that the government should 
nake Turkish the medium of instruction for tho Turks, and 
at the sane tine establish academic institutions in the ca­
pitals of the drab vilayets with the function of studying
61and reviving the * arable heritage. The drabs were ready 
to accept this compromise as a basis for a solution. One 
cannot see how such a defective proposal could have served 
as a basis for any solution at all.
The conflict was, however, more than a language
60. al-Nanar, Vol. 12, part 7 of 16 dug.^ L909, pp.506-507•
61. Ibid., p.507* The suggestion of ?Ubaidallah was 
originally published in the Turkish paper Tasvir-i 
Svkar, and translated by M.d, al-Hhatib in" al’-Muqattam 
W7&I63 of 6 July ,1909, p.2. " ~
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problem It was the clash of two nationalities, one drab 
and the other Turkish. Tho latter tried and failed to do­
minate and absorb tho former. Tho Unionists though aware of 
tho existence of somo sort of national foeling among the 
drabs, nade the fatal mistake of underestimating the extent 
and depth of that fooling.
Huseyin Cahid's (Yalpin) defence of the Young Turks* 
language policy, which he published in Tanin, argued that 
by making Turkish the official language in the law courts, 
the government was only trying to apply the principles of 
the Constitution, which specified that Turkish was the of­
ficial language of the state and that all the subject 
peoples of the Empire were equal before the law. Thus the 
Young Turks were not ready to grant the drabs certain pri­
vileges over the rest of the subjects of the Empire. This 
would nullify tho principle of equality and would create 
a dangerous precodent whereby the rest of the subject peoples
of the Empire might demand tho same treatment as the drabs.
6?That would mean the death of the doctrine of Ottonanism 
Cahid’s arguments sc mod logical and convincing, but they 
did not convince the drabs who wore becoming too aware of 
their national identity. al-Haqlqa, a Beiruti bi-woekly, 
declared in an editorial that to repress the language of a
62. fenin, Ho.428 of 11 -Hov. ,1909.
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nation is equivalent to killing that nation, for no nation
can live without its language*® Raflq al-'dzn warned that
by 1 no glee ting the drabic language in its schools and by
with
replacing it / Turkish, despito their knowledge that the 
drabs had now no bond except that ox language, the govern­
ment touched tho id in their tenderest part and awoke their
64 -national sentiment fron a deep slumber11. al-hxran caution­
ed tho government *:not to give offence to the national 
65 -feelings”.  ^ al-Hanar saw the necessity of reviving the
drabic language for 51 languages aregeoong the most important
66factors which constitute nations”.
Coupled with this language grievance there wore 
sporadic complaints that the majority of the Turkish of­
ficials whom the government used to sand to tho drab vila-
67yets were unable to sppak tho language of the country. f
Though this complaint did not assume large proportions at
this stage, yet it was t ;> be the characteristic feature of
68
the programme of the decentralisation movement during 1912-15.
65* a 1 -Haqiiqa,Ho. 255 of 11 dpr.^ LOlO, editorial entitled,
'1 fT:uT Arabic language and the Government”.
64, riajunat dtliar, p. 134.
65* al-dhram, ITo.9572 of 9 Sepg.^ 905, editorial, t!Tbo^^rj^ic 
1 anpuage jlrg the_ Ottoman Lang don ”. “
66. ul-^unar, Vol. 12, part 2 of 23 Har4L909, pp. 111-112.
$7* al-iiuqtabas (daily), Nos. 656 and 695 of 20 dpr. and 4 
JuheTT^TIT"respectively. The Tines, No.3941 of 24 Mar.* 
1911. -Ilso, P.0.195/2342,“c[esT"SoTl8, Young_to Lowthor, 
Damascus, 10 June,1910* .Also, Hajnu1 at athan, pp.142-3*
68. See below Chapter IV, p$.
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To ask for officials who know Arabic was -fefe tlio equivalent 
of asking for drab officials, for the drabs know that very 
few Turks were acquaintof with tho drabic language. This 
was another attempt by the- drabs to oppose the centralist 
policies of the Young Turks, and to initiate a return to 
decentralised a&ainistrative r.ieasures that characterised 
tho days before Sultan b^dillhanid cmae to power.
Hoantine, a general fooling of disappointment in 
the constitutional regime was becoming apparent among the 
public of Syria. Though commissions wore formed in Danascus, 
Beirut, Aleppo end other Syrian towns to consider important 
questions of reform, such as the construction of roads, 
collection of taxes, instruction and nublie security, their
69
decisions were hampered by lack of funds to execute then.
In tho words ox the British consul at Beirut, "tho referns 
so loudly preached at noisy public mootings, parliamentary 
speeches and press articles end in official circles have
onnor come up to expectation”.1 In dleppo, for instance,
there was little inprovoixont in tho various departments of
government while bribery end corruption were "as bad or
71worse than during the reign of dbdul Hamid". The fact that 
the Syrians as well as the other subjects of the Empire 
expected too much from the Young Turks1 regime was no faulr
of the Young Turks. The subject of the Ottoman Empire,
59T"F.0.371/1002T No. or, Dana'Scus, 11 ' Oct ■ ? 
1910.
70. F.0.571/1006, Ho.31? Ounberbatch to lio-'ther, Beirut,
16 Oct. ,1910.
71. F.0.371/1002, No.49, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 11 Oct., 
1910.
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and particularly the drabs, had always relied heavily on
the Ottoman government for effecting changes and reforms. In
vie vo
fact most, if not all, major reforms/initinted by non at the 
top who wore either statesmen or closely associated with the 
business of administration. However, when tho Xoung Turk 
government, harassed by Its financial and political problems, 
was unable to fulfil tho extravagant expectations of its 
subjects, it was hold to blanc by then.
The principle of equality promised by the Consti­
tution meant the extension of military service to tho non- 
Muslims of the Empire. It was hoped that this measure would 
help In creating imperial unity. Since 1855 the non-Muslim 
subjects of the Sultan were nominally liable to conscrip­
tion in the Turkish army, but they always paid the milita­
ry exemption tax (bedel) x/hich the government was more than
walling to accept. In fact until the publication of the
7?temporary law for the conscription of Hon-Iiuslims on 8
August 1909? military service was confined to Muslins.
Though the Christian press of Syria had welcomed
the law, there was a general desire among the Christians
75of Syria not to enlist.* In fact, the application of the 
new law caused an exodus of young Christians to America.
72. For the text of tho law see: Kavanin-i Cedide,pp.1-2.
Fox4 an drabic translation of the "Firman see: al-Huqafrtam, 
Ho.6274 of 15 Nov., 1909*
73* lisan al-gal, Ho.6153 of 22 Oct.,1909- F.0.371/781, Ho. 
737""^oTonoT“Surt ee s to Lowthe r, Cons t. 20 June ,1909 
discusses attitude of Christlens.
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About 5?000 to 8,000 Christians or about ono sixth of tho
Christian population of tho town of IJLoppo, wore reported
to have emigrated in tho summer of 1909. They wore averse
to military service and dreaded being in the badly paid and
74povorty stricken Turkish regiments.* In goms the Christian
youths were said to be fleeing the country to avoid military
75 76service. J They discovered that it was cheaper* to emigrate
to ..murice than pay the military exemption tax. In Jerusa­
lem the same lack of enthusiasm to enlist prevailed among 
both Jews and Christians. Tho British consul reported that
a total of 250 no32-iIuslim.s had left the district of Joru-
77salom for Europe and Aru-rica. * The Roman Catholics seemed 
especially averse to military service, and in Jaffa went so 
far as to petition the Consuls to intervene on their behalf 
and secure their exemption.''7^  In c ultrast to this, the 
Armenian Patriarch realising that his flock had nothing to 
lose by enlisting, urged then to do so The G-rcuk and
the Latin Patriarchs petitioned the authorities to exempt
74. F. 0.371/781, No . 2 8, consul Fontana to Lowther, A1epp0, 
25 Oct. 1909.
75* al-Huqattan, No.6251 of 23 Sept. 1909-
76. Ibid.
77• F.0.1935/2321, No.76, Consul Blech to Lowther, Jcrus•, 
17 Sept. 1909, he further gives the nos. enlisted from 
each community, e.g. 600 Jews, 121 Latin, Armenians 29 
and SO protcstants.
78 - • -ilso , F. 0.195/2321, No • 78, sane to same, J crus.,
2(T^ept. 1909.
79* Ibid.
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p ntho district of Jerusalem 031 ground of its sanctity,
Lebanon was exempted from the military service because ef
its privileged status. The Lebanese living outside Lebanon
attempted to benefit by this exemption but their efforts
81were not wholly successful,
lanin regretted the aversion of the Syrian 
Christians to military service, end assured them that their
op
fears of being subjected to hardships wore unfounded.
Though some Syrian Christian and Muslim papers made a serious
83effort to encourage the-ir fellow Syrians to enlist, ^
the antipathy of the Syrian Christians continued. However*
there is no evidence to suggest that the Young Turks really
minded this unwillingness of the Syrian Christians to join
the army. Nevertheless, it made them suspect the loyalty
of those Christians to the new regime, and they made no
secret of these suspicions. Tanin, for which the Syrians
had no warm feelings, had tine and again hinted tho doubts
84of the CUP on the patriotism of the Syrians. The Syrian 
press, both Christian and Muslim, was not slow to retaliate.
80. P.O.195/2321, No.76, Blecli to Lowthor, Jcrus., 17 Sept.,
1909.
81. For a detailed account see F,0,371/1006, No.18, Cumber- 
batch to Lowther, Beirut, 25 Mar.?1910. Also, al-Haqlqa, 
No,222 of 28 Fob.1910. ~
82. As quoted by Lisan al-gal, No.6153 of 22 Oct.,1910.
83* Lisan, Ibid. Boo also al-Muqattain,' No.6264 of 3 Nov., 
TTOfr Also al-Ahran, No79&!T2 of 15 Nov. ,1909.
f£wiin, Nos.576 and 585 of 10 and 19 Apr. ,1910, respecti­
vely, also, Tanin Nos.754 of 8 0ct.l910 and following 
Nos. for a scries of articles on Syria by one of Taninfs 
reporters. These -articles gave great offence to leading 
Syrians and were another reason adding to the worsening 
relations of the Young Turks and the Syrians.
110
Fox4 instance, the emigration of many Syrians to America end 
otlior parts of the world, which continued bo fora and after 
the Young Turks1 regime, and which had d-mo the economy of 
Syria a groat deal of h a m , was always after 1909 blamed 
by the Syrian press on the policies of tho Young Turks.
This is unjustifiable as the emigration vras caused by nany 
factors sons of which can only bo ascribed to the Syrians 
thewsclvos.
The government, perhaps, preferred that the Chris­
tians pay the military exemption tax than perform tho service. 
"The Turks", wrote the British Military Attache in Istanbul,
"were not anxious to see any military power in the hands of
P 6the Christian races of the Empire".  ^It would havebeon more 
accurate to say that the Christian peoples of the Empire 
were not anxious to share any power, nilit cry or non- 
military, with the Turks. Their hearts were set on estab­
lishing their own autonomous states. The Unionists, sure 
of the existence of such hopes among the Christian peoples 
of the Balkans, suspected that the Syrian and Lebanese 
Christians entertained sinilax* separatist ambitions. Seve­
ral factors contributed to their suspicion. The Lebanese 
showed more concern about their privileged status than about 
their being Ottoman subjects when th-y refused to elect 
deputies to the Ottoman Chamber. Tho Haronites had always 
looked to France for help and protection. Not only did the
85. F. 0.371/781 - No, 73? colonel Surtees to .bowthor, 
Const., 20 June,1909.
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privileges of Lebanon exempt it fron military service, but
the Lebanese domiciled outside the Mountain were agitating
to acquire the sane right. Tho Christian Syrians wore
fleeing the country to avoid military service. Moreover,
tho Mafran brothers, who belonged to a famous Greek Orthodox
family in Ba’albok, had initiated the first Syrian call for
86tho autonomy of Syria. The press of the Syrian Christian 
emigres in North and South America was outspoken in its
criticism of tho Young Turk regime, and its criticism night
>ad or?separatist undertones. * It was this kind of suspicion 
on the part of tho Young Turks which, among other factors, 
contributed t:> the deterioration of their relations with 
those Christians, end ultimately led to tho growth of their 
onstrangenent fr n the Arabs.
Tho Young Turks were faced with immense difficulties 
in trying to solve the internal administrative problems 
which tho Hamidian regime bequeathed to then* In Syria 
as vwoll as in Albania Sultan Abdlilhamid ruled by the favours 
and exempt ions which he gave to the local tribal chiefs and 
notables. Through then he controlled his subjects there.
By attempting to put an end to such practices, and to inpose
86. See above p. 88 for the ’ Cord be Syr ion 1 end the Matron's 
call •
87. The role played by tho Syrian 6migr£s in the Arab move­
ment and their relations with the Ottoman government 
form a separate and an interesting subject which is 
virtually untouched.
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a more direct system of adninistrntion, the Young Turks
did not add to their waning popularity" in either Syria and
-ALbania. During the year 1910 tho Turkish government had
38to tackle disturbances in Albania, Macedonia and in Syria.
The centralising and unifying policies of the Young Turks
wore the main reasons behind the disturbances in ~lbaria
89and Macedonia, J and in dealing with these disturbances 
they were following preconceived policies.
Tho sane could not be said of their nousurps 
which resulted in the suppression of the revolt of the 
Druses of gauran and of the disturbances of the Beduins at 
Kerok. Both these incidents occurred in the latter half of
1910. The Druses had always been a thorn in the flesh of 
the Turkish authorities, and the Young Turks were too busy 
handling other no re urgent and important 11,0110x3 to plan a 
permanent solution to tho problem they constituted.
The Druses* attack on their neighbours, the vil­
lagers of Bugra Bski Shan, the resulting state of insecurity
in tho area and their subsequent cl-ash with tho authorities,
90generally known as "the revolt of tho Druzes"y was in no way
88. For the revolt in Albania see: F.0.371/1245/6167? Desp*
No. 103? Lowtlior to Grey, Const., 14 Feb.iL9H> being the 
Annual Report for tho year 1910? pp.27-29* For conditions 
in Macedonia” and European Turkey in general see the sane 
pp.29-32 and following files.
89. Ibid., for a brief enumeration of those policies of the 
Young ‘Turks. Bee also series F.0.371/1002 ff. for detailed 
information.
90. This Druzo revolt is well documented in tho contemporary 
sources. The press reported on it ALaily. While some papers 
call it a revolt, others calledlt/Fitna, see for example, 
al-Ahran, Ho.s9850 & 9853? 8 end ll mug.1910. al-Muqatfran, 
No".r6'502 of 15 wug.,L910 and following numbers.
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a calculated novc against tlio Turkish local authorities,*^ 
nor was it a nanifestation of the emerging Syrian national 
feeling. Equally, the revolt was noa on anti-constitutional 
movement engineered by son reactionary' elements in Eyria
op
as claimed by sono Arabic newspapers.-* Certainly it was not
a national uprising. The revolt was a nuch simpler affair.
In the days of Abdulhanid, IJauran had been left
to itself; the powerful Druze chiefs paid taxes only when
it suited then, and both Druze and Muslins evaded military
service. The annual movaoent jf the- Boduins fro20 the Ayrian
desert to the Hauran region, their raids on tho Druzes as
well as on other Settled elements, and the unrelenting feuds
between the Druzes and their Muslin and Christian neighbours,
produced a state of persistent insecurity In the region.
Unlike the Boduins, who raided and departed, the Druses,
settled, and better organised and somewhat more united,
gained ground at tho expense of the sedentary Muslins and
Christians alike• They recovered rapidly from a harsh
campaign conducted against them in 1895-96, and started once
mere consolidating their power. Sultan Abdulhanid regarded
then as a possible danger to tho Eijaz railway. It "was only
91* al-Hucjtabas, No.667 of 11 Sept.^ L911 for an article by 
al -1 AsnYxTn this sense.
92. al-A.hran, 9852 of 10 Aug.1910 & 9853 of 11 AugJ.910.
ITsb Ho.9938 of 21 Nov. 1910 stated that Damascene re­
actionaries were behind the revolt. Official investi­
gations, however, proved this to be groundless.
93* The Tines of Fri.,25 Sept.*1910, p.3*
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the growth of disorder in the European provinces and tho
revolt in the Yemen which prevented the Sultan from settling
the Druze question. To use tho words of The Tines, "the
object of the Hanidian policy soone to have been tho
establishment of a sort of equilibrium between Druse end
Boduins, maintained by government interference on behalf of
the side which held boon most recently worsted. But whan,
after some years, the Druses began to g.-.in the upper hand,
the government, with Macedonia and the Yemen on its bach,
94was not in a position to redress the balance.'1-^ As late 
as 1906 tho Druzes raided as far as the outskirts of Damas­
cus without the government being ablu to punish then. They 
resumed their feuds with their neighbours and continued to 
harass tho villages in tho region of IJauran.
In fact it was one of those feuds between the 
AJrash family, tho ruling family of the Druses , and that 
of the powerful Muslim Miqdad of Busra Eski Shan, which 
caused the clash between tho Druses and the Turkish autho­
rities.^^ A murder of 0. Druse stiriwd the old feud between 
the two families, whereby the Druses attacked and pillaged
94. The Tines, Ho . 39385? Eri., 23 Sept .^ L910, p. 3.
95* al-_.hran, No.9850 of 8 . ug.*L910. The Tines, dh.lcL. See 
also; aT-Huqattan, No.6515 of 30 Aug.X^lC. Also, Buru,
p.210.-^ 7 ~ ^ r f r ~
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two villages belonging to the Miqdud family causing c nsider-
°6ah].e loss of life and property.'* The central government, 
anxious to restore Its prestige which had sunk low In Syria., 
decided to sand an expedition against the defiant Druses to 
punish thou and bring security to tho region of Nauran. 
Moreover, the leader of tho coop edit I on, General Sana Pasha 
al-Faruqi, on Iraqi by origin and the son-in-law of the 
Minister of War, Mahmud Shevket Pasha, was ordered to dis­
arm tho Druzes, enlist then, nake then pay the arrears of
the government's tuxes and finally to introduce basic and
on
necessary reforms in the region* * It could bo argued that
the government hoped that the expedition would ovurawc tho
rest of tho Syrians, whose press had lately shown disturbing
signs of strong anti-Turkish feeling* Nevertheless, all the
Syrian newspapers in Egypt and Syria, unanimously approved
q s
of oho expedition and its objectives. Criticism in some
of these papers was not made at the time of tho expedition
but at a much lator date, when relations between tho .Arabs
and the Turks wore strained and at breaddmig point.
96. Lisan al-Hal, No.6397 of 6 hug.1910. Tho Times, No.39385? 
of Fri7," 2p Sept. 1910, p.3* Also, aL-Huqa^am, No.6502 
of 15 ~aug.l910.
97* Lisan al-Jgal, Ibid. The Tines, Ibid. Lisan, No.6399 of 
9 xug.l^lOV al-Muqa11an, No.6498 of ~10 xugTl910, p.4. 
..ls°, al-J .hr s m ~9o52 of 10 Aug. 1910, Thawsat al- 1 Arab , 
p.54,for a slightly different version.
98,. See for example: al-Huqtabas, No.521 of 10 Nov.1910*
al-.Miran, No.9853 ThT 11 Aug71910. Lisan al-igal, No.6397, 
of 5" ..(ugust, 1910.
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The expedition, well arned and equipped, made its 
qq
way in the Druze area, J and after some light fighting was
able to establish its control over Jebe3_ D r u z e . T h e r e
were hardly any complaints of the way general .3an! Pasha
conducted the campaign. On the contrary there was much 
has t p.-,
praise of/ tact and kindness”. On 8th November, 1910,
the British Consul at Damascus reported that- the"revolt had
in
ended, that the Druzes were handing/their arras, and that
102some 250 Druzes were recruited and sent to Damascus.
Having net such success in the £Iauran, the govern 
ment decided to extend conscription to the Beduins living 
east of the river Jordan. To accomplish that, it was nece­
ssary to take a census of the Beduins and to disarm then.
It was decided to start with the Kajail Arabs who lived 
in the kaza of Kerak; but the Beduins unaccustoned to 
military service, fearing the financial consequences of the 
census, and indignant at the prospect of being disarmed, 
attacked the station at Q.atrana on the Hi juz railway, 
killing the station master with two others, looting and
99. al-Ahrara, Ho.9907 of 15 Oct.^910, and Ho.9899 of 6 Oct. 
T9lt)T~~ Also Ho.9900 of 7 Oct, 1910 and following five 
numbers. See also al-Iluqattan, 6494 of 5 Aug., 1910 
and following numbers.
100. Lisan al-Hal, Ho.6444 of 30 Sept.1910. al-Muqtabas, 
Ho32roT*XC Nov.1910. Also, p.o.195/25427W:T65, 
tel. Devey to Lowther, Dan., 29 Oct. 1910.
101. F.0.195/2342, sane desp. Also, Ho.52, Damascus, 8 Nov. 
1910.
102. Ibid. ‘a"*-'*.
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■burning a train and cutting the line and the telagxnrphic 
wires for several miles. In Perak itself the administrative 
building was attacked and burnt-, while the nutasarrif and
103the garrison ox Perak were besieged in the fortress. ^
The first reports coning from Her ale gave very exaggerated
104accounts of the disturbances, but wore soon corrected.
The snail contingent, which Sanx Pasha sent against tho Be­
duins, speedily relieved the fortress and restored law and 
order in the area.^
Thus the Kerak disturbances, like the Druze 
uprising, wurc in no way a national movement against the 
tyranny of the Young Turks. Though provoked by tho attempt 
of the Young Turks to impose a more direct system of admi­
nistration on the Bruizes and tho Beduins, the disturbances
never assumed on anti-Turkish aspect as suggested by the
*1
British A. Consul at Jerusalem. The Bruizes and Beduins
opposed the attempt to infringe on their old privileges. Both 
incidents wore Indicative of the tremendous difficulties
103. For more details of Perak disturbances see: al-fluo tab as, 
Fos.547 of 11 Deco >1910; 548 of 12 Doc.^910 anT'fol- 
lowing Nos. till No.552 of 22 Doc.*1910. Nos.557 of 
26 Bee. until No.561 of 31 Dec,^ L910 contain very useful 
articles about Kerak, population, economy etc. See also, 
Lisan al-gal, No.6507 of 13 Bee.1910. al-Muqattan, 
Eo7SEI2"~of“2 Dec., 1910. “
104. See for example, F.0.195/2343, No.59, Bevey to Lovrther, 
janascus, 13 BeeJL910. al-Muqattam, No.6608 of 21 Bee., 
and No.6609 of 22 Bec.^TO'. ' "
105* Lisan al-Hal, No.6512 of 19 Bec.^910. F.0.195/2343, 
FoIISd, Bevey to Lowther, Damascus, 20 Dec.1910.
106, F.0.195/2334, No.69, 1. Consul Morgan to Lowther, 
Jerusal., 16 Dec.,1910.
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confronting the Young Turk no giro in Syria as well as in the 
rest of the Empire. To try and make out of either the 
Druzes or the Beduins true Ottoman citizens was to attempt 
the impossible. Thus once more we sea the inapplicability 
of the doctrine of Ottonanisn. The loyalties of the Druses 
and Beduins went to the family, to the clan imMmv and tribe 
than to a unified Ottoman nation. Even Islam, a strong bond 
that bound the iluslin Arabs to the seat of tho Caliphate, 
could not have rallied the Druses nor the Boduins to the 
Ottoman state. Islam had always sat lightly on the Beduins, 
and the Druses were hardly to bo expected to rally to a 
Sunni caliph. Thus the Young Turks' attempt at a more 
centralised system of administration had alienated the 
Druzes and Beduins, and deprived their regime of their 
services. If the report of a certain Border, an American 
missionary who lived among the Beduins of Kerak for many 
years, were to be believed, the Beduins had already started 
looking for an alternative to the Turkish rule; for he 
told the British acting consul at Jerusalem that the Beduin 
Shaykhs asked him to convey their desire for English protec­
tion. This desire was expressed as early as December 191ol^ 
It could be suggested that the Beduins of herak wanted no 
more then a regime, like that of the British in Egypt, which 
would relieve then of the threat of conscription. Whatever 
the degree of dissatisfaction among the Beduin Shaykhs,
107* B.C. 195/2343, No*69, A. Consul Morgan to Lowther, 
Jerus., 16 Dec.,1910.
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the press of Syria was unanimous in approving the noasur3s 
taken by the government.
Nevertheless, as early as 1913 when Turkish- 
Arab relations were nearing a breaking point, the govemi­
ne nt 's actions in the Hauran and Tierak began to appear in 
the anti-CUP papers as a deliberate attempt by the Young 
Turks to turkify the Arab s. Shaykh Rashid Ri£a argued
that by disarming the Albanians, and the Arabs the govern­
ment would be in a nuch stronger position to imp^san . its
plan of ^Turkification" over those races who would be un-
109 -able to resist then. y Ri£a, probably, was expressing a 
point of view which in 1913 becane prevalent among his 
fellow Syrians in Egypt, but which was fan too daring and 
unsupported a notion to broadcast in 1910. However, one 
would not expect strong support for the Druses and Beduins 
among the sedentary and highly sophisticated educated classes 
of the Syrians.
Though the Syrians were fully aware of tho con­
sequences for their country of the increasing Jewish immi­
gration into Palestine they found very little to con.ple.in 
about in the policies of the Young Turk government in that 
natter. The Arabic press of the tine- sustained a lengthy 
and interesting dialogue about the Aionist movement in which
108. al-Manar, Vol. 16, part 1 of 8 Jan.*1913> pp.57-60. 
109• Ibid., p.57.
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the Arabs, no less than the Turks, shoved a considerable 
knowledge of that movement and its aspirations,, Surprisingly 
enough, there was little or no discussion of the alleged con­
nection between the Young Turk movement and that of the 
110Zionists. Apart iron sp 033 a die uid isolated utterances
by al-Manar in Cairo and Nahdat al-Arab in Paris, there was
no criticism of the Xoung Turks1 policies towards the Zion-*
111ists1 plans to colonise Palestine. The truth of the nat-
tor was that there was nothing to criticise; for the Young 
Turks, while favouring Jewish ironigration into the Empire 
as a whole, stood by the restrictions which Sultan Abdul-
112
hanid had put in the way of Jewish immigrants into Palestine. 
The Young Turks, though 3.101 sure of the ultimate motives of 
the Zionists, suspected some separatist undertones in the 
Zionist movement which put then on their guard. The Syrians 
kept reminding the government of the dangers of the increasing 
110
   'gues so rn many  ____ 7 _________  -■
1911; 3963d-, 11 Jul. 1911 and ff. Tho British embassy in 
Istanbul supports the views of The Times on the subject,
though independently; for on esa;apIoseo P.O. 371/124*5/
6167, lTo.103? Annual Report, Low the r to Grey, Const.,
14- Bob.^9U* B. Lewis in Emergence, pp.211—2X2, n.4-, 
showed these allegations to bo" groundless.
111. See, St. Antony* s papers, IfiGGle Eastern .iffairs, Ho.4-, 
edited by A. Houfani, 'Oxford 19655 pp.94— 96,for an
article by H. Mandel, entitled m ~
Immigration into^  Palestine, wh 
uhpubiishod ATieVfis'’011 tbif bub j
112. See sane article pp.79*~89 for a summary of these restric­
tions. Also, B.A* (Istanbul) Mecl jo-i vukla Mazbatasi,
o  u x u u  u  -X. A r a u  i  i x u i i f j  o u  y j  u j r  j j u m u i e a
immigration extensively. See pp.190 ff. and Ch.6
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number of Jewish immigrants arriving in Palestine, and
showed a marked willingness to work hand in hand with the
lidgovernment in conbe.ting -'the Zionist menace1’* Not even
at the tine when the Turks and the Arabs were about.to go > 
their separate ways did the Syrian press condemn the poli­
cies of the Young Turks with regard to Jewish immigration 
into Palestine*
The Young Turk movement was concerned first and 
foremost with the maintenance of the territorial integrity 
of the Empire. Essentially it was a conservative movement 
in that it tried to achieve what the preceding reformist 
movements had attempted. Because of this conservative na­
ture, the Young Turks never attempted, or even contemplated 
to effect social change in the Ottoman Empire. They were 
unlucky in that they assumed power at a time when the poli­
tical problems of the Empire overshadowed other social and 
to some extent economic problems. Thus theix* efforts were 
directed to finding solutions for these pressing political 
problems, and they were busy tackling them when the first 
World War broke out; a war that they entered with the hope 
of solving the problems of their dying Empire, but which 
unfortunately ended in the destruction of that Empire. Hence 
the Young Turks era saw little or no legislation with regard 
to social affairs, and limited legislation as far as land 
tenure, industry and commerce wore concerned. Consequently,
113. See for example, a1-Mugtabas (daily) Nos.319 of 16 Har. , 
1910 and 329 of PB'HurT,Y9Td.
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the social patterns were in 1914- nore or less what they
had been under the latter half of the reign of Abdulhanid*
Syria was 110 exception to this indifference of
the Young Turks to social and economic problems. Only in
Aleppo did its vali Huseyin Kazin, who took his post in
November 1910, attempt to break the power of the local
114-Muslin landowners and notables* Though the attempt
11Sfailed and ended in the recall of the vali, one feels 
that such an attempt was not made as a part of a comprehen­
sive plan for social change by the regime. It was, . . . 
probably undertaken because the Muslin landowners and 
notables of Aleppo had remained, since the establishment 
of the constitution, avowed enemies of the new order, and 
their influence and power, which the constitutional regime 
tried to curtail, proved to be a stumbling block in the x^ray 
of the local government* This attempt by the Vali alienated 
them more from the constitutional regime for which they 
had very little respect. Heedless of the new order of 
things in the Empire, they continued to consolidate their 
power at the expense of the local government and of the 
lower classes of the population of Aleppo. Moreover, their 
increasing power had dwarfed and lessened the importance 
of the new regime in the eyes of the rest of the population
114* F.O. 195/2337, No.27, Fontana to Lowther, Aleppo,
15 Nov.,1910, stated that the Vali championed the 
cause of the poor who were oppressed by the rich, and 
that he did not exceed publislaing articles in the press 
attacking the rich landowners who succeeded in having 
him removed. Bee also, 195/2336, No*2, same to same, 
Aleppo, 20 Mar.,1911*
115* Ibid.
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and overshadowed attempts by the local uuthoratios at re­
forming local government* Such attempts passed unnoticed; 
a fact that did not help to enhance the declining popula­
rity of the Young Turks in Syria.
Opposition to the GUP government continued
116throughout 1911 and the first half of 1912. Though
the majority of the Arab deputies in Istanbul and the
Syrian press in Egypt and Syria continued to criticise the
policies of the Young Turks towards the Arabs, the tone of
117that criticism remained moderate and non-separatist. The 
Arabs must have realised that it was not in their politi­
cal interests, and indeed in their interests as such, to 
separate from the Empire. They were always at pains to 
prove to the Turks their loyalty to the Ottoman state.
In June 1911? E?* *izzat al-Jundi, a Syrian Arab nationa­
list who figured prominently in the politics of the tine, 
wrote in reply to an allegation made by the Runeli, the 
official orgen of the Central GUP in Salonica, that the 
opponents of the CUP wanted the disintegration of the 
Empire, that, 1 Our complaints are from a minority group in 
government that has no interest except furthering their 
personal ambitions* The misunderstanding which exists now
116. P.O.371/1491/4-966, No. 100, Lowther to Grey, Const*
31 Jan. ,1911 and ff.
117. See for example, al-Muqattam, No.6759 of 22 June*1911* 
al-Abram., 9975 of 6 Jan.19II. al-Hanar, 1910-11 is 
full of such articles.
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is between the Arabs and such a group. The Arabs and the 
Turks love each other. All that we want is equality and 
justice, and that our demands should be investigated just­
ly. We know the benefits of unity, and we, therefore, do 
not desire to separate. You [Turks] should realise that 
If you want to separate from the Arabs, the Arabs will not 
allow you to do so, and they will grasp you itfith Iron hands 
while saying to you that you cannot separate from the Arabs 
as long as they live. I declare, on behalf of the civilised 
and non-civilised classes, the previous fact. This is not 
for our love to you, but for the love which we entertain 
for ourselves and in order to secure our Interests 
(nanaf1ina), because our political life is dependent on 
our support of the centre of this beloved sultanate. This i* 
the view of all Arabs, civilians, military and the iiihabi-
110
tants of the desert”. The Arabs, having rea.lised their
numerical superiority in the Empire, pressed the Yeung 
Turks to apply the principle of equality which the consti­
tution had granted. This would have given the Arabs pre­
ponderance in the administration of the Empire, a fact that 
the Young Turks were not ready to grant. The constitution, 
for x-diich the Young Turks had long struggled, was to cause
118. al-Huqatfan, No.6763 of 27 June,1911.
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ultimately nucli discontent anony the peoples of the Skip ire
and tlio final dissolution of the ho rid of loyalty that had
for long kept the Ottonan peoples together.
In face of the refusal of the Young lurks to
listen or even to take the complaints of the drabs seriously,
the drabs began to formulate more advanced and drastic
demands. In the early days of January, the first articles,
elaborating demands for administrative decentralisation,
119appearei, m  al-dauoatpan. ' Significantly enough they 
were written by two prominent Syrians.
119. al-nuqattoni, Nos,6919 end 6920 of 2 and 5 Jan. 1912, 
TbyTIaoLqx al-'A£n and '‘Tali nl-Din Yakan.
(a) drub deputies:
Istanbul, being the poll tie:.1 centre of a vast 
Supine couprising various ethnic groups, hud always had 
its corraunities of Armenians , Grreeks, Albanians, -'.rubs 
and others who flocked to it seairing lucrative posts, 
education and above all opportunities in its trade and 
coanorce. The drab corn.unity of Istanbul consisted, be­
fore 1908, of students, officials and ex-officials, cadets 
and officers as well as merchants and drab residents.'*'
After the assembling of parliament in Decobber 1908 the
0
drab deputies formed an important part of that c 01 in unity, 
which played a significant role in the shaping and develop­
ment of the Turkish-drab relations in the period of 1908-14. 
This role, however, was either overlooked or underestimated
1* In a letter to his friend hashid hida, ’ dbd al-Hanid 
al ~Sa.hr awl, doruity for Hi arm, and later a neiiber^ of the 
Otto nan Senate, described ^ vividly the drab con:-.unity 
in Istanbul. See, al-Manar, Vol. 19> part 5 of 29 
dug. 1916, pp. 173-7^
2. The exact number of that cor: imiity is not known. It 
could be between 2000-5000. See, al-Huci-attai:;, Ho.
5914 of 9 Sept. 1908. " "
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by nost of the sources that dealt with the Question of the 
Arabs and the Turks in this period. Istanbul was the 
centre In which the whole question of the dialogue between 
the Young Turks end the leaders of the Arabs originated and 
developed after 1908,^ ~ hence the inportance of the political 
activities of the Arab community in that city. Within that 
community, the Arab' deputies emerged as the nost Important 
group in that some of then wore to play a critical role in 
shaping and loading the embryonic Arab movement during the 
first six years of the constitutional era.
While the students, officials , ex-officials 
and officers participated in the Arab novenent by the forma­
tion of secret and open political societies, the Arab de­
puties, sone of whose names appeared in the lists of such 
societies, could express their political views and criti­
cism of the government’s policies in parliament. Every de­
puty was free to speak his mind, and parliament was not 
affected by mart rail law, which was declared after the 
April counter-revolution in Istanbul and its neighbourhood, 
and which continued to affect the anti-government press and
5. Neither Zeine, The Emergence, nor Antonins, Anln Sa1 id, 
al-thawra al-1Arabiyya and al-'Azani dealt in a satis- 
Tacibry way ilildT'^ his ro 1 e. This is to give only a 
few examples.
4* Lisan al-Hal, No.6918 of 23 April 1912, reported Sharif 
Jbdffar Fasha as saying after a tour of Syria to find 
out the complaints of the Syrians, that nobody in Syria 
talked about the alleged Arab question as they talked 
about it in Istanbul.
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critics until July 1912, when tlio cabinet of Ghazi lined 
Muhtar Pasha cancelled it.
Though some of the non-Arab deputies made use 
of the newly acquired free don of speecli and either criti­
cised or approved the actions of government, the hrab de­
puties, the great majority of v/hon were elected with the
6approval and support of the CUP , renained silent during 
nost of the first session of parliament. Beside the loyalty 
of that majority to the CUP, which was the only organised 
force in the Supine after the declaration of the Constitu­
tion, the Arab deputies lacked proper knowledge of parlia- 
nontary procedure and were therefore unable to make their 
voices hoard from the start. Until the end of par 1 i an e n tary 
sessions in January 1912, when parliament was dissolved 
over the continual refusal of the Chamber of Deputies to
accept the government's amendment of article 35 of the
7Constitution, r about 30 of the 59 drab deputies renained
5. fanin, 23 July 1912. Ikitihan, Ho.152 of 2? July 19^2.
6. With the exception of Shaflq al-Mu’ayyad and Hushdi al- 
Shana1, deputies of Damascus, and^Ialib al-Uaqlb and 
al-Zuhayr (Basra) and Yusuf Shutwan (BeghazI) all the 
Arab deputies were elected under the auspices of the CUP. 
See, a Buru, pp. 113-116. Also, above pp. 7?-
7. Article 35 which was already amended in 1909, stated 
that in case of disagreement betweon the Chamber and 
the cabinet, the latter had to resign or submit to the 
Chamber. If the cabinet resigned, said the new Ilinistry 
adopted its predecessor's posture wyhich the Chamber 
still rejected, then the Sultan could, with the consent 
of the Senate, dissolve the Chamber* The government1s 
amendment, however, aimed at restoring to the Sultan the 
power enjoyed by him under the Constitution of 1876 of 
dissolving the Chamber without consulting the Senate.
See, B.A. (Istanbul), Heclis-i Nebusan Zabit Coridesi
/cont...
ardent supporters of tlic CUP party* ^ 9
Other reasons given for the silence of the Arab 
deputies were that they lacked proper knowledge of the
o
Turkish language, that there were no good orators among
then and, finally, that some of the CUP deputies tended
to shout down all speakers who did not agree with then,
thereby intimidating and silencing the Arab deputies even
when Questions directly concerning then were being discussed.
Shuler I Ghanin, the brother of the Beirut deputy in the
1876 parliament, the famous IChalil Ghanin, complained in
a letter from* Paris, in which he enumerated the demands of
the Arabs, and which caused considerable resentment in
CUP Quarters,^  that the Arabs did not elect suitable 
11deputies.
The reason for their silence nay, however, be 
sought in the fact that the 23 July 1908 Revolution was so 
sudden that it threw the whole Empire into confusion and
P/n, 7 cont. from previous page,
(henceforth Zabit Ceridosi) pp.649 ff. Sitting of the Chamber 
No.31 of 24 DecT^rgTIT^ZTso, al-Ahram, Nos. 10293-10300 of 
16-24 Jan. 1912. ______
al-Muqattan, No.6015 of 12 Jan. 1909.
9- al^Muqattam, No.6070 of 17 March 1909. Lisan, No.5996 
oT 12 March 1909.
yuudu> Nos. 574 and 576 of 8 and 9 April 1910, respective- 
Ty7“
11. Lisan, No.6311 of 28 April 1910.
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took a very body by surprise, including tlie Young Turks*
Thus the drub candidates for election to the Chanker had
no tine to foruulate a progranne of action to follow if
elected, They, together with other Ottonan deputies, were
unaninously agreed on the condennation of absolute raile,
their deternination that there would be no return to such
rule and in their opt inis tic hopes for a bright future for
12the Ottonan Empire. Beyond such hopes, they wore agreed 
on nothing.
In fart the drab deputies did not fom socially,
culturally and politically, a single and honogoneous group.
They were not even all drab; for anongst their numbers
there were 15 Turks elected to represent constituencies
13m  the drab p3?o vinces. The Constitution, however, de­
duced that a deputy elected to the Chanber should re­
present the whole Ottonan people, not the inhabitants of
14
his constituency alone. dpart fron this, the differences 
in background, education and social standing nade of the 
drab deputies several snail groups, which had nothing in 
conaon cue opt the nane of drab, which covered Yeneni,
12* al-Ilupatfan, ho.6070 of 1? March 1909.
13. Buru, pp.108-109.
Id, See article 71 of the Constitution: Turkish text in, 
Mecnua, "Kanun-u esasi% p.18. English translation 
in Low the to Grey, Bo.io^ -, conf., Gonstant*, 10 May 
1912, forwarding a conplete translation of the Ottonan 
Constitution, E.0.371/14-9 V204-56, p.6.
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Syrian, Hijasi and Iraqi deputies. Ev.m within such 
territorial divisions, social and cultural differences di­
vided one group of deputies fron the other. Hot all the 
deputies of the vilayet of Aleppo, for example, shared 
the sane political views, nor did they cone fron the sane 
social class. A deputy fron Danascus night have none in 
connon with a IJijazi or Yeneni deputy than with his own 
fellow Syrian deputies, This is why it could he argued 
that to speak of an Arah question during this period would 
he to speak of a phenonenon which had not yet energed. 
Nevertheless, despite this lack of unity x^ hich nade the 
Arab deputies ineffective during the first session, and 
to sone extent during the rest of the sessions of parifa­
il ent , sone of those deputies managed to narrow the gaps 
separating then, and to create an Arah lobby in the Chamber 
xfhich played a critically inportant role in powor-politics 
during the period 1909-12.
The loading nen behind the creation of such a 
lobby wore sone of the Syrian deputies, who were opponents 
of the CUP even before their election, such as Shallq al- 
Mu5ayyad al-1Agn and Bushdl al-Shana1 of Danascus, or 
supporters of the CUP who becane disillusioned with it, such 
as 'Abd al-Hanid al-Zahra&I, the deputy of 5ana• Not only 
that, but when the dissident Arab deputies engineered the 
formation of the Liberal Moderate Party (al~gizb al-ffurr
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aI-MuT tadil), the same category of the .Syrian doputies 
was the driving force behind this, act. Their members were 
active in opposing the GUP both inside and outside the 
Chamber, hence the dominant role which the Syrian deputies 
played in the embryonic drab movement.
i/lion the first session began on 17 December 
1908 the majority of the drab dex>uties were content to re­
main adherents of the CUP. Until then, the Committee was
the only organised force in the Chamber, and there wore no
15signs yet of cry rival parties. The CUP which had de­
clared the Constitution was very popular, and people were 
seeking its favour and support rather than thinking of op­
posing ito However, this happy situation for the CUP was 
not to continue for long. By the end of January 1909 
Isnail Kennl Bey, a prominent Albanian deputy (for Berat), 
and until the declaration of the Constitution a veteran
Young Turk, succeeded in forming the Liberal Party (Ahrar
16Pirkasi), the first opposition party in the Chamber.
The majority of its members were, naturally, Albanians, 
but we were told that some Arab deputies sympathised with
15 • al-fluq hut am, Ho. 6041 of 11 Bob. 1909. Ikclam, Ho. 5232 
0?" 18 Dec. 1908.
16. Ibid. Also, Tunaya, Partiler, pp.236 ff. for its pro­
gramme. The'official date of its formation was given 
as 11 Sept. 1908, but it started to be effective 
inside the Chamber fron Jan.19099 the date of its 
real life*
17it, and that four or five of thorn joined its ranks. r
Nevertheless, the A.rab deputies did not try to
forn a party of their own, or even a parliamentary bloc
until November 1909. Encouraged by the activity of the
Liberal Party, and aroused by the criticism in the Arabic
press of their prolonged silence, some forty Arab deputies
net and discussed a plan to follow in the Chamber. They
18elected a committee of eleven to formulate such a plan.
This, however, was not an attempt to forn an Arab party, 
for that committee of eleven included some of the ardent 
Arab supporters of the CUP, such as Sulaynan a 1-Bust"hi, 
deputy for Beirut, who never wavered in his loyal'by to the 
CUP.l^ In fact the correspondent of al -iiuq tab a s in Istanbul 
wrote to his paper that Arab deputies had agreed to serve
one end, namely the Ottonan bond, and that they had de­
cided to enter the ranks of the CUP party. This, the cor­
respondent added, they did with the advice and guidance of
-  _  -  O f )
Sul aynan al - Bus t a m .
While the correspondent did not mention a number,
one source at least stated that forty Arab deputies entered
op
the CUP party at this particular tine."1" This could have
1?. al-Iiuq_a11an, No.6041 of 11 Neb.1909. No names wero given.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., for the names of the committee of eleven.
meant that the- leaders of the CUP made a serious effort 
formally to enlist some of the hrah deputies, tor until 
then all who professed liberal ideas and showed sympathy 
with the ains of the Young Turks were considered as menhers 
of their party. Membership was still a loose tern which 
lacked definition. To have been discredited or exiled by 
the old regime was enough to make one enter the ranks of 
the liberals who fought for the restoration of the Consti­
tution. -association with the old regime was tho stigma of 
shame and unworthiness*
In fact when the election of four Arab deputies 
was challenged in tho Chamber, one of the charges brought 
against then was their association with the Hamidian regime* 
It was only after some discussion, in which the rest of 
the Arab deputies showed their lack of unity and organisa­
tion, that three of the four Arab deputies wore accepted
pp „
by the Chamber. The candidature of the fourth, Yusuf
Shutwan, deputy for Benghazi, was rejected on tho grounds
that he was one of the spies of Abdulhanid, that he was of
bad character and finally that ho had used his influence to
secure election. It is of interest to note that Shutwan
24was elected by his constituency in absentia. However, he
22. Lisan, Nos.5917 o^ -d 5950 of 14 &, 19 Jan. 1909 respectively. 
Also, al-Muqattan, No.6015 of 12 Jan. 1909.
25* Bor details, see minutes of tho 3rd Sitting of the Chamber 
on 22 Dec. 1908, In Takvim-i Yekayi, Nos.74 and 75 of 
24 & 25 Dec. 1908, respectively. Also, al-Muqatj?an, No.
6008 of 31 Dec. 1908. '
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was only accepted when re-elected. Shufrq. al-Mu’ayyad, the
deputy for Damascus who won his seat without the support
of the CUP, and one of the chief founders of tlio Arab-
25Ottoman Brotherhood,  ^which the Unionists viewed with
great suspicion, was the first of tho three Arab deputies
case
to be accepted. The discussion of his/was brief, and it
is remarkable that none of the Arab deputies cane to his 
ocdefence. Instead it was Siza Tevik (Bdrine) who defended
- 27al-Mu’ayyad and refuted the charges brought against him.
The election of J?alib al-Naqlb, the leading notable of Bagra
who became its deputy, and that of his colleague, Ahmad
p °
Pasha al-Suhayr, was also accepted without much trouble. °
It seens possible that the CUP decided to use its 
majority in the Chamber to obtain acceptance of the elections 
of all three Arab deputies, on the understanding that Arab 
deputies would formally enter the ranks of its parliamenta­
ry party. This would explain the entry of the forty Arab 
deputies in the CUP party.^ It is also feasible that the 
Young Turks, already sensing opposition fron some of the non- 
Turkish deputies, such as the Albanian veteran Ismail Kenal
25- Bor this society, see, below, pp. 167-175*
26* Sitting, No*6, 28 Doc. 1908, in Takvim-i Vekayi, No.79
of 29 Dec. 1908, pp.9 ff. for details of that discussion. 
al-Muqattan, No.6015 of 12 Jan. 1909.
7^* Ikdan, No.5243 of 29 Dec. 1908 for a resume of Sized s 
speech and commentary.
28. Bor more details, see Sitting No.24 of 8 Feb. 1909* in
Takvin, No.121 of 16 Feb. 1909* PP«6 ff.
29. See above, pp. 133-134.
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Bey, wanted to strengthen their already big majority by
winning over the wavering Arab deputies * The Arab-
Ottoman Brotherhood was certainly doing its best to make
itself the focal point around which the Arab deputies night
gather.^ It caused uneasiness in GUP quarters by tho grand
reception which it organised for tho Arab deputies on their
arrival* The Turkish Press sensed nationalist undertones
31in the anthem and slogans read at those ncaptions. This 
seems to have worried the GUP, which in an effort to secure 
the support and goodwill of the Arab deputIis, decided to 
accept the election of the three deputies. Moreovexq 
‘Arif al-Mardinl, one of the founders of the Arab-Ottonan 
Brotherhood and an outspoken critic of the GUP, was appointed 
vali- of Basra in February 1909.^  While ’Arif showed re­
cognition of the favour which the Corral it g o  had done him 
by remaining faithful to them to the end, and by combating 
on their behalf the reformers in the vilayet of Syria in 
1913* the thrwe hchb deputies, to whose elections the Com­
mittee objected, remained throughout the parliamentary ses­
sion which ended in January 1912, bitter opponents of the 
Committee. Both Jalib al-Naqib and Aluiad pasha al-Zuhayr 
played a, loading role ir opposing tho government’s scheme
50. al-Hnqattan, Ho.6041 of 11 Fob. 1909.
31. Ikd oi 1, Ho s. 5216 mid 5218 of 2 & 4 Dec. 1908 respectively 0 
Also al-Iheqat^am, Ho.5997 of 17 Dec. 1908.
32. al-liaaattam, Ho.6064 of 10 Harch 1909.
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to fuse the Ottonan Navigation Company, the Hanidieh, 
with the British Lynch Company. The affair which cane to 
he known as the Lynch Affair was probably one of the reasons 
behind the sudden resignation of the cabinet of Huseyin 
HIIni Pasha in December 1909* Shafiq al-Mu7ayyad, the third 
aggrieved Arab deputy, remained to the end, sometimes the 
sole Arab deputy to do so, behind all opposition to nost 
of the Unionists' schemes and policies*  ^ His opposition 
to the Committee was almost a personal vendetta, which 
ended in 1916 when he was hanged by Ceimal Pasha for alleged 
acts of treason.
Apart fron condeMiing the manifesto issued by
- - -the 1 Conite Syrien’ founded by Rashid Matran in Paris,
the Arab deputies renained dormant within the Chamber for 
the first four months of its life. The manifesto, which 
called for autonomy for Syria, caused a stir in Istanbul 
and Syria. Telegrams were sent from Damascus, Beirut and 
Paris to the Chamber dissociating the Syrians fron the ma­
chinations of the Maprans and emphasising the loyally1* of
33* Bee for instance, Zabit Ceridesi, Sitting, No.14 of 
13 Nov. 1909* in lakvin, No.~4G9"~of 24 Dec. 1909, pp*
2-7* Also, Meeting No.57 of 13 Feb. 1910, Zabit 
Ceridesi, pp.1614 ff.
34. This society is of no importance, for - apart from this 
manifesto - it was completely inactive. For its forma­
tion, see, al-Muqattan No.6028 of 27 Jan, 1909* Al- 
Muqatrfran, also condemned it. For a copy of the 
Manifesto, see, F,0.371/561/45494 (110 covering despatch) 
Also, The Times, No.38852 of 9 Jan. 1909, and No.38928 
of 8 Apn7T9Cf9.
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the Arabs to the Ottoman throne. ^  Ruhr al-Khalidr, the 
deputj^  for Jerusa.leu, agreed with the contents of those te­
legrams and ashed that they should be pub 1 is he cl in the 
press.^ ’Ad al-IJanld al-Zahrawr decolored this "madness
of Rashid Matron1' and requested that Matron should be tried
37 —by the government. { Rushdi al-Bhana* (Damascus) complained
that the Turkish press confused Hairin’s society and called
38 ~r —it an Arab society which it was not, Mir Mu]pamnad Arslan
(Latakiya) reminded the Chamber that this act of Rashid
Matron should not be held against his family who were loyal
39Ottonan citizens,  ^ Having assured the government of their
40103mlty to the new regime, the Syrian deputies, together 
with the rest of the Arab deputies, were content to remain 
silent over nearly all the major issues discussed in the 
Chamber until well after the crushing of the counter­
revolution of April 1909.
35* For the text of such telegrams, see Tnkvin, Ho.97 of
20 Jan. 1909. Damascus telegram was sTgnea by 218 per­
sons, many of whom were Christians. See also Ho.95 
of 18 Jan. 1909.
36. See Bitting Ho.13 of 14 Jan, 1909 in Tabvim, Ho, 94 
17 Jan, 1909* pp.5 ff., and Ho,96 of T^Tjan. 1909.
37 * Ibid•
38. Ibid,
39. Sitting of 18 Jan. 1909 in Tanin Ho.168 of 19 Jan. 1909*
40. Huseyin Cahid Yale in, "Osnanli Meclisinde - Arap
Mebuslar". Yakin Tarihniz, Vol.I, pp.265-266 accused 
the Arab deputies of denouncing the manifesto of 
Matron "011137 outwardly".
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For instance, in both the clash between lianil Pasha
41and the'CUP which brought about his downfall, and rhe
sequence of events leading to the coup d'etat of 13-14
April 1909* the Arab deputies showed negligible interest.
On 13 February 1909 the Chamber assembled to question
Kanil Pasha on sone ministerial changes which he had nade
42without consulting his colleagues. He was suunoned, but 
he refused to cone, and tried to have the interpellation 
postponed. But the Chamber was In no nood to wait, and 
without hearing Itanil' s explanation, the deputies passed
43a vote of no confidence in his cabinet by 198 to 8 votes.
Kanil's fall was wholly engineered by the CUP, for only a month
before * his cabinet had received a large vote of con-
44
fidence by the Chamber.
The great majority of the Arab deputies went along
with the CUP, either by voting against ICanil or by abstaining.
Out of the eight deputies who voted for Kanil, three were 
45Arabs  ^who, though CUP supporters, went against the wish
41. For tho downfall and its results, see F. Aonad, The
CUP in Turkish Politics, pp0 70 - .
42. Lowther to Grey, Ho.93* Conf., Pera, 11 Feb. 1909*
F.0.371/760/6295. Also, McCullagh, pp. 33 ff.
43. Sitting No.21 In Takvin of 18 and 19 Feb, 1909. -Iso, 
Lowther to Grey, boT IU2, conf., Pera, 15 Feb. 1909, 
F.O.37I/76O/705O. al-MuqafrEan, No.6050 of 22 Feb.1909,p.1.
44. Sitting'No.12, part 2 of 13 Jan. 1909 iu Takvin of 16 
Jan. 1909. Also, Tanin and Ikdan of 14 Jan, 1909*
45. They were al-Zahrawi (jjana), Rif'at (Aleppo), and Sayyid 
Muhamad !Abd al-Rahnan (Uudayda) . See, Ikdan No.5288
ox 14 Feb. 1909.
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of their party. It has, however, heen suggested that the
Arah deputies agreed to vote against Kanil if the Counittee
46agreed to disniss the geyh -ul-Islan Ceiaaluddin Efeiidi.
There is 110 evidence to support this suggestion. Apart from 
the fact that Cenaluddin's nenoirs nade no nention of this 
condition,^ the Arab deputies had no complaint whatsoever 
against the geyh-iil-Islan. The truth of the natter was that 
the Arab deputies like nany of the other nenbers of the CUP 
party, had no definite plan for voting in this, and other 
crises. Deputies had hitherto voted as their private con­
victions diet ated, and it was not until the second parlia- 
session
nentary/of April 1912 that CUP deputies were nade to toe
the party line in all natters of importance.
Arab deputies were almost silent as to the demands
and needs of /k*ir constituencies, and their activities in
the Chamber between December 1908 and April 1909» were in-
48dividual efforts which lacked coordination. They did not 
reflect the demands of the Arab provinces as revealed by 
Arab journalists in the press. For instance, the deputy
46. Tiirkgeldi, G-ortip Istittiklerin, Ankara, 1951? pp.20-21,
as quoted by P.' Ahmad* The CtJP In Turkish Politics, V • Iz, n. ts£
47* Bee Cenaluddin Efendi,. Hatxrat-i-Siyasiye, Istanbul,
1355/1917.  —
48. Bee for instance Sittings Uos. 12 and 13 of 13 Jan.
1909 in Takvin, Ho.93 of 16 Jan. 1909; and Sitting Ho.
36 of 6 HarcTTl909 in Takvin, Ho. 140 of 9 March, 1909.
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of Euxrus introduced a report to tlio Chamber in its sitting 
of 1 March 1909 requesting that until tho Turkish language 
bocane none general, officials sent to vilayets such as 
IJijaz, Yenen and Tripoli should he chosen fron those who 
knew the local languages # 'Tie hrah deputies (except for 
al-Bustani, who suggested that the report should he trans­
ferred to the appropriate commission for further study),
49renained completely silent over this important issue.
Moreover, they did not raise a finger when the proposal
50for a firmer Press Law was discussed in the Chamber. The
proposal caused considerable opposition in both the Turkish
51and Syrian press. Embarrassed by this silence, a group 
of Syrian deputies attempted to organise sone sort of 
joint Arab action in the Chamber. They thought of forming 
an Arab opposition party,
In February 1909? opposition to the CUP began 
to manifest itself among non-Turkish deputies. It was
52then that some Arab deputies over 60 according to Tanin ,
49* See Sitting No. 36 of 6 March 1909 in Takvin, No *140 of 
9 March, 1909*
50. See details in Sitting No.47 of 29 March, 1909 in Takvin 
No.165 of 30 March, 1909*
51* See Ikdan No.5282 of 8 Feb. 1909* Tanin No.300 of 3 July 
1909. Lisan No.5951 of 21 Feb. 190^T7""a 1 -Ahran I>To.9441 
of 7 April 1909.
52. Tanin No.191 of 11 Feb. 1909.
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held several nee tings under the c hai r r ion ship of Nd.fi ’Pasha
al-Jabirx, deputy for Aleppo, to consider their tactics
in the Chanter and to forn c. moderate par'by which would he
55open to all Ottonan deputies. The purpose of this party
would he to strengthen the "bonds of Ottonan unity hy pre­
serving the right of equality which the Constitution granted 
to all the peoples of the Empire. However, while aplying 
this principle of equality the numerical proportion of 
each ethnic group (tunsur) would have to he taken into con­
sideration. Only through such a scheme, could true Ottonan 
unity he achieved. Naff1 Pasha and his friends claimed
that their proposed party would attempt to accomplish
^  • • 54this pro case am.
This attempt to create an hrah parliamentary party
was bitterly criticised hy Huseyin Cahid in an editorial in 
55Tanin. Despite its professed Ottonan aims, Cahid saw in
the party an attempt to break the unity of the Empire instead
of strengthening it. He accused the drab deputies concerned 
of wanting to form a purely "Arab party" which would cater 
for Arah interests only (nanafi1 1arahiyya). He then 
denounced the party as a 'national (nilli) party which
53. IkdamNo.5287 of 13 Fob. 1909, p*3, Naff explaining the 
aims of the party to Dr.Kiza Nur (Sinope), and denying 
any nationalist aims of the proposed party.
54. Tanin No.191 of 11 Feb. 1909.
35* Ibid. Editorial entitled "Arap Firkasi".
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constituted a clear invitation to otlier ethnic groups in
56the Empire to follow its example.
In its next issue laniii reported tliat deputies
fron the Xenon and African Tripoli had denied any knowledge 
a
of such/party, and had gone further to deprecate all 
atterpts to break up Ottonan uni'by. 'In an attempt to ex­
ploit regional and political divisions anong the Arah de­
puties, Tanin called upon the deputies of Baghdad to nake
57their stand clear fron the recent Arah machinations.
Tanin knew that the GUP could count on very devoted sup­
porters anong Baghdadi deputies such as Isnail Hakki Baban- 
zade. Petty divisions anong the Irak- deputies, and their 
lack of leadership, were real difficulties to he overcone 
bofo.ro an Arah opposition party could he formed. Nafi* Pasha 
and his colleagues had to wait until November 1909 when 
their efforts materialised in the formation of the Liberal 
Moderate Party.
The April counter-revolution was a blessing in
them
disguise for the GUP, fox’ it left/the unchallenged masters 
of the Empire. Thoy were in complete control of parliament. 
The Liberal Party (Ahrar), the only opposition party, was 
dissolved. Its members were disgraced on the grounds of 
their alleged part in the counter-revolution, and their
36. Tanin No.191 of 11 Feb. 1909. Bor further cricisns
see7^ H„ Cahid Talpin "Osiaali Meclisinde - Arap Mebuslar" 
Yakin Tarihiniz, Vol. I, pp.265-266.
57. Tanin No.192 of 12 Peb. 1909.
i m
leader, I snail Renal, was in flight. The Press law was 
passed "by the Chanter alnost without opposition* The 
Arah deputies, who showed sone irritating signs of wanting 
to forn their own party, together with other dissident 
deputies, were stunned hy the success of the Unionists, 
and were content to toe the line, at least for the tine 
being. With such a colourless Chamber, there was a pres­
sing need for an opposition party.^
i/hen the deputies returned iron their parlinenta- 
ry recess in November 1909? al-Muqafrton's correspondent in 
Istanbul wrote to his paper that there were signs that 
this session was * going to he one in which parties would 
he formed.^ I snail ICenal, who returned to the capital, 
was husy trj^ ing to forn another party fron the remnants 
of his Liberal Party, and fron the dissatisfied non-Turkish 
deputies, whoso numbers began to increase. Meanwhile sone 
32 deputies, the majority of whom were Arabs, held a 
meeting in the Pera Palace Hotel where they agreed on the 
necessity of forming a political party. This party, they
decided, to call the Liberal Moderate Party (al-gizb al-
60gurr al-Hu11adil) . Its purpose would be to strengthen
58. Buru, p. 255- Ikdan. Nos, *54-38 and 54-51 of 9 & 22 Nov., 
respectively."-
59- al-Muqattan, No.6274- of 15 Nov. 1909.
60. Buru, pp.260-261. al-Muqatfan, No.6280 of 22 Nov* 1909# 
Ikdan No.54-63 of 4- Dec.~l909T
the bonds of unity among tho various ethnic groups of tho 
Rapine without encroaching on tho rights or tho identity 
of any one group. Furthermore, this party would oppose 
the government in a moderate and constitutional way, and 
would work to pronote true equality anong the peoples of 
the Empire. Though the party would be opposed to dividing 
the Empire on any federal basis, it would advocate the prin­
ciple of nore participation in the local administration of 
the vilayets by the general councils.
This party, however, was not wholly an Arab party; 
it had sone frnenian, Greek, Albanian and Turkish deputies 
anong its nenbers. Sone Arab deputies still adhered to 
the ranks of the CUP party, and sone of then tried to 
discourage their fellow Arabs fron joining the newly
CO
formed party. They had little success. Rushdl al- 
Shana1 (Damascus) nade an attempt to give the party a dis­
tinct tly Arab character by including in its programme se­
vere,! points relating directly to Arab needs; the nost 
outstanding of these being the elaboration of schemes for 
settling the nonadic Arabs. The attempt was, however, given 
up for the sake of creating a nore heterogeneous party which
61. Por full or details of programme see, Tunaya, Partiler, 
pp.282-285. Buru, p.263, Lisan No.6193 of 7 Dec.T'959# 
al-Muqatfan, Nos.6280 & 629!T"c>f 22 Nov. & 9 Dec.
1909.
62• al-Muqattan No.6281 of 30 Nov. 1909.
63would cater for the needs of all its different members.
Thus, after November 1909 the Arab deputies were
divided between the CUP Party and tho Liberal Moderate
Party* It is significant that only one of then joined the
third party in the Chamber, formed on 21 February 1910,
under the name of The People’s Party (Aha1i Firkasi)^ .
Its programme, criticised hy Cahid in Tanin as noro suitable
for European countries than for the Ottonan E m p i r e , ^5 did
not appeal to the Arab deputies* However, the People’s Party
professed itself to be a democratic socialist organisation
interested mainly in the betterment of the conditions of
the peasants and workers. It also advocated a greater
measure of administrative decentralisation, which non-
66Turkish groups found interesting* The Arab deputies were 
already too far connitted to other parties to give such a 
programme a serious thought. But it nust be added that 
both this party and the Liberal Moderate Party continued 
to act cooperatively inside the Chamber until their merger 
in the liberal Entente in November 1911*
63. Buru, pp.261-262.
64. The list of founders included the name of Purhad Bey 
(Tripoli, North Africa). Bee, Ikdan No.5543 of 22 .Fob* 
1910 for the list and a discushion of its programme. 
Ikdan said its members I'jere 30, all of whom dissidents 
from the CUP Party.
65* Tanin No.455 of 8 Dec. 1909.
66. Buru, 264 is the only source to mention administrative 
decentralisation. Por programme see Lisiin No.6203 of 
20 Dec. 1909, al-Abram No.9653 of 14 Dec. 1909. Also, 
Ikdan, Ibid.
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The importance of the Arab lobby could be seen
in two major issues which wore discussed in December,
1909 end May, 1911* Th, first, over which the Arab deputies
showed considerable solidarity, was the debate on the 'Lynch
affair' which occupied the whole of tho sittings on the 12
and 13 December 1909* The Lynch Company was an English
concern which, in accordance with several firmans granted
to it, was navigating the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates 
67rivers. ( The Haniedieh, the Ottoman Navigation Company, 
was also navigating the same rivers. In an attempt to end 
competition between the two companies, and the ensuing 
legal and political problems, the cabinet of Hilni Pasha 
granted the Lynch Company a concession which enabled it to 
merge the Haniedieh with itself. Though the newly amalga­
mated Company was to retain the name Lynch, its shares were 
divided between the Ottoman government and the owners of 
the original Lynch Company. Moreover, the Company was
given a monopoly of the navigation of the Tigris and Euphra- 
68tes. The cabinet, however, signed and granted the con­
cession without consulting tho Chamber of Deputies about it; 
a right which the Chamber claimed to be its constitutional 
privilege.
67* For a brief history of the Lynch see, Buru, pp.176-179*
68. Buru, ppJ79-180. al~Huqatfcan, No.6311 of 30 Dec.1909> 
for more details o'f'"the reriis of concession.
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Moreover, some Arab and other deputies felt 
that the terms of the concession were not fair, since the 
Hamiedieh had 12 vessels compared with the three of Lynch 
Company* The cabinet was further embarrased by the press 
publicity given to the issue* The CUP press accused the 
Germans of obstructing the governments scheme.^ Other 
papers opposed it on the grounds that it gave Britain ex­
tra privileges in the area of Iraq and the Persian Gulf, 
an area in which British penetration was being viewed 
with much concern by the Iraqi deputies
On 12 December 1909 the issue was raised in the 
Chamber when four Iraqi deputies interpellated the govern­
ment as to why it granted such a concession without seeking 
permission from the Chamber. The Grand Vezir, Hilmi Pasha, 
gave a lengthy explanation, which was often interrupted
by his opponents, Arabs and others, trying to shout him
down. Hilmi was followed by Shawkat Pasha (Baghdad) 
who refuted his arguments and emphasised the fact that the 
government ought to have consulted the Chamber. Halil Bey 
(Menteshe) the leader of the CUP Party, tried to soothe 
the rising tempers of the opposition members, but with 
little success* Both Cavid, the Minister of Finance, and
69* See Jeune Turc, 12 Dec* 1909, eno. in Marling to Grey, 
No.9S7'very confid., Const., 14 Dec. 1909, F.0.371/781/ 
4606. Tanin, Ho.464 of 1? Dec. 1909*
70. Buru, p.180. al-Ahram, 9654 of 15 Dec. 1909.
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Talat, the Minister of the Interior, attempted to move a 
motion for forcing a vote on the issue, but with no suc­
cess. The sitting ended with the Chamber reaching no de­
cision on the issue, and the President postponed discus­
sion for the next meeting.^
In the second sitting the main Arab speaker was 
Khidir Lu£fl (Zor) who, presumably speaking on behalf of 
the rest of the Arab deputies, assured the deputies that 
"we Arabs [Arab deputies] have no bad intentions towards 
the government, and that our aim is the preservation of 
the safety of the fatherland (watan). We denounce, however,
all attempts to endanger that safety by granting such
72economic concession to foreign Companies1'. But the 
whole issue was by now assuming a different character, 
for speakers who followed LuffI were discussing the 
wider constitutional implications of the question, namely 
whether the executive power had the right of granting any 
concession at all without the authorisation of the legisla­
ture. Zohrab (Istanbul) discussed the Issue at length and 
reminded the Chamber that the question was developing into 
a ministerial crisis of the first magnitude.^ The vote 
was then taken as to whether or not the Chamber was
71. Sitting 13 of 12 Dec. 1909 in Takvim, No.408 of 23 Pec. 
1909. Also reported in, al-Ahram ITd.9659 of 20 Pec. 
1909. al-Mu_qattam No.6311 of 3*0“Pec. 1909. Burn, m>* 
180-183.
72. Sitting 14 of 13 Pec. 1909, in Takvim, No.409 of 24 
Pec. 1909? p.3«
73* Ibid., pp.3-5.
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satisfied with the Grand Vezip's explanation. Sight de­
puties, among whom was Shaflq al-Mu’ayyad (Damascus), 
found the explanation insufficient and rejected it. 168 
deputies including 15 Arab deputies, accepted it; 66 de­
puties abstained. The rest of the Arab deputies - A3 in 
number - were among the abstainers.f
Hilmi Pasha, probably indignant at the opposi­
tion to his1 scheme in the Chamber, resigned office on 28
December 1909» two weeks after receiving an overwhelming
75vote of confidence. ^ His successor, Halcki Bey, reversed 
the decision concerning the Lynch concession, and went 
even further in refusing th grant other concessions ear­
marked for British firms in Iraq*^ This was a victory 
for the Arab lobby in parliament, and it demonstrated, 
to both the Unionists and the Arabs themselves, the lobby's 
importance. It is significant that the solidarity of the 
Arab deputies over the Lynch affair, and their subsequent 
effectiveness, was never to be repeated again; not even
on more pressing Arab problems such as the question of the 
77Yemen.{(
7ArITitTing 14 'of "13 Dec!. F9U9 in JaEvlmV Ho .409 of 24 Dec. 
19095 p. 7? for list of names.
75* al-Muqattam, Ho.6311 of 30 Dec. 1909 suggested that
HiImi resigned because of the criticism of the Chamber. 
See also, Ho,6314 of 4 Jan.1910. P. Ahmad, "Great Bri­
tain's relations with the Young Turks, 1908 - 14, "Mid­
dle Eastern Studies, Vol.2, July 1968, Ho.4, p.317*
76. Ibid. Also Grey to Lowther, teleg. Uo.37> Confid., P.O. 
I 7 ” P e b .l9 1 0 , P.O.371/1004/5693*■
77* During the whole parliamentary session no serious attempt 
was made by the Arab deputies to discuss the problem of 
the Yemen in the Chamber. Only once did al-£ahraw^f ^
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However, all through the year 1910 opposition
to the CUP regime was gathering momentum, and with the
opening of the new session in November 1910, there was
already talk of amalgamating all opposition parties and
groups inside the Chamber into one strong party, that woulcl
stand up to the CUP more effectively, and perhaps succeed
in ousting it from power.^ The attacks of the Opposition
on the government became more frequent and more violent 
79in tone. ' The Arab deputies who distinguished themselves 
in the ranks of the opposition during this session were 
mainly Syrians. Among then, Shaflq al-Mu’ayyad was byjhr 
the most outspoken critic of the government. On one such 
occasion al-Mu’ayyad1s severe criticism of the budget 
provoked Husseyin Cahid to accuse him of being one of 
Abdulhanid's spies.^ The accusation caused bitter argu­
ments in the Chamber during which the question of whether 
P/n. 77 cont. from previous page.
make such an attempt but his effort was frustrated by the 
CUP members. See, Sitting 39 of 12 Peb., 1910, in Zabit 
Ceridesi, pp.290-297*
78. al-Muqattam, No.6593 of 30 Nov., 1910.
79. Boo for example, Zabit Ceridesi, 3rd Year, Sittings 
3-42, pp.30-1158. Also, al-Huqattam, Nos.6602,
6603? 6604 o f  14, 15, 16 Dec., 1910, and N o .6607
of 20 Dec., 1910.
80. Details in Sitting No.85 of 9 Hay, 1910, Zabit 
Ceridesi, pp. 15-5-18. See also, al - Ahr am", TFo.9778 
of 16' May, 1910. Buru, pp.270-275*
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or not the government should publish the reports of the
0 *1
spies ( Jurnal) was debated at length* On another oc­
casion al-Mu’ayyad attacked the CUP regime for restricting
the freedom of the press and free speech, and described
82the Committee as a 'criminal organisation* . But in spite 
of such criticisms of the government's policies and con­
tinual harassing, the opposition was not able to effect 
a change of government. Nonetheless the lines dividing 
the opposition members from those of the government were 
beginning to be sharply drawn. Voting over all important 
issues began to follow clear and defined patterns. The
names of some 30 Arab deputiesvere always among the oppo-
83nents of government policies. ^ Most of those members 
were Syrians.
Attacks on CUP ministers continued throughout 
1911, and they wex^ e particularly strong and bitter during 
the early months of that year. During Pebruary and March 
1911 the Committee was occupied by internal strife between 
its radical and conservative wings. Many of the CUP depu­
ties had felt that the government had fallen into the hands 
of ua clique from Salonica", which was represented in the
81. Sittings Nos.85? 86 of 9? 10 May, 1910, Zabit Ceridesi, 
pp.1538-1545.
82* Sitting No.11 of 5 Dec. 1910, Zabit Ceridesi, pp.249-255? 
for the full text of al-Mu’ayyad rs speech.
83. Bee for instance, Sitting No.29 of 24 Jan. 1910, Zabit 
Ceridesi, pp.75-76.
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cabinet by Talat, Cavid, Ismail Hakki Babanzade and Hala-
Qh
ciyan. This extremist group was accused by its CUP 
opponents of being under the domination of Zionists who, 
through the Free masonic lodges, came to control the CUP.^ 
Sir Gerald Lowther, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, 
was convinced that Zionism played no small part in the dis- 
sensions which divided the CUP in February 1911* Coupled 
with this crisis in the CUP there was general concern, 
among Turkish and Arab deputies at the rising tide of 
Zionism in the Ottoman Empire. The persistent propaganda 
in favour of Zionist projects in Palestine had awakened the 
Turks to the danger of an "undesirable aliens1 problem on 
a large and embarrassing scale The Arab leaders were 
well aware of this danger, and the Syrian press was con­
ducting a continuous battle against Zionist plans in Pales-
Q Q
tine. It was against this background that the Zionist 
problem was discussed in the Chamber.
84. Lowther to Grey, Ho.800, Conf., Const. 2 Nov. 1910,
F.0*371/1010/20761.
85. Same to same, Ho.560, Conf*, Const., 24 May 1910,
Fc0.371/1244/20568.
86* Same to same, Ho.121, Conf., Const., 22 Feb* 1910,
F.0.371/1244/7151.
87* Ibid.
88. Prominent among such papers were: Fulastin, al-Karmal, 
al-liuq tab as, al-Mufid, al-Ahram, al-lK&am, 3X1 
edited by'Syrians.
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In March. 1911 , Cavid Bey, the Minister of 
Finance, was severely criticised by Ismail Hakki Bey, 
the deputy for Gumulciine, and the leader of the Ahali 
party, who had once been an ardent supporter of the CUP. 
Cavid’s budget was harshly attacked and he was virtually 
accused of being in league with the international Zionist 
movement. His loans were received from Jewishbanking 
houses in Paris against which the Zionists were supposedly 
accorded facilities in Palestine. Ismail Hakki then tried 
to show that the aim of the Zionists was to establish a 
state in the Holy Land. After brief observations by Karasu 
(Salonica) and Nissim Mazliah (Izmir), both of whom were 
Jews, the Grand Vezir replied to the accusation of Hakki.
He tried to minimise the significance of the Zionist 
movement and ridiculed it as the fancy of some Jewish ' 
idealists. Nevertheless, he assured Hakki that the govern­
ment was standing firm in preventing immigration.^
This campaign, apart from stirring up a series of 
anti-Zionist articles in both the Turkish and Arabic press,
precipitated the resignation of Cavid and two of his 
90colleagues. It seems possible that the whole campaign
89. For the full debate see Sitting No.4*9 of 1 Mar. 1911, 
Zabit Ceridesi , pp.1363-1392. Also, al-Muqtabas (daily) 
Nos,629, 530 of 20, 21 Mar. 1911. al-Muqattam, No.6675 
of 12 Mar. 1911. Lowther to Grey No *14*6, conf., Const., 
7 Mar. 1911, F .0.371/124*5/9105•
90. The Amrual Beport for 1911, enc. in Lowther to Grey,
No .TOC), c o n f . ,  C o n s t. ,  31 Ja n . 1912, F .0.371/14-91/4-966.
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was tlie worlc of some Syrian deputies who had heen disturbed 
about the activities of the Zionists in Palestine, and whose 
ranks had been strengthened by the election of ShukrI al-
1 Asall as deputy of Damascus, on the death of Muhammad al-
— *r 91 -*'Ajalani. Al-fAsall was a pronounced anti-Zionist, and
he had conducted a campaign in the Syrian press against the
plans of the Zionists in Palestine, even when he was
qa*immaqam of Nazareth, a spot desired by the Jewish colo- 
92nistsi In fact it had been suggested that the dragging 
of the Zionist issue before the Chamber was done "on 
prompting from ShukrI Bey al~1 Asall" If such prompting 
was done by al-1Asall, it must have been in an unofficial 
capacity, for he took his seat in the Chamber on 4 March 
1911» three days after the debate.^
Al-'Asall, however, had plans of his own* On 
29 March 1911 he delivered a previously prepared speech in 
which he complained that the Arabs in the Empire did not 
have their share of the posts of the various governmental 
departments* He told the Chamber that after studying the 
official salnane he found the names of only four junior 
Arab officials in all the departments of the State.
91. al-Muqtabas (daily) Nos.584, 586 of 26, 29 Jan. 1911.
92 . al-Muqtabas (daily) No.5^2 of 5 Dec.1910. Also N. Mandel, 
'5!ur£s, "Arabs" St. Antony’s Papers, MEA, 4 pp.95-97.
95. Ibid., p.97.
94. See Sitting N o .51 o f  4  Mar. 1911, Zabit Ceridesi, p .
1455. ----- ---------------------
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A l - 1Asall claimed that in the Ministry of Binance alone 
there were 111 lurks, 13 Jews, 10 Armenians, 4 Greeks but 
not a single Arab, though the Arabs had many qualified men 
among them there were no Arab valis and Ministers* When 
someone interrupted al-*Asali by saying that he would be 
made a Minister, al-*Asall retorted UI would never become 
a Minister because I am an Arab". When he was reminded that 
Mahmud Shevket Pasha was an Arab, al-fAsalx replied that 
Shevket was only one person, while the Arabs were 15 
millions. However, both Wahbi (Konia) and Bay id Bey (Izmir) 
replied to al-1 Asall asking him not to raise such explosive 
national problems.^
Though al-'Asali's speech was the first attempt 
to discuss Arab grievances in the Chamber, no Arab deputy, 
except Bi<Ja al-§ul£. (Beirut), was ready to support him.
It was neither an organised effort nor typical of the 
wishes of the majority of the Arab deputies. As such it 
was bound to fail. It, however, caused a sharp reaction 
In the Turkish press.
It was on the Zionist question that the Arab de­
puties, or rather the Syrian deputies, were to show a 
measure of solidarity. The attack of Ismail Hakki on Cavid
95- B or debate  see S i t t i n g  No.68 o f  29 M ar. 1911» Z a b it  
C e r id e s i , p p .1940-1945. A ls o , a l-M uqbabas ( d a i ly J T "
No0&44" o f  6 A p r. 1911. a l-M uqatt'am ,Tfo.15S97 o f  7 A p r* 
1911.   —
96* al-Muqattam, No.6696 of 8 Apr. 1911 gave a summary of 
articles in the Turkish press replying to al-’AiSalx. 
Tanzimat, No.7 of 4 May, 1911. 5
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and his raising of the Zionist question was only the herald, 
for in May 1911» and during the Budget dehate, the Syrian , 
deputies raised the Zionist issue a second time. ShukrI 
al-*Asall and Rulja al-Khalidl (Jerusalem) were the main 
speakers on the subject. Al-1Asall distributed to the 
deputies stamps, on which the picture of Herzl and other 
Zionist leaders were printed, and which he claimed the 
Jews in Palestine were using; he also stated that they 
had their own separate courts, clubs and flags. A l fAsalI
was implying that the Zionists wanted to establish an in­
dependent Jewish State in Palestine. He also claimed that
they were buying large tracts of land in the vicinity of
the £Eijaz x'ailway • Al-7Asall was followed by Ru^ tl 
al-Khalidl, who gave a long historical review of the ori­
gins of the Zionist movement. He supported his facts by 
quotations from the Old Testament, and read part of speeches 
of leading Zionists to prove that their aim was to esta­
blish a Jewish State in the Holy Land. He suggested that 
Jewish immigrants should become Ottoman citizens and that 
tbey should settle in other parts of the Empire. At this 
point Piza Pasha (Konia) interjected "let them settle in 
Konia". Mazliah, the Jewish deputy of Izmir, and Yartkas, 
a Greek deputy, replied to the speech of Pu&I. Yartkas 
saw a similarity between this anti-Jewish movement and 
that against the Armenians under the Hamidian regime.
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Khalil Bey, Minister of Interior assured the Arab deputies 
that the Ottoman Jews did not agree with the aims of the 
Zionists and that the government would guard against the 
concentration of Jews in one place. The Arab deputies 
found this reply satisfactory.*^
This was the last concerted effort of the Arab 
lobby in the Chamber until the end of the parliamentary 
session in January 1912. Its result was to heighten the 
Arab opposition to the CUP. It also showed that the Sy­
rian deputies dominated the lobby, and that the Arab 
deputies had not yet found a common cause. Their grie­
vances were regional rather than general Arab demands.
The general election of April 1912 was so well
prepared that out of 275 members, only six opposition
98members were elected. During the 47 meetings held by 
the Chamber, from 18 April to 6 August 1912, there was no 
sign of an Arab lobby or of any other opposition to the 
policies of the CUP government. With almost unanimous 
vote, the government carried out its amendments of the 
various Constitutional articles which the previous Chamber
97. Sitting No.99 of_16 May 1911> Zabit Ceridesi, pp.2974- 
3001. Also, Lisan, 6S49 of 31 May l9ll»al-Muqtabas 
(daily) No.69Tof 31 May 1911*
98. Report On The Proceedings in The Ottoman Chamber, 
A^iT-JuIy T9l2, ' in Harling to Grey, NoVSoS, conf.,
" Const., l7~“JuTy 1912, P.O.371/1497/30869. See also, 
Tunaya, "Elections in Turkish History", Middle 
Eastern Affairs, V, No.4, April 1954, p.118.
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had refused to accept. For instance, the amendments of
article 35? an issue which caused the dissolution of the
previous Chamber, was passed by the majority of 212 votes 
99to 15* The deputies then moved on to discuss and pass
the budget. In these discussions, which in the last
session wass the occasion for the opposition to attack
the government, not a single criticism was raised against
the policies of the cabinet.'*'^ Like the majority of the
101
members the 65 Arab deputies remained loyal CUP supporters.
After the downfall of the CUP from power, and the sub-
10?sequent dissolution of the Chamber in August 1912, the 
Empire was without a parliament until May 1914. The Balkan 
wars of 1912-13 had prevented the holding of any elections 
until that date.
99. Sitting No.19 of 24 June 1912, Zabit Ceridesi, pp. 
337-346 for debate and list of names*
100. See Sittings Nos. 24-37 of Uul-23 Jul. 1912, Zabit 
Ceridesi, pp.42-738.
101. In the first Chamber the Arab deputies were 59 in 
number divided as_follows: 26 Syrians, 14 Iraqis,
11 Yemenis, 4 Hijazis and 4 for Tripoli (North 
Africa). The Syrians were divided thus: 6 for the
vilayet of Beirut, 8 vilayet of Damascus, 8 Aleppo 
vilayet, 3 mutassarriflik of Jerusalem and 1 for 
mutasarrifllE of Zovl Tne 65 Arab deputies of the 
1912 Chamber were divided as follows: 31 Syrians,
18 Iraqis, the rest Yemenis, Hijazis and from North 
Africa. The Syrians were: 8 for Beirut, 9 Damascus, 
10 Aleppo, 3 Jerusalem and 1 Zor.
102. See Sitting No.40 of 25 July 1912, Zabit Ceridesi, 
pp.768-771; and No.47 of 5 Aug. 1912, Zebit Ceridesi, 
pp.913 ff.
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The elections of April 1914- had once more pro­
duced a colourless Chamber, which, until its adjournment 
in August 1914, on the occasion of the outbreak of World 
War I, busied itself with passing the Budget. There vere 
81 Arab deputies in this Chamber'*"^ including men who had 
previously been active in opposing the Young Turk regime, 
such as the leading Syrian decentraliser Salim ’All 
Salam (Beirut), Baris al-Khurl (Damascus), Jalib al-Naqlb, 
Sulayman Pay<Ji (both Basra) Jamil al-ZahawI and Shawkat 
Pasha of Baghdad.
It was ^three of these men who finally brought to 
the notice of the Chamber three of the long felt Arab 
grievances, namely, the non-use of Arabic in the law 
courts, lack of government schools, their low standard 
of education and use of Turkish as the medium of instruc­
tion, and finally the insufficiency of chances given to 
Arab students for study abroad. The first of these 
grievances was raised by Sulayman Payjl during the de­
bate of the Budget of the Ministry of Justice.
He started by asking the deputies not to mis­
understand or misinterpret what he was going to say. He 
then complained in rather mild language that officials in
103. The number of the Arab deputies rose probably because 
of a rise in the population. These 81 deputies were 
however, divided as follows: 36 Syrians, 29 Iraquis, 
12 Yemenis and 4- £&dSzis. There were no deputies 
from African Tripoli which had been occupied by the 
Italians in 1912. The Syrian deputies were divided 
as follows: 9 Beirut, 11 Damascus, 12 Aleppo, 3 
Jerusalem and 1 Zor.
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the local administration especially those in the law courts
were ignorant of Arabic. He pointed out the injustices
which usually resulted from conducting legal matters through
the translators. To stop such injustices, officials should
learn Arabic, the language of Islam and the Prophet, Pay^Ll
asserted that both the Ministers of War and Interior were
learning Arabic. He further complained that the government
decree of September 1915 authorising the uso of Arabic in 
104-law courts was never carried out in Iraq. He concluded
by reminding the Chamber that, by putting forward these
complaints, he was not suggesting that all officials should
be Arabs, for t?we are all Ottomans desiring the progress
of this State whose interests we will guard with our lives
106and property* ^
Paris al-Kliurl agreed with Pay$I and said that 
Syria suffered from the same ailment. He enumerated some 
examples and asked the government to put an end to this 
situation.
Two debates after this one, Salam spoke, not 
about the demands of the Syrian decentralisers of whom he
104*. This decree, supported by an Imperial Irade was issued 
after the CUP and the Syrian reformers came to terms 
after the Paris Congress. It was a concession to Arab 
demands. Bee below, Ch. V, p. 33tf--36 >
105. Sitting Ho.30 of 11 July 1914-, Zabit Ceridesi, p.395*
Por the whole debate see pp. 591-599*"
106. Ibid. pp.598-599*
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was until recently the spokesman, hut about the insuffi­
ciency and low standard of education in Syria. He compared 
the government schools with those of the foreigners, much 
to the disadvantage of the former. Salam urged the govern­
ment to take more interest in the schools of Syria. He 
went on to complain that the Arab students were poorly re­
presented in the missions of students sent abroad for 
study, and requested that choice should be based on exami­
nation. The Minister of Instruction replied to the speech 
of Salam. Sa’ad Allah al-Manla (Tripoli, Syria), and al- 
Zahawl (Baghdad) asked the Minister some minor clarifica­
tions to which he replied. The Minister s.aid that he was
aware of the problems and defects which the speakers pointed
10nout, but the budget of his Ministry was limited. '
In a different sitting FaycLx spoke again, this 
time complaining about the inadequate number of the govern- 
ment schools in the vilayet of Ba§sra. Al-Zahawl,
who followed him, urged (among some interruptions) that the 
instruction in secondary schools in Baghdad be in Arabic* 
However, al-Zahawi was not allowed to finish his address, 
for the president accepted a motion for closure, despite 
protests from the speaker. y
107* Sitting No.33 of 14 July 1914, Zabit Ceridesi, pp. 
698-702 for the full text of BaTam*s speech; pp, 
702-709 for the discussion.
108. Sitting No.34 of 13 July 1914, Zabit Ceridesi, pp# 
723-725 for the speech of Bay$I*
109* Ibid., pp.725-728 for al-ZahawI's speech and discussion.
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Thus there is reason to believe that had the 
life of this Chamber been long an Arab lobby might have 
appeared in it. But as things stand it would be erroneous 
to speak of an Arab lobby in this Chamber or in the one 
that preceded it. In the 1912 Chamber all Arab deputies 
were elected because they were supporters of the CUP. In 
the 1914 one, except for a handful, they were members of 
the CUP parliamentary party.
(b) Arab Societies:
While the Arab deputies, who opposed the Young 
Turk regime, were active through their lobby in the 
Chamber of Deputies and through their contribution to the 
formation of parliamentary opposition groups and parties, 
Arab students in the higher educational institutions 
of Istanbul, Arab cadets and officers, as well as some 
deputies and members of the Arab community there, concen­
trated their political efforts in the formation of Arab 
societies, both secret and open. By so doing they 
contrxbuted to the Arab movement, which was in the making, 
but had not yet taken a definite shape. More important 
still, they voiced, in the various programmes of those 
societies, the hopes and aspirations of that movement 
which the Young Turks failed to recognise. By so doing 
they alienated the leaders of the movement, a factor which
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together with the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the 
First World War and its subsequent defeat, had ultimately 
led to the termination of Ottoman rule in the Arab pro­
vinces.
The Young Turks were suspicious of the Arab 
machinations throughout the period 1908-14, and when they 
discovered the existance of some of the Arab secret so­
cieties in the latter half of 1914, their suspicions be­
came a certainty that the Arabs were working to secede
1from the Empire. In fact the programmes of the open and 
secret Arab societies, founded in Istanbul between 1908- 
14, did not express a desire to separate from the Empire, 
but rather an intention to secure certain political rights 
and reforms for the Arab provinces whose inhabitants were
1. See, Dorduncu Ordu-u Humayun; Aliye Divan-i Harb-i 
Orfisinde Tetkik Olunan Meslese^T Siyasiye bakkinda 
12ahat, Ist'anbul, 135^/1916, pp . 5~-30 ?" and pp .117-127 > 
wliere this book (henceforth referred to as Izahat) 
ascribed revolutionary and separatist aims to all the 
Arab societies; an accusation that was put forward as 
the justification of the execution of many Arab nationa­
lists in 1916 by Cemal Pasha’s military tribunals. 
Because of these executions, Cemal Pasha., who was the 
Commander of the Fourth Army in Syria, was styled by 
the Arabs as al-Safah, the vhedder of blood. Izahat, 
which was published simultaneously in Turkish, Arabic 
and French, was intended to be the official explana­
tion of those executions, and must therefore be treated 
with great care and reservation. The Arabic copy was 
written in poor and broken language, and slight dif­
ferences exist between the facts and narrative of the 
three copies. For the full title of the Arabic and 
French copies, see Bibliography.
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quite willing to remain a part of the composite Ottoman 
state. The programmes of open societies, such as al- 
Muntada al-Adabi (the Literary Club) founded in 1909 by 
Arab students for cultural and educational purposes, bore 
a striking similarity to those of the secret societies, 
and in fact one often wonders why the Arabs of Istanbul
o
resorted to the means of foxmiing secret societies at all. 
The aims which those societies tried to pursue were legal 
enough to be incorporated in the programme of any non­
secret Arab society. Arabic sources, which often exagge­
rated the importance and role of those secret societies, 
did not attribute any separatist aims to them, and there 
is no reason to presume that they were trying to cover up 
such sinister items in the programmes of these societies.
2o Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, implied in his, ffawl al- 
fa.ara.ka al-~arabiyya al-faaditha, Sidon, 1951> voi.1, 
p.26,' that secret societies had different aims from 
open ones and that they constituted a new phase in 
the Arab movement, but he did not substantiate his 
allegation. (This book is henceforth referred to in 
this study as Darawaza.)
3. See for example, Darwaza, 1, pp.26-33«
Shihabi, pp.68-8(). Afamad 'Izzat al-'Azami, al-Q,aqLiyya 
al-!arabiyya, asbabuha, muqadimatha, tatawurha wa 
natai.iuha* Baghdad 19^ 2* (tiei.ceforth referred to as 
al-'Azami), vol.3? pp.50-34-* and vol.4, pp.53-54-.
Also 3*aid, al-Thawra al-arabiyya, 1, pp. 10 ff. Majid 
Khaduri erroneously srated that Arab sources regarded 
al-1Ahd society as most effective in spreading Arab 
separatist ideas among the Arab officers in the same 
way as al-ffatat society had done among civilians, see 
his article, ^ziz cAli al-Misri and The Arab Nationalist 
Movement", in St. Antony's Papers, MEA No.4, Oxford 
University Press, 1'965, p.14-3.
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Other writers who ascribed to them separatist aspirations
seem to have been misled by the fact of their being secret
societies, and were probably under the influence of what
4Cemal Pasha said about them in his Izahat* It was only
on the eve of the revolt of the Sharif of Hecca in June
1916 that some writers ascribed separatist aspirations to 
- 5al-Patat society,^ which had been formed in 1911 by 
Syrian students in Paris but was to transfer its head­
quarters to Damascus on the outbreak of the Pirst World 
War.6
The formation and the activities of the Arab so­
cieties constituted an important chapter in the history of 
the Arab movement during the period 1908-14* Though none
of them was specifically formed to propagate Arab national 
n
ideas, yet all of them came to concern themselves with the 
Arabs alone and with their welfare. They were a reaction 
to the Unionists* failure to recognise the Arab demands and
Izahat, p*7 ff. Prench copy, La Verite, pp*7 ff*
5* The full title of al-Patat is Patat al-Umma al-'Arabi- 
yya, though it is often referred to as Patat al-* Arab* 
This secret society however, was to play a more impor- 
tant role in the Arab movement at the tine of Paisal*s 
government in Syria and the Prench mandatory rule * there. 
It was rather insignificant during the period under 
study* Moreover, it was formed by Syrian students in 
Paris and as such does not concern us directly here* 
Details of it in Darwaza, 1, pp*27-52.
6* Bee, Darwaza, 1, p*31*
7* Antonius, p.108 as well as other Arabic sources, for 
instance, Darwaza, 1, 26, attribute the propagation of 
national ideas to such societies*
16?
to their suspected intentions of "turkifying" the Arabs* 
Even Jojn1 iyat al-Ikha* al-1 ArabI al- 1 UthmanI (The Arab- 
Ottoman Brotherhood Society), founded on 2 September 1908 
by some prominent Arabs of Istanbul to help the CUP pro­
mote the cause of Ottomanism and protect the newly granted 
constitution, showed an irritating awareness of an Arab 
nation (al-Umna al-1Arabiyya) whose conditions it promised
o
to better. This is significant, for the society was
formed at the time of the "Turco-Arab honeymoon1' which
marked the early days following the declaration of the
q
constitution.' In fact its name and objectives were con­
sidered as signs of that honeymoon, and its founders 
never tired of emphasising its Ottoman aspect. Never­
theless, the society was more Arab than Ottoman; it was 
founded by Arabs and attracted only Arabs to its ranks. 
According to Amin Sa'Id, who was the only Arab writer to 
quote verbatim the first article of the programme of this 
society in his al-Thawra al-fArabiyya al-Kubra, written as 
late as 1934-, and therefore relying heavily on newspapers 
ard other earlier sources for its information, al-Ikha1 
declared itself as "consisting of all the Ottoman Arabs in
8. Amin Sa*Id, al-Thawra al-*Arabiyya, 1, p.8. Hassan 
Saab, The Arab Fede'rallstsoft neOt toman Empire,
AmsterISn, 1958, p.2261
9. Antonius, p.102, H. Saab, p.226.
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Istanbul regardless of their various affiliations and
sects, and that e\rery Arab (and the Arab is every indi-
Arab
vidual who was born/or took an Arab home) is eligible for
of
membership provided that he is/good and upright charac­
ter. . The article then proceeded to define the
means by which the conditions of the Arabs should be 
improved. These ranged from education and the construc­
tion of roads and factories and the sedentrisation of 
nomads to the preservation of the "rights of the sons of 
the Arabs from all injustices and encroachments", 
and in case of their being aggrieved by government of­
ficials to help them seek justice from higher authorities.
By so doing, al-Ikha * hoped to assist the CUP 
in guarding the principles of the Constitution, and in
uniting all Ottoman nationalities in loyalty to the 
IPSultan. Despite the fact that al-Ikha* professed 
itself to be a vehicle for the promotion of Ottomanism, 
it was obvious to the Arab community in Istanbul and to the 
leaders of the Syrian enigr&s in Egypt as well as to the 
Young Turks, that its real aim was to cater for Arab wel­
fare vis-a-vis what its founders considered as signs of 
an anti-Arab attitude shown by the new regime towards Arab
10. Amin Sa’Id, al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya, 1, p.7* 
lEid. Also, Hassan Saab, p.226.
12. Ibid.
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officials who served Abdhu-lhamid* such as 'Izzat al-Abid
and Abu>l-Huda. Those Arab officials wore employed by the
Sultan as part of his plan to win the loyalties of his
13Arab subjects. ^
With the Young Turks Revolution these officials, 
like the rest of Abdulhamid1s close advisers and counsel­
lors, were removed from office. Not only that, but some 
of these Arab counsellors were subjected to a bitter at­
tack in the Turkish press. The pride of some Arab students 
in Istanbul, and probably of other Arab officials, was 
hurt when they witnessed the general onslaught in the 
Turkish press on their 'Izzat al-'Abid, Abu’l-Huda, Najlb 
and Salim Mallj.ama.^ 1' They probably, felt that In 
denouncing these Arabs, while saying nothing about their
13. The Hamidian Arab policy played an important role in 
determining the nature and scope of the Turkish-Arab 
relations. This subject is now being investigated by 
a research student, St. Antony's, Oxford; see 
Introduction, p. xx •
1A, Bor an example of such attacks, see, Ikdam, No.5097 
of 15 Aug. 1908. Aljmad QadrI, Mudhakkarutl 1 an al- 
thawra al-'Arabiyya al-kubra, Damascus, I95'6j ~
T^enb^eTbrTE^Amaci (^ adrx"j, p. y, narrated an incident 
of such attacks (of a Turkish officer, Sabri Bey, who 
while addressing a Turkisn crowd on the merits of the 
Constitution, made several and specific attacks on 
'Izzat al-'Ibid and other Arab dignitaries). Qadrx 
said that he confronted this speaker and refuted his 
arguments , and he further stated that this incident 
was the main reason behi&djh.is, (together with others), 
forming the society al-ffatat only four days after the 
declaration of the Constltution. Amin Sa'Id, al- 
thawra al-'arabiyya, Vol.l, p.8, stated that the un­
justified attacks on 'Izzat and other Arab officials 
were a reason for the Arab students in Istanbul 
flocking to al-Ikha *.
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Turkish, equivalents, the new regime was conducting a de­
liberate policy of discrediting and denouncing the Arabs 
in general. In this, they believed, the Young Turks were 
motivated by nationalistic considerations.^
It is not surprising thus that the founders of
al-Ikha*, who were mostly men associated with the former 
16regime, were prompted by fear of what the new regime held 
for them and for their fellow Arabs into forming their so­
ciety. This suspicion of the Unionists' intentions to­
wards the Arabs was then the driving force behind the 
formation of al-Ikha* as well as the majority of the Arab 
societies.
The suspicion was mutual, for the Young Turks 
viewed the appearance of al-Ikha* with great mistrust 
and saw it as a tool of reaction with a secret programme 
aiming at the separation of the Arabs from the Empire.^
15* ATjmad Qadri, pp.6-7*
16. The idea of the society was conceived by Shaflq al- 
Mu’ayyad al-'Azm, a man related by marriage to a pre­
vious G-rand Vezir, Cevad Pasha, and a former high of­
ficial in the Oaisse de la Bette._ Nadra Hai^ ran, a 
close associate of Shaflq, and Shakir al-gusaynl, a 
former head accountant of uhe Ministry of Instruction, 
were among the founders of the society. The list of 
the founders is predominantly Syrian and shows clearly 
the association of such men with the Hamidian regime. 
See, for this and the complete list of names, al- 
fAzamx, vol.II, pp. 99-100. See also, al-Muqattam 
No.§914 of 9 Sept. 1908. A&mad Qadrx,"pp;7-8.' Imin 
Sa'id, al-thawra al-'arabiyya, vol. I, p*7* See also, 
Arab Bulletin, No*90, 1918, copy in P.0.882/27*
I?* Izahat, pp.9-10. Aslo the Prench copy, La V§rit&, pp. 
11-13. See further, Tanin, No *254 of 18'Hay 1909. n.
3> col.4, and No.256oi §0 May, 1909, p.3*
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The Young Turks were not alone in their suspicions of the 
real nature and ains of this society. Prominent Syrians 
such as Raflq al-'Agn, Rashid Rija and the editors of al- 
Muqattam expressed their displeasxire at its formation and 
believed that there was no need for such a society. They 
were further sceptical as to its name, which they consi­
dered as nationalist, a matter not only contrary to the 
spirit of brotherhood that marked the early days of the
Constitution but which was the negation of the concept of 
*1 8
Ottonanism. Al-1Adi, an Arabic newspaper published in
Istanbul voiced the rumour that the society was established 
with the object of serving the personal interests of some
IQ *
of its founders. J Al-Ikha» Ts reception of the Arab 
deputies aroused criticism in the press, which detected 
national undertones in the speeches delivered and the 
slogans shouted during that reception.^ Amin S&'Id 
described the reception as "the first Arab demonstration
PI
that Istanbul saw". It was this nationalist aspect of
18. See, Ma;jnu1 at athar, p. 130. Al-Hanar, Vol.II, part 
12 of~STJan.l9?I97 pp.936 ff. aT-huqattam, No.6127 of 
25 May, 1908, p.5.
■^9. Al-1 Adi, No.l of 5 Nov. 1909? p.l? col.3*
20. See above, p.
21. Amin Sa!Id, al-thawra al-1arabiyya, vol.I, p.8.
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al-Ikha’ which the Unionists found intolerable.
Moreover, its founders were not content to con­
fine their activities to Istanbul, hut proceeded to open
pp
branches in some Syrian towns. Al-Muqattam reported the
formation of a branch in Aleppo which found such a welcome
that some 900 members, including Muslim and Christian
notables, joined it. ^ This is significant because al-
Ikha’ was the only Arab society which had, to an extent,
attracted some Christians to its ranks. Nadra Majran,
a member of a famous Greek Orthodox family in Ba’albek,
was among the Syrians who launched the idea of forming al- 
24Ikha’. All the other secret or open Arab societies were 
exclusively Muslim organisations, initiated and dominated 
by Syrian Muslims, the only exception being al-’ Ahd so­
ciety, which though Muslim dominated was founded by a non- 
Syrian officer, the Egyptian ’Aziz ’All al-Mi^ri, and had 
further some Iraqi officers among its active members. 
However, the majority of the Arab community in Istanbul 
were Muslims. Nevertheless, the Islamic bond which was 
considered by some writers as the main factor in the re­
lations of the Arabs with the Turks, did not prevent con­
stant friction and occasional clashes between that communi-
22. Antonius, p.103? stated that branches were founded
throughout the Arab provinces. There is no evi­
dence to support this claim.
23* al-Muqattam, No.6046 of 17 Eeb. 1909.
2^* A1-- ’Azani, Vol.II, p.98«
ty and the Young Turks,
Opposition to the nominees of the Committee of 
Union and Progress in the Parliamentary elections of Da­
mascus, a city that remained throughout the period 1908-14 
an ahode for the opponents of the constitutional regime, 
centred around the club of al-Ikha* there Shaflq. al-
Mu’ayyad, the chief architect of al-Ikha* was elected a
26deputy for Damascus despite opposition of the CUP* It 
was not surprising, then, that the CUP tried to annul the 
election of al-Mu’ayyad and Yusuf Shutwan (deputy for 
Benghazi), both of whom were among the founders of al-Ikha*. 
The charges brought against them were their bad characters 
and use of illegal means in the elections, as well as their 
association with the old regime* Al-Mu*ayyad*s Candida-
27
ture was, however, accepted but that of Shutwan rejected, 
Al-Mu’ayyad remained to the end a bitter opponent of the 
CUP while Shutwan collaborated with the Unionists towards 
the end of 1912*
It seems reasonable to argue that the CUP was 
disturbed by the futile attempt of al-Ikha* to create
po
around itself an Arab parliamentary party, and tried to 
25* Buru, pp*111-112*
26* Ibid* See further, al-Ahram No.9532 of 26 Nov* 1908* 
al-Huqattam No *5978 of 25' Nov. 1908, for more details 
of Damascus elections*
27. See above, p./3^(Chapter III).
28. al-Muqattam, No.6041 of 3 Peb. 1909» gave details of 
this attempt.
buy off some of its outspoken founders. The candidature 
of al-Mu5ayyad was accepted, and 1 fir if al-Mardini, a ve­
hement critic of the Unionists and one of the founders of
- 29al-Iklia*, was appointed vali, of Bagra. J Nevertheless,
the CUP continued to watch the activities of al-Ikha* un­
easily and took the opportunity of the April counter­
revolution to close the society and similar societies which
at:
30
.were
/formed by other n ionalities after the declaration of
the Constitution,
A1-Xkha* al-1Arab! al-1Uthmani, which was the 
first open society to be formed and dominated by Syrian 
Arabs in Istanbul, included men of different and, some­
times, conflicting aims. While some of its members were
sincere in serving the cause of Ottomanism, the motives of
31others were dubious. It was this lack of unanimity of
purpose among its members which caused the failure of al-
Ikha* to achieve its aims, in particular the desire to
32better the conditions of the Arabs. The establishment
29* al~Muqattam No.6064 of 10 Mar. 1909, discussed this 
issue ana suggested some reasons as to why al-Mardini 
was appointed vali of Bagra.
30. ShihabI, p.69* al-*Azami, Vol.II, p.103- Antonius, p. 
105* Ian in, Nos. 254” of 1"8 May 1909 and No. 256 of 20 May 
1909, accused al-Ikha* of connections with reactionary 
elements working for the overthrow of the Constitution. 
Izahat, pp.11-12, repeated the accusations. al-Ikha* 
denied the allegations in lanin No.256 of 20 hay 1909* 
lanin No.167,of IQ Jan. 1909 implied such connections. 
Also, A.Qadri, p.10.
31 * al-1Adi, No.1 of 5 Nov. 1908. al-'Azami, Vol.II, p.102.
32. al-'Azami, Ibid. ShihabI, pp.68-69*
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of this society and its activities in Istanbul and Damas­
cus had certainly contributed to the suspicion with which 
the Young lurks viewed the deeds and intentions of the 
Arab leaders in rhe capital as well as in other towns of 
the Arab provinces. Ihis suspicion was the underlying 
feature of the Turkish-Arab relations which, with the 
exception of a brief interlude following the declaration 
of the Constiintion, continued to deteriorate throughout 
the period 1908-14*
The closure of al-Ikha* which no doubt added to
35
the enstrangement between the Arabs and their government,
created a political vacuum among the Arab community in
Istanbul, Al-Muqtada al-Adabl, (The Literary Club) was
founded by Arab students, allegedly for educational and
cultural puiposes, to fill that vacuum. Most sources
agree that its foundation took place in the autumn of
1909, and that among the Arab youths who were behind its
appearance the efforts of fAbd al-Karim al-Khalil, a law
student from al-Shaya£ village [near Beirut], loomed very 
34large. The Club was probably founded with some encoura-
33* Matjmu!at athar» pp. 129-130, considered the closure 
as one of the first acts of the Unionists against 
the Arabs. S.G. Haim, Arab Nationalism, pp.31-32.
34. Al-^Azaml, Vol.Ill, pp*7~9* ShihabI, pp.70-71* Amin 
Sa'id, al-thawra al-farabiyya, Vol.I, pp.8-9* Izahat, 
pp•10-127 ‘BtSu, p .3i0, put its foundation as late as 
February 1910. He gave no Justification for such a 
date. Ahnad Qadri, pp*10-11. Darwaza, vol.l, pp. 
23-24. MuljLamnad_Jamil Beyhun, Qawafi 1 al-! Uruba wa 
mawakibuha khilal al-fusur. Beirut, 1950 (hereafter 
Qawaf11), Vol. II, p.21.
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gement fron Arab deputies such, as ?Abd al-^amld al-ZahrawI, 
and some of the former members of al~Ikha* Al-Khalil,
who was hanged in 1915 'by Cenal Pasha on the charge of 
treasonable nationalist activities, was, with the excep­
tion of a brief interval, the president of the Club fron 
the end of 1909 till its closure in 1915* ^
Like al-Ikha*, al-Muntada was an open society 
established by Arabs for the welfare of the Arabs, but un- 
H ^ e al-lkha> it enjoyed the confidence and the support 
of the government, and as a result was to play a more con­
crete role in the development of Turkish-Arab relations.
It consequently played a tangible part in the emergence of 
the Arab national movement in the period 1908-14. ATpnad 
'Izzat al-!Azami, who was closely associated with the
35* Izahat, pp.10-14. Al-'AzanI, Vol. Ill, pp.J-10, where 
he mentioned the fact that Shukrx al~3Jusayni, one of 
the founders of al-Ikha* gave al-Khalll and his 
friends 60 Turkish Liras and the furniture of al- 
Ikha* . See^also, pp.7-8. The same story is repeated 
by Amin Sa'Id, al - thawra al -'arab iyy a , Vol. I, pp. 8-9. 
Also, Muha]]IQal Harh ^arazat'j al-fiayyat al-hizibiyya 
fi Suriyya (1908-1955)* Damascus, 19559 p. 31. Antonius,pTro^ r
36. al-Azami, vol.Ill, p.13. In pp.10-11, al-!Azami gives 
details of controversy over the issue of electing a 
first president of the Club. The candidature of al- 
Khalll was challenged by three young veterans, namely 
Dr. A^nad Qadrl, Dr. !Izzat al-Jundx (both of whom 
were to gain fame in_the Arab movement at a later 
stage) and *Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’irl. Al-Zahrawi ne- 
diated2 and the difference was solved by electing a 
Mugtafa *Adil, who was an independent of both groups.
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-  57formation of al-Muntada, f and was later to edit its 
58periodical, tells us that the programme of the Club was 
drafted by al-Khalil, and after its language was corrected 
by Shaykh Rashid Ri£a, J was shown to Khalil ganada, the
Ministeribr Awqaf, who not only approved of it but chose the
- - 40 -nano al-Muntada al-Adabi for it. gamada, himself a Syrian
domiciled in Egypt, promised to give al-Muntada the sun of
500 Turkish Liras fron the Awqaf budget provided that it
would become "an educational club" in which lectures would
be delivered to Arab students, and a library built up,
also some of its rooms would be used as an accommodation
41
for poor students. Thus al-Muntada was officially to be
37* AT^ inad C-JadrI, p. 11, mentioned the name of al-’Azanl
among the founders of al-Muntada. He is the only source 
to do so. According to al-1A'zani himself in Vol.Ill, 
p.9, the founders were three Muslim Syrian youths, na­
mely, al-Khalll, Yusuf Sulaynan G-aydar (Ba’albek)
Sayf al-Din al-Khatxb (Damascus) and Al^mad Jamil al- 
gusayni (Jerusalem.) Izahat, p.* 11, gave the same list 
except for al-^usayniV' Botlx Ami n Sa’Id, al-thawra al- 
1arabiyya, Vol.I, p •8, and Antonius, p .108, n.2, 
gave’a longer list of founders. They added the names 
of Raflq Rizq Sallum (Christian fron Horns) and Sali£ 
§aydar (Ba1 albek) .
58. Its periodical was named after it "al-Muntada al-Adabl" 
and was originally the periodical of a secret society 
known as al- 'Alan al-Akhdar (see below p. ISO, &ncl its 
name then" was LisaiTTal-* Arab. For further details, see 
al-fAzamI, Vol.Ill, p.58#
59* Rashid Ri$a was the editor of al-Manar of Cairo, but at 
the time was in Istanbul trying to improve the worsening 
relations between the Arabs and the Turks, and to secure 
the government’s help for an Islamic missionary school 
which he was endeavouring to establish in Cairo. For 
Riga's account of that journey to Istanbul, see, al- 
Manar, Vol.15> part 2 of 11 Mar. 1910, pp.145-150, and 
paiHTp of Apr.1910, pp.219-225*
40. Al~fAzamI, Vol.Ill, pp*7-9.
> PP«8-9*
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a club and a meeting place fox* Arab students in Istanbul, 
and it was to concern Itself wholly with cultural and li­
terary affairs. Under such a non-political programme,
42 —which the CUP tolerated, al-Muntada operated, and be­
cause of it, it managed to be the longest surviving Arab 
society*
In actual fact, al-Muntada exerted a good deal
of political influence, and Cenal Pasha in his Izahat
claimed that before it was a week old "political issues
and secret instigations" appeared as an item of the acti-
45vities of the Club. ^ Cenal Pasha went as far as to 
assert that 'Abd al-Ghanx al-^raysx, the editor of the 
renowned anti-CUP Beiruti newspaper al-Mufxd, and one of 
the many Syrian nationalists who were tried by the mili­
tary tribunal in fAley (Lebanon), testified before that 
tribunal that the real aim of al-Muntada was to dissemi­
nate Arab national ideas among the Arab students and 
ultimately to promote the secession of Arab lands from the 
Empire.^ Raflq Rizq Sallun and Sayf al-Dxn al-KhaJxb, 
two founders of al-Muntada tried and subsequently executed 
by the fAley tribunal,^ confessed to similar nationalistic 
charges against al-Muntada, and to a secret programme of
42. Antonius, p.108.
^3* ^gahat, p*ll*
44. Ibid., p.13*
45. Ibid, pp• 118—119, for the charges against these men 
and their sentences*
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that Club. Only founders and top members were allowed to 
be acquainted with this programme, which, according to
46Izahat, amounted to treasonable acts against the State.
Izahat claimed, rather unjustifiably, that the Club became 
a mere branch of the Administrative Decentralisation Party 
of Cairo, membership of which was the sole reason why the 
military tribunal of Cenal Pasha sent nany Syrian nationa­
lists to the gallows.^
1^ Izahat is too biased to believe, nationa­
list aims were attributed to al-Muntada by al~fAzani 
and Mustafa al-Shihabi. Both men lived through that
period and took part in the political activities of Arab
48 -students m  Istanbul. Al-'Azami stated that al-Muntada
was the only Arab society responsible for spreading na­
tional ideas among the Arab youths inside and outside 
Istanbul. ' According to al-Shihabr al-Muntada was con­
ceived by "Arab nationalist youths" (Shubban al-1Arab al- 
Qawniyun) as an attempt to save and preserve the rights
of the Arabs which were threatened by the policies of the 
50Unionists.-' No sooner had this Club been formed than it
^6* Izahat, pp.12-14 for these confessions, and for the 
HeFaUs of the alleged secret programme of the Club.
47. Por this claim, see. Ibid., pp.14-16. See also, pp. 
117-127 £°r lis*t oF "those condemned and their
alleged crimes.
48. Al-'AzamI, Vol.Ill, pp.5-7* Al-Shihabi, p.67> and 
pp.70-72.
49. Al- * Azani, Ibid •
50. Al-Shihabi, p.67*
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"became "an abode of Arab nationalism - or Arabian - 
(al-’Uruba)" in the capital.*^ The cultural and literary 
programme of the Olub was a cover for national aims which 
remained its genuine, but latent, purpose. Another Arab 
writer, As'ad Daghir, an active participant in the events 
of that period in Istanbul, wrote that with the change of 
the GUP’S attitude towards the Arabs al-Muntada became a 
political centre (Markaz Siyasi).*^ All three Arab writers, 
writing at a much later date than the formation of al- 
Muntada, probably read far too much into the intentions 
and the activities of the Club, and thus ascribed aims and 
purposes which would have fitted a more recent stage in the 
history of the Arab movement, and which al-Muntada neither 
had the facilities nor the opportunity to serve,
The real importance of al-Muntada does not lie 
entirely in its political and allegedly nationalist acti­
vities, but in the fact that it provided a meeting place 
"in which Arabs fron all parts of the Empire felt at hone 
and talked freely in an atmosphere in which minds relaxed 
and the traffic of ideas could rove'A^ Arab students, 
who after the proclamation of the Constitution cane to 
Istanbul in great numbers to finish their studies, were
51. Per an elaboration of this point, see, al-Shihabi, pp.
70- 71*
52. As 1ad Daghir, Mudhakkaratl1ala banish al-qadiyya al-
’Arabiyya, Cairo, Cn.d7) , p.35*
55. Antonius, p.109. Bee also, al-Shihabi, p.71*
181
able to neot and know each other* Al-MutadaT s cultural 
and social activities,^- such as public lectures, celebra­
tion of the birthday of the Prophet and the performance of 
Arabic historical plays, which were usually attended by 
the majority of the Arab community in Istanbul,^ gave 
those students a further chance of meeting Arab deputies 
and politicians* Such contacts broadened their minds as 
to the issues which were at stake between the Arab leaders 
and the Unionists, and incited then to take more interest 
in those political matters* Like most other students,
Arab students seem to have concentrated more attention on 
politics than they ought to have done, and some sober - 
minded Arabs complained of the students of al-Muntada 
who neglected their studies and started meddling with 
political questions which were beyond their abilities to 
g r a s p N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  the Arab students a,cted on certain 
occasions as a very effective pressure group, which in­
fluenced the decision of the government, and made the Arab 
community in Istanbul realise its own power and influence.
5*+. Por a summary of such activities, sec al-1AzanI, Vol. 
III, pp.13-30. Darwasa, Vol.I, p.24. Al-Shihabi, p.
71, and Buru, pp.311-517• For one example of its cul­
tural activities, see, al~Muqtabas (daily) No.99/1599, 
of 28 Jan. 1914.
55* Lisan al-gal, No.6623 of 1 May, 1911, and al-Muqtabas, 
Ibid.
56. See articles in, al-Ahram No.9769 of 5 May, 1910, and 
No.9770 of 6 May 1910. _Xt is of interest that these 
ciiticisns of al-Mimtada were answered by no lesser 
nan than RashIU' Hija i n al-Manar, Vol. 13, part 6 of 
7 July, 1910, pp.469-470,
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For instance, wb.cn the Turkish newspaper Ikdan
published in March 1910 an article on the Yenen xtfhich gave
67great offence to the Arabs, { students led the protest of
the Arab comnunity in Istanbul, and committed acts of
violence against the newspaper and its editor. In fact
the protest of the Arabs was so strong that the governnent
was forced to close Ikdan and send its editor for trial.^
Moreover, the president of al-Muntada, 'Abd al-
Karln al-Khalll, attempted, a far reaching cultural project
when he put forward in June 1911 bis scheme encouraging
enterprising individuals among the Arabs to found private
schools throughout the Arab provinces which would instruct
60the pupils In the Arabic language. He tried to solicit 
support for his scheme among the Arab deputies, whom he in-
57 • The article of Ikdan was reproduced in a number of
Arabic papers wEicE"~did so in the process_^of replying 
to its allegations - see for example, Lisan al-Bal,
No.6277, of 18 March, 1910; al-Ahram, FoTT/30 of' 17 
March, 1910. Buru, pp.157-161 ^ deals with this incident 
in some detail. The allegation which gave offence to 
the Arabs in Istanbul and elsewhere was that the Yemenis 
were ready to sell anything for money including the 
honour of their women.
58. Lisan al-£Eal, No.6274 of 15 Mar. 1910. It also reported 
protests of some notables in Damascus and Beirut against 
Ikdan1s article. Bee further, Buru, pp.157-159. Al- 
SIxihaEx, p.65.
59. al-Manar, Vol.13, part 3, 7 Jul.1910,p.220. Buru,p.157.
60. For the ten points of al-Khalll’s scheme, see, al-fAza- 
ni, Vol.Ill, pp.20-22. Also, al-Ahram, No.10134 of 13 
Jul.1911. Al-Manar, Vol.14-, Part 8V 24- Aug.1911, p p .  
635-637. BiEurpp7316-317.
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61vited to a meeting to discuss the issue. In the speech
of welcome to the deputies, al-Khalll showed a narked
awareness of ftWanemee® an Arab nation that was held
back by its lack of education,and which needed national
62schools for its advancement and unity. Both the 
government's schools and the foreign schools were #iot suf­
ficient for the needs of the Arab nation (Umma), and 
only through a national scheme of education, and a 
standardised curriculum in all the primary schools would 
that nation restore its glorious past.
Though the Arab deputies welcomed the scheme 
heartily, and promised to support it they did not 
supplement it. The Syrian colony in Egypt, whom al- 
Khalll visited in the summer of 1911 to enlist their sup­
port for his scheme were more responsive, and they formed
64a committee to help him. However nothing more was 
heard of this committee, and like the whole scheme it 
came to naught.
The scheme was probably devised by al-Khalll, 
in concert with some opponents of the GUP government among 
the Arab deputies and the Arab community in Istanbul, as an
61. al-'Azami, Vol.Ill, pp.14-15, for details of that meet­
ing.
62. See the whole text of al-Khalilfs speech in, al-'Azani,
III, pp.16-20.
63. Ibid., p.19.
64“* Ibid., p.28. al-Hanar, Vol.14, part 8 of 24 Aug. 1911, 
pp.635-837? for that visit, and the names of the 
committee.
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answer to tlie continuous neglect of Arabic by the govern­
ment in its schools. This issue had been during the period 
1908-14, one of the major grievances of the Arabs against 
the Young Turks regime.^ The scheme, aiming at the crea­
tion of one Arab nation, which, according to al-Khalll,
had already possessed a unity of language, history, land
66and interests, could have been the real answer to the 
educational grievances of the Arabs. The unionists raised 
no objection to the scheme, probably realising that it was 
a mere talk which the Arabs lacked the will and the re­
sources to implement, However this important project of 
al-Khalil failed to materialise; had it succeeded it 
would have been one of the lasting results of the efforts 
of al-Muntada.
Al-Khalil, around whom the activities of al- 
Muntada revolved after 1910, and some of his friends,^ 
were naturally in touch with the Arab opponents of the
CUP in Istanbul and with the decentralisers of both
6RCairo and Beirut. It was these contacts which probably
ma^ iii ■■ II I ■ I ■ ■ 1 - r            ■—--   T1 1 \    ~|— i II ,
65- See above, C.II, p. to S'.
66. Speech o f  al-Khalil, al-'Azaml, Vol.III, p . 17.
6 7 . Those f r ie n d s  w ere : R a f iq  R iz q ^ S a llu n  (a  C h r is t ia n  
fro m  Horns) S a y f a l- D in _ a l- K h a t ib  (M u s lim  fro m  Damascus) 
and D r. ' I z z a t  a l- J u n d l (M u s lim  f r o n  H on s). A l l  th re e  
were c o -fo u n d e rs  o f  a l-M u n ta d a . The f i r s t  two were 
e xecu te d  i n  1915 by  C ena l' Pasha w h ile  th e  t h i r d  was 
d e p o rte d  to  A n a to l ia  b u t was k i l l e d  by  h is  guards when 
he a tte m p te d  to  escape. See Iz a h a t ,  p p .118-119*
Buru, p . 315.
68. Al-ShihabI, p .71.
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nade Cenal Pasha accuse al-Muntada of being a nore branch
69of the Decentralisation Party*  ^ In view of such contacts 
and due to the deliberate policy of the CUP government in 
1913} which aimed at winning over the Arab youths of Istan­
bul, al-Khalll came to play an exceedingly conspicuous
role in the agreement and events which followed the Arab
70 -rCongress of Paris*' Al-Khalil, who was often referred 
to in both the Turkish and Arabic press at the tine as nthe
representative of Arab Youth " in Istanbul (Mu1tamad al-
—  71Shabiba al-1Arabiyya)' assumed the role of a recognised
intermediary in the negotiations for the settlement of 
differences between the Arab decentralisers and the CUP*
In fact the agreement arrived at between the government 
and the Syrian decentralisers was no more than an agree­
ment between al-Khalil, in his new capacity and the
72leaders of the CUP* Again in the celebrations and feasts 
held to commemorate the new Turkish-Arab rapprochement 
al-Khalil stood projajnentiHe became virtually the spokesman 
of the decentralisers.
69° Izabat, pp.14, 15*
70. Chapter V. below deals with this Congress and its 
results•
71. Al-'Azami, Vol.III* p.28 claims that al-Muntada esta­
blished a secret society under the name of al-Shabiba 
al- * Arabiyya whose aim was the independence- of Arab 
lands. This is wrong since the name was publicly 
used by the papers at the tine: see for example,
Fata al-1Arab, Ho.50/1484 of 12 Feb. 1914.
al-Manar, Vol. 16, part 8 of 2 Aug. 1913, pp.636 ff.
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The speeches of Talat Bey, Cenal Bey, Midhat §ukru and 
other leaders of the CUP echoed far and wide throughout 
the Syrian provinces,^ and it looked as though all was 
now well between the Arabs and the Unionists. The lat­
ter, who had always suspected the Arab decentralisers of 
Syria and Iraq of being in collaboration with the foreigners^
seened now anxious to establish a working bond with the 
9Zl
young Arabs. Those young Arabs of Istanbul could be nore 
easily influenced and won over by the government than the 
"old" Arab reformers. It was almost like a deliberate 
attempt to drive a wedge between the old Arab reformers 
and the young ones. The Unionists had succeeded in this 
and in subsequently paralysing the cause of Arab reform, 
for soon al-Khalil and his young friends in Istanbul were 
disowned by certain sections of the reform movement, and 
to al-Khalil!s great disappointment, he was solely blamed 
for the mishaps which befell that movement.^
Prom now and until its closure in 1915? al-Munta­
da, like the rest of Arab societies, lost its vigour and
73. al-Ahram No.10781 of 16 Aug. 1913. Al-Islah, No.91/
IK86 V f  '25 Aug. 1913. Thavrat ai-!Arabi pp.82-90. 
Al-'AzanI, III, p.30*
7^* Thawrat al-1 Arab , p.102.
75* See, Pat a al - 'Arab Nos. 36/1470 and 39/14*73 of 26,
29 Ja. 1914-, respectively. al-Islah, N0 . 94-/14-89 of 
28 Aug. 1913. al-Muqattam No s ’. 7433 V 74-36 of 8 & 11 
Sept. 1913? respectively. al-Ahram No.10831 of 5 
Oct. 1913. Thawrat al-'Arah/ p.8£.
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ceased to play an effective role in the political life
of the capital, al-Muntada never "established branches
76in various towns in Syria and Iraq” as alleged.{ It 
remained to the end of its days a society operating fron 
Istanbul and dominated by Syrian students, who were helped 
and guided by some Syrian opponents of the CUP in the ca­
pital. al-Muntada was of special importance for the future 
Arab movement which was to receive leadership and guidance 
fron many of its active members.
According to Mustafa al-ShihabI the activities of 
the Arab youth did not stop at the formation of al-Muntada, 
but extended to the founding of Arab secret societies. He 
claimed that as a result of contacts between such youths 
and certain Arab officers three secret societies were 
founded* , namely al-Qahtaniyya, al-Patat and al-'Ahd* ^  
Al-Shihabi was the only source to state that al-Patat 
was formed in Istanbul by Arab youths and officers.*^
All other sources agree that this society was formed in 
Paris by Syrian students who were studying there; that 
its activities were confined to Beirut and Damascus, and 
were to reach their peak during Anir PayPal's administration
76* Antonius, p.109.
77 * al-Shihabi, p .68•
78. Alamad Qadrl, pp.6-2, save a different version of the 
founding of al-Patat. See above, n. 14 p.
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in Syria, The other two secret societies were founded in
Istanbul . and had branches in Syria and Iraq. Though
sone civilians were mentioned anong the members, the
military element dominated in both societies. Their
importance has been far exaggerated by the sources, and in
fact their activities and impact would not warrant the
7 9amount of discussion and publicity given to them.('
Different accounts were given of the programmes 
al-Qa&franiyya and al-1Ahd. Antonius and Saab ascribed 
federal ideas to both societies. They believed that 
those societies worked for the attainment of a broad fe­
deral scheme based on the example of the Austro-Hungarian
Ausgleich in which all the political rights of all the
80
ethnic groups would be recognised. This is yet another 
attempt to secure for the Arabs their rights within the 
Ottoman Empire. Other sources, while silent on the 
existence of federal ideas in the programme of al-
79. Most of the Arabic sources dealt with then in a 
rather inflated way. See for example, Darwaza, 1, 
pp.27-33. Al-’Azami, III, pp.30-35i and IV, pp.
53 if. Other writers who followed those sources 
did the sane. To mention only one writer who wrote 
in English: Hassan Saab, The Arab Federalists of
the Ottoman Empire, dealt ext ensively with totK 
allQaHtaniyya and al-1Ahd, and read far too much in 
tHeir * programmes and activities. See, pp.234-270. 
to him both societies had federal ideas, thus the 
title of his book.
80. Antonius, p.110, 119. Saab, pp.234 If.
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Qahtaniyya» mentioned such ideas in the programe of
al-1 Ahd.^* Al-Shihabi ascribed federal ideas to
neither.^ 'Aziz 'All al-Migrl, the founder of al - 1 Ahd
and alleged co-founder of al-Qahtaniyya, ^  denied on one
8a
occasion that his society worked for a federal scheme.
This confusion in accounts stens probably fron 
the fact that it is difficult to know precisely the pro­
grammes of secret societies, their nenbership and genuine 
achievements. What the Arabs failed to achieve in their 
open societies and through their dialogue with the Young 
Tucks was usually claimed as achievements, or at least as 
part of the programmes of secret societies.
However, al-Qafrfc'aniyya was the first Arab secret 
society to be founded in Istanbul towards the end of 1909#
81. For example, al-'Azanx, III, pp.30-54 dealt with al- 
(jafctaniyya, and mentioned no federal Ideas in its 
programme, while in Vol.IV, pp.53-54 stated that al
1Ahd desired to establish a dual monarchy of the 
Ottoman Empire on the model of Austria-Hungary. The 
sane story in Anxn SafId, al-thawra al-1Arabiyya, 1,
p. 10, and pp*4-6-47. Ahnad Qadrl, "p.14, Darwaza, 1,
p.32, and Farazat, p.41 attributed federal ideas to 
al-1Ahd.
82. Al-Shihabi, p.69 for al-Qahtaniyya, and pp.78-79> for 
al-*Ahd.
83* Saab, 234. Antonius, p.110, 119. Also, Farazat, p.40.
84. Buru, pp.557-560, narrates an interview which he (in 
the presence of Hassan Saab) had with 'Aziz !AlI al- 
M i s n  in Cairo. *Azxz had denied that al-1 Ahd 
haa any federal ideas in its programme which aimed 
onlj at securing a decentralist system of government 
'Aziz suggested that the programme night have been 
corrupted after he left Istanbul early in 1914.
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There is some difference as to who founded it. Bone writers
believed that Khalil ganada, Minister of Awqaf in
 ^ 85the cabinet of Kanil Pasha was its founder. ^ Others give
the credit to al~2ahrawx, the deputy for gana, while a
third group stated that ganada together with al-ZaharawI,
1 Aziz "111 al-Mi§rx and Salln al-Jaza’irx founded this 
86society. The truth is that the society was forned by a
group of civilians and officers, conspicuous anong whon 
was Salln al-Jaza’irl, an officer and the grandson of one 
of the Algerian exiles who had acconpanied Anxr *Abd al-
- - T 87
Qadir al-Jaza’irx to Damascus. ' The society aimed at
the betterment of the conditions of the Arabs, an ain which
al-Ikha? 1Arabl al-1Uthmanl had attempted to attain before.
Al-Qah£ aniyya also aimed at a national awakening of the
Arabs by reviving their glorious past, promoting their
cultural, social and economic standards and by making then
aware of their usurped rights so that they night be urged
83to demand then. This is a significant reflection on the
85. For example, al-'Azanx, III, p.31. Amin Sa'Id, al-tha~ 
wra al-'Arabiyya, Vol.I, p.10.
86. Ibid. Izahat, p.,16. Farazat, p.40. Also, Muhammad 
ry'ahir al-TTJmnarI al-Musilx, Tarikh Muqadarat al-!Iraq 
al--Siyasi^ya, Baghdad, 1925,n^HenceT6rtH~lATT5narI');
87. Salln al-Jaza’irx was the nephew of Shaykh Jahir al- 
Jaza’irl referred to in the introduction above, pp.
For Salim!s role in the formation of al- 
Qab^aniyya, see, al-'Azanl, III, pp.31-33. Amin Sa'Id, 
aT-rhawra al-3Arabiyya, 1, p.10. Buru, 320. Al-Shihabx,
p. 60.
88. Al-ShihabI, p.69. Also, Majid Ehadduri, "'Aziz 'All Mi$rx 
and the Arab Rationalist Movement" in St. Antony's 
Papers, No.17* MEA, No.4, ed. by A. Houranx, Oxford 
Unxversity Press, 1965* p. 14-2.
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apathy and indifference of Arab public opinion to the 
heated arguments which were going on between their leaders 
(almost self-appointed) and the leaders of the Young Turks 
Al-Qahfraniyya had a password and a signal for
QQ
identification but as its programme was essentially
that of recognised Arab societies, it became inactive with
in a year, and most of its members joined other societies,
such as al-Eatat and al-1Ahd, Antonius, however, said
that the society had "died of wilful neglect” because its
90founders discovered a traitor amongst them. He is the 
only writer to mention this fact,
A l a n i y y a  was the first attempt of Arab of­
ficers in the Turkish army to enter the realm of politics. 
Envious of the achievements of their Turkish counterparts, 
who declared the Constitution and continued to play a 
leading role in the political life of the Empire, the Arab 
officers were, probably, trying to follow suit and play 
the sane role but with regard to their own people, the 
Arabs, This tendency of the military elenent to try and 
assert themselves in the field of politics, which has be­
come a bedevilling feature in the modern history of the
89. For details of such sign, see, al-'Azaml, III, p.54. 
Antonius, p.lll_. Izahat, p,17> IN pp. 16-18, Izahat, 
accused al-Qabtanlyya of separatist aims.
90. Antonius, p.lll.
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Middle East, was more noticeable in tlie fornation and acti­
vity of al"*1 Ahd society.
Al-1Ahd (the Covenant) was founded by 'Azxz 'All 
al-Migrx, an Arab officer in the Turkish army whose con­
tribution to the Arab nationalist movement is often over-
91 —rated, in October 1913# 'Aziz intended the society to
be confined to the circle of army officers, but the list
92of its nenbership included the nanes of sone civilians. 
They were, however, in the minority, and the soldiers do­
minated the ranks of al-1Ahd. Iraqis, being the most nu­
merous in the Turkish army, were heavily represented in
93its membership. The reason given for its formation was 
that there was a general feeling, particularly among the 
Arab officers, that the governments bad intentions to­
wards the Arabs had increased, and that it had resolved on
91* Eor an assessment of 'Aziz's role in the Arab nationa­
list movement in pre__and post War I period, see Majid 
Khadduri, 11'Aziz 'All in, St. Antony's Papers,
No,17, pp.140-163#
924 Antonius, p. 119? said only two civilians were admit­
ted, and gave the name of Amir 'Adil Arslan as one of 
the twoo Tahsln al-*Askarlj, Mudhakkaratx 'an al- 
thawra al-1Arabiyya al-kubra wal thawra "al-*Iraqiyya, 
Baghdad, 1936, vol.l, p.b, gave the names of five ci- 
vilians among the members of al-'Ahd, all of whom were 
students. He also gave the nanes of sone 19 cadets 
as members, the majority of whom were Iraqis. Pro­
minent among its military members were, Salln al-Jaza’- 
irx, Nurx al-Sa'xd (a former Prime Minister of Iraq), 
Yassxn al-Hashini (Baghdad), Mawlud Mukhli§ (Baghdad), 
Amxn lu^fx al-Ifafiz (Damascus) and many others. Por 
a fuller list see, Darwaza, 1, p.33? al-Azami, IV, p.
55#
93• Anvonius, p .119 *
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94-stern neasures as a solution for the Arab problem.' 
Moreover, the leaders of the Arabs in Istanbul and else­
where had realised that the government hud no intention 
of carrying out rhe it eras of the agreement reached in 
Paris with the Arab reformers.^ In this atmosphere of 
deteriorating Turkish-Arab relations, al-1Ahd was founded
to support the Arab agitation for a decentralised system
96of administration for the Empire* There is nothing re­
volutionary in its programme, and considering its pur-
POS0S al-1Ahd could have been more effective as an open 
97society* J { Even if we accept the allegation that one of 
its aims was to transform the Empire into a dual monarchy 
on the model of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich that would 
not make^a revolutionary society* This suggestion for a 
dual monarchy x-ms not a new one, nor was it revolutiona­
ry, for it had been proposed as a remedy for the problems
of the Empire as early as 1908 by the Turkish ex-Char g§
98d 1 Affaires in Washington. In fact it is hard to find
94. Eor those neasures, see, Amin Salid, al-thawra al- 
'Arabiyya, 1, pp.4-7-48. Al-Azani, IV, pp.56-57.
TOiawrat al-1Arab, pp.78-79.
95. Al-Azani, IV, pp.55-58.
96. For the_views of 'Aziz, see, Buru, 557-560. Bee also, 
al-Shihabi, pp * 78-79.
97. Its secretary, Talia al-Hashini, suggested to Aziz to 
make public its aims, since its prupose was to end the 
differences between Turks and Arabs. See, Majid Khad- 
duri, St. Antonyms Papers, 17, note 25 > p.149.
98. See, Alfred Be Billinski, "The Turkish Revolution",
The Nineteenth Century And .After, No.CCCLXXIX, Sent. 
T958V pp.564- ff.
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a reason as why al-Qag$&niyya and al-Ahd assuned a secret 
character at all. However, with the arrest of'Aziz'All 
al-Migri in February 1914 - an incident that had caused 
considerable connotion anong the Arab connunity of Istan­
bul - and his subsequent release and departure to Egypt
qq
in April 1914, y al-Ahd becane dornant. Nevertheless,
'Aziz, together with sone of its officer nenbers were to
join the Revolt of Sharxf gusayn of Mecca in 1916, and to
play an inportant part in it.*^^
Two other secret societies, which had nothing
nuch to their credit, were nentioned by al-Azanx, nanely
The Black Hand (Jan1 iyat al-Yad al-Sawda* ) , and The Green
(Janjiyat al-!Allan al-Akhdar). No date was given for
the fornation of the first of these societies, but its
founder was said to be Da*ud al-Dubunx, ^  Iraqi nedical
student. Its ain was a terrorist one, to assassinate
Arabs who opposed the Arab novenent. Its nenbers, nainly
nilitary cadets, were divided anong thenselves, and as
result the society dissolved before it was a year old,
101having achieved nothing.
99. See Below, pp*3J{?.
100. Al-*Azanx, IV, pp.65-66. Tahsin al-Askari, pp.184 ff. 
Majid Khadduri, St. Antony1s Papers, pp.151-155*
101. Al-’Azanx, III, p.59.
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Da’ud al-Dubunx, for whom the formation of secret socie­
ties held a special fascination, also founded the society
of the Green Flag in September 1912. According to al-'Az-
102
anl, its nane was a reference to the green Nejdite flag#
It had civilians, nainly medical doctors and students,
and junior array officers among its members. Its aim was
to strengthen national bonds between Arab students in
Istanbul and to urge them to work for the welfare of their
Arab nation (Unna) Its most significant work was the
publication of a political - literary periodical called
Lisan al-'Arab (the language or tongue of the Arabs),
edited by al-'Azani. However, this periodical, was soon
made the organ of al-Muntada al-Adabl, and was called 
105after it. Like the rest of the secret Arab societies, 
al~1 Alam al-A3hadar had modest achievements and limited its 
activities to Istanbul alone. None of these societies 
had separatist aims#
102. Ibid., p*36. The green f?.ags and banners were always 
thesymbol of rebellion in the history of Islam.
103* Ibid., Also, Amin Sa’Id, al-thawra al-1Arabiyya, 1 
pTTU.
104. al-'Azani, Ibid., pp#37-36; Amin Sa'Id, Ibid#
105. Ibid., for more details.
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CHAPTER IY
THE SYRIAN DECENTRALISATION 
MOVEr'EENT.
The Syrian decentralisation movement, with its 
two main centres in Cairo and Beirut, was the culmination 
of Arab agitation for the assertion of their rights with­
in the Ottoman Empire. The movement, which made its first 
appearance in the early days of 1912 in the form of news­
paper articles and booklets written by Syrians and arguing 
in favour of administrative decentralisation as a system 
of government for the Arab provinces,*^* was to develop into 
the first organised and open Syrian political party seeking 
to oppose, largely through constitutional means, the
1. Important among those articles and booklets were two 
articles published by gaqqi al-’Agm, who was to become 
the secretary of the^Becenrfcralisation Partyfof Cairo 
later on, and by Wall al-Dxn Yakan, a prominent Arab 
writer and journalist, in al-Muqattam, No.6919 of 2 Jan*, 
1912* P*4-, and Ho.6920 of 3 Jan. 1912, p*4, respectively. 
Both articles dealt with Administrative Decentralisa­
tion for Arab lands, gaqql follows up his arguments in 
his booklet: Haqa*iq 1 an al-Intikhabat al-Niya-
biyya fl al-* Iraq wa^Surlyya wa^PaTastin, Cairo, 1912.
In tTSe second Half of 1912 ancTbowards the end of that 
year there were almost incessant articles in the press 
on the subject of Administrative Decentralisation, see 
for example; al-Hugettarn* No.7104- of 8 Aug. 1912, and 
No.7217 of 21’ fiec. I9127 P*4-; Also, Lisan al-Hal, Nos. 
7122-7126 of 20-26 Dec., 1912; al-Ahram’l o t  T W O  of 
8 Aug, 1912 for a declaration by an unknown organisa­
tion calling itself Pityan Qabtan. The declaration enu­
merated demands for the Arab nation all of which fall 
within the range of administrative decentralisation. This 
organisation is probably fictitious. Also No.10582 of 21 
Dec. 1912 for agitation of Arab students in Istanbul for 
the introduction of administrative decentralisation in 
Arab provinces*
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centralising and anti- Arab policies of the Young Turks. 
Apart from the sympathetic response to the movement in 
Basra and Baghdad, a response that was mainly due to the 
instigation and encouragement of the powerful Sayyid jllib 
al-Uaqlb of Basra, who was known for his opposition to 
the CUP and support of the Syrian decentralisers, the 
movement remained exclusively Syrian. Moreover, it came 
to be regarded as a manifestation and proof of the rising 
tide of nationalism among the Syrian elite, Por the first 
time in the history of Syria, Muslim and Christian nationa­
lists worked together for what their press termed the 
common aim, namely the granting of administrative decentral 
isation to their provinces. Subsequent events and facts 
showed that this common aim was not as common as the press 
inferred, for divergences and differences did occur. 
However, this willingness of the Muslims and the Christi­
ans to work together made their agitation for the intro­
duction of a measure of administrative decentralisation 
in the system of the government of the Ottoman Empire, of 
critical importance in the history of the Turkish - Syrian 
relations during this period. The suspicion with which 
the Young Turks viewed the movement, and its subsequent 
failure, widened the ever growing gap between the Syrians 
and their Ottoman government* When the Turks resorted to 
repressive measures to strangle the Syrian movement, the 
Syrians were driven to disappointment and despair and as
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a result some of them began to look for other alternatives 
to the rule of the Turks,
Origins of the Syrian Decentralisation Movement;
This movement, however, had no claim to origina­
lity, It was no more than an echo, though with some va­
riations, of ideas which had been in the air since the 
Congress of 4 February 1902, convened by the Ottoman Li­
berals in Paris in order to establish a common line of 
2
action. The Congress, however, split, partly on persona­
lity conflicts but mainly on the issue of the necessity 
of securing the assistance of the Eruopean powers and the 
participation of the Turkish army in the contemplated 
internal involution, Prince Sabaheddin, the president 
of the Congress, headed the "interventionists" while 
Ahmed Riza and his faction remained opposed to this policy. 
This difference between the Prince and Ahmed Riza began 
"to crystallize from now onwards as one between Turkish 
nationalism and Ottoman liberalism”. The former stood
2. On the Congress, see E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks - Pre­
lude to The Revolution of 1908, Beirut'," 1965? pp*"6'6' i’f *; 
E7"”Lewis, Emergence, pp.2C2'-'2U5; Timaya, Partiler, pp. 
106 ff. ‘
3. Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics - The Transition to 
a Hulti-Party System, Princeton, 1959? p.14.”11so, 
Tunaya, lbldT,mrjbTXUU; B, Lewis, Ibid., p,203*
4. B. Lewis, ibid. See also, Ramsaur, pp.81, ff.
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for the principle of Ottomanism to he implemented through 
a centralised form of government in which the Turks were 
to have the dominant role. Ahmed Riza was the outspoken 
representative of this school of thought, and he was 
challenged by Prince Sabaheddin, "who envisaged a total 
transformation of the Ottoman Empire by decentralizing the 
administration and promoting individual initiative, and 
by inducing the intelligentsia to engage in productive 
occupations rather than seek government jobs".^ Thus the 
Prince emerged as the main advocate of the concept of 
administrative decentralisation as a remedy for the pro­
blems of a multi-racial empire such as that of the Otto­
mans, and from then and until the entry of the Ottoman 
Empire in the Eirst World War in October 1914? the name of 
Sabaheddin was associated with all political parties and 
groups calling for decentralisation in the Empire. Na­
turally the ideas of the Prince became popular with the 
non-Turkish peoples, and when he founded his Tesobbusu 
Sahsi ve Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (The League for Private 
Initiative and Administrative Decentralization), he set up
5. K. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p*19* Eor a brief
account of Sabaheddin and his ideas and bibliography 
see’ Ibid-* Also, B. Lewis, Emergence, pp.203-204, 
Ramsaur, pp.81-89. All four authors were agreed 
that Sabaheddin was influenced by the writings of 
the Erench writer, Edmond Demolins.
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■branches, particularly in Asiatic Turkey, in Erzurum, 
Trabzon, Izmir as well as in Damascus and Latakiya in 
Syria, while a certain Malpmud al-'Alayill started a 
branch in 'Aley in Lebanon.^ It is significant that the 
Damascus branch was set up by two Muslim Damascenes who 
were to play an eminent role in the agitation and organi­
sation of the decentralisation movement in the years 1912- 
1913} namely the cousins Rafiq al-'Agm and ]JaqqI al-'Agmu^ 
The former was to be the president of the Ottoman Admini­
strative Decentralisation Party, which was founded in Cairo 
towards the end of 1912, while the latter became its secre­
tary,, Thanks to the efforts of Prince Sabaheddin to dis­
seminate his Ideas of a federalised Ottoman state, the 
Syrian movement for decentralisation found the traditioh 
to draw upon and the pretext which its leaders would so 
often cite.
Prince Sabaheddin*s League, and ultimately his 
ideas, were in fact to meet considerable opposition from 
the powerful CUP and were as a result foredoomed to failure.
6. To Tunaya, Partiler, p.142. For the Programme of the 
League see, ibicL, pp.142-144, Buru, p.56.
7. Tunaya, Partiler? p.145, Buru, p.55. _For a short 
biography of Rafiq al-'Agm, see, Majmu'at Athar, 
preface written by M. Rashid Ri$a. For tliat of 
JJaqql al-fAgm, see Matjallat Lisan al-*Arab, (Baghdad) 
Void, Part 5 of M a y 7 d ^ 3 7 T p ^ 3 - 1 1 9 . ---
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Fearing any sort of opposition, and certainly that of a 
well-known figure like Prince Sabaheddin, whose ideas 
were becoming too popular with the non-Turkish nationa­
lities, the CUP took care to nip the Prince's League in 
the bud. The CUP brought pressure to bear on the Prince, 
who being a theoretician and idealist, gave in; in 
November 1908 he dissolved his League, and publicly de-
Q
Glared his support for the programme of the CUP*
The concept of decentralisation, however, did 
not disappear from the scene of (Turkish politics. It re­
vived in the programmes of two opposition parties, namely 
the Osmanll Ahrar Firkasi, the Liberal Party,formed in 
September 1908, and the Hurriyet Ve Itilaf Firkasi, the 
Liberal Union founded in November 1911. Like most of the 
Turkish opposition parties and groups the common feature
of their programmes was severe criticism of the CUP
q
centralisation policy.J Among the founders of the Liberal 
Party were men from Sabaheddin*s entourage, and though the 
Prince himself was anxious not to have a link with this 
party, it was undoubtedly inspired by his ideas, and he 
game to be considered, by both his enemies and supporters,
8. A. Mandelstam, Le Sort de 1*Empire, pp.14-16. Buru, 
p.87. Z.N. Seine, The Emergence r~P*97*
9. Tunaya, Partiler, pp.239 ff*
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10as its spiritual head. The Ahrar formulated a programme
11which outwardly was not different from that of the CUP, 
for to them it was not the programme hut its execution, 
that mattered; and they saw in the execution of the CUP*s 
programme a "lack of liherali'sm and tolerance, and a
I P
tendency towards the Turkish nationalism". The Ahrar
was furthermore, associated in the minds of many non-
Turkish deputies and patriots, who rallied to its cause,
and more significantly, in the minds of the leaders of
the CUP, with the concept of decentralisation advocated
by Sabaheddin. In the words of a Young Turk, the Ahrar,
"promised equal chances to all nationalities in Turkey to
13develop on their own nationalist lines". ^ The Ahrar as
a party did not have a chance of playing an important role
in Turkish politics, and beyond securing for itself one
member in the Chambei4 of Deputies, and organising for its
purposes a group of deputies composed of Arabs, Albanians,
Greeks and Armenians, it left little lasting effect on the
Turkish scene. As a result of the strict laws issued after
Serebesti, No.96 of 21 Peb., 1909, pp.1-2; also No.
124' of*”20 March, 1910, p#3, col. 1-3; and No. 14-0 of 
6 April, 1910, p.4-.
11. Por the programme of the Ahrar see, Tunaya, Partiler,
pp.239 ff.
12. Mandelstam, p.15.
13. Halil Halid, "The Origins of The Revolt In Turkey" in: 
The Nineteenth Century And After, Vol.65, No.CCCLXXXVII 
nay, iyoy, p<.y>y.
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the April 1909 counter-revolution against all forms of op­
position to the Young Turks regime, the Liberal Party- 
transferred itself to Paris, and was finally dissolved 
in 1910.14
On the 21 November 1911» the first opposition 
party*which was to form a real challenge and threat to 
the CUP, was founded. The Liberal Union, as this party 
came to be known in western sources, emerged from the 
union of almost all opposition parties, dissatisfied na­
tional groups in parliament and personalities opposed to 
15the CUP* ^ This party, composed of various and divergent
groups, was united only in its opposition to the CUP and
in its determination to oust it from power* Though this
party failed to work out a positive and constructive pro- 
16gramme, it tried to win the support of the non-Turkish 
nationalities by declaring that its aim was,"the consoli­
dation of the principles of the constitution and the pro­
motion of good understanding between the various elements
17of the Empire," ' and by advocating a limited measure of
14. Tunaya, Partiler, p.318.
15. Yeni Ikdam, No.585 of 22 Oct., 1910, p.3* col.6, talked 
of meetings and efforts which preceded the formation
of Liberal Union. No.586 of 26 Oct. 1910, gave de­
tails of one such meeting. Tanin, No. 1158 of 23 Nov., 
1911, p*3, col.2, wrote under^bhe title, "Yeni Bir 
Firka", of fusion of various parties and groups In the 
formation of such party and gave details about its 
formation. See also, B. Lewis, Emergence, p.221, 
Karpat, Turkey's, p.17.
16* See Tunaya, Partiler, pp.319 ff*
17* Lowther to Grey, No.864, conf., Const., 25 Nov., 1911, 
F.O. 371/1253/48319* Also, Tanin, No.1158 of 23 Nov., 
1911* p*3*
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decentralisation. Only in contrast to the programme of 
the CUP, could that of Liberal Union be branded as decen­
tralist. Though the Ententists, to use a word deriving 
from the official term given to the Liberal Union in 
French, Entente Liberale, declared in their election 
manifesto that they were ready to concede certain points 
in education and the powers allotted to the General Coun­
cil of the Vilayet, points which could be described as of 
a mild decentralist nature, the gist of that manifesto 
fell quite short of what the Syrian decentralisers were
*1 O
to demand in January 1913* Nonetheless this new party 
struck the fancy of the Syrian Arabs both at Istanbul and 
at home. Among the leaders of the party, which gathered 
around itself a number of prominent Ottoman politicians, 
were also some Arabs. Nearly all of them were previously 
either supporters of the CUP or sympathisers with its po­
litical programme. This fact indicated the increasing 
tension between the emerging Arab nationalists and the 
CUP leaders, who showed themselves more inclined to work 
towards the furtherance of the interests of a Turkish na­
tion rather than the interests of an Ottoman nation.
18. al-Muqattam, No.6962 of 22 Feb., 1912, p*l, gives the 
fentehtists1 manifesto and compares and contrasts it 
with that of the Unionist. As well, the same Issue 
of al Muqattam furnished details of decentralist 
points In the Ententists1 programme. On such points 
see also, Tunaya, Partiler, pp.340 ff.
In fact some of the Syrian deputies in the 
Chamber played an important role in the negotiations
iq
leading to the formation of the Liberal Union party. y
The list of its founders included the name of fAbd al-£Eamid
al-ZahrawI, the deputy for gama, a former sympathiser of
the CUP and a prominent decentraliser who was to pay for
his views with his life. Pushdx al-Sham'a and ShukrI al~
'Asall, both, deputies for Damascus, and bitter opponents
of the CUP!s Arab policies, were among the members of
20the party's executive committee. The Syrian press,
whether in Egypt ot* in Syria itself, welcomed the new 
21party. Branches were set up in the main Syrian towns: 
Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Aleppo, as well as in Bagra 
and Baghdad. Other centres in the Arab vilayets, such as 
in the gijaz and the Yemen, being backward or engaged in 
revolts, and as such of little or no importance in the 
political life of the Empire, were of no interest to the
19# Yeni Ikhda, No.586 of 26 Oct., 1911; al~Muqattam, No. 
6893 of"28 Nov., 1911, pp.1-2.
20. Tanin, No.1158 of 23 Nov. 1911, p.3, col.2, gives the 
names of the founders and of the executive committee 
of the party. For a French translation of formation 
and names of this party see Stamboul, of 22 Nov.,
1911, being an enclosure in Lowther to Grey, No.864, 
conf., Const., of 25 Nov., 1911, in F.0.371/1263/48319.
21. See for example, al-Muqattam, No.6893 of 28 Nov., 1911* 
and No.6898 of 6 Dec., 1 9 l l al-Mufld, No.848 of 6 Dec., 
1911; al-Muqtabas, (daily) No.844 of 7 Dec., 1911 and 
No.847"of II DecT, 1911 gives such a welcoming article 
by gaqql al-fAgim, Nos.869-873 of 4 Jan., 1912, to 9 
Jan., 1912 give the programme of this party.
206
leaders of the Liberal Union and consequently no branches
were established there. Moreover the Liberal Union fought
the elections of 1912, and it had great hopes of winning
the majority of the seats in Syria. One of its leaders,
Lu£fi Fikri, deputy for Uersim and an outspoken critic of
the CUP, accompanied by ShukrI al-'Asall, toured the
22Syrian vilayets preaching their programme. Their ef­
forts were, however, in vain, for the CUP was to rig 
those elections and consequently to establish its absolute 
control over the Chamber. The leaders of the CUP seemed 
never to have forgotten or forgiven the leaders of the 
Syrian decentralisation movement their association with 
the opposition parties and in particular with the Liberal 
Union. Izahat, the book published by the Fourth Army on 
Cemal Pashds orders to justify and defend the famous 
trials of 1916 in which many Arab nationalists were tried 
and subsequently hanged, is at pains to try and establish 
a close link between the formation of the La Markaziyya 
party in Cairo towards the end of 1912, and the designs 
of the CUPfs opponents, namely the Libexvxl Union, to bring 
about the downfall of the CUI' cabinet.^ It was only
22* al-Muqatfram, No.6962 of 22 Feb., 1912, pp.l & 4 for
Lutfi’s activities in Damascus and talk. Yeni Ikdam No. 
697 of 16 Feb., 1912, p.3, Col.2, for Aleppo.
23* See Izahat, (Turkish copy) pp.40-44, where proof of
linksbetween the Syrian decentralisers and the Liberal 
Union were produced, Izahat, relied heavily on confes­
sions of some of the accused, mainly those of 'Abd al- 
C-hanl al-'Araysi, the editor of the nationalist paper 
al-Mufld, and Sayf al-Dln al-Kha^Ib, a young Arab na­
tionalist. Some letters written privately by some 
leading decentralisers, such as Rafiq al-'Agm, to
/cont..
natural that opponents of any regime would seek its down­
fall, a fact that makes the accusations of Izahat look 
absurd. However, the opposition parties and societies 
such as the League of Prince Sbaheddin, the Ahrar after it 
and the Liberal Union kept talking about administrative 
decentralisation as an alternative to the centralisation 
policies of the CUP, and by so doing provided the Syrian 
decentralisers with a tradition to draw upon and a for­
mula for expressing their discontent with the government, 
which in their opinion, had persistently ignored the po­
litical rights of the Arabs in the Empire.
Thus the Syrian decentralisation movement was 
essentially an anti-CUP movement which had been mounting 
to a climax under the impact of the general political si­
tuation in the Empire during the years 1911-1912. Through­
out 1911 and until its fall on 17 July 1912 the Unionist 
regime was getting extremely unpopular, and its policies 
were meeting with increasing opposition both inside and 
outside parliament. The position of the CUP was further
P/note 23 eont. from previous page.
friends and other persons were also produced, see for 
instance pp.42-44. For a French translation see French 
copy, La Veritfe, pp.58-63*
24. Foreign Office material, press and sources, Turkish and 
non-Turkish, narrate in great detail the difficulties 
of the CUP during 1911 and 1912, Files F.O. 371/1228 
ff. are full of such reports. For a brief account see, 
Lowther to Grey, No.100, conf., Const., 31 Jan.,1912, 
forwarding the Annual Report for 1911> pp.1-58, in 
F.O. 371/1491/4966. 'See also, B. Lev/is, Emergence, pp. 
220-224. For a detailed account see F. Ahmad7 Qjh.e 
Committee of Union and Progress, pp.160-212.
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undermined by the dissension and strife between two fac­
tions among its leaders. A group of moderates led by 
Colonel Sadik Bey, an officer who played a leading role 
that is often overlooked in the 1908 revolution, came to 
oppose successfully the domination of the CUP by men like 
Talat, Cavid, Ismail Hakki and their associates, who were
closely connected with the harsh and unpopular policies
PSof the various CUP-dominated governments. ^ Notwith­
standing strenuous efforts to heal the schism within the 
CUP, Sadik Bey and his fr&6nds left the rani® of the 
party to form, with other dissident groups and opponents 
of the Unionist regime, the Liberal Union in November 
1911, which demonstrated the declining fortunes of the
once-powerful CUP by spectacularly winning the by-elec-
27tion, held in Istanbul on 11 December 1911•
Moreover the Committee's majority in the Chamber 
was fast dwindling, and its leaders soon realised that if 
their party was to stay in power, a general election con­
ducted under their auspices had become exceedingly
25* The Annual Report For X911» as above, pp.2 ff. Also, 
ffemorandum m  F .0.371/1 9’, F.O.16 May, 1911, pp.l?-
2TI PTTftmad, The Committee of Union and Progress, 
pp. 170-179* See also, YenIrl!kda5~No.4-00 of 21 
April, 1911, and No.402 oT'23"April, 1911, and No,
430 of 21 May 1911.
26. Yeni Ikdam, No.402 of 23 April, 1911.
27. al-Muqattam, No.6911 of 21 Dec. 1911, Lewis, Emergence, 
pp.22112227
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necessary. Hence they decided to introduce to parliament 
their scheme of modifying Article 35 of the Constitution.
The modification which had been approved by the Committeels 
Congress of September 1911 was intended to restore to the 
Sultan the power, enjoyed by him under the Constitution of 
1876, of dissolving the Chamber, in the event of continued 
dispute between the Cabinet and the Chamber, without the 
consent of the Senate. The opposition leaders, such as 
Lutfi Pikri, found it difficult to believe the CUP*3 
concern for the prerogatives of the Sultan, and not with­
out good reason, concluded that the real aim of the CUP 
was to dissolve parliament and conduct new elections in 
which they would use their influence to secure a majority
po
over the newly formed Liberal Union. The opposition
leaders were right, for this was exactly what the CUP dido
po
After bitter parliamentary debates, y the government failed
to have its bill of amendment passed, and in accordance
with certain constitutional provisions, parliament was
30dissolved on 17 January 1912. In the elections that
28. Lowther to Grey, No.934-* Conf., Const,, 18 Dec., 1911,
F .0*371/1263/51563; and No.955, same to same, Conf., 
Const., 18 Dec.^ 1911, P.O.371/1263/51584. fAbd al- 
^[amid al-Sahrawo. expressed similar views in an article 
m  his paper al-Idara, (previously sd-gadara) of 
Istanbul, which allMugattam No.6935 of 22 Jan., 1912, 
p.2 reproduced.
29* Por these debates see Meclis-i Hebusan Zabit Ceridsi, 
Sittings Nos. 31-36 of 24 Dec., 1911-11 Jan., 19r2,' ' p. 
649-772.
30. Text of Irade in Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Ceridsi, pp.
831, Sitting No.40 of 16 Jan., 1912 7 TransIat ion in 
Lowther to Grey, No.52, conf., Const., 17 Jan., 1912, 
P.O.371/1487/2877• See also, same to same, No.69, /cont.
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followed, the GUP secured itself an overwhelming majority 
"by dxshonest means. By thus illegally removing the le­
gal parliamentary opposition, the Committee hastened its 
own downfall* This action, together with other policies 
of the CUP which were causing mounting discontent in 
Albania, Macedonia and Syria, convinced its adversaries 
that the Committee intended to persist in its centralising 
and oppressive policies. Dissatisfaction with the Com­
mittee's policies united Albanian nationalists in their 
successful efforts to oppose militarily the Unionist re­
gime, and resulted in the renewal of the terrorist acti­
vity in Macedonia and had ultimately led to the action of 
Halask&r Zabitan Grupu, Group of Saviour Officers, in May 
- June 1912 which precipitated the fall of the CUF.^
The fall of the CUP cabinet 011 17 July 1912, 
created the first and most vital prerequisite for the 
emergence of the Syrian decentralisation movement. It meant
P/note cont, from previous page.
conf., Const., 24 J a n .,  1912, F .0 ,3 7 1 /1 4 8 7 /3 9 3 9 . a l-M u q a t-  
£am, No.6935 of 22 J a n ., 1912, p.l. “
3? . See for instance: Lowther to Grey, No.324, conf., 
Const., 18 April, 1912, F.O.371/1494/17830, also, 
Iktiham Nos., 154 of 26 July 1912, p.3 and No.159 of 
31 July 1912, p.3. al-Muqattam, 7008 of 18 April, 1912, 
al-Ahram, No. 10357 oi 29 March., 1912.
32. Marling to Grey, No.592, conf., Const., 10 July, 1912, 
F.O.371/1495/29823. Major Tyrrel to Marling, No.55* 
Const., 29 July, 1912, enc., in F.O.371/1495/53863, 
forwards programme of Saviour officers. Also, Marling 
to Grey, No.233, teleg., conf., Const., 18 July, 1912, 
F.O.371/1496/30444. F. Ahmad, The CUP, pp.207-216.
B. Lewis, Emergence, pp.223-224^
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the removal of the Unionist regime which was adamant in
its refusal to consider any call to decentralise the
system of administration, and its replacement by cabinets
which the Syrian decentralisers hoped would be amenable
to their aspirations - a hope that was to be dashed* None-
the less, the collapse of the Committee's regime was,
,rhailed with general relief, and the country looked for
the formation of a strong liberal government, which would
rid the nation of the incubus of the occult Committee,
and extricate it from its thickening difficulties"
Ghazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha formed the new cabinet on 21 
54July 1912? and proceeded to set right some of the Com­
mittee's oppressive policies* The state of siege was 
lifted the very next day, and on the 15 August the Com­
mittee-dominated parliament was dissolved.^ In fact
the whole programme of the new cabinet was an indictment 
of the CUP administration.
35* The Annual Report For the Year 1912, p. 3* in Lowther 
to Grey, WoA3157 conf ., Cons t ., Apri 1, 1913*
F.O.371/1812/18393.
34o Hatt appointing Muhtar Pasha in Takvim-i Vokayi, No.
IIS5 of 23 July, 1912, p.l. Ikit iham, No.149 of 22
July, 1912.
35* B. Lewis, Emergence, p.224. Also, Ikitiham, No.148 of 
22 July, l^I^TMarTing to Grey, No.256 teleg., conf., 
Const., 23 July, 1912, F.O.371/1496/31301.
36. Marling to Grey, teleg., conf., Const., 30 July, 1912,
F.O.371/1496/32320. al-Muqattam, No.7102 of 6 Aug., 
!9i2, Lisan al-ffal, No77'K>2"of 13 Aug., 1912, for an 
Arabic fTr ansi at Ion of programme.
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Moreover, the cabinet showed a willingness to 
ascertain and deal with the Albanian demands* A commission 
composed of two Albanian members, Marshal Ibrahim Pasha 
and Danish Bey, was sent to Albania to discuss their 
grievances with the rebels.^ It was acts like this that 
made the CUP press accuse the cabinet of Muhtar Pasha of 
being an Ententist, an accusation that it was quick to 
deny. However, the Syrians were jubilant. Notables 
from both Beirut and Damascus sent telegrams to the Sultan 
congratulating him on appointing such a we11-chosen cabi­
net, and requesting him to dissolve the parliament and 
order elections for a new one.  ^ Al-Muqtabas, a famous 
Damascene paper, which had been suspended by the Unionist 
regime on account of its continuous attacks, resumed 
publication, and showed its joy over the fall of the CUP. 
Numerous articles in al-Muqatfran, al-Ahram, and Lisan al- 
gal, all of which were to preach the cause of decentralisa­
tion persistently, welcomed the new cabinet and put high
57* Marling to Grey, No.255? teleg., conf., Const., 27 
July, 1912, P.0.371/1496/3184-7* al-Muqattan, No.7097 
of 51 July 1912. ~
38. Lisan al-ffal, No.7062 of 11 Oct., 1912, and No.7065
Oct., 1912.
•fcVi©
39. For/Beirutis' telegram see, al-Muqattam, Wo.7098 of 1 
Aug., 1912; For Damascene one seeTTSrbihaia, No.154- 
of 26 July, 1912, p.3.
4-0. Falastin, Wo. 163/62 of 17 Aug., 1912, p.3.
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41 -rhopes on it. In one such article, Rafxq al-^Agm appealed
to his fel low-countrymen to support the new government, 
and to leave it alone to find tine to deal with the pres­
sing problems of the Empire which the misguided policies
/ i  Q  _
of the Unionists had created. Men like Rafiq al-!A^m,
known for their opposition to the GUP were anxious to en­
list support for the cabinet of Muhtar Pasha for fear of 
the return of the GUP to power* They shared with this ca­
binet and its successor their opposition to the Unionist 
way of governing the Empire, together with a strong de­
sire to destroy the Committee as a political force. To 
the Syrian decentralisers, the destruction of the CUP 
as a political power meant the partial end of its central­
ising policies, and a fair chance that the Arabs - a term 
synonymous in their minds with Syrians - might secure some 
of their political rights in the Empire. To them the only 
way to achieve that was through reforming the system of 
government of the Empire by introducing administrative 
decentralisation.
41. al-Muqattam, No.7097 of 3^  July, 1912, and No.7098 of 
T T u g ., 1^X2, and No.7105 of 9 Aug., 1912, for exam­
ples of such articles^ See also, al-Ahram, No.10454 
of 1 Aug., 1912. Lisan al-2al, No.7t)12 of 13 Aug., 
1912, and No.7021 oF"55 Aug., 1912.
42. Article in, al-Muqafrtam, No.7105 of 9 Aug., 1912, p.4.
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The word "Reform" - I slab. “ was much in the air 
throughout the latter half of 1911 and the whole of 1912. 
The Armenians, the Albanians and the Syrians were all to 
ask for it. It gained momentum from the day Ahmed Muhtar 
Pasha assumed power on 21 July, 1912, and continued to be 
a much discussed subject until the Ottoman government 
entered the First World War on 5 November 1914. It was 
not social or economic reform which was much under discus­
sion then, but reform of the administration on the basis 
of decentralisation. The first definite demand for such 
reform was put forward to the central government by a 
number of Albanian nationalist groups. As a result of the 
Albanian insurrection of 1912, three sets of demands were 
presented*
The first list was drawn up by the insurgent 
Muslims of the vilayet of Kossovo, and was known as the 
Prishtina programme. It contained 14 articles which dealt 
with the right to carry arms, regional military service, 
respect of customary law, the principle that government 
officials should know the Albanian language and customs, 
and that Albanian should be taught in the schools. An 
interesting demand was the one for the impeachment of both 
HakldL ‘ . and Said cabinets. The second programme
contained most of the items of the previous set of demands, 
and some others, "which were considerably far-reaching in 
the direction of decentralisation, and the recognition of
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Albania as a national and geographical entity” A third 
memorandum of demands formulated by the Gheg Albanians 
went a step further by* stipulating ‘ an Albanian Na­
tional Assembly, independent of the Ottoman parliament 
in Istanbul, and controlling its own finance and army*
Albania was geographically defined as comprising the four
44vilayets of Monastir, Kossovo, Janina and Scutari. It 
was the Albanian insurrection of 1912 and the demands ge­
nerated by that insurrection as well as the conciliatory 
attitude shown by the government towards the Albanian re­
bels which made a tremendous impression on the Syrian op­
ponents of the GUP, and set their hearts on a movement of 
their own*
The future leaders of the Syrian decentralisa­
tion movement must have viewed the events in Albania with 
great interest. The Albanian and the Syrian deputies had 
always worked jointly, inside and outside parliament, in 
opposing the Unionist regime. They participated in the 
formation of all the opposition parties, and the veteran
43. The Annual Report For 1912, p.31, in Lowther to Grey, 
W:jiy^o6nf7T^onsJt'7rW~April, 1913, F.O.371/1812/ 
18393.
44. For all these demands see, The Annual Report For 1912, 
as above, pp.30-31. For a b’rlef" account of tHe insur- 
rection, see, pp.28-30. For a series of articles on 
the ‘Albanian Problem,” see, The Times, Nos. 3994-3 of
5 July 1912, and 399^6 of 9 “3nTy," 1912, p.5. See also 
No.39962 of 27 Jnly, 1912, p.5, for an account of the 
policy of the Committee there and other provinces. 
eJ^hiciattam, No.7082 of 13 July, 1912.
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Albanian deputy for Berat, Ismail Kenal, came to be re­
garded as the spiritual father of all opposition to the 
GUP. He was respected and trusted by the Syrian deputies, 
some of whom he came to know during his official stcyin 
Beirut as vali in 1890. Because of such respect, and of 
his leading role in the insurrection, some of the leading 
(Syrian deputies such as ShukrI al-!AsalIs deputy for Da­
mascus and known for his bitter opposition to the GUP, 
felt jubilant over the success of the Albanian rebellion*
He expressed such feelings in a telegram which he addressed
to Hassan. Bey of Prishtina, one of the leaders of the Kos-
45 —sovo rebels0 ^ Hassan Bey, who probably knew al~!Asali
from the Chamber of Deputies, where both of theaplayed 
a large part in the heated anti-CUP discussion which cha­
racterised the last days of 1911, thanked al-'Asall for
his telegram* He added that what the Albanians had done
46was inspired by their love for the Ottoman land. Muhibb 
al-Dln al Khajlb *s Arabic translation of a book written 
by a certain Gaptain Ahmet Hamdi, about the defeats of 
the Ottoman army.by the Albanian rebels, was according 
to a cabinet decision, na dangerous publication which 
would cause discord among the [Ottoman] peoples”, whose
45- Falastln, No.170/69 of 11 Sept., 1912, p.3, refers to 
PHIs’ telegran. Izahat, p. 41 gives text of this tele­
gram. French translation in French copy of Izahat,
La Verit6, p. 60.
46. Fa.LastIn, No.170/69 of 11 Sept., 1912, p.3.
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entry to the Empire should he prohibited.^
It is no wonder5 than, that Izahat nade the most 
of feelings suoh as those of al-’Asall , and charged the 
Syrian decentralisers with cherishing the sane hopes as
4-8
the Albanians, namely:wanting to separate from the Empire.
The same accusation was indeed a recurring theme in the
Committee^ press. y Heedless to say the Syrians replied
to these accusations and assured the government and the
CUP of their never-ending loyalty to the state and their
earnest desire to maintain the integrity of the Empire.
Out of such desire, they declared, stemmed their movement
for reforming the administration in their provinces as
well as in the rest of the Empire. Only by such reform
could the Ottoman Empire survive, and in its survival lay
a bright future for both the Arabs and the Turks.^ Such
arguments and counter-arguments, however, seemed academic,
for they failed to admit the fact that the reform movement
4-7. B.A. (Istanbul), Meclis-i Vukala Mazbatasi, No. 179, 
of Shaaban-Ramazan 1331, July-Aug., 1913,Mazbata 
Said book had seal of Halaskar Zabitan «
Mujjibb al-Din was resident in Cairo at the tine and 
hence the reference to the prohibition of the transla­
tion^ entry.
Izahat, pp.4-1-4-2.
4-9. Bee for example article written by Ahmed_Agayef in 
Jeune Turc, and reproduced by Lisan^ al-Hal, No.714*5 
o'i 18 Jan., 1913, Sahah (no date" given; Turcuman 
Hakikat (no date given) as in al-Ahram No.10593 of 8 
Jan., 1913.
50. This is the underlying argument used by the decentrali­
sers in numerous^articles in the press; see for 
instance, al-Ahram, No.10606 of 21 Jan., 1913, and
al-Muqatpan, Nos.7311, 7321 of 5, 26 Apr.,1913.Also, 
Lisan, No77l5q 11 Jan., 1913.
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was the logical conclusion of three years of harsh rulo
by the various Committee dominated governments. Sir
Gerald Lowther, the British Ambassador in Istanbul,
wrote of the Syrian decentralisation movement, "This
movement is in great part a reflex of the 'Turkification
SIPolicy' of the Committee. Moreover, the success of 
the Albanians, and the fact that administrative deeentrali 
sation was a favourite demand of the Albanians, and the 
feature of the "Berchtold proposals" gave the Syrian 
movement its main characteristic and made it,in a sense, 
inevitable.
No sooner had the Albanians achieved their de­
mands, than another set of suggestions as to the way the 
European provinces of the Ottoman Empire ought to be 
administered, were presented to the Porte by Count Berch- 
told, the Austrian Poreign Minister. These proposals 
came to be known as the "Berchtold proposals". They 
merely invited the Powers, "to consider the advisability 
of recommending to the Porte the adoption of the principle 
of 'decentralisation1 in dealing with the question of the 
future of the European Provinces"This ill-timed pro­
posal, though harmless in itself, implied that the Porte
51* Lowthor to Grey, No.238> conf., Const., 24- April, 1913 
P.O. 371/1775/144-74-.
52. The Annual Report For 1912, pp.4—5, in P.0*371/1812/
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was incapable of decent government, and was thus a moral 
encouragement to the discontented elements both inside 
and outside the Empire as well as a staggering blow to 
the prestige of the government, which was struggling to 
remedy the disastrous results of the Committeefs 1Turki- 
fication1 po l i c y P u b l i c  opinion as expressed in the 
press agreed that reform was necessary, but it must not 
take the form of autonomy or decentralisation.Tanin 
warned that the cabinet should not accept the principle 
that Europe had a right to interfere directly or indirect­
ly in Ottoman affairs.-^ In view of all this pressure on 
the cabinet, the Grand Vezir told the Austrian ambassador 
that the Porte would not accept any advice on its domestic 
policy, but he added that the government was ready to 
extend the reforms conceded to Albania to other European 
provinces,^
This willingness of the cabinet of Muhtar Pasha 
to consider reforms for some of the provinces of the 
Empire greatly encouraged the Syrian decentralisers in 
formulating their own demands. If the Albanians could
53. The Annual Report For 1912» p* 5? in P.0.371/1612/
13393”  —
5^ » Ikdam, of 8 Oct,, 1912. Tanin of 8 Oct., 1912#
55* Article by Huseyin Cahid, "Devletlerin Tesebbusu",
3*n ^anin of 10 Oct., 1912, See also, Tanin of 22 Oct., 
1912. The Annual Report, p.5* referred to the pressure 
on the "cabinet by the Oommittee^ press,
56, The Annual Report Por 1912, p.5.
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talk of desiring a decentralised system of government for 
their country and get their way, and if the sane demand 
could he put forward hy the Powers on behalf of the inha­
bitants of European Turkey, why could not the Syrians, 
who had complained for so long that their political rights 
and their interests within the constitutional Ottoman 
Empire had been utterly neglected by the Unionists, for­
mulate similar denands to those already presented to the 
government? The argument seemed sound, but perhaps more 
important, the moment was mosj? opportxine for the presenta­
tion of such denands*
The Impact of the Turco-Italian War and the Balkan Wars:
The immediate origins of the Syrian decentrali­
sation movement are, however, to be sought in the effects 
of the Turkish-Italian war of 1911-12, the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire in the Balkan wars of 1912-13* and the 
ensuing revival of the whole question of the European 
interests in the Empire* Both wars made it quite clear, 
not only to the Syrian decentralisers, but to the Euro­
pean Powers, that the Ottoman Empire, despite the advent 
of the constitutional era, and the lavish expenditure on 
its army, was still hopelessly weak* The tone of the 
Syrian press suggests a growing apprehension on the part 
of the Syrian journalists and leaders as to the fate of 
their country from rumoured European designs for the
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partition of the whole Empire. The Syrian reformists 
indeed argued that it was this fear of Europe’s intentions 
that gave then the incentive and pretext to start their 
movement of decentralisation in an attempt to stave off 
foreign aggression and by so doing to ensure the con­
tinuity of the Empire
The outbreak of the war between Italy and the 
Ottoman Empire at the end of September 1911 had further 
added to the rising misfortunes of the GUP and was one of 
the important factors that finally led to its fall from 
power in July 1912. Moreover, it strengthened the cause 
of the opposition parties. When parliament, was convened 
from its annual recess to discuss the war and the situa­
tion arising from it, there was an uproar in the Chamber 
of Deputies against the policies of the cabinet of Hakki 
Pasha, which, according to the opposition, had lost the 
Empire one of its provinces.^ Both the supporters and 
the opponents of the CUP government blamed it for not 
paying full attention to the defence of the North African 
province. During the sitting of 16 October 1911* a notion 
was handed to the president by the two deputies of African
57* al-Muqattam, No.7302 of 4 April, 1913* the first 
articIe of Rafiq al-’Agm on: "The Syrian Movement,
Its Causes and Results". al-Manar, Vo1.16, part 3 of 
8 March, 1913* pp.237-2387for"KT^a1s arguments. al~ 
Islah, No.29/14-24 of 12 June, 1913* for Tabara’s 
views. Palastln, No.200/99 of 25 Dec., 1912, p.4.
58. Per those sittings see, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Ceride- 
si, pp.39 ffo Tanin, No.1140 of 4 Nov., 19U andfol- 
lowing numbers givey summary of all these sittings.
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Tripoli, NajI and §adiq Beys, demanding the trial of the 
cabinet of Hakki for its intentional negligence in the 
defence of T r i p o l i I t  was clear to the GUP, which 
dominated and influenced the jbolicies of the cabinet of 
Hakki, that the demand for the trial of that cabinet was 
a total condemnation of all that the CUP stood for. 
Centralisation was one of the major items of the CUP 
policies, and discrediting the Committee^ regime was a 
denunciation of that item of policy* Hence the talk of 
the necessity of introducing a measure of administrative 
decentralisation in the system of the Ottoman government.
However, the memorandum of the two deputies of 
Tripoli, was valuable to the leaders of the Syrian de­
centralisation movement not only because it was an anti- 
CUP manifesto signed by two Arab deputies, but because 
it provided them with one of their future demands. The 
memorandum did not advocate any sort of administrative de­
centralisation either for Tripoli or for the rest of the 
Arab provinces of the Empire, but it suggested that 
Tripoli should have been allowed to organise its own
59* Meclis-i Mebusan Sabit Ceridesi, sitting No. 5, of 16 
ScTETJ I91Xi PP • 41-44 for Turki'sK text of motion of 
NajI and Sadiq Beys. For a full Arabic translation, see 
al-Manar, Vol.14,_part II, of 21 Nov., 1911* PP«862- 
867« Also, al-Ahram No. 10223, of 24 Oct., 1911* P*2. 
For an English Nummary see Lowther to Grey, No.728, 
conf., Therapia, 18 Oct. 1911, F.O.371/1255*
60. Yeni Ikdam No.587 of 27 Oct., 1911, P*l, editorial 
which also discussed previous incidents of trials of 
Grand Vezirs.
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local militia if it was expected to defend itself against
*1
tlie Italian invasion. Using exactly the same argument 
in connection with, their provinces, the Syrian decentrali- 
sers, were to formulate their demand for local military 
service, a demand that the Turkish authorities found most 
objectionable.
Shaykh Rashid RigLa, the editor and owner of the 
Islamic monthly al-Nanar» and one of the founder members 
of the Ottoman Administrative Decentralisation Party, 
published a series of articles in al-Nu*ayyad, which he 
later on republished in his own periodical, on the Turkish- 
Italian war. Because he saw in the war and Its conse­
quences a revival of the whole Eastern Question he appro­
priately entitled his articles "The Eastern Question - and
62Italy's Aggression on Tripoli". Ri^ La saw in the fact 
that Europe maintained a complete silence with regard to 
the Italian aggression and that none of the Powers ob­
jected effectively to Italy's action, a clear proof that
65this aggression had been agreed upon by the Powers. ^
This complicity on the part of Europe, Ri$a pointed out,
had revealed "Europe's bad intentions towards the Islamic 
64world". He then argued that the loss of Tripoli would
61* al-Nanar, Vol.14, part II of 21 Nov., 1911, p.865.
62. Eor these articles see, al-Nanar, Vol. 14, part 10 
of 22 Oct., 1911? pp.750-755 and pp.855-858.
65. a I-Nana r, Vol. 14, p. 754* and p,855*
64. Ibid., p.751.
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mean, the beginning of a process of disintegration in the
Ottoman Empire, and Austria would soon capture Salonica
and its neighbourhood, while the Syrian vilayets would
he placed under the protection of the Powers.^ Ri$a
concluded by putting the blame for the loss of Tripoli
66on the misguided policies of the Unionists, and by urging 
his Muslim readers to guard against the disappearance of 
the Ottoman state, for its disappearance would mean "the 
eclipse of Islamic rule from this planet".^ These argu­
ments by Rida became the standard arguments which the 
Muslim leaders of the Syrian decentralisation movement used 
in justifying their preference for a decentralised system 
of government. The Muslims who initiated and dominated 
the movement in both Cairo and Beirut had always maintained 
that their sole aim was to prevent the territorial dis­
integration of the Empire.
When,in January 1912,rumours started; circula­
ting in Beirut to the effect that the government was about 
to sign a peace treaty with Italy, some Beirut notables 
sent a telegram to the president of the Chamber of Deputies 
65* al-Manar, Vol.14, pp.754-755*
66. Ibid. Like RidLa, most of the opponents of the CUP
naturally blamed it. However, Hiiseyin Cahid, editor 
of the CUP organ Tanin replied at length to these ac­
cusations in an editorial entitled, "Tarablus 
Garb ve Ittihad ve Terrakki", see Tanin, Ho.1140 
of 4 Nov., 1911, p.l.
67* al-Manar, Vol.14, p.754.
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in which, they pleaded with the government neither to give 
way nor to compromise over the question of Tripoli. They 
declared that "to give a handful of the soil of Tripoli 
away, would lead to the dissolution of the hond of 
Ottomanismrt
This deep concern for the future of the Ottoman
Empire, the last of the powerful Islamic states, which was
shown by Rashid Rija, and shared hy the Beirut notables
and other leading Muslims, did not, however, reflect the
attitude of the Syrian masses. The British consular
reports on Syria during and after the war show a marked
indifference on the part of the population to the war
and to its results. The war was too distant to raise
issues directly affecting the political and the financial
lot of the Syrians. Trade was hardly affected, and apart
69from the Italian attack on the harbour of Beirut, ' Syria 
was in no way affected by the war. Only in Damascus, 
and probably because of an Islamic feeling of solidarity 
with the inhabitants of Tripoli, had some feelings been
6^ * al-Muqatfram, No.6933 of 15 Jan., 1912, p.l.
69o Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.11, conf., Beirut, 28 Feb., 
1912, F.0.195/2395/1076. Also, same to same, No.12, 
conf., Beirut, 29 Feb., 1912, F.0.195/2395/1077. al- 
Ahram, Nos.10327 to No.10335 of 24 Feb. - 4 March, 
I9IS7
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onexpressed for the Tripoli war.{ However, public opinion 
remained firmly against the government, for the British 
Consul-General in Damascus reported that, "the people - 
hut not the press - are inclined to grumble against the 
government, and to remark that since the establishment
71of the constitution, provinces have been lost to Turkey"; 
The same anti-government sentiments were recorded in 
Aleppo where there was a suspicion that the Unionist re­
gime had merely sold the province of Tripoli to the 
I t a l i a n s I t  was also believed that Tripoli, *’like 
the other lost Ottoman provinces, [was] likely to be more
prosperous under European administration than ever under 
73the Turks.1 (^  The Beirutis were equally apathetic, for 
the Consul at Beirut reported that the Turkish-Italian 
war generated no patriotic reaction other than, "a gene­
ral alarm caused by the false rumours of Italian inten-
74tions to land in Beirut”. The Consul went on to report 
that, "in Mount Lebanon the news [of the war] probably 
only revived speculations among many Lebanese as to when
70. Devey to Lowther, No.50 conf., Damascus, 2 Oct., 1911,
E.0.371/1255/4*1637 •
71. Ibid.
72. Consul W. Toung to Lowther, No.38, Conf., Aleppo, 28 
Oct., 1911, E. 0.371/1257/44803.
73. Ibid.
74. Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.12, conf., Beirut, 29 Feb. 
1912, E.0.195/2395/1076. For further reports, see, 
Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.65, conf., Beirut, 9 Nov. 
1911, E.O.37I/1258/47158. Also, al-Ahram, No.10238 
of 10 Oct., 1911.
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their turn would come to he placed under some European
75administration11.{^  This indifference of the Syrians, 
which was coloured with a strong mistrust of the policies 
of the government, and the emergence of separatist atti­
tudes among some Syrians - apparent in their preference 
£r foreign rule - gave a great boost to the cause of the 
decentralisers. The Turco-Italian war had made the poli­
tical leaders in both Syria and elsewhere realize that 
the Empire was weak, and that in case of aggression against 
Syria, the government might not be able to defend it. It 
was this fear which lay behind the emergence of the Syrian 
decentralisation movement.
The Balkan wars of 1912-13 further helped the 
cause of decentralisation by adding to the fears of the 
Syrians and convincing them that Ottoman Empire was near­
ing its death and that its disintegration was imminent.
War broke out on 18 October 1912. On the pre­
vious day, peace with Italy was signed at Lausanne. Italy 
i*etained Tripoli but allowed the Porte to save face by 
permitting the Sultan to keep his right of appointing the 
qa^ .1, A representative of the Sultan was to stay in Tri­
poli, and the name of the Sultan was to be mentioned in 
the prayers as before. It was clear that to all intents
75* Oumberbatch to Lowther, No.61, conf., Beirut, 10 
Oct., 1911, F.0.371/1256/41727.
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and purposes Tripoli had ceased to he part of the Ottoman 
Empire.^ With the outbreak of the war the experienced 
and Anglophile Kamil Pasha was made Grand Vezir, and on 
29 October he assumed office.^ This veteran Turkish 
statesman was known for his very strong opposition to the 
CUP and its methods of government. His last hostile act 
against the Committee had been the memorandum which he 
sent to the Sultan from Egypt on 20 December 1911> in 
which he ascribed all the misfortunes of the Empire to 
the Committee's policies. He, for instance, held the 
Committee responsible for the loss of Tripoli, and con­
demned the secretive nature of the Committee which made 
it unconstitutional.^ Because of such acts and because 
of his reputation as an opponent of the CUP, Kamil Pasha 
was looked ppon as the deliverer from the tyranny of the 
Committee, and the Syrian decentralisers thought that he 
was completely in sympathy with their aspirations.
76. For a brief summary of the treaty, see, Buru, pp.404- 
406^ . Also, Nicola Ziadeh, Libiyya Pi al-'Usur al- 
gadxtha, Cairo, 1966, pp.8J2"84.
77. Ikdam of 30 Oct., 1912.
78-. Pull text of Kamil's memorandum - Arida, in Tanin, No* 
1242 of 16 Feb., 1912, p.3. In p.T, Sahid in an 
editorial replied at length to Kamil's accusations.
Yeni Ikdam, No.698 of 17 Feb., 1912, gave text of 
Arida, and replied to Cahid's article. See also,
LowtKer to Grey, No.152, conf., Const., 19 Feb., 1912, 
F.0.371/1^86/81^7? fo£* English translation of Kamil's 
memorandum. B. Lewis, Emergence, p.222.
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Thus the coming of Kamil Pasha to power was 
another encouragement which the decentralisers received*
It has heen suggested that Kamil Pasha had incited them 
to action, and that he had allowed their agitation to 
grow and assume large proportions, out of a desire to 
avenge himself on the Unionists*^ This is an over­
simplification of the whole issue; for as was later 
evident, the Syrian demands went further than Kamil, or 
indeed his successors, the Unionists, were ever willing 
to grant.
It was the defeat of the Ottoman armies "by the 
allied Balkan states which shocked the inhabitants of 
the Empire as well as the Great Powers. No one had ex­
pected it. The Turkish armies were caught unprepared, 
lacked organisation, faced a struggle in a new theatre 
of war, and were thus routed everywhere. By early 
November 1912 the Turks had been driven back to the 
Qatalca line of defence, about forty miles from Istanbul. 
The weakness of the Empire was brought to the eyes of all 
Ottomans as well as to the notice of all European Powers. 
The Syrian decentralisers once more raised the cry that 
Syria and the rest of the Empire were in danger of 
passing under European rule, that the system of centrali­
sation was to be blamed for the present misfortunes of
79• §syh. Muhsin-i Eani (el-Zahirl) / Huseyin Kazim Kadri/, 
On Temmuz Inkilabi Ve Netayioi: Turkiye Inkirazinin 
Saikleri, Make do ny a, ^rmenisTan" Ve Suriye Meseleleri, 
1stanbul, 1336? p. 10$.
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the Empire and that the only way to strengthen and pre­
serve the Empire was through the introduction of a de- 
centralised form of government*.
The truth of the matter was that the loss of 
European Turkey shifted the centre of gravity of the 
Empire to the Arab provinces* There was some talk by a 
number of Syrian and Turkish journalists of transferring 
the Ottoman capital to either Anatolia or Syria* For 
varying reasons the names of Damascus, Konia and Aleppo
pi
were mentioned* Coupled with this tendency there was 
another; to consider the Ottoman Empire as an Asiatic 
rather than a European state, now it had lost all its 
possessions in Europe* Yusuf al-*Isa, the editor of 
Falas-ftin, a journal ardently supporting the CUP and
80. This argument was put forward in a wide number of
articles, see for example, al-Naglr, No.1423 of 7 
Dec., 1912, article by Shibli Shumayyil. al-Muqattam» 
No.7192 of 22 Nov., 1912 g.4, and No * 7217 of 21_Dec., 
1912, p.4, article by Rafiq al-!Agm. Lisan al-gal,
No. 7125 of 24 Dec., 1912, editorial" al-AKramT 
No.l05§5 of 26 Dec., 1912, article by Mukhtar Beyhum. 
al-Manar, Vol.l5> part 12 of 9 Dec., 1912, pp.954- 
95&, for the views of Rashid Ri£La.
81. Article by Shumayyil in al-Naglr, No.1423 of 7 Dec.,
1912. See English translation of two articles by 
the Turkish journalist, Ahmed Ferid Bey, in his 
paper, Vazife, enclosure in Lowther to Grey, No. 
475»^oonf.JL donst., 25 May 1913, F.0.371/1822/24944. 
Rashid Rija, though for other reasons of his own, 
also suggested the transfer of the capital to 
Damascus, see, al-Manar, Vol.16, part 2 of 6 Feb.
1913, p.112.
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appearing in Jaffa, arguod in fc^ Arour of the Empire being
an Asiatic power, and reminded the Turks of the fact that
Anatolia and the Arah provinces had become the new base
for the Empire, and he further urged the government to
82introduce wide reforms in these places. Moreover, the 
Syrians became more conscious of their numerical pre­
ponderance in the Empire and consequently of their
strength. Hence their eagerness to share power in that
Empire with the Turks. From this eagerness stemmed their 
demand for a decentralised federalised system of govern­
ment. A certain fAbd al-MasI^L al-An^aki went as far as 
to suggest, ,Tthe Arabisation of the Turks” This sug­
gestion is indicative of the mood prevailing among the
Syrians after the end of the Balkan wars.
However, the Syrian decentralisers were able to 
follow up their original argument that the evident weak­
ness of the Empire had made its disintegration more im­
minent. Rumours were rife that Syria was about to be 
annexed by a foreign power* Circumstantial evidence in­
dicated that this power was France. The campaign conduct­
ed by the French press, and in particular by Le Temps with
82. See leading article in, Falastln, Ho.227/24- of 5 
April, 1913*
83. Suggestion made in an article in al-Muqattam, Ho.7262 
of 15 Feb.,1913. Further discussion ox this sugges­
tion in, al-Muqattam, Ho.7264- of 18 Feb., 1913* and 
Ho. 7266 of SO Feb., 1913.
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regard to the alleged French interests in Syria, com-
I
bined with the famous declaration of Poincare, m  which 
he reiterated the same point,^ greatly alarmed the Muslim 
leaders of the Syrian community in both Cairo and Beirut. 
(Their conviction that France was working to annex their 
country was further strengthened by "the ostentatious 
activity of French consular representatives in all mat­
ters connected with the protection of Catholic institu-
or
tions in Syrid’, and by the constant visits which French 
cruisers paid to the Syrian coasts.
In fact the rumours of an impending division of 
Asiatic Turkey into spheres of influence among the Euro­
pean Powers, were circulating so widely that the Italian 
ambassador in London found it necessary to call on the 
British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and convey 
the fears of his government over the subject. He told 
Grey that "some people thought the armistice [between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states] was only an
84. Bertie to Grey, No.39, conf., Paris, 24 Dec., 1912, 
F.O.371/1522/55334, gives summary of such an article 
-^n Le Temps, of 24 Dec., 1912. Also, same to same, 
conf.," No.41, Paris, 27 Jan., 1913, F.0.371/1775/ 
4171, for a passage from Le Temps, of 27 Jan., 1913.
®5* The Times, No.40089 of 23 Dec., 1912, p.7. Also,
The Memoirs of Raymond Poincar§, translated and adap- 
ted by Sir’George Arthur, London, 1926, Vol.I, p.
336, and p.338 for declaration. Z.N. Zeine, The 
Emergence, p.117*
86. Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.79, conf., Beirut, 4 Dec., 
1912, being enclosure in Lowther to Grey, No.1072, 
conf., Const., 15 Dec., 1912, F.0.371/1522/54463.
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Tentr* acte1 between the liquidation of European Turkey
and Asiatic Turkey* The Italian ambassador in Paris and
the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Pome have had their
apprehensions aroused by the persistent articles in the
87Temps about Syria”. ' Grey, however, assured the ambas-
OQ
sador that Britain had no designs in Asiatic Turkey*
But the matter was not to rest there, for there 
were reports in the French press that British agents were 
active in Syria, working for the annexation of that count­
ry either to Britain or to Egypt.^ Kitchener, the 
British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, and Cumber- 
batch, the British Consul-General in Beirut, were named 
by the French press as the British agentsa^  After the
British Foreign Office had established that these reports 
91wore false. Grey told Cambon, the French ambassador in 
London, that ”His Majesty*s Government had neither the 
intention of taking any action nor any design nor political
87. Grey to Rodd, No.37, conf., Foreign Office, 30 Jan.,
1913, F.0,371/1775/5141.
88. Ibid*
89. Minute in, Grey to Goscher, No*32, conf., F.O., 24 
Jan., 1913, F.O.371/1775/4261. The Times, No.40090 
of 24 Dec., 1912, p.3.
90. Grey to Viscount Kitchener, No.92, teleg., conf,,
F.O., 7 Dec., 1912, F.O.371/1522/52330.
91. Ibid. See also Kitchener's reply in, Viscount Kitche­
ner to Grey, No. 85, telegr., conf., Cairo, 8 Dec., 
1912, F.O.371/1522/52354.
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qp
aspiration of any sort”. Grey, wo are told, agfeed to 
allow the French Premier, PoincarS, to quote his assurance 
to the French parliament.  ^ Poincare did exactly that 
in his statement of policy which he read to the parliament 
on 21 December 1912.
The French press, anxious to sustain French 
public opinion in the interests of their country in Syria, 
seized on the opportunity of PoincarS’s speech, and gave
QlLthe whole issue a completely different colouring.J 
Grey had reason to complain to the French ambassador in 
London that, ”though what M. Poincare had said in the 
Chamber had repeated what I had said with regard to Syria,
I was made anxious by the use to which 'fthe French press 
had made of this statement. My denial of intrigues and 
political designs on our part was being interpreted in 
some organs of the press as if I had given some new empha­
tic recognition of French interests, and as if France was
going to take some step to consolidate and strengthen those 
95interests”. Grey, then, went on to assure the ambassador 
that the British governmentfs aim was the preservation,
92. Minute in, Grey to Goschen, No.32, conf., F.O.24 Jan., 
1913> F.O.371/1775/4261. Aslo, R. Poincar6 Memoirs,
p.336 and p.33B.
93. R. Poincare Memoirs, pp.336 and 338.
94. The limes, Nos. 40089 and 40090 of 23 and 24 Dec.,
1912, respectively.
95* drey to Bertie, No.635* conf., F.O.London, 31 Dec., 
1912, F.O.371/1775/253.
96
and not the disturbance of the status quo in Asiatic Turkey.
Nevertheless, the campaign in the French press 
increased the rumours of an impending division of Asiatic 
Turkey into spheres of influence by the Powers. These 
were so strong that a question about them was asked in 
the German Reichstag. When the Imperial Chancellor replied 
that he was aware of the rumours, but had no official con­
firmation of them, and that their existence had been de­
nied to him by the concerned governments, his answer, it
97was reported, was received with laughter.
The Ottoman Decentralisation Party of Cairo:
Poincar&*s declaration, and the controversy which 
followed it in the press and some diplomatic circles,had 
a tremendous impact on the Syrians both inside and outside 
Syria. The declaration certainly roused to enthusiasm 
"les coeurs Libanais”, and mot with the approval and gra­
titude of the Maronites of Mount Lebanon, and other pro-
98French elements in the Lebanon and Beirut. The Journal
De Debats of 7 January 1913 recorded an example of such
96. Ibid. See further , Jukka Nevakivi, Britain and France 
lrTThe Arab Middle East, 1914-1920 (London, 1969) pp. 
I~l2. “
97* Goschen to Grey, No.37? conf., Berlin, 29 Jan., 1913?
F.0.371/1775/4684.
98. Bertie to Grey, No.72, conf., Paris, 9 Feb., 1913?
F.O.371/1775/6488.
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gratitude of the Maronites and their eagerness for the
o 99installation of French inle in kyria.  ^ As was later 
evident5 Muslims and other elements were in favour of 
British rule. However, a third group of leading Muslim 
Syrians viewed the prospect of any Western rule in Syria 
with concern and apprehension.
Among this last group were some of the Muslim 
Syrian emigres in Cairo. Disturbed by the military weak­
ness of the Empire,which was made so vivid by the results 
of the Balkan war, and 1 frightened by a voice from Paris 
which so emphatically declared that France had interests 
in Syria, and that France was not going to renounce those 
rights",***^  those Muslim emigres went into action. To­
gether with other leading Syrian emigres they formed a 
delegation which called on the Ottoman representative in 
Cairo, Rauf Pasha, to convey to him their fears of a 
French attack on Syria similar to that of the Italians 
on Tripoli. They further informed him that they had 
formed a "Committee of themselves" to prepare and organise
the defence of Syria, and they requested him to solicit
i mthe support of the Sublime Porte for their project.
99# For extract of Journal and more details see, Bertie to 
Grey, No.31, conf., Paris, 22 Jan., 1915? F.O.371/ 
1775/3548* For further instances see, Corresp. d*
Orient, of 1 Jan., 1913? PP.46-47, as quoted by Buru, 
al-fArab wal Turk, p.430, see also, Buru, p.429#
100. al-Manar, Vol.17? Part 5 of 25 April, 1914, pp.395-396.
101* al-Manar, ibid. Amin Sa'Id, al-Thawra al-1Arabiyya, 
Vol.1, p.l^ lT al-’Azami, vo 1,5 ? P • 41, rep eat s Amin 
Sa*xd. All three sources agree oh the details of the 
formation of the Decentralisation party of Cairo.
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Rauf Pasha having done nothing about the request, the dele-r
gation together with some more Syrian 6migr6s who became
interested in the subject, proceeded to discuss ways and
means of defending Syria against any foreign attack. Prom
the suggestion that a local militia was the answer, their
discussion developed into the belief that only a system of
government based on wide administrative decentralisation
would provide for the defence and the material benefit,
not only of Syria, but of the rest of the Empire. Thus,
late in the year 1912, they formed a political party, which
they called gizb al-Lamarkaziyya al-Idariyya al-'Uthmanl,
102the Ottoman Administrative Decentralisation Party.
Raflq al-'Agim was chosen as its president, Iskandar 
*Ammun, a Lebanese Christian, as vice-president, gaqql al- 
'Agm as secretary and MuljAbb al-Dln al-KhaJxb as assistant
secretary. Shaykh Rashid Rida, Dr. Shibll al-Shumayyil,
10^ -  _
a prominent Lebanese man of letters, ^ Da’ud Barakat,
the editor of the Cairo daily al-Ahram, Sami al Jaradlnl, 
a lawyer, and others were among the founders of the part^?^
102. al-Manar, Ibid. Amin Sa'Id, al-Thawra al- 1Arabiyya, 
VoT.irp* 14. al-1 AzamI, vol.3T p.4l. ral-Aliram, No•
No.10606 of 21 Jan.1913.
103. Por a general discussion of Rashid Riga's views and 
those of Shibll Shumayyil see, A. Hourani, Arabic 
Thought, pp.222-244, and pp.245-259? respectively.
104. al-1AzamI, Vol.3? pp.41-42 gives list of names of 
founders. So does, Darwaza, Vol.I, p.34, al-Shihabl, 
p.81, Buru, footnote No.2 in p.434. They all give 
tne same names. Antonius, footnote 2 in p.109 gave 
only three correct names, the first three names. The 
rest of the names in the list of Antonius were not 
founders as asserted by him, but were charged by the 
military tribunals of Cemal Pasha in 1915-1916 of 
being members of the Decentralisation party.
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In an interview with MuT^ibb al-Din al~ICha£ib, 
who still resides in Cairo, he confirmed to me the fact 
that the party was originally thought of and created by 
the leading Muslims of the Syrian §migr6s in Cairo. The 
Christians, he said, were invited to join in order to 
avoid complications and division* He indicated that the 
Muslims knew too well the leanings of the Christians to­
wards certain Foreign Powers to leave them out of the
105Lamarkaziyya party. In using the term Muslims, and
Christians, MuT^ibb al-Dln seems to mean the leaders, and 
not the rank and file, of both communities. The Muslims, 
who also initiated the decentralisation movement in Beirut, 
dominated that of Cairo to the end.
On 17 February 1913 the Decentralisation Party 
published a statement in the press explaining the advanta- 
ges of decentralisation as a system of government in do­
minions with so many difference races, customs, tradi­
tions, creeds and languages as the Ottoman Empire. De­
centralisation, and not centralisation, declared the 
statement, would be the answer to all the ills of the 
Empire, To emphasise its point, the statement made a 
comparison between the Ottoman Empire, which was ruled 
by a centralist system of government, and Switzerland,
105. Interview with Mu^ibb al-Dln al-Kha$Ib in his Cairo 
residence on 10 Sept., 1967.
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which employed decentralisation as its method of govern­
ment. The comparison, needless to say, was to the ad-
1
vantage of Switzerland. The statement went on to cri­
ticise the existing system of centralised administration 
used by the Unionists and ascribed all the problems of 
the Empire to it. To strengthen the Empire against in­
ternal and external dangers, to preserve it and maintain 
unity among its peoples, administrative decentralisation 
had become a necessity. The statement was then followed 
by the programme of the Party containing sixteen articles, 
and all sincere Ottomans, to whom the programme was ad­
dressed, were asked to support the Party
Articles One and Two of the programme declared 
that the Ottoman state is a constitutional representative 
state composed of vilayets which are inseparable parts of 
the Sultanate. Every vilayet should be administered on 
the basis of administrative decentralisation, it being 
understood that the sultan will appoint the vali and the 
Chief Judge. The administrative Council of the vilayet 
should appoint the rest of the officials and the vali
106. al-Manar, Vol.16, part 3 of 8 March, 1913> pp.227-
223* S*or the full Arabic text of the statement, see, 
Ibid., pp.226-229. al-Ahram, No.10629 of 17 Feb., 
1913, pp.1-2, and al-Muqattam, No.7262 of 17 Feb., 
1913* P*l? give the statement and the full pro­
gramme of the Party.
3-07• al-Manar, ibid, pp.229-231 gave the whole programme. 
al-Ahram, ibid. al-Muqattam, ibid.
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1 OR
ratify the choice. Then the programme specified a
set of rules for the promotion* discipline and the pen­
sioning of tho officials."3"^ It also stated that in the
lye.
capital of every vilayet there shouldjx General Council, 
an Administrative Council, a Council of Education and 
another one of Awqaf» and defined their rights and duties 
in a series of a r t i c l e s . E o r  instance, Article Six 
gave the powers of the General Council. Those were very 
wide powers. Except for matters concerning military and 
external affairs, which were the responsibility of the 
central government, the Council was to have full respon­
sibility for all the administrative work of the vilayet.
It had the right to organise the budget, to supervise the 
work of the government, to regulate and draft all the laws 
necessary for the maintenance of law and order, and to see 
to the educational and local needs of the inhabitants. 
Einally, the decisions of this council were declared
111
to be irrevocable, and should be carried out immediately.
While the Administrative Council was made res­
ponsible for the choice of all the officials of the vi­
layet, other than the vali and the Chief Judge, all 
108. al-Nanar, ibid, p.229-230.
109* Article three, see ibid., p.230. al-Nuqattam, 
ibid., p.l.
110. Article four, al-Nanar, ibid„ Articles 5-Hi ibid.
111. Articles five and six, ibid.
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matters connected with, education, sucli as the programme
and financing of the schools were left to the Council of
Education. Similarly all affairs of the Awqaf were to he
—dealt with by the Awqaf Council.
Articles Ten to Thirteen recommended that the 
members of these various councils should be elected and 
that the system of electing them as well as the parliamen­
tary representatives should be reformed so that all ele­
ments of the nation should be fairly represented. Where 
customary law had been in use, the practice should be ad­
hered to. Measures for reforming the system of the land
tenure, and laws for settling nomadic tribes would be
11%
looked into by the Party. ^ The programme then went
on to stipulate in its Fourteenth and Fifteenth Articles,
that every vilayet would have two languages, Turkish
and the local language of its inhabitants. The last
article of the programme specified that military service
was to be performed locally in time of peace, and in
times of war the Ministry of War in Istanbul would be
responsible for the despatch of soldiers to the theatre
of war. At such times the General Council should provide
114for and organise the defence of the vilayet,
112. Articles 7 -9 , al-Manar, ibid., p.230.
113. For articles 10-13, see al-Manar, ibid., pp.230-231.
114. For articles 14-16, see, ibid., p.231. For a detailed 
commentary on the programme of the Party see article 
by Kaflq al-'Azim entitled, "What Reform Do We Want?" 
in al-Muqattam; No.7370 of 24 June, 1913, PP.1-2, and 
N o .T S T T o r-S T J u n e , 1913 and N o.7375 o f  30 June, 191J.
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The programme was a step further towards adminis 
trative decentralisation than the Liberal Union ideas. It 
gave, for Instance, wide powers to the General Council 
of the vilayet, specified two official langauges in every
vilayet and made the language of the inhabitants of the
vilayet the language of instruction in the schools. The 
Liberal Union, being mainly/Turksih opposition party, was 
not ready to concede such points* On the whole, however, 
the programme of the Decentralisation Party was a moderate 
one, and it did not include an article requesting the ap­
pointment of foreign advisers to reorganise the police,
the gendarmerie, justice and finance as has bean errone-
116ously asserted. It was the Reform Society of Beirut
which made such a demand much to the disapproval of some
11 6members of the Decentralisation Party in Cairo.
The Decentralisation Party, however, intended 
to pursue Its aims by open constitutional means. It was 
the first political party which had its headquarters in 
a place other than Istanbul, and which proposed to con­
duct a sober constitutional opposition to the Unionist 
regime. The Unionists viewed the emergence of the new
party with apprehension. The fact that Cairo, the centre 
th.e
of/party, was beyond their reach, the presence of the 
British in Egypt and the notoriety of the founders of the
115. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought, p.283, for this assertion
116. See below,pp. 269-270.
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Party for their strong opposition to the CUP, raised the 
suspicions of the Unionists as to the motives of the party. 
Hence the allegation of Cemal Pasha in Izahat that the 
Decentralisation Party had other secret and separatist 
aims. Whether they entertained hopes of establishing an 
autonomous Syria on the Egyptian model, under a local 
ruler and with foreign protection, is uncertain. The 
allegation is only supported by the evidence produced by 
Izahat» a document that should be treated with great 
care and reservation,
1 1 o
Despite the appeals of its founders, the 
Decentralisation Party was never recognised as a legal 
political entity by the Turkish authorities. On the 
contrary after the closure of the Reform Club of Beirut, 
there were reports that the local authorities had started 
confiscating its programme from many Syrian towns,^^^
The branches of this Party set up in Syria were, therefore, 
without legal sanction from the local government. Con­
sequently, correspondence between those branches and
120their headquarters were conducted with great secrecy*
33-7• Izahat, pp,48-56, also, pp,83-88, Por French transla­
tion, "see, pp,69-78, p.103, pp.112-119.
118, For an example of such appeals, see articles by Rafiq. 
al-'Agm, the president of the Party, in al-Muqattam, 
No. 7314 of 18 April, 1913, p.4 and No.7321 of"26 
April, 1913.
119. al-Muqattam, No.7311 of 15 April, 1913, p.4, and No. 
7309 of il April, 1913.
120 Darwazza, Vol.I, p.35
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When some of that correspondence foil iyy the hands of the 
Turkish authorities at the outbreak of the Pirst World War, 
Cemal Pasha and his military tribunal were puzzled as to 
the nature of the whole decentralisation movement, and con­
cluded that the Decentralisation Party must have had a 
secret programme beside its published one.
Though the Decentralisation Party declared it­
self to be an Ottoman party which all Ottomans could join, 
it remained and came to be considered as a "purely Arab
party". Only "Arhbs" joined it, and it set branches
1 PIonly in "Arab lands". In this fact lies the signifi­
cance of this Party in the history of the Arab movement.
It. furthermore, provided the first organised stej^?n the 
agitation of the Syrian Arabs against the Unionist regime. 
Por the first time an opposition party was formed outside 
Istanbul whose entire membership was Syrian. Muslims and 
Christians showed signs of willingness to work together. 
Nevertheless, the Party gradually came to be dominated 
by the Muslims. The hearts of the Christians were not in
it as Mu£ifb al-Dln al-Khaflb seemed to imply in an inter- 
125view. ^ Despite the considerable means of propaganda,
121. Ibid*
122. Antonius, p.109.
123* Interview with Mu^Libb al-Dln_al-IQiatIb in Cairo, 18 
September, 1967. Rashid Rida in his preface Majmu'at 
fthar, p.v, stated that some_of the members of the 
Jarby had other motives. Ri£a, however, did not 
define those members.
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which this Party possessed- for al-Ahram, al-Muqattam and 
al-Manar freely preached its cause - thanks to the British 
administration in Egypt which granted the country a reason­
able amount of freedom of the press, it failed to achieve 
its ultimate aim. It remained to the end negative. Its 
leaders merely agitated for a form of administrative de­
centralise,tion, and were content to forward to Istanbul 
and to publish in the press protests against certain acts 
of the CUP government. However, the anti-CUP activities 
of some of the Syrian leaders continued for a time to re­
volve around the agitation of the Decentralisation Party. 
Yet like the Reform Society of Beirut, it completely 
failed to appeal to the masses of the Syrian people. It 
was an elite party, thought of and supported by the few 
1 enlightened1 and educated Syrians. Finally there was no 
evidence, whatsoever, to justify the accusation of Mir 
Shaklb Arslan and other ardent CUP supporters that the
formation of the Decentralisation Party was "a foreign 
124plot” , and that its founders were tools in the hands
of the foreigners who desired to destroy "our glorious
Islamic K i n g d o m " T h e  decentralisers of Cairo and
124. Shaklb Arslan, »Ila al-1Arabi, pp.15-16, and p.19*
See also, a l - I q F a lT  Uo7^96 of 12 May, 1913* Tercuman 
Hakikat, as quoted by al-Ahram of 10595 of 8 Jan.,
125* Shaklb Arslan, "Ila al~!Arab, pp.33-34, in pp.54 ff. 
Shaklb developed his argument.
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Beirut argued that their motives wei*e patriotic, and that 
not only the foreigners, hut men such as !Izzat al-'Abid, 
whose name was often mentioned in connection with the de­
fined to Cairo alone.
The Beirut Reform Society:
Almost simultaneously with the formation of the 
Decentralisation Party of Cairo, and probably with some 
encouragement from it, the General Reform Society for
-| pQ
The Vilayet of Beirut (hereafter called Beirut Reform 
Society) came into existence. Like that of Cairo the 
Beirut Reform Society was prompted into action by the con­
cern of its members for the territorial integrity of t$ie 
Ottoman Empire and by their desire to prevent their vila­
yet from passing under foreign rule. However, the Beiruti 
reformers were to concern themselves with demanding a form 
of administrative decentralisation for the vilayet of 
Beirut alone, and they never attempted to interest them­
selves in the affairs of the rest of the Empire.
126. Izahat, p.91 tried to establish a connection between 
Vizzat al-'Abid and the formation of the Party.
A. Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp.282-283 repeated the 
accusation of Izahat^
127. al-^anar, Vol.16, part 3> of 8 March, 1913, p.239* 
Rida^refuted the above accusation which he claimed 
to have been stated by some newspapers in America.
He did not specify what newspapers he meant.
128. Its full Arabic title was " " '*
126centralisation movement, had no hand in the formation
127of their party. ( The movement, however, was not con-
ax-i§xanxyya xx xjexrur
19137
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Nonetheless sporadic and uncoordinated signs of this 
movement were evident in other Syrian towns. The whole 
movement was to a great extent the result of the impact 
of the Balkan War on the Syrians.
Besides reemphasising the shocking weakness of 
the Ottoman Empire, the defeat of the Ottoman troops in 
the Balkans had two immediate effects on the majority of 
the inhabitants of Syria. It added to the rising unpo­
pularity of the CUP among some sections of the Muslim com­
munity which held the Unionist regi^i responsible for 
those defeats, and it generated a strong agitation among
both the Muslims and the Christians in all the Syrian
120vilayets for foreign intervention in Syria. J In Beirut, 
for instance, it was reported that such an agitation 
existed among the Muslims and the majority of the Chris­
tians. It was ,!in favour of British or Anglo-Egyptian 
intervention in Syria or the establishment of a sort of 
local autonomy_ i»#130 British Consuls in Beirut,
Aleppo and Jerusalem wrote at length about the unmistake- 
able existence of this agitation, its persistence and
al-Manar, Vol.15? part 12 of 9 Dec., 1912? pp.958-960, 
article By Ri£a entitled "The Syrian Question" arguing 
against such agitation for foreign rule. al-Muqattam, 
No.7192 of 22 Nov., 1912, p . d i s c u s s e d  suck uen&en- 
cies for foreign rule. See further, Lowther to Grey, 
No.1072, conf., Const., 15 Dec., 1912, F.O.371/1522/ 
54463•
130. Lowther to Grey, No.1072, conf., Const., 15 Dec.,
1912, P.0.371/1522/54463.
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131the sincerity of its advocates.  ^ No such reports were 
received from Damascus, but it can be ascertained from a 
report from the Consul at Aleppo that such agitation 
was also apparent in Damascus,**-52 presumably it was not 
as intense as that of Beirut.
In Beirut, which was to become the centre of the 
reform movement, the desire for foreign, and in particular 
for British, rule, was more evident than in other parts of 
Syria. In one of his many reports on the subject, the 
British Consul-General in Beirut wrote to Sir Gerald 
Lowther, the British ambassador to the Porte, in the 
following terms,
T!Not only is the Moslem feeling bitter against 
their government on account of their defeats in European 
Turkey, but they also see no hope of a betterment in the 
future of the administration of the country, and openly 
discuss the advisability of paving the way for tutelage, 
the possibility of which is vividly suggested by the ru~ 
noiired designs in this direction of Prance, to which I 
have had occasion to call the attention of H.M.embassy. "
131* See for instance, Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.79? 
conf., Beirut, 4 Dec., 1912, P.0.371/1522/54463. 
Pontana to Lowther, No.4, conf., Aleppo, 13 Jan., 
1913, P.O.371/1776/392!. McGregor to Lowther, No.
4, conf., Jerusalem, 22 Jan., 1913, P.0.371/1776/ 
6024.
132. Pontana to Lowther, No.17, conf., Aleppo, 25 March, 
1913, P.O.371/1773/16941.
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"Before the war with Italy, this question was 
merely discussed from time to time as a more or less dis­
tant possibility owing to Turkish misgovernment in general 
and the apparent failure of the constitutional regime to 
bring about an improvement in the general situation".
"The war with Italy and the facility with which 
the loss of Tripoli took place encouraged a greater freedom 
of speech on the subject of possible further dismember­
ment of the Ottoman Empire, and the people in Styria, 
especially the Christians, began talking pretty openly 
about the possibility of foreign intervention in the af­
fairs of Turkey, and it reached from many sources that the 
general feeling both among the Moslems and Christians 
alike was that, should circumstances necessitate a foreign 
annexation, local preference was for England or Egypt 
under British auspices" ,-^ 3
The Consul then went 011 to say that there was 
a considerable feeling of mistrust of Erench intentions 
in Syria, and a fear that the British government "nay be 
inclined to acquiesce in the pretensions of the Erench
134government, and give it a free hand as regards Syria." ^
133. Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.76* conf., Beirut, 14 
Nov., 1912, being enclosure in Lowther to Grey,
No.984, conf., Const., 21 Nov., 1912, E.0.371/150?/ 
50279.
134. Ibid.
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As a reaction against the French intentions in ^yria* the
Consul reported that, "1 have "been indirectly approached
hy leading Moslems of Beirut with the object of finding
the views of H.M. Government with regard to a possible
"extension of Egyptian rule to Syria, and how far they can
rely upon its support of their wishes, which they declared
are shared by all the Moslems and by sixty per cent of
135the Christians in Syria’L ^  The Consul also stated that
approaches and appeals were made to the Khedive, "as head
136of a British dependency" to intervene in Syria, ^
IjDhe Consul said that he refrained from giving 
then any encouragement. Grey approved his action because 
"it is neither practicable nor desirable that we should
157
entertain such an extension of territorial responsibility."
Unlike the Muslims and the non-Catholic Christi­
ans who wanted British rule for Syria, the Catholics, and 
especially the Maronites of Mount Lebanon, preferred
French rule, and were actively trying to counteract the
138pro-British agitation. While the British government 
135* Ibid.
156. Ibid. See also copy of telegram from Cumberbatch to 
Lowther, (no number given), Beirut, 13 Nov., 1912, 
being enclosure in Lowther to Grey, No.984? conf., 
Const., 21 Nov., 1912, F.0.371/1507/50279.
137* A minute by Sir E. Grey to despatch No.984, above 
despatch.
138. Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.79? conf., Beirut, 4- Dec., 
1912, being encl. in Lowther to Grey, No.984-, conf., 
Const., 15 Dec., 1912, F.0.371/1522/544-63.
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showed indifference to the agitation in favour of British 
rule for Syria, and instructed the British Consuls not to 
encourage its advocates, the French government was very 
much interested in the Maronite movement, and did all it 
could to encourage it. France had always claimed to he 
the champion of the Christians in the East,^^^ and as 
Le Temps declared, "the policy of France merely aims at 
not allowing the name of France to fall into discredit 
among the Christians of the East".^*^ It is not without 
significance that Le Temps entitled this article "France, 
Jlngleteiro, Syrie", and devoted it wholly to the question 
of French interests in Syria. French cruisers paid re­
gular visits to the Syrian coast; whenever they made their
14i
appearance they raised the fears of the Muslims, and
encouraged the Maronites and the Catholics to look forward
142to the day when France would finally occupy their land.
Even the Ottoman government showed signs of being uneasy 
at the persistence with which France continued to emphasise
139* For a Turkish point of A/iew about this claim see, 
Ikdam, No.5700 of 1 Jan., 1913? P*l? editorial.
140. Le Temps, of 24 Dec., 1912, being an encl. in Bertie 
W™Grey7 No.39? conf., Paris, 24 Dec., 1912, F.O. 
371/1522/55334.
141. Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.76, conf., Beirut, 14 Nov.,
1912, being encl. in Lowther to Grey, No.984, conf.,
Const., 21 Nov., 1912, F.O.371/1507/50279*
142. Cumberbatch to Lowther No.79? conf., Beirut, 4 Dec.,
1912, encl. in Lowther to Grey, No.1072 of 15 Dec.,
1912, F.O.371/1522/54463. al-Muqattam, No.7198 of 28 
Nov., 1912, Buru, pp.432-453*"' —
her interests in Syria
The Muslin leaders in Beirut were equally dis­
turbed. Thinking that French intervention in Syria was 
imminent, in despair they turned to Britain.. To justify 
their act they argued that British administration was 
credited with being more responsible, liberal and bene­
ficial than French rule. They pointed out that Egypt
was more prosperous under the British than Algeria under 
144
the French. The debate on which system was better 
for Syria, British rule or French, occupied prominent
and wide space In the press of the Syrian 6migr6s in
145 -America.  ^ However, Ri£a in an illuminating article
advised the Syrians to uphold the cause of their Ottoman
146Empire and to trust neither France nor Britain.
Britain was in any case reluctant to accept political 
involvement in Syria. Having failed to interest Britain 
in their cause, and having realised that foreign inter­
vention in Syria was not so imminent, the leading Muslims
143. See Big. Argivi, Carton No.125/33, for several des­
pat chesTrom^ETTe Ottoman Ambassador in Paris to 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Said Halim Pasha, e.g. 
teleg. No.45 of 26 Nov., 1912, Rifat to Halim Pasha, 
letter No.9687/135 of 18 Feb., 1913, same to same.
144. Cumberbatch to Lowther No.79, as in Fn. 142.
145* See Big. Argivi, Carton 125/33, for several cuttings 
from those papers, e.g. al-Fajr.
146. al-Manar, vol.15, P&rt 12 of 9 Bee., 1912, pp.958-
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in Beirut decided to start a movement of their own by 
means of which they hoped to secure the long neglected 
political rights of the Syrian Arabs*
Thus the Beirut decentralisation movement stem­
med from another movement that was separatist in character 
and which had originally aimed at inviting foreign inter­
vention, and ultimately foreign rule into Syria* Both 
the opponents and the supporters of the Beirut movement 
were aware of the fact that among its leaders were men 
who had once desired British rule and others who yearned 
for French rule, as well as a third group who wanted 
nothing but administrative reforms.3*^ The presence of 
the first two groups, of whose seditious agitation the 
Turks must have been aware, were probably the main reason 
why the cabinet of Kamil Pasha and its Unionist successor 
found it difficult if not impossible to trust the motives 
of the reformers, who never failed to assure the Turks of 
their patriotic intentions.
The Muslim leaders of Beirut who initiated the 
reform movement there were, furthermore, alarmed by the 
activities of the Christian Lebanese nationalists. At 
the end of 1912 there was a marked increase in the 
ever growing movement of thosenationalists for the exten­
sion of the boundaries of the Lebanon to include the Biqa*
147* galastin, No.201/100, of 28 Dec., 1912, editorial 
article*"
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148and other adjacent areas. Some Lebanese nationalists
went so far as to ask for the inclusion of the town of
Beirut, Sidon and Tyre in the boundaries of Lebanon.1^
This demand which was known as Bayr al~Qamar scheme, was
according to al-Muqattam1s correspondent in Beirut the
direct incentive for the Beirutis to start their movement
of reform. It was this demand, he suggested, which made
the leading men in Beirut rise in opposition to it, and
in an attempt to strengthen their country they contacted
the vali and requested that the government should intro-
180duce reform, in their vilayet.  ^ The correspondent made 
a very revealing point when he wrote, ’'Syria is situated 
between the Lebanon and Egypt, both of which are develop­
ing. Therefore, Syria has either to develop, or will ulti-
151 -nately be absorbed by the Lebanon or Egypt”. A m i n  
SafId writing at much later date, put it even more blunt-
i
1 y when he ascribed the agitation of tbe Muslim leaders 
for reforms to their fear of the intrigues of the Maronites 
of Mount Lebanon. Because the Muslims were a minority 
group in Beirut, and because their town was bordered by
148. The Lebanese were also pressing for reforming some 
aspects of their Reglement Organique, for this move­
ment see, Al-Ahram7“ifo.10576of 14 Bee., 1912 and 
No.10589 of 51 Dec., 1912. al-Muqattam, Ho.7215 of 
19 Dec., 1912, and Ho.7192 of 22 Nov., 1912. File F. 
0.571/1491 contains abundant and useful information 
on the subject. Big. Argivi, (Istanbul, Carton No. 
574/14 deals with the same subject.
149. al-Muqattam, Ho.7198 of 29 Nov., 1912, and Ho.7216 
oT^O i)ec0 * 1912.
150. al-Muqattan, Ho.7216 of 20 Dec., 1912, p.4*
151. Ibid.
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the Lebanon on three sides they were alarmed by a possible 
cooperation between the Maronites and the French in an at­
tempt to occupy Beirut
Salim 'All Salam, a leading Muslim among the re­
formers of Beirut, and a deputy for that town in the 1914- 
parliament, says in his unpublished memoirs,that the 
pro-French and the pro-British agitations were the direct 
reasons that gave rise to the reform movement.^4- gaiaia 
also claimed that it was he who contacted the vali,
Edhem Bey, revealed to him the gravity of the situation, 
and consequently suggested to him that the government 
should introduce "wide and extensive reforms in all the 
vilayets", if it desired the country to remaih under its 
c o n t r o l . O n  hearing this the vali sent a telegram to 
Istanbul repeating the substance of what Salam told him, 
and emphasising that 1 if we do not take the initiative
152* Anln SafI&, al-thawra al-1Arabiyya, Vol.l, p.18,
155. Ihe Memoirs Of Salim 'All Salam, are in the form of a 
microfilm in the American University of Beirut. They 
are in Salam*s handwriting, and^are undated. They 
cover the period 1908-1918. Salam says, because of the 
loss of his private papers and its destruction during 
the First World War and the Mandatory period, he has 
to rely on his memory and^the newspapers1 reports at 
the time. Nonetheless Salam*s memoirs contain some 
original and interesting material, and are in no way 
mere copying from the press. Apart from a few errors, 
which arose mostly from the normal failing of a human 
memory, the memoirs are fairly accurate.
154. Salam, Memoirs, pp.8-9*
155- Ibid,, p,10o
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with reforms the country will escape us"
The cabinet of Kamil Pasha did not immediately
157
agree to the request of the vali as is commonly presumed. 
In fact the Grand Vezir's reply stated that until the con­
vening of parliament, which the government hoped would be 
soon, the vali could call the General Council of the vila­
yet to ascertain the necessary reforms, which should then 
be forwarded through the deputies of that vilayet for con­
sideration.^^ Salam tells us that neither the vali nor
the Beirutis were satisfied with this evasive reply, and 
that in order to calm the people of Beirut, Edhen Bey, 
apparently on his own initiative, decided to form 
a Committee under his chairmanship to draft a scheme of 
reforms which he would then send to Istanbul as soon as
IRQ
possible. On Salam1s commenting that the valif s 
scheme was going to be an official one, Edhem Bey told him
156. Khairallah, Les Regionos Arabes Liberees, Paris,
1919» p. 39, as quoted' by Zeine, The Emergence, p.101*
For Arabic version of telegram s c e a l -1 Azami, Vol.5, 
p. 47, Amin Sa'id, al-thawra al-*Arabiyya, Vol.l, p. 
18. Muhammad Kurd 1 All, Kbitat alA'Sham, Vol.5, p. 1295 
Buru, p.444. All these s0urces do noK give a precise 
date for this telegram other than the last days of 
the year 1912*
157* Most of the Arabic sources make this assumption. See
for instance, al-1Azami, vol.3, p.47, Amin Safid,
al-thwara al-1Arabiyya, Vol.l, p.18. Even some of the 
papers' hade this "mistake, see, al-Ahram, No. 10579* 
of 18 Dec. 1912.
158. Salam, Memoirs, p.10, al-Muqattam, No.7216 of 20 Dec., 
al-Ahram, No.105&5 of 26 Jan., 1913, Izahat, p.
31»
159^ Salam, Memoirs, p.10.
257
that he (Salan) and his friends could draft another schene 
of reforms. Salam is the only one of our sources that
mentions the fact that the Beirut Society of Reforms was 
formed on the actual suggestion of the vali himself. All 
other sources said that the Society was created hy the 
reformers themselves, hut it had the tacit approval of 
the authorities in that neither the vali nor the central 
government raised objections to its existence or to its 
activities. In fact the Society held its first formal
meeting in the Municipality Office which was a government 
building.
It seems possible that the government, which 
was busy with the Balkan question, was not much interested 
in what was going on in Beirut as long as it did not 
assume dangerous proportions. There was no evidence, 
however, that Kamil Pasha*s cabinet was willing In any 
way to grant the Beirutis their demands. On the contrary, 
there was evidence that the cabinet understood something 
completely different by the word "decentralisation" from 
what the Beirutis had in mind. Regid Bey, the Minister
160. Salam, Memoirs, p.10.
161. See for instance, Lisan al-Bal, Ho.7210 of 12 April, 
1913* al-Ahram, Ho.10674- of 12 April, 1913. Cumber­
batch to lowther, Ho.34, conf*, Beirut, 17 April, 
1913, P.0.371/1775/20328.
162* Lisan al-Bal, Ho.7141, of 14 Jan., 19131 and Ho.7210 
oTTSTjSrlXT 1913.
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of Internal Affairs in the cabinet of ICamil Pasha 
made it quite clear that the governnont understood by 
administrative reform when he told the editor of Jeune 
lure in an interview, that the cabinet intended to give the 
vali more powers to enable him to deal with the local af­
fairs of his vilayet without interference ffom Istanbul* 
Reform to Regid Bey was the draining of marshes, improve­
ment in the roads and public works and making rivers na- 
163vigable.  ^ The decentralisers1 papers found the views
of Re$id Bey disheartening, and Lisan al-Bal commented
that the difference between the government and the nation
(Umma) was wide, for while the majority of the people
(Ahall) wanted to reform the basis of administration, the
cabinet desired to concentrate on reforms "which we con-
*164srder as secondary"*
Thus the reformers were under no illusions when 
they started preparing their demands. Ror were they dis­
couraged by views such as those of Reisid Bey* Both the 
vali1 s coramittee, which came to be known as the "Official
Committee", whose activities have been completely over-
166looked by historians,  ^and the Beirut Reform Society
153* Interview reproduced in al-Ahram, Ro.l0613» of £9 
Jan^, 1913* al-Muqattam ]tfo• 723? of 4 Jan., 1913*
Lisan al-gal,' ?l30 ox "31 Dec., 1912.
164. Lisan al-Balf Ro.7130 of 31 Dec., 1912.
165* Almost all the Arabic sources are silent about the
activity of the Official Committee. Zeine, The Emer­
gence , and Antonius, said nothing about this committee, 
this 'is to mention only two authors who wrote in 
English* There was a tendency in the press at the tine 
of reluctance to report fully on the work of this 
society*
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proceeded in an atmosphere of enthusiasm to hold their 
meetings without showing any signs of discouragement*
The Beirut Reform Society held more meetings than the 
Official Committee and its activities captured the lime­
light* Lisan al-gal, al-Mufxd of Beirut as well as al- 
Ahran, al-Muqattam, al-Manar, of Egypt and al-Muqtabas 
of Damascus together with other local Syrian papers re­
ported its activities regularly and in detail* This is 
probably the reason why the Beirut Society and its scheme 
have completely overshadowed the work of the Official Com­
mittee.
The Muslin leaders who started the decentrali- 
sation movement in Beirut were anxious to avoid divi­
sion and to present the government with one front* Hence
their invitation to the Christian leaders in Beirut to 
167join then* ' To gain their friendship and cooperation 
the Muslim leaders were obliged to forgo certain rights 
of the Muslin community of the vilayet of Beirut; for 
instance they had to accept that the Christians should 
have half the seats in the proposed General Council of the 
vilayet, despite the fact that the Christians were in the
1 CD
minority* Ardont supporters of the CUP who were at
the same time opponents of the reform movement such as
al-Muqattam, No.7126 of 20 Dec*, 1912, and No.7227 
of 4 rJan. 1915.
167- al-Muqattam, No.7227 of 4 Jan., 1915*
2-6®* al-Manar, Vol. 16, part A of 7 April, 1913? p.280*
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Shakib Arslan, often accused the Muslin reforners of de­
liberately forsaking the rights of tho Muslins of Beirut 
for their own personal benefits.1^  Arslan pointed out 
that if the Christians were in the majority in the vilayet 
of Beirut they would have never agreed to the Muslims 
sharing the seats of the General Council with them,*^0 
al-Muqattam1 s correspondent in Beirut recorded in one of 
his despatches that there was some reluctance among se­
veral leading Christians to participate in the reform move­
ment, and they believed that the best alternative for then 
was to join hands with Lebanese nationalists,^*^ This 
preference for more cooperation with Christian Lebanese 
nationalists was indicative of an attitude prevalent among 
the Christian nationalists, namely, to consider the Le­
banon as their refuge.
However, tho advocates of reform decided to 
press on with their demand for administrative decentrali­
sation. To give their scheme a popular aspect and to 
broaden its base, they resolved to compose a ’national1 
Society of Heform. They consequently asked the heads of 
the various religious communities of Beirut to send their 
representatives to a society that was to draft a scheme 
of reforms for the vilayet**^^ They also wanted to give
169• Shakib Arslan, IIa al-fArab, pp.38-40, where he 
argued the po iniT convincingly.
170. Ibid., p.39«
171. al-Muqattam, Ho.722? of 4 Jan.,1913*
172. Lisan al-Bal, Ho.7129 of 30 Dec., 1912. al-Muqattan, 
lbid. ’
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their Society an official touch by inviting the Admin­
istrative Council and the Municipality to send representa- 
173tives. ' This was never done and the Society remained 
to the end an unofficial body*
The administrative councils of the various re­
ligious communities finally elected eighty-six members 
who formed the Society of Beirut for Reforms. To mark 
the inter-communal solidarity, forty-two members were 
Muslims, forty-two Christians and two Jews.'**'7^  In its 
first official meeting held on 12 January 1913, a Muslim, 
Shaykh Aljnad 1Abbas al-Azharl, was chosen president, and 
a Christian, Dr. Ayyub Thabit, as secretary. After passing 
a resolution establishing the necessity of reforms for 
Beirut, the members elected a working committee of
173* al-Muqattam, ibid.
174. Lisan al-Hal, No.714*1 of 14- Jan., 1913* gives a
complete list of the 86 members, the votes of each 
member, the_numbers alloted to each religious com­
munity. Lisan gives the composition of the Society 
of 86 as follows: 4-2 Muslims, 16 Greek Orthodox,
10 Maronites, 6 Greek Catholics, 2 Protestants, 2 
Syrian Catholics, 2 Armenian Catholics, 2 Latins,
2 Jews and 2 Orthodox Armenians. The British Consul 
at Beirut gives the same list except for the 2 Ortho­
dox Armenians, see, Cumberbatch to Lowther, No*8, 
conf., Beirut, 24- Jan., 1913, being end* in Lowther 
to Grey No.82, conf., Const., 2 Feb., 1913, P.O. 
371/1775/6020. The same despatch in P.0.195/24-51* 
al-Muqattam, No.7238 of 18 Jan., 1913, p.l. Salam, 
Memoirs, pp. 12-13 gives names of 86,identical with 
Lisan. Less informed sources give inaccurate numbers, 
izahat, p.31 give numbers as 80, Buru, p.4-4-5 gives 
number as 84-. al-rAzamx, vol.3, p*4-7, and Amin 
8a*Id, vol. I, p.18 gives number as 90.
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twenty-five, composed of twelve Muslims, twelve Christians 
and a Jew, "to draw up a list of the necessary reforms 
and to work for their adoption" .^75 This committee held 
several meetings in which, al-Muqattamfs correspondent 
in Beirut reported they discussed a scheme of reforms 
which the decentralisers of Cairo had sent to them.^^
This is the first mention of an attempt hy Cairo Party to 
establish a direct link with the Society of Beirut, and 
to try and influence it. The Beiruti reformers were, 
however, to show their independence of the Cairo Party 
hy formulating demands which were not in line with the 
programme of that Party, and were to become typical of 
their movement
Of the two organisations which were discussing 
and drafting reform schemes for the vilayet of Beirut, 
vali1 s committee was the first to finish its task.
On 20 January 1913 the General Council of the vilayet 
was convened to discuss the reform scheme. After raising 
objections to the proposed right of the valx to appoint 
ard dismiss qa’immaqams and the mutagarrifs, and to the
176
time limit within which he could object to its decisions,
175* Lisan al-gal, No.714*1 of 14- Jan., 1913* also for names 
of 25 members.
176. al-Muqattam, No.7237 of 17 Jan., 1915.
177. Ibid. Also Shakib Arslan, Ila al-!Arab, pp.36-37-
178. Lisan al-gal, N0 .714-7 of 21 Jan., 1913.
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the General Council passed the vali1s scheme which was 
subsequently published in the papers.
The scheme of 12 articles started by dividing 
the affairs of the vilayet into matters pertaining to the 
central government (such as defence, foreign affairs, 
customs and posts) and local matters relating to the 
internal concerns of the vilayet, its administration and 
development which were the responsibility of the General 
Council. The vali, the representative of the central 
government, had to execute the decrees of that govern­
ment and those of the General Council. He could appoint 
some officials, and had, under certain conditions, the
•I Q A
right to object to the decisions of that Council.
The scheme then went on to provide for the formation and 
the rights and duties of the General Council of the vila­
yet. The Council which was to have a Joint Christian and 
Muslim membership (15 Christians and 15 Muslims, no 
provision was made for the Jew) was a non-political 
organisation whose function would be to conduct the local 
administrative affairs of the vilayet. Unless the vali
objected to the decisions of this council, they would be
181
valid and should become law as soon as possible. The 
vali was in no way made inferior to that Council.
179. Lisan al-Bal» No.714-7 of 21 Jan., 1913. Al-Ahram, 
NoTIUSIY of"'27 Jan., 1913.
180. Articles 1 and 2, Lisan al-Bal, No.714-1 of 21 Jan., 
1913.
181. Articles 3? 4* and part of article 8. Lisan, ibid.
264-
After providing a set of rules for the appoint­
ment, promotion, dismissal and disciplining of the offi-
182cxals of the vilayet, the scheme made the administra­
tion of awqaf the responsibility of the local religious
183
councils concerned. ^ It made Arabic admissible in
government offices, though Turkish remained the official
184- 186language, and put some local revenues to local use. ^
The scheme was, however, completely silent as to the
language of instruction in the schools and the question of
regional military service, both of which were important
items in the programmes of the Decentralisation Party of
Cairo and the Beirut Reform Society,
Perhaps the most striking feature of the scheme,
which made it almost treasonable in the eyes of the
187Unionist regime, r was its provision for foreign inspectors
182. Articles 5 and 7* Lisan, Ibid. All officials, except 
the vali, were to_lmow Arabic according to article 5* 
Hutasarrifs and qa*immaqams and all junior officials 
were to he "from the inhabitants of the vilayet.
183. Article 9> Lisan. Ibid.
184-, Article 11, Lisan, Ibid.
185. Article 8, Lisan, Ibid.
186. See above, pp.^.4o-^ and pp.Z^7* was
187* I^&hat, p .31 stated that the vali1s scheme^contra­
dictory to the laws of the Empire, and found the 
articles dealing with foreign inspectors most objecti­
onable, and accused Lebanese members of al-Nahdla al- 
Lubnaniyya society of being behind the iiitroduction of 
such articles, in an attempt to pave the way for 
foreign intervention in Beirut. Iaahat, probably had 
Zainiyya, HanI and the others who wrote to the French 
Consul in Beirut asking for French rule for Syria, for 
it went on to quote this letter in pp.34— 37. For French 
text see French copy, La Verite, pp.50-54-. See also,
PP. 4-5-57.
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and advisers to be attached to the various governmental 
departments of the vilayet. Like the scheme of the Beirut 
Reform Society, it gave them wide powers. For instance 
the decision of any particular inspector in matters re­
lating to his concern would be final. They were, however, 
to be appointed from the U.S.A. or from small countries 
with no interests in the Ottoman Empire, and were to know 
French, Turkish or Arabic. They would serve In govern­
mental departments such as the police, the gendarmerie, 
and the postal and telegraphic services, as well as the 
customs, finance and justice departments. A foreign 
inspector was to be appointed to the General Council and 
to all the livas of the vilayet. In every liva the 
inspector would be charged with the duty of supervising 
the government of that liva and advising on improving it. 
The initial contract of such inspectors would be for an 
initial period of fifteen years.
The vali 1 s scheme bore striking similarity, 
even in the wording of most of its important items, to
189that of the Beirut Reform Society. The twelve articles 
188. Articles 6 and 12, Lisan, Ibid.
189* For the complete Arabic text of the 12 articles, see, 
Lisan al-Bal, No.714-7 of 21 Jan. 1913* Salam, 
Memoirs,' pp. 17-21. al-Ahram, No.10611 of 27 Jan., 
I9I3* For a French translation, see Rcveil, of 28,
30 Jan. and 4- Feb., 1913? all three being enclosures 
in Cumberbatch to Lowther, No.26, conf., Beirut 27 
March, 1913? enc. in Lowther to Grey, No.238, conf., 
Const., 24- March, 1913? F.O.371/1775/14*4-74-, same 
desp. in F.O. 195/24*51*
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contained most of what the Beirutis were to present in
their own scheme. In fact the four Beirutis whose help
190the vali sought in drafting his scheme, y found nothing
to complain about, in a letter which they sent to the press,
except that the vali1s scheme did not make Arabic the of-
191ficial language of the vilayet. J The presence near the 
vali of those four Beirutis, who were also active among 
the reformers of Beirut, may well be the explanation of 
the revealing similarity between the two schemes.
To turn now to the activities of the Beirut 
Reform Society; on 51 January, 1913 the sub-committee, 
which was drafting a scheme of reforms, put its final 
scheme of fifteen articles before the Society, which 
after thoroughly discussing it passed it for publicatiol?^ 
The scheme of the Beirut Reform Society merely 
echoed demands that were already specified in either the 
programme of the Decentralisation Party of Cairo or the 
vali1s scheme. It was more detailed and more specific 
about certain demands, as for instance the wide and spe­
cific powers which it gave to the General Council of the 
vilayet. This Council which was to be composed of thirty
190. They were_ATimad Mukhtar Beyhum, Kamil al-§ui£t,
Petro Jarad°and Ibrahim Thabit, see, Salam Memoirs,
p.10.
191. Text of letter in Lisan al-gal, No.714-8 of 22 Jan., 
1913.
192. al-Manar, Vol. 16, part 4* of 7 April, 1913, p.275*
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members, half Muslims and the other half Christians (no 
provision was made for the Jews), had powers to run the 
internal administration of the vilayet, to contract loans 
not exceeding half the amount of the revenues of the vila­
yet, to interpolate the vali, and could demand his dis­
missal by a two-thirds majority. In short the vali was 
made a mere executive officer of the Council. ^
Over the question of language, the Beiruti scheme 
went a step further than that of the vali and that of the 
Syrian §migr£ in Cairo. It demanded that Arabic should 
be recognised as the official language of the vilayet,
and with Turkish should be an official language in Parlia- 
194-ment. J Bike the programme of the Decentralisation Party
it asked for regional military service and requested that
the military exemption tax be reduced to 30 Liras for the
Nizami regiments (active army), and to 20 Liras for the
Ihtlyat (active army reserve) and the Itedif (reserves)
Like the other two schemes, the scheme of the Beirut
Poform Society specified that all officials should know
Arabic, and gave the administration of the Awqaf to the
196local religious councils* J Unlike the other two it was
193. Articles 3-5* see, al-Manar, Ibid. pp.276-277. Lisan 
al-gal, No.7155 of 30 Jan., 19157
19^ • Article 14-, al-Manar, Ibid., p.279, Lisan, Ibid.
195* Article 15, al-Manar; Lisan, Ibid.
196. Article 11, Ibid.
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more specific as to what revenues ought to he spent in 
the vilayet and what should he sent to Istanbul. Article 
8 stated that revenues obtained from customs, postal ser­
vices and the military exemption tax were to go to the 
Imperial Treasury in Istanbul. All other revenues were 
to be spent locally, and their expenditure to be controlled 
by the General C o u n c i l . T h e  articles providing for 
foreign inspectors and advisers and stipulating their wide 
powers were an exact reproduction of the articles in the 
vali1s scheme dealing with the same subject. For instance 
both schemes made provisions for a Higher Council to be 
composed of all the foreign inspectors serving in the ca­
pital of the vilayet and of the president of the General 
Council. This Council was to be under the chairmanship of 
the vali. Wide powers were given to it. For instance it 
could interpret all the laws and decisions made by the 
General Council, . it could decide whether any official 
ought to be dismissed or not, and it could settle all mat- 
tters of disagreement between any inspector on the one 
hand and the General Council or any governmental depart­
ment on the other and its decision should be final 
In the Beiruti scheme the vali could only object to the
197* Article 8, al-I1anar, Ibid., p.278.
198. Article 7, 13 and parts of article 4*, 5 and 6 , all 
deal with the foreign advisers. Article 13 deals 
with the Higher Council see, al-Manar, Ibid., p.279« 
For vali1s scheme see article"12, in Lisan al-Bal,
No.71^-7 of 21 Jan., 1913, dealing with Higher 
Council.
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decisions of the General Council if he had the approval of 
this Higher Council.
Such provisions raised criticisms of no other 
than Rashid Ri$a* He wrote in al-Manar, ”we deprecate the 
fact that they [the Beirutis] have sacrificed their most 
sacred rights to the foreign advisers. They have given 
them more powers than was expected; those powers consti­
tute a great danger to the future of the country. The 
Beirutis have not even given themselves the right of 
making the advisers accountable for their actions".
Ri$a then advised the Beirutis to revise their scheme
and withdraw such as the articles dealing with the powers
200 fiX- —  —  of the foreign advisers. Elsewhere^ al-Manar, Ri$a
voiced more detailed criticisms on the subject, and he ex­
pressed his doubts whether the central government would 
accept this project of reforms. He then concluded by
calling on the reformers of Beirut to join hands with the
201
Decentralisation Party of Cairo to create a united front. 
Naturally Syrian supporters of the CUP were against the 
whole of the reform scheme and in particular against 
items in it which gave foreigners such wide powers in the 
affairs of their country, and which in the words ^
199. al-^anar, Ibid., p.276, for article 4-.
200. al-Manar, Vol.16, part 4- of 7 April, 1913, p.280.
201. in Ibid., p.314-, pp.312-314- for detailed criticisms.
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of these supporters, made of the whole decentralisation 
movement, "a by-product of foreign intrigues that aim at 
the destruction of the bond of Ottomanism and Islamic uni­
ty" .
Though the programme of the Society of Beirut^^ 
was more detailed than the other two schemes, it was like 
that of the vali, of a more local nature. Unlike the De­
centralisation Party of Cairo, which declared itself to 
be an Ottoman party, the Society of Beirut had neither 
claimed to be concerned with vilayets other than Beirut, 
nor did it try to extend its activities to the other
P O A  _  „
vilayets of Syria. In an editorial, Yusuf al-!Isa 
criticised the failure of the reformers in Beirut to 
make other neighbouring Syrian towns participate in the 
movement of reform. If such participation had taken 
place, then the Ottoman government would have been obliged
202. Shakib Arslan, Ila al-TArab, p.19*
203, For the full Arabic text of the 15 articles, see,
Lisan al-Hal, No. 7155, of 30 Jan., 1913- al-Muqtabas 
(dalIy)No.1112 of 10,Peb., 1913* Salam, Memoirs,
jp. 19-23. al-^anar, Vol. 16, part 4- of 7 April, 1913♦ 
pp.275-279. Muhsin Fani, On Temmuz, wrongly gives 
this scheme (in Turkish) as the vali*s scheme. For a 
French translation of the scheme, see, Dig. Argivi, 
(1stanbul) Siyasi Kismi, Surriye Ahvali, Carbon box 
No.125> File No.33 * Also/Carnegie to Grey, No.3AO, 
conf., Paris, 24- June, 1913, F.O.371/1827/29038. Also, 
Reveil, of 20 Feb., 1913, being enc. in Cumberbatch 
to Lowther, No.26, conf., Beirut, 12 Feb., 1913,
F.o. 371/1775/144-74-.
204-. Lowther to Grey, No.238, conf., Const., 24- March,
1913, F.O.371/1775/14-4-74-, wrongly asserted that the 
Society intended to extend its scheme "to other 
Arab speaking vilayets".
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to consider the reform movement as a desire of all the 
Arab vilayets and "not as a luxury commodity for Beirut 
alone,f.^^ However, the Society remained a purely Beiruti 
organisation, and perhaps it was this parochial aspect of 
the movement which encouraged and enabled the Turkish 
authorities to suppress it, and by so doing put an end to 
the attempt of the Beirutis to secure their rights in the 
Empire,
The Reform Hovement in other parts of Syria:
The movement was so confined to the town of Bei­
rut that the rest of the vilayet remained utterly indif­
ferent to it. They neither echoed the enthusiasm of 
Beirut for reform, nor followed its example. In Tripoli 
a list of demands was prepared by some enthusiasts for 
reform and a committee of forty was nominated to discuss 
it, but nothing resulted from this effort for none of the 
forty members, according to al-Muhaml, a local paper, 
turned up to discuss the list, al-NasIr of Beirut re­
ported that a meeting, held in Sidon by a committee of
205* Falastln, No,204/1, of 15 Jan., 1913, pp.1-2.
206, As quoted in Falastln, No.206/3 of 22 Jan., 1913, al- 
Mufyaml thought the list of reforms was similar to the 
list of food in restaurants (menu), the implication 
being that it included a variety"of demands which, 
besides being incongruous,were meant to satisfy the 
desires of many customers.
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Sunni Muslims, SfcI*Is and Christians, to discuss the ne­
cessary reforms for their town, came to no result because 
of division between the members of the committee. Being 
a minority group, the Christians believed their presence 
in the committee would have no effect, and consequently
e —  —
withdrew from the meeting. Thta Shx'is demanded that they 
should have their own mufti, qadl, and members of the 
Bench in law courts, and that their lands should be 
exempted from the fushur tax. The Sunni Muslims, unwil­
ling to share the power which they held in Sidon with 
the ShiT Is, opposed the demands of the latter, and as a
result of this dieoord the meeting ended without having
207 -achieved any results. ' In Haifa the qa1immaqan in­
vited the "notables and the enlightened" to formulate 
their demands for reform. The demands presented to the 
qahmmaqam were in way similar to those of Beirut.
They did not go beyond requests for the repairs of certain 
roads, the building of a new government house, the foun­
ding of a new school and the improvement of security in
p A Q
the town. Not only in the rest of the vilayet of 
Beirut did the Beiruti movement of reform fail to strike 
a strong echo, but also in the rest of Syria, where very 
little interest in it was shown.
207. As quoted in ffalagtln, No.206/3 of 22 Jan., 1913#
208. al-Iglab, No.11/1406 of 22 May, 1913.
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There were some feeble and insipid manifesta­
tions of reform, in the vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo 
as well as in the mutasarrif1ik of Jerusalem. These ma­
nifestations, which achieved little, were mostly the work 
of certain individuals, known either for their strong op­
position to the CUP, or their association and in some 
cases, friendship with the reformers of Cairo and Beirut. 
However, in all three centres opponents of the reform 
movement, who were usually adherents of the CUP* conducted 
a strong and successful opposition to the sporadic acti­
vities of the decentralisers there.
In Aleppo the reform movement was reported to 
be unwelcome and making slow progress owing to the pro­
paganda of its opponents who were misleading the simple 
people by telling them that the movement was contrary to 
the Islamic religion and was unpatriotic.^^ It seems the 
opponents of the movement had some success: for, beside a 
very brief report in al-Muqattam of a reform scheme, no 
mention was made in our sources of a reform movement in 
Aleppo. Al-Muqattam*s report merely said that among the 
important items of the Aleppine scheme was the demand to 
make Arabic the language of instruction in the schools in 
addition to making it an official language like Turkish. 
The report, however, added that the dismissal of the vali
209* Falastin, Ho.229/26 of 12 April, 1913» P*A, quoting 
al-Muqt'abas.
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of Aleppo* Refik Bey, had delayed the despatch of the scheme
210to the authorities,
The British consular reports were completely
silent on this movement. Instead they reported a marked
and lively agitation in favour of British rule for the
vilayet, an agitation led, we are told, by Muslim notables,
211Arab tribal chiefs and Kurdish chieftains. The agita-
21?tion continued throughout March and April, and the 
British Consul put it on record that on two occasions he 
was contacted by leading Muslims asking for British rule 
for Aleppo*
On the first and more important occasion, the 
British Consul was visited by six Arab shaykhs of import­
ance who presented a petition written in French^^ and 
signed by fifty-six Arab notables on behalf of the Muslim 
population of northern Syria, expressing their "unanimous
210. al-Muqattam, No.7285 of 14 March, 1913, p.5*
211. For an early report on such agitation see, Lowther to 
Grey, No.1131, conf,, Const., 31 Dec., 1912, F.O.
371/2 773/572. See also, Fontana to Lowther, No.78, 
conf., Aleppo, 14 Dec., 1.912, being an enclosure in 
Lowtherfs above despatch No.1131, F.O.371/1773/572, 
Also, Wooley to Fontana (no no. given), Beirut, 5 Dec., 
1912, being an encl. in Fontana*s above despatch No#
78, F.O.371/1773/572.
212. See for example, Lowther to Grey, No.279* conf., Const. 
5 April, 1913, F.O.371/1773/16736.
213* The petition was written in French and not in Arabic 
because its authors were intending probably, to 
present it to the French Consul with whom they had 
been in contact. French was also the language of 
diplomacy, see, Fontana to Lowther, No.17, as below.
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pi 4and earnest desire" to toe placed under British rule.
Talking atoout the deputation of six the consul said)
"In the course of conversation they told me that the entire 
Moslem population of Aleppo, high and low, feel that the 
state of things is such as to admit of no hope of impro­
vement under the Ottoman Government, either in the near or 
distant future; that the Muslims were fairly contented 
under the rule of Atodel Hamid, tout that they know those 
of their faith in Egypt and India enjoy a government far 
preferable to his, and that with one common accord they 
were praying for a British government of the country,
whether similar to that of Egypt or of India. "
On the second occasion the British consul was called upon
toy two prominent Arabs, one of them, the president of the
216local branch of the Liberal Union party. Thus at a 
time when the reform movement in Beirut was reaching its
214. The text of the French petition, which makes interest­
ing reading in, Fontana to Lowther, No.17* conf., 
Aleppo, 25 March, 1913, toeing encl. in Lowther to 
Grey, No.299* conf., Const., 10 April, 1913* F.O.371/ 
1773/16941. Text also in F.O. 195/2453/3.966.
215. Ibid.
216. Fontana to Lowther, No.24, conf., Aleppo, 21 April, 
1913, F.O.195/2453/1966. Same desp. in Lowther to 
Grey, No.381, conf., Const*, 3 May, 1913* F.O.371/ 
1773/21752. See also, Lowther to Fontana, telg. (no 
No. given), conf., Const., 2 May, 1913, F.0.371/1773/ 
21752, where Fontana was instructed that "in case of 
such applications you should confine yourself to inti­
mating that we cannot encourage projects which are 
[inconsistent with the views of the Central Ottoman 
Government." This telegram was approved toy the 
Foreign Office in a minute to Lowther*s despatch No. 
381 of 3 May, 1913 - above.
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climax, Aleppo not only failed to follow its example but
merely echoed sentiments which Beirut had expressed months
"before it started its agitation for reform.
Half-hearted attempts hy the supporters of the
Liberal Union in Damascus to follow the example of Beirut 
217failed. { Even then the Ententists were not the ini­
tiators of the brief attempt to formulate demands of re­
forms necessary for Damascus. It was the vali, Kazim 
Pasha, who, in accordance with instructions from Istanbul 
to ascertain the demands of the inhabitants, had called 
upon the heads of the various governmental departments to
p * 1  O
prepare schemes of needed local reforms. It was then
that some Damascenes who in the words of the al-Muqaftam1s 
correspondent Mwere seeking to please the government,f 
took the initiative by asking the president of the Muni­
cipality Council to invite about 160 of the leading men 
in Damascus to elect a committee to draw up a scheme of 
reforms. On the afternoon of 17 January 1913* the 160 
persons, who included Muslims, Christians and Jews, held 
their first meeting in the Municipality Office.
Ihe meeting came to nothing,for those present 
were unable to agree as to the meaning of the word
217* Lisan al-gal, No.7141 of 14 Jan., 1913* al-Ahran, 
F57Io6U57of' 17 Jan., 1913*
218. al-Muqattam, No.7243 of 24 Jan., 1913*
219* Ibid.
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"refoma1 - iglafo, While the Unionists understood by re­
form such material improvements as the draining of marsh­
lands, the construction of roads and the founding of
schools, the Ententists understood the introduction of a
2P0decentralised form of government* Efforts to reconcile 
the two hostile groups failed, and it was decided that 
each of them should draw up its own scheme of reform, and 
forward it to the General Council. al-Huqa$tam of 31 Janu­
ary 1913 published a scheme of 23 articles which it said 
"a group of educated and trustworthy" Damascenes had 
drafted. This group seemed to be Ententist, for it held 
a meeting in the Ententists1 club to which some others
were invited. The meeting passed the scheme, after dis-
221cussion, for forwarding to the General Council. No 
further information on the fate of this scheme was 
available•
The scheme, which was quite different from that
of Beirut, could not be described as decentralist in any
way* True, it provided for an elected General Council
that would be responsible for certain aspects of local
administration, but it did not place it. over the vali, or 
             —
220. Ibid*, for details of that meeting and the arguments 
used by each group. It was also stated that the 
Ententists opposed the election of a committee from 
among the 160, who were invited, for they realised 
that the Unionists were in the majority in the 
meeting, see, ibid*
221. al-Muqattam, No.724-9 of 31 Jan., 1913, p*l.
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subject the vali to it,as the Beirutis had done. The
Council could interpolate the vali, but it had no right to
dismiss him. In cases of disagreement the disputed nat­
ter was to be referred to the Council of State in Istanbul*
The scheme made Arabic the language of instruction, though 
it retained the compulsory teaching of Turkish In schools. 
Officials should know Arabic, which must be used in all 
official business connected with the public. Military 
service was to be local in peace-time and for two years
only, and the military exemption tax/to be reduced. 
Certain taxes were to be reformed, and provision made for
scheme, it did not ask for the appointment of foreign 
inspectors and advisers. This Is significant, for it 
strengthens the impression that the inclusion of articles 
dealing with foreign inspectors and advisers was the work 
of Christian Lebanese nationalists.
Another scheme of reforms of a general nature 
\tfhich did not mention foreign inspectors, was that for-
A —• O p X
warded to the cabinet of Kamil Pasha by Uajib Malliama. 
Najlb,who,together with his brother Salim had so loyally
222. Ibid., for all the 23 articles of the scheme.
223. Por a short biography of Uajlb and that of Salim
was
pop
the settlement of nomadic tribes. Unlike the Beirut
served Sultan Abdulhanid was\ completely
Malhama, see, extract from report on Turkey 1906
in F. 0.371/1822/255-55/13'• 
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discredited after the advent of the constitutional eras
was making a hid to re-enter public life. The Tines
was
believed that the scheme of Ha jib Mal£.ana/supported by 
some Muslim notables, and that he was working for a de-
pp/L
centralist system of government for Syria, Hajib, 
who drafted his scheme after touring Syria, specified re­
forms of a general nature. Syria should not be totally 
linked to Istanbul. Officials, or at least heads of de­
partments, should be acquainted with Arabic, and should 
be given wider powers. The G-eneral Council should be 
more representative of the inhabitants of the vilayet, 
and because of its knowledge of local needs, should be 
permitted to deal more freely with such needs. Education 
should be made general $ the system of justice was to be
reformed, and the coasts of Syria were to be properly de- 
225 -rfended.  ^ Ha jib probably knew from his previous exper­
ience at the Porte that only such reforms would be 
listened to by the authorities. However, nothing is 
known of what became of this scheme.
In the mutasarriflik of Jerusalem the decentra­
lisation movement met with a poor response#^ 26
224*. The Tines, No.4-0103 of 8 Jan., 1913*
225* For Najib's scheme, see, Lis an al-gal, Ho s. 714-3 and 
714-4- of 16 Jan. and 17 Jan., 1913, respectively,
226c al-Muqafrtan, Ho.7298 of 28 March, 1913, attempted to 
expTain why.
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schemes of reforms were put forward by the inhabitants, 
and apart from telegrams sent from Jaffa by its ex-deputy 
gafij; al-Sa’Id, and from Ga&a by !Srif al-gusaynl and others 
to the authorities in both Jerusalem and Istanbul asking 
that the reform scheme of Beirut be applied to their 
sanjak, there was no talk of administrative reform in 
Jerusalem.gafig al~SafId and ’Irif al-gusaynl were 
well known for their strong opposition to the CUP in the 
first Chamber of Deputies. Their efforts to initiate 
a movement of reform were made towards the second half 
of April 1913, after the closure of the Heform Club of 
Beirut,/my well be connected with that event. Perhaps 
it was an attempt to step up the agitation for reform in 
order to overawe the Ottoman authorities. Owing to the 
firm attitude taken by the authorities after the closure 
of the Beirut Club, and the opposition which the activities
of al-Sa?id and al-gusayni encountered from the Unionists
alei 
229
228in Jerus m, this insipid interest in reform came to
nothing.
227. Palastin. No.228/25 of 9 April 1913t Por an English 
translation of gafiz's telegram, see, Hough to Low­
ther, No.27, conf., Jaffa, 12 April, 1913, being
encl. in Lowther to Grey, No.34-6, conf., Const., 2$ 
April, 1913, P.O.371/1814-/19789 - Desp* also gives 
further details.
228. Por these opposing telegrams, see, Falastln, ibid. 
Hough to Lowther, Ibid.
229. Falastln, No.229/26 of 12 April, 1913* Por an account 
of the reform movement in the mutasarriflik, see, 
McGregor to Lowther, No.35, conf., Jerusalem, 12 
April, 1913, being encl. in Lowther to Grey, No.34-1, 
conf., Const., 24* April, 1913, F.O.371/1814/19326.
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Thus George Antonius was completely inaccurate 
when he wrote, "About the middle of February 1915s the 
Committee of Reform [Beirut] gave publicity to their 
scheme. It was greeted with demonstrations of popular fa­
vour not only in the Syrian provinces, but also in Iraq* 
Public meetings were held in Damascus, Aleppo, Acre, Nablus, 
Baghdad and Basra, and telegrams acclaiming the scheme 
as being the expression of the universal desire in the
o'50
Arab provinces poured into Constantinople".  ^ To start 
with ,the Beirut Society published its scheme on 31 Ja­
nuary 1913 and not ’hbout the middle of February" As we 
have seen, no public feeling acclaimed this action in 
other parts of Syria. Iraq was equally indifferent, and
Sayyid Jalib al-Naqib, the man behind the Reform Society 
231of Bagra,  ^ reacted to the closure of the Club of Beirut 
rather than to the publication of the scheme of the Beirut 
Reform Society. Moreover, the programme of the Society of 
Ba$ra was more in line with that of the Decentralisation 
Party of Cairo than of Beirut. Finally the Beirut Reform
230. Antonius, p.115.
231* For this society and the reform movement in Iraq_as 
a whole, see, Buru^ pp^.489-502. Also, Muhammad Jahir 
al-'Umarl al-Mugili, Tarikh Muqadarat al-^raq al- 
Siyasiya , Baghdad, 1933, Vbl.1, p,168. Amin Sarid, 
al-thawra al-*Arabiyya, Vol.l, p.24. Also, Marling 
to Grey,' ’ !No. 8l8, conf., Const., 25 Sept., 1915,
F.O.371/1845/45367, enclosing Croitf to Marling, No.51, 
conf., Ba§ra, 28 Aug., 1913* See also same to same,
No.52, conf., Basra, 30 Aug., 1913, F.O.371/1845/ 
45368.
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Society did not send its scheme to Istanbul until the 
second half of March.
Dissolution of the Beirut Reform Society;
The coming of the CUP to power on 25 January 
1913 caused distress among the Syrian reformers who con­
sidered it as the deathblow to their movement.Though 
the new government promised to condone the action of its 
predecessor In as far as reform was concerned it reminded 
its Syrian subjects that defending the fatherland in face 
of the renewed war in the Balkans had priority over all 
other demands.Moreover, the valis of Aleppo, Damascus 
and Beirut were changed. Hazim Bey, a devoted supporter
of the CUP, who twice served as vali of Beirut,replaced 
234Edhem Bey whom the Beirutis believed to be in sympathy 
with their movement. Al-Ahram prophetically commented, 
"Edhen was dismissed because he was a reformer who en­
couraged the reformers. It had been said Hazim, who re-
235
placed him, was instructed to kill the reform movement.”
2?2. Cumberbatch to Lowther, Ho.12, conf., Beirut, 20
Jan., 1913> encl. in Lowther to Grey, Ho.104, conf., 
Const., 7 Feb., 1913, P.0.371/1788/7281. al-Ahram,
Ho.10618 of 4 Feb., 1913.
233. Circular by the Minister of the Interior, in al-Ahram, 
Ho.10618 of 4 Feb., 1913, p.2, al-Muqattan, UoY7262 
of 14 Feb., 1913. ------  —
234. Bag. Argivi (Istanbul), Iradler, Dahiliye, Ho.2749,
of 13 Feb., 1913. Takvin-i Vekayi, Ho.1'377 of 18 Feb., 
1913. -----------
235. al-Ahram, Ho.10639 of 28 Feb., 1913.
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To achieve that end Hazim used several means* Por instance
he tried to sow dissension between the Muslims and the
Christians in Beirut in an attempt to break up the Beirut 
256Society.  ^ He further attempted to bribe the Muslin re­
formers by offering leading figures among them such as 
Shukri al-*Asali, the former deputy for Damascus, import­
ant administrative postsf237 jjj_s efforts, however, failed 
and produced opposite results, for instead of appeasing 
the Muslim reformers he angered them, and as a result many 
resigned their posts in protest.^^ Hazim also tried to 
create an opposition group to the reform party, and to 
apply pressure on the press of the reformers. Hone of
Hazim1s tactics met with success and the reform continued
24*0to grow and assume dangerous proportions.
Thus on 8 April, 1913,after careful preparations, 
Hazim issued an order dissolving the Beirut Reform Society 
and closing its Club, on the grounds that it was illegal
236. al-Ahram, Hos.10653 and 10655 of 17 and 19 March,
1915? respectively. Cumberbatch to Lowther, Ho.39* 
conf., Beirut, 13 May, 1915, P.0•371/1775/24-34*9*
Lisan al-gal, Ho.7197 of 28 March, 1915.
237* al-Muqattam, Ho.7286 of 1]5 March, 1915, and Ho.7297 
of 23 March, 1913. al-Ahram, Ho. 10652 of 15 March, 
1913. They all relate the interview between Hazim 
and al-'Asali, who refused the job.
238. Lisan al-gal, Ho.7190 of 19 March, 1913 and Ho.7197 
of 2S March, 1913* Salan, Memoirs, pp.23-24*.
239* Salan, Memoirs, pp.22-23. al-Ahram, Hos.10625 of 12 
Peb., 1*5X5” and" 10651 of 14-"March, 1913, and Ho. 10688 
of 30 April, 1913. al-Muqattam, Ho.7297 of 29 Mar.^ 913,
24*0. al-Muqattam, Ho.7359 of 11 June, 1913 for interview 
of Hazxri with the editor of Jeune Turc in which he 
indicated this.
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and that some of its demands were of an unconstitutional 
nature. Hazim further stated that after the promulgation 
of the New Law of the Vilayets there was no raison d’etre 
for the Reform Club. On the same day Hazim conmunicated 
his order to the press. On 9 April all Beirut papers,
with the exception of Ababil and al-Ra’y al-1?^, appeared
framed in borders of black, with this order as their sole
24?contents. As this form of protest was without pre­
cedent in Syria, the British Consul in Beirut sent a copy
t 245of al-Nufxd with the order and its translation.
The Beirutis talked widely of demonstrations, 
but the Society decided to send a petition of protest to 
the Grand Vezir. The vali being wrongly informed that 
members of the Society collecting signatures for the 
petition were inciting the inhabitants to demonstrate, 
arrested five of then on 11 April. As a result,shops were 
closed in p r o t e s t a n  incident that was settled largely
241. i'or the Arabic text of the order', see, "Lisan al-gal 
No.7207 of 9 April, 1913? Photostat copy" o'f which in, 
Zeine, The Emergence* p. 189* aA-Nufid, No. 1248, 
of 9 April," 191?. £'or a Prench translation, see Re- 
veil, of 10 April, 1913, being encl. in Cunberbalxh 
to Lowther, No.31? conf., Beirut, 10 April, 1913*
P.0.371/1775/18783.
242. Palastin, No.229/26 of 12 April, 1913* al-Muqattan,
No.7309 of 11 Apr., 1913? p#4. Cunberbatch""to Lowther, 
No.31* ibid.
243. Cunberbatch to Lowther, No.31? ibid.
244. Lisan al-gal, Nos.7210 & 7211 of 12 & 13 Apr.,1913. 
al-Muga11an~, No.7310 of 14 Apr. ,1913. Cunberbatch to 
Lowther, No.34? conf., Beirut, 17 April? 1913? I'.O. 
371/1775/20328.
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by the efforts of the British Consul The Decentrali­
sation Party of Cairo showed its solidarity with the 
Beirutis hy sending two strongly worded telegrans of pro­
test, one to the Grand Vezix^  Mahmut Shevket Pasha and the
OIL
other to the vali himself. It also despatched tele­
grams to the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy and to The Tines, Le Temps and to the Congress of
Ambassadors In London discussing the peace settlement
247for the Balkan wars. r The Society protested hut without 
248avail, for the Grand Vezir replied to its telegram hy 
another one confirming the action of the vali.^^ The 
government took the view that the newly published Law of 
the Vilayets granted a wide measure of administrative de­
centralisation, which would he sufficient for the Empire 
250now. The Syrian decnntralisers rejected the new law as
251
another stop hy the Unionists towards further centralization.
245. For Consul's part as intermediary, see, Cumherhatch 
to Lowther, No.34, ihid. Also, Lowther to Grey, No.
190, teleg*, conf., Const., 13 April, 1913, F.O. 
371/1775/16900.
246. Text in al-Muqattam, No.7310 of 14 April, 1913, p.5.
247. Ihid., text of one such telegram (to the Ambassadors 
Congress) In F.C.371/1779/17136 (no No.given),
13 April, 1913.
248. For texts of such protests, see, Lisan al-gai, No.
7210, of 12 April, 1913. —
249. al-Ahram, No. 10676 and 10678 of 15 & 17 April, 1913. 
al-huqatfram, No.7314 of 18 April, 1913.
250. For the Turkish text of the Law, see, Idare Umumiyet 
\ilayet Kanuni, Istanbul, 1329. For an English ana­
lysis of the law, see, Lowther to Grey, No.300, conf., 
Const., 12 April, 1913, F.O.371/1801/17400.
251* Article hy Paflq al-'Agim criticising the law in al-
Muqattam, No.7308 of 11 April, 1913. Bee also, Cont...
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Towards the end of April, probably because of 
the increasing agitation for reform, the government nade 
an attempt to compromise with the docentralisers by pas­
sing a decree permitting the use of Arabic in law courts 
and making it the medium of instruction in primary and se­
condary schools on condition that Turkish remained an
252obligatory subject.  ^ Tanin published a series of articles 
complimentary to Arabic. The reformers were not impres­
sed and both al-Ahram and al-Muqattan bitterly criticised 
the decree. Al-Ahram,after demanding the dismissal of 
Haz:m Bey and the opening of the Reforn Club and attacking 
the contradictory attitude of the government, said "Our 
thanks to the government for realising the importance of 
the Arabic language, but there is no room for bargaining 
and our demands should either be accepted as a whole ov
F/note cont. from previous page.
al-Alaran, 10718 of 4 June, 1913# Lowther to Grey, No.210 
teTeg,, conf,, Const., 29 April, 1913? F.O.371/1801/ 
19771. 
252. Text of decree in official gazette, Beirut, No.1221 
of 11 April, 1913* Tanin, No.1577 of '21 April, 1913. 
al-Ahram, No.10683 oT '2"5 April, 1913. al-Muqattan, 
No775S3 of 30 April, 1915.
253. Tanin, Nos. 1576 and 1577 of 20 and 21 April, 1913. 
al-lqbal, No.4-95 of 5 May, 1913. English translation 
in Lowther to Grey, No.332, conf., Const., 21 April,
1913? F.O.371/1799/19319. 
254. al-Muqattan, No.7335 of 14 May, 1913.
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refused as such." ,^ 55 al-Ahram, then pointed out the 
government failed to realise that this whole question was 
a political and a national one.^^
The story of reforn in Beirut thus came to an 
end, and until the Paris Congress of June 1913? the whole 
movement degenerated into protests., accusations and counter­
accusations in the press between the authorities and the 
reformers. In fact the agitation was more against the 
CUP than for reforn. Kamil Pasha, who visited Beirut 
after his fall from power, summed up the attitude of the 
Turkish authorities to the Syrian decentralisation move­
ment when he told some leading men in Beirut that, "he 
considered the demands for decentralisation, contained in 
the Beirut scheme, too drastic, and that he would have 
preferred to see the Moslems take the lead in demanding 
reasonable reforms from the government instead of secon­
ding the Christians in insisting upon changes which it
must be impossible and impracticable (sic.) for the govern-
257nent to accord."
255. al-Ahram, No.10688 of 30 April, 1913.
256. Ibid.
257« Cunberbatch to Lowther, No*46, conf., Beirut,
27 May, 1913? being encl. in Lowther to Grey,
No. 512, conf., Const., 7 June, 1913? P.O. 371/ 
1822/26662.
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Nevertheless the attitude of the Unionist 
government had embittered the Syrian decentralisers, 
hardened their opposition to the CUP regime and nade 
then nore than ever conscious of their rights and identi­
ty with)h.the Empire. It was not a coincidence that some 
of those reformers began to voice clear and vivid ideas 
of a purely Arab nationalism. Ur. 'Izzat al-Jundl, a 
prominent Syrian decontraliser, wrote in protest against 
the closure of the Reform Club, that the lurks must 
realise that the unity of the Muslims and Christians 
was a fact” and he added, "Today there is no difference 
between a Muslin and a non-Musliru An Arab bond unites 
us, for we are Arabs before we are Ottomans, or even
Muslins or Christians....., Over and above everything
else, we are Arabs: the Muslin is an Arab before he is
a Muslim, so is the Christian and the Jew, and so are
258all the inhabitants in Syria and other Arab lands",  ^
Other references to a Syrian nation (Sh'ab SurrI) and 
an Arab nation (Umma * Arabiyya) were frequent in
258. al-Ahram, No.10682 of 22 April, 1913*
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newspaper articles and speeches by reformers.
It was in this atmosphere of rising tensions 
between the Unionist regime and the Syrian leaders, 
and the rapidly developing Arab movement, that the Arab 
Syrian Congress was to be held.
259* See for instance, ai-Huqatfam. No. 7311 of 15 April, 
1913; and No.7314- of 18 April”, 1913 for articles 
by Rafiq al-^Azn, entitled "The Syrian Movement - its 
causes and Results". See further, al-Iglah, No. 
2/1397 of 12 May, 1913?„for a revealing speech by 
!Abd al-gamld al-Zahraw! in a meeting of the De­
centralisation Party in Cairo.
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CHAPTER V
THE ARAB CONGRESS OP PARIS 
ITS PROCEEDINGS AND IMPACT.
The first Arab congress, held in Paris between 
18-23 June 1913? was the last move by the Syrians to se­
cure their demand for administrative decentralisation*
It constituted the final chapter in the history of the 
Syrian decentralisation movement. The failure of the 
Congress to achieve its main aims, and the subsequent 
disillusionment of the Syrian Arabs with their govern­
ment contributed to the main reasons that led to the 
appearance of separatist tendencies among their leaders.
With the closure of the Reform Club of Beirut,
the dissolution of the Society of Reforms in that town
and the repressive measures taken by the vali against
the reformers' newspapers, the centre of agitation for
reform shifted to Paris.^  The idea of a Congress origina-
2tied in the minds of five young Syrians studying in Paris.
T. BeT^lsan al-Hal, iNos. 7££7» 724-3 of 1 and 20 May, l9l3*
respectlvely. Al so- al-Ahram, No, 10694- of 7 May, 1913.
2. They^were:_'Abd al-Ohanl al-'Araysi (Beirut), 'AwnI 'Abd 
al-Hadl (Nablus) Muhammad al-MaT^ana^anl (Beirut),
Jamil Mardan (Damascus), Tawflq Pa5id (Beirut). See, al- 
Lajna_al-'Ulya li $izb al-Lamarkaziyya, al-Mu*tamar al- 
1Arabi al-awwal, Cairo, 1913 (hereafter hdutamar), p.?* 
As1 ad Daghir, MudhakarattI, p. 58. A^mad Qadri,p * 1A *
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All itfere Muslims, and some authors have claimed that they 
were nemhers of the secret Arab society al-Patat. The 
reason given hy the preparatory committee for calling 
such a congress was to demand reforms based on admini­
strative decentralisation in order to strengthen the Arab 
provinces and, in particular, Syria which were nowthreat- 
ened by western agression* The committee believed that 
the centralist policies of the Ottoman government were 
the main reasonsbehind the weakness of the Empire and the
IL -subsequent dangers surrounding it. Al-Ahram put it
blunffcywhen it wrote, "there is a fear that a State
is going to occupy their country, and hence the Syrians
decided to convene a congress in Paris in order to declare
5
to Europe their opposition to any foreign occupation"*
Rashid Pi£a echoed the sane justification for the Cong- 
6 -ress* Lisan al-Bal stated that the reason for assembling
in Paris was to make it plain to the Prench government
that the Arab Unna generally, and the Syrians particular­
ly, would not accept any substitute for their Ottoman
3. Por example, Ahmad Qadri, p•14; _Antonius, p.114;_ 
Muhibb al-Dm al-Khaflb, Sirat Jil, p.30; al-Shihabl, 
p. 85.
gl~Manar, VololG, part 5 of 7 May, 1915, p.393. Amin 
£> a1 id, althawra al-fArabiyya, Vol. 1 , p.27.
5* al-Ahram, No.10690 of 2 May, 1913.
6. al-Manar, Ibid*
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government; and the Congress would then try to secure
1 re forms for the country, lest it pass into the hands of
7
those who covet it."'
The originators of the Congress had, however, 
more sophisticated aims in mind* They hoped that the 
holding of the Congress would, besides securing adminis­
trative decentralisation for the Arab provinces, serve as 
a means for "the preservation of the identity of the Arab 
Uinma, and for the removal of obstanles from the path of 
its progress so that it could strengthen itself by be­
coming civilised and by benefiting from the experiences of 
science and civilisation. By thus becoming strong the 
Arab Umma would also strengthen the whole of the Ottoman
o
State (Pawla)11 This is the first indication that the
architects of the Congress considered 1 westernization1 
as important as administrative decentralisation for the 
future of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Smpire. In 
this indication lies the importance and the originality 
of the organisers of the Arab Congress. It is significant 
that the idea of the congress had sprung up among young 
Arabs living in Paris as a "result of their contact with
Q
the West, and their living in a free atmosphere11.'
7* Lisan, No.7262 of 12 June, 1913*
8* M*utamar, p.5* See also, Thawrat al-1Arab, p.69;
Buru, p.505; Amin Sa'id, al-ihawra aldArabiyya, 1, pp. 
25-26.  -------
9* Parwaza, 1, pp.36-37*
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The originators of the idea of the Congress 
talked about their idea to ShukrI Ghanin and Nadra Ma^ran, 
two leading Syrian Christians in Paris, and then they 
revealed their plan to the Paris Arab community (al- 
Jaliyya al-1 Arabiyya). The idea being approved and wel­
comed by all, the community elected a preparatory commit­
tee of eight persons whose job was to contact Arab organi-
10sations and leaders, and to prepared for the Congress*
Significantly, the committee had four Muslin and four
11Christian members.
The appearance of an idea of a congress and the
way its committee was formed had repeated distinctive
features of the reform movement in Cairo and Beirut. In
Paris, as well as in Beirut and Cairo, Muslims took the
lead and invited the Christians to join them. In all
three centres the reformers claimed to have been prompted
by patriotic i*easons to start their movement. It can,
therefore 9 be suggested that the Arab Congress of Paris
was the completion of the Syrian reforn movement.
In fact the first decision of the preparatory
committee, which was taken on 11 March 1913? stated that
10• wtamar, p.p. Al-Shihabi,. p•85. Anin Sa *id^  al- 
thawra al-1Arabiyya, 1 pp.25-26. A^nad Qadri, “ p. 14.
11* M’utanar, p.5 for the names of the committee. Of the 
five initiators the name of Tawfiq Pa*id_was dropped. 
That^of Ghanin, Nadra Ma£ran, Jamil Ma'luf and Charles 
Debbas (all Christians) were added to make the com­
mittee of eight. Por the names with brief comments, 
see, al-Sliihabi, ibid. Also, Cunberbatch to Lowther, 
No.10, conf., BeiruPT 14 May, 1913? P.0.371/1822/24353*
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the committee had resolved to affiliate itself to the De­
centralisation Party of Cairo whose aims were the sane as
IPthose of the proposed Congress. The reason given by
Atymad QadrI, a prominent member of al~Eatat, for such a
decision was "to spread the Arab movement" and spread its
ideas through the agency of the Egyptian press with which
the decentralisers of Egypt had already established good 
13contacts.  ^ Moreover, the organisers of the Congress must 
have realised that they, because of their youth, had 
neither the national status among the Arabs nor the poli­
tical reputation to win support for their idea of the 
Congress. The decentralisers of Egypt had both assets, 
and establishing links with them was imperative for the 
success of the Congress. There is no evidence that the 
architects of the Congress were influenced by the re­
formers of either Beirut or Cairo. They were acting 
entirely on their own initiative.
On 4 April the preparatory committee, which had 
already styled itself The Committee of the Arab Congress, 
wrote to the Decentralisation Party of Cairo conveying 
their decision of affiliation and asking then "to send 
a delegate representing the Syrian community in Egypt and 
who would be the president of the congress since you are
12* H’utanar, p*5* Al-Shihabi, pp.85-66. Buru, p.505*
13. Alpmad QadrI, p. 15* See further, Darwaza, 1, p.37*
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14the origin of our work and the example which we follow”. 
Having thus nade the Decentralisation Party the patron of 
the Congress, the committee went on to specify its agenda. 
The discussion would cover the following topics: the na­
tional life in the Empire and the opposition to any foreign 
occupation, the rights of the Arabs in the Ottoman Kingdom, 
the necessity of introducing reforms in the country on the 
basis of decentralisation (as specified in the programme 
of the Decentralisation Party of Cairo), and, finally, 
the emigration from and immigration to Syria. Speakers 
would be selected to discuss these topics, and the Congress 
would be open to the press. The preparatory committee 
left it to the Cairo decentralisers to decide whether the 
decisions of the Congress should be forwarded to the Ambas­
sadors conference in London (where the Balkan Peace 
treaties were being discussed), to the various Embassies 
in Paris, or whether such decisions shoiild not be forwarded 
at all. However, the broad outlines of that decision 
of the Congress would be: the recognition of the national
life of the Arabs; the warding off of foreign occupation 
and the introduction of reforms on the basis of administra­
tive decentralisation in the Arab lands.^
14. Text of letter in^ H’utanar, pp.6-7. Also, al-'Azani, 
III, pp.53-55* Amin""Sa1id, al-thawra al-'Arabiyya, 1* 
pp.25-26. ~ “
15* H’utanar, ibid. Also, al-Manar, Vol.16, part 5 of 
r W 7 “T91JTpp * 595-394*:
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Th.ua the preparatory comittee had not only 
set the agenda of the Congress in advance hut also its 
proceedings and decisions. The ain was not to reach new 
decisions hut to inpress on the Ottoman government the 
decision reached at Cairo and Beirut, namely the need for 
an administrative decentralist system of government for 
Syria, and the rest of the Arah provinces. However, the 
moderate programme of the decentralisers of Cairo appealed 
more to the committee than that of Beirut.
On 11 April the supreme committee of the De­
centralisation Party accepted the invitation of the pre- 
paratory committee of the Congress, u and on 14 April 
wrote to thorn that the representatives of their Party
would he'Ahd al-Hanld al-Zahrawi, for the presidency,
— 17and Iskandar 'Amnun, r Al-Muqa11an saw in the acceptance 
of the Decentralisation Party to take the lead of the 
Arah Congress "evidence that the Syrian nation (al-Sbsth 
al-Surl) is agreed on the demand for decentralisation,
1 o
and united in the acceptance of this nohle aim".
On receiving this letter the committee of Paris
published in the press a circular entited "Invitation to
the sons of the Arah Umma", The circular declared that in
16. M’utamar, p.8. Darwaza, 1, p.37. Al-Shihabi, p.86.
•*-7• a*l-^ anetr, ihid.
18• al-Muqattan, Ho.7511 of 15 April, 1913*
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view of the dangers surrounding the Arab lands, and in 
particular Syria, an Arab Congress, under the auspices of 
the Syrians, had been decided upon. The Congress would 
be attended by delegations of leading nen from the Arab 
lands, and from Syrian communities in Egypt, the Americas 
and western Europe. After stating the aims of the Con­
gress, the declaration appealed to all Arabs, and especial­
ly to their leaders, to send either their representatives
iq
or their telegrams of support to the Congress. J
The Congress was therefore intended to be an 
Arab one. In fact it cane to be a congress organised by 
Syrians as an extension of the Syrian movement for de­
centralisation, and with the exception of two representing 
Iraq, all the participants were Syrians. Prominent among 
then were the Beirutis and Lebanese, whether representing 
emigres of Paris and the Americas or representing their 
homelands. Even the two members who were supposed to 
represent Iraq were residents in Paris, one being a mer­
chant and the other a law student. Anotner merchant re­
siding in Paris represented the Syrian emigres in Mexico. 
Two prominent Syrian journalists, Ha jib Diyab, the owner 
of Mirat al-Gharb in Hew York, and Hafun Makarzal, the
19. Text of Circular in, M’utanar, pp.9-11. Also, al- 
Mugattan, Ho.7322 of 29 April, 1913. Al-fAzanI, III,
PP*55-57. Eor the text with an English translation 
sue Zeine, The Emergence, Appendix M, pp.185-188.
French Translation in La Verit§, pp.65-67* Izahat, 
pp.45-47.
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owner of al-Huda of New York, together with Ilyas Maqsud 
represented the Syrian emigres of the United States of 
America. Six delegates, three Muslins and three Chris­
tians, represented Beirut in their capacity as members of 
the Beirut Reform Society. One of then was, however, un­
able to attend the congress. Ba’albek was represented by
two delegates, and the Arab community of Istanbul by fAbd
20
al-Karim al-Khalil, the president of al-Nuntada al-Adabl.
A1 Zahrawl and 'Anmun were the delegates of the Decentra­
lisation Party of Cairo. The biggest delegation (four 
Muslins and four Christians) was that of the connunity of 
Paris.^
The Congress was attended by twenty-four dele­
gates, half being Muslims and half Christians. It will be 
recalled that the membership of Beirut Reform Society 
was similarly divided between the Christians and the 
Muslins. Moreover, the Congress was dominated by journal­
ists. .it least ten members were professional journalists, 
five of whom owned newsxoapers, the other five being editors 
and correspondents. Nearly all the young Syrian Muslin 
participants were law students. Al-!AraysI, hinself a 
journalist, was the only one studying political science,
20# Por this society see above, pp. nf- I 87
21# For the complete list of the delegates see M ’utamar, 
pp. 14—1 6. Also, al-Ahram, No.10737 of 26 J u n e V T 9 I3 * 
al-Isla^i, N o , W W 3 9  of 1 July, 1913.
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Arab notables (a !^ n ) were hardly represented in the Con­
gress, a factor utilised by the opponents of the reforn 
movement to belittle the importance of that Congress. 
Furthermore, unity of purpose was lacking among the parti­
cipants. While some delegates were working for the adop­
tion of administrative decentralisation for the whole of 
the Arab lands, others desired reforms only for Syria 
os? even a part of Syria such as Beirut. Izahat had indeed
accused the Lebanese Christians in the Congress of working
22for the annexation of Beirut to the Lebanon, a coveted
aim of Lebanese Christian nationalists* It is significant
that some Muslin Arab writers repeated and believed in the
23accusations of Izahat. ^
*Abd al-^anld al-ZahrawI, the president of the
Congress, complained, in a letter to his friend Rashid
Ri^ La, of the diversity of the assembly. He lamented that
some of the Beirutis* delegation (the two Christians Khalil
Zainiyya and Ayub Thabit) had as their "only interest
24Beirut and Beirut alone". The British Consul in Beirut 
wrote that the aim of the Beirut delegation, whose expenses
22- Izahat, p*56. Also, La V&rit§, pp.65-66♦
23• Kor example, Salan, Memoirs, p.30; al-*AzamI, IV, pp. 
71-83; Anin_Sa!id, al-thawra al-*Arabiyya, 1, p.31; 
Beyhun, Qawafil, 1,~p*24,
24. Text of letter in al-Manar, Vo1.19, part 9, Sept.1916, 
pp.175-180. Also in Thawrat al- 1Arab, pp.129-136. See 
further, S.G. Haim, "The Arab Awakening - A Source 
for the Historian?" Die Welt des Islans, n.s., Vol.II 
(1953), p.241. -
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were defrayed by public subscription, was to plead the 
cause of reform in some European capitals,including Paris, 
"in the hope of obtaining foreign intervention at Con­
stantinople for rhe introduction of the scheme drawn at 
25Beirut". ^ In another report the Consul stated that the 
Delegation had no written mandate but had letters of re­
commendation from some religious heads in Beirut and that 
"they have no connection with the ’Arab Syrian* Congress
Committee, though they will no doubt meet and discuss
26 —natters with them". Khalxl Zainiyya wrote in a message 
al-Ahran from Paris that the Beirut delegation decided 
to take part in the deliberations of the Congress" al­
though they were not sent for this aim".^ Hence the 
Beiruti delegation remained a separate■body within the Con
pQ
gress, a fact which led to some friction and discord.
It was this lack of unity among the delegates which the
CUP government exploited and which contributed a great
deal to the ultimate failure of the Congress.
25. Cunberbatch to Lowther, Ho.36, conf., Beirut, 13 May, 
1913, P.O.371/1775/22531•
25. Same to same. Ho.47, conf., Beirut, 30 May, 1913,
being encl. in Lowther to Grey, Ho.504, conf., Const.,
7 June, 1913, P.O.371/1775/
27* al-Abram, Ho.10737 of 26 June, 1913.
28. Evidence of such discord in Zainyya*s messages from 
Paris in al-Ahram, Hos.10780, 10797 of 15 Aug. and 
5 Sept., 1913, respectively.
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However, the launching of the idea of on Arab 
Congress in Paris aroused considerable opposition in the 
CUP and its Arab supporters„ Tanin attacked the organi­
sers of the Congress and raised doubts as to their real 
aims. It described the Congress as a 'strange* one, and 
tried to show that it was insignificant and that it was
not representatives of all the Arabs since it had no de-
29legates fron Xenen,Baghdad, Egypt and North Africa. y
Moreover the Committee government, according to some
writers, tried to persuade the French government to ban 
30the Gongress. The Committee, however, succeeded in in­
ducing its supporters in Syria to send telegrams to Istan­
bul decrying the organisers of the Congress and depre­
cating their action as unrepresentative of the wishes of 
the Arabs. As1ad al-Bhuqayrl, an ardent CUP supporter and 
the deputy for Acre, left Istanbul for Syria especially 
for this purpose.^ 'Abd al-'Azxz Jawlsh, a former editor 
°£ al-'Allan, the organ of the Egyptian National Party -
who was living in Istanbul at the time, busied himself with
32mobilising opposition to the Congress in the capital*
29. Tanin of 6 May, 1913. Arabic translation in al-Muqat- 
fa m ~ N o .7354 of 13 May, 1913, and al-Ahran, No7106989 
of 13 May, 1913. Also, thawrat al-1Arab/ p.77*
30. For example, Thawrat al-'Arab, p.75* Buru, p.507* 
Antonius, p . 113. Archival dip 1 onatic material does 
not, however, reveal such attempt by the Ottoman 
go vornnent.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. Bee further, al-'Azanl, III, pp.71-74-*
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These efforts, resulted in the despatch of the necessary
■jpy
telegrams,  ^but did not prevent the reformers fron 
holding their Congress,
In one such telegran, a group of Damascene no­
tables tried to minimise the significance of the call 
for an Arab Congress in Paris as a vengeful act against 
the government by three or four "amoral and aggrieved ye mag
men who had neither social position in Syria nor mandatory
'54-power to spealt on behalf of its people". It is true 
that the Congress did not represent the whole of Syria. 
Neither Damascus, nor Jerusalem, nor Aleppo were represen­
ted in it. The only Damascene in the Congress was Janxl 
Mardan, a young law student, who attended as one of 
the representatives of the Arab community in Paris.
Opposition to the Congress never took a religious 
form. Though it centred round two influential Damascene 
notables, namely 'Abd al-Ra£man Pasha al-Yusuf, the 
wealthy leader of the Kurdish community of Damascus, and 
Muhammad Pawzx Pasha al-’Agn, of the well known Agn fa­
mily, it was not social in inspiration though it had some
33* Most of these telegrams are to bo found in the Archives 
of the Foreign Ministry in Istanbul (Hariciye or 
Disisleri Arsivi) in the section: Surlyo Islahai'i,
Caffon Sox No". 125 * Pile No.33.
34-. Pis, Ars. (Istanbul) Car. No.125/33, teleg. No.3716 
date& 13 Hay, 19l3. See also, Tanin, No*1612 of 16 
May, 1913. al-Ahran, No.10718 oF 4 'Jun$, 1913 replied 
to the accusations of the telegram. Multamar, pp.ll- 
13,claimed that unfair means were used in order to 
obtain signatures for those telegiians. Also- al-Iglah, 
Nos.36/1431 and 37/14-32 of 20, 21 June, 1913.'T e e  
further, Buru, pp.507-511? Thawrat al-1Arab, pp.75-79*
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social undertones. The line of division was between the 
opponents and the supporters of the GUP, All the parti­
cipants in the Congress were its pronounced opponents who 
saw in its policies the biggest obstacle to the achieve­
ment of their demand for administrative reform,
/mother criticism raised against the Congress 
was that it was to meet in Paris, ,Tthe capital of those 
who are covetous of our country” Tanin, probably
having Shukri Ghanin in mind, commented that some of the 
signatories of the declaration calling for Congress were 
not Ottomans but naturalised French citizens,^ ;j,-Iqbal,
an Islamic weekly appearing in Beirut and a supporter of
the CUP, equated the holding of the Congress in Paris with 
37treason, ( The newspapers of the reformers, on the other
hand, replied to such accusations assuring the government
38of their loyalty and patriotism. Their arguments were
the same as those given by al-ZahrarwI when asked by the
editor of Lo Temps, during an interview, why they
chose Paris. Al-Zahrawx told the editor of Le Temps in an
35* al-Iqbal, No.496 of 12 May, 1913. Also Nos.497* 498 
and 500 of 19j 26 May and 9 June, 1913> respectively.
36, Tanin, of 6 May, 1913•
37, al-Iqbal, No.499 of 2 June, 1913.
38, See^for example, Lisan No.7262 of 12 June,_1913; al- 
Iglah, No.23/1418 of 5 June, 1913; al-Abram, No.XC690 
of 2‘^ a y , 1913.
304
interview that they chose Paris as the place for their 
Congress because of the lack of freedom in Syria, a fact 
evident in the repressive measures taken by the government 
against the Beirut Reform Society. He further pointed out 
that the reformers wanted to make their uvoice heard in 
Europe, whose interests are increasing day by day in the 
Ottoman dominions, and that by living among you we will 
be able to eradicate a number of misconceptions and to lay 
foundations for an understanding between the East and the 
Vest”.  ^ Paris, moreover, had the biggest Arab community. 
Al~Zahrawi had merely repeated the same arguments used by 
the reformers* press.
However, the main reason for holding the Congress 
in Paris s e e m s t o  have been the desire of the partici­
pants to draw European attention to their demands or even 
to secure diplomatic support for those demands. Though 
the papers of the reformers never hinted at the fact that 
the organisers of the Congress were following the example
of the Armenians, who were at the time feverishly seeking
40
the support of European Powers for their movement of reform,
39# M ’utanar, p.19# For the whole interview see, pp.19-21* 
Also, al-I§lah, No.40/1435* of 26 June, 1913; Al-'AzanI,
III, 62ASHC
40. File F *0.371/1815 deals with the Armenian reforms. For 
a short and lucid account see, Memorandum by Fitz- 
maurice, being an enc. in Marling to Grey, No.747? 
conf., Const., 27 Aug., 1913, F.0.371/1815/40170.
See also, Grey to Lord Granville, No.236, conf*, F.O.
22 July, 1913> F.O.371/1815/34337* Lowther to Grey,
No.1129, conf., Const., 31 Dec., 1912, F.O.371/1773/ 
570.
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one Turkish writer was convinced that this was the aim of
41 - Tsone of the Syrian reformers. . Al-Zahrawi and his as­
sociates were mainly concerned with the achievement of 
their ideal of administrative decentralisation, and they 
hoped that the government would listen to then this tine 
more seriously from Paris. Nonetheless, by convening their 
Congress in Paris, the Syrian decentralisers brought to 
mind the memory of the Kamidian despotic rule and the 
struggle of the Ottoman liberals, in Paris and other 
European capitals, to end that rule.
The Congress lasted six days during which four 
formal sittings were held. Nine speeches were delivered, 
and their theme followed closely the published agenda of 
the Congress. The speeches were examined and approved
by a committee of five before they were read to the 
42listeners. Each sitting began with the reading of te­
legrams and messages of support sent to the Congress by 
various individuals and organisations, then the speech 
would follow and after a short discussion the meeting 
usually ended. The sessions were attended by sone 200 
Arab listeners, and on the last day of the Congress the 
doors were "thrown open to all visitors without restriction 
and the deliberations were held in French". ^  All the
41. §eyh Muhsin Fani, On Tenrnuz, p.168.
^2* M ’utamar, p.24 gives names of this committee. In
the programme of each sitting.
43. Antonius, p.115*
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proceedings of the first throo sittings woro conducted 
in Arabic. The president and the committee were elected 
by secret ballot, and the offices of the committee were 
equally divided between the Muslims and Christians.^
The speeches and the deliberations of the Con­
gress emphasised the need for reforms on the basis of de­
centralisation, and laid strong emphasis on the Arab claim 
for full political rights in the Ottoman Empire, and to 
their right to participate in the administration of its 
affairs. There were also constant references in the 
speeches to the opposition of the Arabs to any foreign 
intervention in their lands* The reference here is clear­
ly to the rumoured designs of France in Syria.^ There 
was no talk, however, of separation from the Empire. On 
the contraiy, loyalty to the Empire was most fervently 
expressed, and all the speakers stressed their desire 
to maintain its integrity, provided the demands of the 
Arabs for a decentralised form of government were granted. 
What, perhaps, marked the Congress as an Important phase 
in the history of the Arab movement was the fact that its 
deliberations "give a vivid pic*ture of the atmosphere* 
of moderate Arab nationalism at the time. It was an
44. For the names of the committee and details of the 
opening session see M ’utamar, p.27* Also, al~I§lab,
No.44/1439 of 1 July, I§l3,~al-MufId, No.l^TfToTl 
July, 1913 and al-Ahran, No•10?37 of 26 June, 1913*
45. -Intonius, p.115.
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atmosphere of ’westernisation,,, " Sone of the speeches 
show that the younger Arabs, who were in touch with 
western civilisation and culture, were nodelling their 
views on race and nationalism on western political theo­
ries prevalent at the tine.^ The road for the emergence 
of the doctrine of Arahism was thus being paved as early 
as the year 1913*
Abd al-Hanid al-ZahrawI was the first speaker to 
address the Congress. He started his talk "Our Political 
Education" by stressing the necessity for such gatherings 
and by replying to the accusation of the opponents of the 
Congress that the participants had no social standing in 
their countries. He then argued that the essence of any 
political education was to teach the people (unna) the 
principle of keeping vigil over the acts of the govern­
ment in order to safeguard their rights. The principle
though not entirely unknown to tho Arabs, was long known
48 - -«■in Europe. Al-Zahrawi went on to emphasise the fact
that politics which for ten centuries had made the Arabs 
and the Turks nix with each other had begun to divide 
them, and the Ottoman bond which had for so long united 
tho two races was now grievously damaged. The only way
to save that bond and to preserve the integrity of the
46. -o H,;uroni» Arabic Th/ught, n.283.
47. H.3. Nuseipe~h,""TThe ld6as of Arab Nationalism, Ithaca, 
Hew York, 1959 > pp.51-52.
^’u.tanar, p.31*
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Empire would be to admit the Arabs to its administration.
He then declared, "Erom now on the basis of our political 
education will be to spread this idea and to adhere to it.
We have found that decentralisation is the best of means 
for taking part in the administration outside the capital.
As for the affairs of government in the capital, our 
brothers [tho Turks] are not ignorant of the ways and
IlQ _  _
means of sharing in their administration". J Al-Zahrawi
50
wished the Armenians and the Kurds to adopt the sane idea.
The concluding remarks of al-ZahrawI were the
most significant part of his address * Their significance
lay in the compliments and flattery which ho, a turbaned
shaykh of strong religious background, paid to Europe.
After refuting the allegation that the aim of the members
of the Congress was to sell the Arab lands to the foreigners,
al-Zahrawi stated:
"We have not come to Europe for that .... We 
have come to Europe, and we hope many of us
will follow suit, to enlarge and broaden our
intellect and resolution by seeing the achieve­
ment of intellects. We have come to add to 
our knowledge of Europe’s civilisation, and 
of its civilised social systems
Al-Zahrawi wanted Europe to know more "about us". 
"Europe is not the ghoul; the ghoul is bad administration 
and corrupt management. If Europe is a ghoul it would not
49. Ibid., pp.36-37*
50. Ibid.
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have given the Empire aid for tho last hundred yoarsh"1 
He finished his speech by hoping that tho drab nation 
would support the cause of the Congress.^
The second speaker was a rAbd al-Ghana al-'Aray- 
si, ono of the initiators of the Congress, and subsequently 
one of its five secretaries* Together with another Syrian 
he owned and and edited al-Hufld of Beirut, a paper noted 
for its strong opposition to the CUP as well as its 
leaning towards a noderate Arab nationalisn. Al-'AraysI 
who was studying journalism. and political science in Paris 
at the tine of the Congress, however, cane to be identi­
fied with trends of extreme Arab nationalisn which emerged 
after the outbreak of the First World Wax', and was con­
sequently executed by the Turks in 1916.
In all tho deliberations of tho Congress, it 
was the speech of al-Araysx which revealed, ’’how nuch 
the Arabs had already drunk fron the springs of European 
nationalism”.  ^ It showed fully tho direct influence of 
western political concepts on the ninds of the younger 
generation of Arab leaders. .ll~!Araysx echoed theories 
of race and nation, which were current In Europe in the 
second half of the nineteenth century and tho early part 
of the twentieth century.
51- Ibid., p.38.
52. Full text of speech in, H*utamar, pp.28-38. Also, al- 
l£llb) No.44/1*39 of 1 July, I'9l3? and al-Ahran, Ho. 
To757 of 26 June, 1913.
53. Huseibeh, p.51.
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Al-'AraysI told his audience:
"In every political syston there are two kinds 
of rights: the rights of the individual, and
the rights of the group (Haqq Janaah). The 
groups are nany, but the most exalted is the 
national group, And the nations have a right 
which is quite different fron that of the indi­
viduals," ^
Al-’Araysx, then, put the question whether the 
Arabs have the right of a group, and he answered:
"In the view of the G-ernan school [of politi­
cal science], a group has no clain to any such 
rights unless they possess unity of language 
and of race; unity of history and traditions 
according to the Italian school. The French 
scholars require unity of political aspira­
tions. If we consider the Arabs in the light 
of these political views, we find that they 
possess unity of language, unity of history, 
traditions and unity of political aspriations.
Tho Arabs, therefore, are entitled to the right 
of group, of nation and an unrna," ^
He went on to say, "The first right of any 
group is the right of nationality. The Arabs 
as a group, are no exception. We are Arabs be­
fore we acquire any political colouring [before 
we are Ottomans]• Ve have preserved our charac­
teristics, our attributes and our entity over 
nany centuries in spite of the efforts of Istan­
bul, aiming at political absorption, imperial 
exploitation and racial amalgamation. All these 
efforts, however, led to one result - zeal for 
our rights as a group and to the revival of 
this honourable and noble instinct, the instinct 
of race [in us]. We will oppose all that which 
might result in the weakening of this nationali­
ty, and we will seek all that which might revive 
the characteristics and attributes of the Arabs."
56
54-* M*utamar, p.4-2, Al-Shihabl, p.89*
55. Ibid,
56. Ibid., p.4-3. Al-Shihabl, p.90. Buru, p.515* Husbeibeh, 
pT37T
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Al-'AraysI, then, denied that tho Ottoman state 
could claim the right of conquest in the Arab lands. It 
might claim this in the Balkans, but it is common 
knowledge that the Arabs were not conquered* On the contra­
ry, they helped the Ottomans to establish the basis of their
state. "We are the basis of this state, and not exploited 
57captives", ' The Arabs were determined to preserve their
position, their nationality and their equality in the
Empire. They had no aspiration whatsoever to secede as
long as their rights were maintained* "Our adherence to
this State [the Ottoman State] depends on how far our
rights are guaranteed. Tho stronger that guarantee, the
our adherence to
greater tho degree of /that State11,58 This declaration 
amounted to a mild threat. It shows how far the Arab 
leaders became conscious of their power in the Ottoman 
Empire In the period following the Balkan Wars.
Al-'AraysI went on to show at length how the 
rights of the Arab nation (umma) were completely neglected 
by the government. While the Arab population of the 
Empire amounted to 13 millions, more than half tho popu­
lation of that Empire, they had only five members in the 
Ottoman Senate, and far fewer representatives in the 
Chamber of the Deputies than their numbers seemed to justi­
fy. He complained that tho Arab deputies were not elected
57. M’utanar, p.4-3.
58. Ibid., p.4-5.
but appointed, and that the Arabs, though tho biggest
ethnic group in the Enpire, were not represented in the
cabinet, Not only that, but the Arabs were hardly enployed
in the administrative posts of the Enpire: there was one
Arab vali in every thirty, half the posts in Istanbul
,!and all the posts in our countries (biladuna) are not in 
59our hands". y
The speaker declared that as long as the Arabs
remained half the population of the Enpire, they should
have a say in the way government loans assigned for public
works were spent. Half ought to be spent in the Arab lands.
As for Arabic, it nust be made the official language in
the Arab countries, not by a mere decree of the govern-
60
nent, but by an article in the Constitution of the Enpire.
A decree passed by one government, he argued, night be 
rescinded by another. He concluded by declaring:
"We ask for our right as a group, as partners 
in this State: partners in the legislative and
executive powers, and as partners in the general 
administration of the Enpire* As for the internal 
affairs of our countries [vilayets] we are 
partners of ourselves: for instance in the
funds for education, public works and awqaf - 
also in freedom of the press and of association. 
To attain such an end,the General Councils of 
the vilayets should be given extensive powers".
61
The Arabs, he said, would use all legal means 
to reach their goal, and if Istanbul tried to silence then
59« Ibid., pp.45-4-8. See also, al-Shihabi, pp.91-92. 
Euru, p.516.
60* H>utanar, p.4-9.
61. Ibid. Also, al-Shihabl, p.92.
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by force, they would fall back on other means5 "Xu poli­
tics the end justifies the means especially if that end
6?is just and noble.’1
Al-1Araysl’s speech, typical of the first Arab 
Congress in nany ways, was followed by a brief, tense 
discussion. The president of the Congress agreed with all 
the speaker had said. Aljnad Mukhtar Beyhun, a nenber of 
tho Beirut delegation, suggested that tho Congress should 
pass a resolution stating that all tho refornors should 
refuse to accept any posts until the government carried 
out the desired reforms. The suggestion was postponed 
to the end of the session, when all resolutions would be 
taken. Another suggestion stated that in order to avoid 
weakening the Enpire by allowing too nany official langua­
ges, Arabic, the language of the Quran and of the majori­
ty group, should be nade the sole official language of 
the whole Enpire. Al-'Araysi replied that specifying 
more than one official language would not weaken the 
Enpire* Belgium and Switzerland were examples in point* 
Moreover, he stated that making Arabic the official lan­
guage of the Enpire would be unfair to Turkish, and we
wantedfnoro than to preserve our language. The president
63however, stopped the discussion at this point. ^
62* Ibid., p.50. Eor the full text of the speech see 
fflutamar, pp.4-2-50. The speech was entitled ’The 
Right s_o'f the Arabs in the Ottoman Kingdom”. See also, 
al-J.slah, No.4-8/144-3 of 6 July, 1913, and al-Ahram, 
No*10?44 of 4- July, 1913* Parts of the speech in al- 
Shihabl, pp.89-93.
63* Eor the discussion of al-'Arays!*s speech see, 
M»utanar, pp.50-53*
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In the afternoon session* Nadra Majran* a member
of a well known Greek Orthodox family in Ba'albek* and
who was residing in Paris* delivered his address on "The
preservation of the National Life in the Ottonan Arab 
64Lands". In a lengthy introduction to his speech Nadra 
emphasised the solidarity of the Muslin and Christian 
Syrians, and argued that the Arabs were worthy of a po­
litical life of their own. He told his audience that* 
until the massacres of 1860* which were engineered by the 
Ottonan government in order to introduce a noro centrali­
sed forn of administration in Syria* tho Syrian Arabs 
were left under the rule of their local notables and 
ashraf* and were subjected to a minimum of interference 
from Istanbul. Because of the bond of religion the Muslin 
Arabs never felt themselves a conquered people under the 
Seljuks, the Ayyubids and the Ottomans. They accepted 
their rule as a Muslin rule aiming at the support
65of Islam and the raising of the banner of the caliphate*  ^
They felt that they were their brothers and partners in 
the administration of their countries. In making these 
remarks Majran was trying to justify the long acquiescence 
of the Syrian Arabs to foreign rule, and he was not at­
tempting, as Ernest Lawn put it, "To make the glory of
64. Nuseibeh* p*51> erroneously stated that the address 
of Majran was entitled "Social Solidarity between 
Muslin and Christian Arabs"*
65* M*utanar, pp*55-56*
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" 66Islam virtually equivalent to tho glory of the Arabs".
Ma^ran went on to add that the idea of race 
had always held stronger appeal for tho Arabs than reli­
gion. He said, "If racial pride is a virtue, then the
67
Arabs possess it to an extent unequalled by other peoples.!1 
His proof was that the Ghassanid Arabs, who were Christi­
ans, deserted the Byzantines, their fellow-Christians, 
and collaborated with their Arab kinsmen in the army of 
Abu 'Ubaydeh Ibn al-Jara^ ., when the latter advanced on 
Syria at the head of his Muslin army. "The Arab solida­
rity shown by the Ghassanid Christians during that criti­
cal juncture is the strongest proof that the Arabs' pride 
of race takes precedence over religion. And this is in­
deed tho virtue of living nations, the nations that refuse 
68to die". These comments, however, illustrate how far 
the ideas of the leaders of the Syrian Arabs have been af­
fected by western political thought.
After assuring his listeners that the Arabs 
wanted real reform, and after denying any danger of Euro­
pean intervention in Syria, Majran declared that the Arab 
umna was never desirous of replacing the Ottonan rule by 
a foreign one, nor were they anxious to establish an Arab
66. See C» Ernest Lawn "From Ottonanisn to Arabisn: the 
origin of an Ideology" in The Review of Politics, 
xxiii (1961), p.397*
67* M’utanar, p.56.
68. Ibid. See also, Nuseibeh, pp.51-52. Ernest Law, The 
Review of Politics, 1961, pp.396-7*
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State (Dawla * Arabiyya) "We Arabs,rt he concluded, "want
fraternity with the rest of the Ottonan ethnic groups 
( ' ana sir) .
In the discussion which followed,the president
enphasised tho fact that apart fron the nassacres of 1860,
the Syrians lived in harnony, When Mafran was asked by
a certain Na^hub al-Shartunl if he denied the fact that
France had sone interests in Syria, the president reninded
al-Shartunl as well as the rest of the audience that there
than
was "no need to discuss subjects other/those concerning 
our administrative and internal affairs",^ Khalil Zainiy- 
ya, a nonber of the Beiruti delegation and an alleged 
prot£g§ of France, suggested to the participants, who ac­
cepted his suggestion, that no one should be allowed to 
discuss the foreign policies of the powers in that session
and the coning ones. On that note ended the address of 
no
Matron.{ His speech was a significant one because it
was an attenpt by a nenber of a religious ninority to on-
73
courage tho substitution of ethnic for religious solidarity.
69* M’utanar, pp.59-63.
70. Ibid., p.63*
71* Ibid., p.64.
72. For the text_of the whole address see, Ibid., pp.54-64. 
Also, al-Iglah, No.45/1440 of 2 July, 19137
73* In the circunstances, the speech of Matron, was inter­
esting. Of. the position of the Copts vis-d-vis Egyp­
tian nationalisn. See, Sanir Seikaly, The Copts 
under the British Rule, an unpub 1 ishedMi.I). fhesis, 
presently to” thie University of London, 1967*
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The Congress then proceeded with its progranne 
and Fajib Diyab, owner of the newspaper Mir* at _al~Gharb, 
and the representative of the "Syrian Unity Society" in 
New York, was called upon to deliver his address. It 
was entitled, "The Hopes of the Syrian Emigres". Najlb 
supported his fellow Syrian reforners in their demand for 
reform, and their desire to secure their rights within the 
framework of the Ottonan Enpire. He hoped that the father­
land would soon attain the standard of European constitu­
tional rule and that the knigr^s would return to their
country equipped with European knowledge and science in
74order to benefit that country. The sitting ended after
the participants accepted the suggestion that no reformer
should accept any government post unless the basic pro-
75gramme of the Congress was agreed to by Istanbul. ^
The main speeches in the third session of the 
Congress were those of Shaykh A£nad Jabbarah, one of the 
prominent Muslin delegates of Beirut, and editoi* of al- 
Itibad al-^Uthnahl and later of al-Islab, and that of 
IskandarcAnnun, the delegate of the Decentralisation Party 
of Cairo. Tabbarah spoke on "Emigration from and Immigra­
tion to Syria". After giving a statistical survey of the 
area of Syria, its population and the number of the Syrian
74. Text of speech in, M*utanar, pp.66-74. Also al-Aliram, 
No.10746, of 7 July, 1913*al-Iglah, No. 49/1^44 of The 
sane date.
75. For more details see M*utanar, pp.76-80.
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innigrants abroad and the reasons leading tp sued innigra- 
76tron,f Jabbarah went on to assure bis audience tbat tbe 
reforners wanted to strengthen the Arab nation and that 
"Ve want reform in order that we nay becone the tongue 
and the beating heart of the State... We were born Ottoman^ 
grew up as Ottonans and want to renain Ottonans. We will 
not accept any substitute for our Ottonan S t a t e " W h e n  
Jabbarah cane to the part of his speech dealing with in- 
nigration to Syria he was very brief. In the eight 
lines which he devoted to this inportant issue, he told 
his audience:
"People are divided into two groups as re­
gards the problen of immigration to Syria. One 
group disapproves of the innigration of non- 
Arabs to Syria, and is apprehensive that the 
intermingling between the newcomer * and the 
native might corrupt the latter's morals and 
change his customs. The other group sees no 
objection to this immigration, and in contrast 
to the first group, believes that it has sone 
gain for Syria because the Arabs, according to 
this group, have the quality of absorbing new­
comers, and not being absorbed by then. As for 
myself, I believe that the country ought to 
welcome the near and the distant, and I see no 
objection to the immigration if it has a special 
form of organisation Cnizan khass]•"
It was not clear whether Jabbarah was referring
to Jewish immigration to Palestine, a question very much
discussed at the time, or to the question of immigrants
76* Ibid., pp.84-88.
77. Ibid., pp.89-90. For the whole text of the speech, see,
> pp.84-94*. Also, al-Muqtabas? (Daily) Wo. 1242 
oFT3 July, 1913; al-IglaET"loW1445 of 8 July, 1913-
78. Ibid., pp.92-93.
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from European Turkey which. Tanin had suspected the parti­
cipants in the Congress were determined to oppose.^ It 
seems that Jabbarah was referring to both questions but 
in a rather ambiguous way.
As to why he adopted this vague attitude to such 
important issues, it is difficult to give a definite answ­
er. One can only put forward a mere suggestion which 
evidence in the Arabic sources seen to augment. The 
Turkish and western sources do not deal in detail with 
this period in the history of the Turkish-Syrian relations, 
and are therefore almost silent over this issue, (pabbarah 
as well as the organisers of the Congress, however, must 
have realised that it would serve the purpose of their 
Congress better if they confined themselves to their major 
aim, namely the demand for administrative decentralisation. 
To fight on more than one front would have been folly, and 
to dwell on the complicated issue of the Jewish immigra­
tion to Palestine which involved European countries, would 
divert attention from their main purpose. After all, they 
came to Europe not to alienate it, but to seek sympathy 
and support. They always associated the Jewish immigrants
79* Tanin of 6 May, 1913* Arabic translation of article in 
aX-Muqatfran, No.733A of 13 Nay, 1913* Tanin1 s suspi­
cions were based on a series of articles which appeared 
In al-Muaattan towards the end of 1912 opposing the 
conlhg or refugees and immigrants from the Balkans 
(following the Balkan war there) to Syria as an 
Intentional effort by the government to weaken the 
Arab nation and. their national movement. See al- 
Muqafrt-am, Nos.7210, 7211, 7212 and 722A of 13T14*,
16 and Jl Dec.,, 1912, respectively.
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with European .culture and financial interests.' . As such, 
they were welcome* But what the reformers wanted at the tine 
was to he the masters in their own house, and once that 
happened, the coming of the Jews to Syria could he regu­
lated hy Ma special form of organisation" as Jahharah had 
already indicated. His point of view was shared hy other
QA
Syrian leaders. What worried them at that time was not
the Jewish immigration as such, hut uncontrolled Jewish
immigration. Ihey suspected the CUP of heing in league
with the Zionists and consequently of giving then free un-
81regulated entry to Palestine.
Another theory put forward as an explanation for 
the ambiguity of Jahharah over the issue of Jewish inmi­
gration to Syria was that the speech of Jahharah came at 
a tine when an entente between the leaders of the Syrians
and those of the Zionists was contemplated, and preliminary
82steps had already been taken towards achieving it.
80. See al-Ahran, No.10718 of 4 June, 1913 where Halq al-
* Ajn, the president of the Decentralisation Party of 
Cairo, told Sami Hochherg, the editor of the Zionist- 
hacked Jeune lure, that he and his party welcome the 
immigration of Jews if "a law for such immigration has 
been laid down as in all other foreign countries". Also 
al-Iglaft, Ho.24/1419 of 6 June, 1913.
81. See for example, Palagtin, Nos, 170/69, of 11 Sept.1912 
and 196/95? 20Q99 of 11, 25 Dec., 1912 respectively. 
Al-Islah? Nos.48/1442 of 6 July, 1913 and 72/1467 of 
TT]ug., 1913? 156/1551 of 15 Nov., 1913. Also, al- 
Ikdan, Nos. 12, 19 of 15 March, and 3 May, 1914, respec 
tively. Al-Ahran, 10096 of 30 May, 1911.
82* N. Mandel, "Attempts at an Arah-Zionist Entente, 1913- 
14", in ms, Vol.I, No.3? April, 1965? pp.238-267. See 
also his article, "(Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration 
into Palestine, 1882-1914", in St. Antony1s Papers,
/cont..•
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Thus any opposition which Jabbarah night have felt did 
not appear in his speech "because either of his discretion 
or that of tho committee whose duty it was to revise and 
approve the speeches of the Congress* Not only that but 
we are also told:
"A resolution was proposed in favour of such 
innigration as was capable of benefiting Syria 
econonically. In the discussion which followed, 
Khairallah Khar all ah, a delegate representing 
the Arabs in Paris, spoke against Turkish inmi- 
gration, and said that only an innigration of 
people of neans could bo useful to the Arab 
provinces. At this Beyhun exclaimed, 1 Jewish 
immigration: yes, but Turkish immigration, no*"
There were some murmurs from the Arab students 
who had assisted in the organisation of the 
Congress, but none spoke against this remark*
All the speakers concurred with Khairallah in 
opposing Turkish immigration."
The president, al-Zahrawi, who was keen not to 
anger the Ottonan government, goes the narrative, inter­
vened, and a decision to condemn Turkish immigration was
P/note cont* from previous page.
No,17) MEA* No.A, ed* A. Hourani, Oxford Univ. Press,
1965) pp.99-102* See further his unpublished thesis (sane 
title as tho previous article), Oxford, Ch.8 and Ch. 10. 
Mandel relied heavily on Jewish archival material (mainly 
the Central Zionist Archives) for tho propagation of his 
theory of an Arab-Zionist entente. Though the Arabic 
newspapers, some of which Mandel read in translation 
toyed with the idea of coning to an understanding with the 
leaders of the Zionists in the Empire, none of these 
articles went as far as to put specific and definite pro­
posals for an entente.
83. N. Mandel, "Attempts at an Arab-Zionist entente11, 
in MES, April, 1965? p.2A8.
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84 -dropped. Falastin, an anti-Zionist paper appearing in
Jaffa, consented on fabbarah's speech by commending bin
on showing clearly the dangers of innigration fron Euro-
pean Turkey to Syria, but "he looked at the problem fron
one angle, for he did not mention the dangers which
Zionist ‘ innigration would bring to the country, nor the
future problems which the leniency of the government with
88them would create".  ^ There is no sign of anger in the 
commentary of Falastln,and its reforence to fabbarah's 
speech as showing the dangers of innigration fron European 
Turkey to Syria remains puzzling for the official text of 
that speech, and the press reports of it, made no mention 
of such dangers.
If the above-mentioned discussion of Jabbarah‘s 
speech is true, then it shows that there was much discus­
sion and activity which were not recorded in the book, 
al-H’ utamar al-1Arabi al-Awwal, published by the Ottoman 
Decentralisation Party of Cairo as the official account 
of tho proceedings of the Congress. The book was published 
as early as 1913? and the Ottonan government, which found 
its contents harmful, prevented its distribution in the 
Empire.^ Nevertheless there is no mention in the book of
84. Ibid.
85* Falastln, No.252/49 of 9mJuly, 1913* See also, Handel,
1 Turks, Arabs" St. Antonyfs Papers, 17) p.101.
86. B.A (Istanbul), Neclisi Vukla Mazbatasi, No.186/784 
of 4 Harch, 1914; see also, Fata al-1Arab, No.93/
1527 of 2 April, 1914.
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any discussion after Jabbarah1 s address, and certainly no 
reference to the delegates discussing or condemning the 
Turkish immigration from European Turkey into Syria,
Amir Shaklb Arslan in his hook Ila al-!Arab, which was a 
reply to and a refutation of, the demand for decentrali­
sation, declared in emotional and reciprocal language 
that the reformers of Paris had discussed and rejected 
the Turkish emigration from European Turkey.^7 What makes 
one doubt the validity of his statement is that he added 
that the reformers, while rejecting the immigration of 
the refugees from the Balkan states, did not mention the 
movement of emigration from Syria, which had devastated
QO
the Syrian lands. Arslan was certainly wrong here, 
for most of Jabbarah’s address was in fact devoted to the 
subject of emigration from Syria.
Iskandar 'Arnun, the vice-president of the De­
centralisation Party, was the last to address the Con­
gress in its last session of 21 June, 1913* In his ad­
dress, ’'Reform on the basis of Decentralisation,,f'Amnun 
summed up the aims and aspiration of the decentralisation 
movement. He pointed out the defects of the system of 
centralisation, and asserted that the call for decentra-
87. Shakib Arslan, Ila al-'Arab, pp.83-85.
88. Ibid., pp.83-84.
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lisation was not a call for separation fron the Ottonan
Empire, nor was it a movement against the Turks* "It is
the mere replacing of one form of government, which has
nearly caused the death of the State, by administrative
decentralisation which would benefit all theethnic groups
89of the Empire*" y He told the audience: "We want an
Ottoman government, neither Turkish nor Arab, and in which 
all Ottomans have equal rights and obligations, and that 
no group would deprive the other its rights for
reasons of either race or religion,
The discussion which followed 1Amnun*s address 
showed the cleavage that existed inside the Congress be­
tween the Beirut delegation supported by some Lebanese 
participants on the one hand, and the delegates of che 
Decentralisation Party, and perhaps the rest of the mem­
bers on the other* Charles Dabbas, a representative of 
the Arabs in Paris, reminded TAmnun that there would be 
no real reform without the help of the foreign advisers.
He cited the example of Japan, which employed foreign 
advisers, and as a result progressed and defeated Russia, 
while Indo-China felt apprehensive about foreign experts
TPutamar, p.105*
90, Ibid,, p.104. For the full text of speech see, Ibid., 
pT9S-104. Also, al-Aiiran, No.10742 of 2 July, l^TJT 
Parts of the speech in al-Shihabl, pp.93-95.
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and was dominated and exploited by the foreigners, Salim 
hill Sal an, a leading Musli.u anong tho Beiruti delegation, 
agreed with Dabbas and added that the Beirutis included a 
demand for foreign advisers in their scheme. Al^ mad Jab­
ber ah (Beirut) half-heartedly commented that every vilayet 
should be left to decide on the issue in accordance with 
their local needs. 1Amnun replied that there was no dif­
ference between the programme of his Party and other re-
91form schemes. It seems, thus, that the Congress was
not a happy harmonious gathering, and differences existed
between its members, a factor which the CUP government
was to exploit in its attempt to kill the reform movement.
92After two short speeches, the Congress
93
proceeded to pass eleven resolutions and three appendices. 
These resolutions restated the principles of the decentra­
lisation movement. Arabic should bo acceptable in the 
Ottoman parliament and the official language in the Arab 
vilayets. Instruction should bo in that language. Mili­
tary service was to be performed locally except in time 
of war. The principles of employing foreign advisers and
91* Bor the discussion see, M*utamar, pp.10^-106.
92. See Ibid., pp.107-112.
93. Bor the list of the resolutions and appendices,
Seo, Bbid., pp.115-120. al-'Azanl, III, pp.68-70.
Ahmad Qadri, pp.16-18* Buru, 522-25. Thawrat al- * Arab, 
^2-73. Bor a Brench translation see, Carnegie to G-rey, 
No.339* conf., Paris, 23 June, 1913? P.O.. 371/1827/ 
29037* Also, Zeine, The Emergence, pp. 161-162, 
Appendix C.
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extending the powers of the General Gouncil of the vilayets
(as in the reforn scheno of Beirut) should be accepted
q z l
and carried out immediately. (The central government 
should help the Lebanon to cover its deficit. This re­
quest was probably nade as a friendly gesture towards the 
Lebanese nationalists in the Congress, possibly at their 
own instigation. The Congress expressed its support and 
approval for the Armenian demands which were based on de­
centralisation. In the appendices, all those who supported 
the Congress were thanked. The throat was repeated 
that all members of the various reforn societies would 
refuse all governmental posts unless the resolutions 
were implemented. If their societies permitted then to 
accept such posts, then they night do so. Finally it was 
stated that these resolutions should be the ’’political 
programme of all Ottoman Arabs, and no candidate should 
be supported in the parliamentary elections unless he under­
takes to support this programe11,^
The fourth and last session of the Congress was 
held on 23 June, 1913, and was open to all who wanted to 
attend. Moreover, its proceedings were conducted in 
French. Beyhun, Dabbas and Ghanim gave their speeches
94. Some murmurs and criticism of the demand for foreign 
advisers were heard, and replies by Beirutis were 
given. See, M’utamar, p.114.
95* Ibid., p.119*
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which, were more or less a r&sunb of what had already heen
said in the Congress. Their ain was to faniliarise the
press and foreigners who attended the neeting with the
qa
ains of the Congress.
The First Arab Congress ended officially when 
its president acconpanied hy six of its members called 
upon Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, to thank hin 
for the hospitality of the French government, and after­
wards called on Rifat .Pasha,, the Ottoman ambassador in 
Paris to hand him the resolutions of the Congress.^
From this point onwards, the story of the Congress became 
that of delegations travelling "between Paris and Istanbul, 
agreements signed, promises made and subsequently broken.
Perhaps the most important immediate outcome 
of the Congress was that it resulted in a short-lived 
honeymoon between the CUP government and the Syrian do- 
eentralisers. For a moment it looked as if the long­
standing grievances of the Syrian Arabs had come to an 
98end* The tone of the CUP press completely changed;
after opposing and attacking the reformers bitterly,
96o French text of Beyhunfs speech in, Ibid., pp.124-134. 
Translation of that of Debbas and Ghanxn in pp.135-9, 
pp.140-6, respectively.
97• The delegation were : al-Zahrawx, Salan, Beyhun, 
Zainiyya, Ghanim, Jabbarah and 1Amnun. For details 
of interview with Pichon and speeches see: Le Temps 
of 1 July, 1913, encl. in Carnegie to Grey, No.353» 
conf., Paris, 30 June, 1913, P.O.371/1827/30049.
Also M’utanar, pp.147-8. al-Ahram, 10748 and 10764, 
of 9 and 28“July, 1913, respectively.
98. al-Ahran, Uo.10748 of 9 July, 1913.
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papers such as Vazifat,the official organ of the CUP 
government, wrote as early as the end of June {deprecating 
the fact that, "the Turkish press knows little of the na­
ture of the Syrian problem, because it has no correspon­
dents in Syria* Our press tackles Syrian affairs in an
ignorant way’1. The paper went on to say that it was not
of
enough to read the reports of the valis/ Syria, and that 
nuch tine and energy should be spent in learning the es-
QQ
sence of the Syrian problem.  ^ This optimistic and pro­
mising attitude was also reflected in the Arabic press#***^  
It seems that both the Turkish and Arab journalists were 
aware of the fact that negotiations were in progress be­
tween the Syrian reformers of Paris, and Midhat §ukru, 
the secretary general of the CUP and, more or less, the 
spokesman for the government.
The CUP government, having failed to prevent
the meeting of the Congress in Paris, decided to negotiate
101
a settlement with the Syrian reformers. The reports of
the talks and activity which preceded the actual agreement
99. Vazifat as quoted by Lisan al-Hal, No.7277 of 1 
July, T913. ------------
100. See Lisan, No.7288 of 14 July, 1915* al-Ahram, ibid. 
al-Muqaftam, No.7376 of 1 July, 1913.' al-Islah1
No.37/1432 of 21 June, 1913.
-^01* al-Manar, Vol.16, part 8 of 2 Aug., 1913? p.635 ff. 
Thawrat"* al- * Arab, p.79. al-Ahram, Ibid.
329
"between the government and the Congress leaders are very 
confused. Most of the newspapers xdaich reported the 
events of these few days between the beginning of the
Congress and the conclusion of the settlement gave varied
10? - and often conflicting reports. The account of Rashid
Ri$a in al-Manar, however, is the nost accurate narrative
103of the actual events of those few weeks. ^
The CUP reached a general understanding with
regard to the nain demands of the decentralisers with
'Abd al-Karin al-KLalil, the president of al-Mumtada al~
Adabl. according to Rija this understanding was reached
owing to the efforts of Sharif rAli ^aydar, a supporter
of the CUP who was desirous of reconciling the Arab re-
104formers and the government. nftcr the terns of the 
understanding were signed by al-Khalll and Talat Bey, 
the former came to Paris to put then before the decentra­
lisers. He was hoping to secure their support for the 
drafted agreement. Al-Ahram wrote that the first condi­
tion which the reformers laid down was the removal of 
Hazin Bey, the vali of Beirut,"who was the sole reason
102. Sec for example: Ikdan, Ho.5874- of 28 June, 1913* 
Lisan, Ho.7283 and' 7288 of 8, 14 July, 1913.
103* See, al-Manar, Vol.16, Part 8 of 2 Aug., 1913, TO* 
635-62R77
104. Ibid., p.636. Also, Djemal Pasha, Memoirs of a Turkish 
Statesman, pp.58-59* 0. Stitt, A Prince of Arabia: 
TheASnir^Shereef Ali Haidar, London, 1937? is conple- 
teTy silent on the role of the Sharif in the 
settlement.
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105behind their coning to Paris".  ^ Hazin was, however,
renovod, and the reformers1 press hailed this as the
106herald of the promised reforn*
The decentralisers of Paris revised the draft
of the agreement, and after making slight additions, they
declared they were ready to negotiate its contents with
the CUP. 1.1-Khalil went back to Istanbul and conveyed
to the leaders of the Committee the views of his
follow reformers in Paris. Consequently Midhat §ukru
and al-Khalil "the messenger of peace and reconciliation"
arrived in Paris, and after some discussions an agreement
of twelve points was arrived at.^^
The agreement which the press of the reformers
considered as a victory for their cause, was not published
immediately. In fact what is known of it is mainly what
that press claimed to be its unpublished draft. Al-Ahran
aru-1- al-Iglifc sew in the agreement a severe rebuff by the
government to the opponents of the reforn movement, and
108
a tacit recognition of the pure intentions of the reformers.,
105, al-Ahram, No.10738 of. 27 June, 1913- al-Islah, No. 
50/1445““of 8 July, 1913 claimed that Hazin was dis­
missed as a move to gain the confidence of the Arabs, 
and that his successor Ali Munif was instructed by 
Talat to respect tbe wishes of the Beirutis.
106. Bee for example, al-Ahram, ibid., al~Iglab, ibid.
1^7* al-Manar, ibid.> 656.
108, al-Ahram, ibid. al-Iglab, No.56/1151 of 15 July, 1915.
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Jubilant reports kept coning from Istanbul that the 
government had decided to carry out reforms in Syria, and 
in one of these reports Talat Bey was reported to have 
said that all the demands of the Syrians were going to be 
accepted and that "the government desires to live in 
peace with the Arabs»,-^9 Al-Muqattam, always severe in 
its criticism of the CUP, admitted that the Arab demands 
had been accepted, but asserted that their acceptance was 
due to pressure by the Arab officers on the Unionists11^ 
In another lengthy article al-Huqatfam alleged that most 
of the demands of the Congress of Paris were accepted by 
the government. It claimed that the Armenians were en­
vious of the success of the Syrians, and were reported
as saying, "The Syrians and the Arabs got more that we,
111although we struggled for longer years than they,"
Though things looked unruffled on the surface, 
the leaders of the decentralisers were becoming exaspe­
rated by the long time the government had taken without 
issuing any official recognition of the Paris agreement. 
Rumours were getting wilder every day, and when Reuter 
published a telegram that the government had accepted 
the demands of the Arabs, Raflq al-'Agm, the president of
109. Lisan, No.7282 of 7 July, 1913. al-Islafc, No.49/1444 
of*T July, 1913.  *--
110. al-Muqattan, No.7376 of 1 July, 1913.
111. al-Muqattam, No.7386 of 12 July, 1913.
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the Decentralisation Party, hastened to publish the terms
112of the Paris agreement in the press. It seems that
Raflq al-’A^m intended this as a tactical move to pin the 
gmovernnent down to what it had promised to the reformers. 
Al-’Agm was certainly mistaken in his calculation, for 
it was this publication of the terns of the alleged agree­
ment (which the government had intended to keep secret 
in order not to incite the other ethnic groups of the 
Empire to similar demands) that jeopardized the harmonious 
relations which had for such a short time existed between 
the CUP and the Syrians.
In the letter which al-’Agm sent to the press, 
he sta.ted that the agreement recognised the rights of the 
Arabs in the Ottoman Empire and the need for reforms in 
the Arab provinces, on the basis of administrative de­
centralisation. The agreement contained thirteen articles. 
Education in the elementary and secondary schools was to 
be in Arabic. Arab soldiers were to serve when needed 
in places near their homelands. It provided for the ap­
pointment of European inspectors in every vilayet, and 
for a special regulation specifying their duties and terms 
of reference. Official transactions in the Arab provinces 
were to be in Arabic. The decisions of the General Councils
112* Bee: al-Ahram, No.10753 of 15 July, 1913* al-Muqattam, 
No. 73B S oF~X5 July, 1913. Compare with al -I b lab * No. 
58/1453 of 1? July, 1913.
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should be valid and must be carried out immediately. The 
awqaf were to be left in hands of the millet councils. 
Public works to be dealt with by the local authorities. 
Three cabinet ministers were to be from among the Arabs.
At least five valis and ten mutasarrifs to be Arabs; there 
should also be Arab advisers and assistants in the various 
ministries. The last article specified that in Beirut 
half the members of the council should be Muslims and the
113
other half non-Muslims. ^
The immediate result of the publication of the
alleged agreement was extreme jubilation. A wave of
optimism and gladness swept over Beirut and Cairo, and
among the Arab students in Istanbul. This narked the
114clinax of the Syrian-Turkish honeymoon. In Beirut,
al-lslah hastened to publish the text of al-fAgnfs letter,
113. For the Turkish and Arabic text of the agreement see, 
al-^anar, Vol.16, part 8 of 2 Aug., 1913, pp.638-640. 
There is a difference between these texts and al- 
!Azn!s letter In that the latter claimed the agree­
ment to be 13 articles while the latter gave only 11 
articles. Both articles 12 and 13 aro absont *£rcn 
al-^amar1s text. Most of the Arabic sources follow 
the text of al-!Azn's letter with slight variations.
114o For the banquets and celebrations and speeches on the 
occasion of the new Turkish-Arab understanding (which 
were going on in Istanbul) see al-Muqattam, No.7423, 
of 25 Aug., 1913* Thawrat al-fArab, 82-90 “for some 
examples. Zeine, The Emergence,^pp.106-7.
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and was at pains to prove that tho agreement was based on 
the reforn scheme of B e i r u t . I n  an earlier issue al- 
Iglafr published a slightly different version of the agree­
ment in an attempt to silence the press of the opponents 
of tho reforn movement, which had claimed that the re­
formers had abandoned their "rotten scheme which they 
drafted in Beirut".'**^
The first reaction of the CUP was to send a de­
claration to its newspapers, including those of Beirut 
such as al-R’ay al-1 Arm, Ababil, and al-Iqbal, in which it 
gave its own version of the agreement3 The reformers de­
duced from that declaration that things were not as bright 
and hopeful as the letter of al-'Ayn had depicted.The 
CUP was prepared to grant four articles only: Education
in the Arabic language, officials chosen from the inhabi­
tants of the vilayet when possible, regional military ser­
vice, and public works to be tho responsibility of local
councils. This v*as the first blow to the high hopes 
which the leaders of the reform movement entertained in 
the weeks following the Congress of Paris.
The government’s decree stipulating reforn in 
the Arab provinces, which was all that the CUP cabinet
al-Iglah, No.61/1456 of 21 July, 1913.
116. al-Islah, No.58/1453 of 17 July, 1913.
117« 8ee for instance al-Iglah, No.65/1460 of 25 Inly,
1913> for the four articles and commentary.
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was prepared to offer, was published on 5 August, 1913.118 
(The decree put the administration of the awqaf in the 
hands of the millet councils, officials to be acquainted 
with the Arabic language, teaching in certain schools 
to be in Arabic, regional military service accepted and 
foreign inspectors to be appointed* On the eve of its 
publication al-Khalxl despatched a number of telegrams to 
the reformers * press in Syria claiming that the govern­
ment had accepted the terns of the agreement which was 
signed by its representative and that of the Arab Youth 
(al-Sliablba al-1 Arabiyya)» Lisan al-gal though descri­
bing the terms of the decree as "elastic" accepted it as
the first step by the government towards reforms, and as
1?0showing its good intentions. Other papers agreed that
i  P I
the decree was vague and illusive.
On 8 August, the decree was confirmed by an 
Imperial Irade, which made further alterations in its
118. Arabic text of decree in al-^anar, Vol.16, part 9 
of 1 Sept., 1915* pp•718-19: Also, al-Huqattam, No. 
7142 of 12 Aug., 1913. Thawrat al-1 SraTS', pp7ffg-81. 
al-Ahram, No. 10772 of 6 Aug.
119. al-Iglafe, No.73/1468 of 4 Aug., 1913- From the refe­
rence to ah agreement signed between the government 
and the Arab Youth in this telegram it seems possible 
to deduce that the government had ignored its origi­
nal agreement with the reformers of Paris and had 
probably signed another one with al-Khalxl and his 
young friends in Istanbul. al-Iglafc, ibid., hinted
at this possibility.
120. Lisan, No.7306 of 4 Aug., 1913.
121. See for example, al-Ahran, Nos.10772, 10773 of 6, 7 
Aug., 1913. al-Islah, "So .'75/1470 of 6 Aug., 1913.
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1 2 2contents. The concessions were considerably reduced.
For instance the question of appointing foreign inspectors 
was completely omitted. The appearance of the Trade 
"caused dismay which presently turned to despair. For it 
gradually dawned upon the watchful Arabs that it, too,
was only a blind, and the CUP's game was to sidetrack the
123issue". y Al-Muqattam commented "We have hastened and
published a text of an agreement which was absolutely
124false," - referring to the text of the agreement pub­
lished by Baflq al-!A^m on 15 July, 1913* Despite the 
outward expressions of warm friendship between the various 
Arab delegations in Istanbul and the Turkish authorities, 
it was becoming apparent that the days of understanding 
between the reformers and their government were drawing 
to an end.
Moreover, differences among the reformers began 
to be noticeable after the middle of August, 1913. Even 
in Paris there were signs that the unity between Muslins 
and Christians was ending. When the three Muslins among 
the Beirut delegates agreed to go to Istanbul to negotiate 
with the government and supervise the execution of the re­
forms, this had been taken as a sign that the Miislins were
122. Turkish text of Trade in Takvim-i VekayjL, No.l!560 
of 23 Aug., 1913Piirabic translation in al-Manar, 
ibid., p.720,
123. Antonius, p.117*
124. al-Muqattan, No.7412 of 12Aug., 1913.
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partly giving in to the government.'*-^  In Istanbul the 
government played the role of the hospitable host to the 
delegation, which ultimately returned to Beirut loaded 
with promises that the reforn would be carried out.^^
The Muslins among the reformers must have realised that 
they could not secure more from the government, and de­
cided to keep quiet for the time being* This attitudo was 
more typical of the Beirut Muslim reformers than those of 
Cairo. While the leaders of the Decentralisation Party 
of Cairo maintained a hostile attitude to the Unionists 1 
regime all through the second half of 1913 and the whole 
of 1914) the Beiruti Muslin reformers were less hostile. 
Even some of their papers which had previously maintained 
a very critical stand against the CUP such as al-Iglafc 
and Pata al-'Arab now adopted a more resigned attitude 
which was to remain unchanged until the outbreak of the 
First World War. Men like Salam were to accept becoming 
deputies in the Ottoman Chamber knowing full well that 
CUP was the master of that Chamber, and that to be a de­
puty in such a Chamber was to serve the cause of the 
Unionists.
i25♦ al-Ahram, No.10797 of 5 Sept., 1913.
126. al-Iglah, No.95/1490 of 29 Aug., 1913. Also, A.
Consul-General Rawlins to Marling, No.72, conf.,
Beirut, 3 Sept., 1913, P.0.371/1775/42600.
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However, the differences among the reformers 
were made more apparent by the acceptance of al-Zahrawr, 
the president of the Congress, the seat of the Ottoman 
senate which the Unionists offered to him. Five other 
Arab notables were appointed to the S e n a t e . B y  such 
appointments the CUP was putting the final successful 
touches to buying off the leaders, and to sowing dissen­
sion among the reformers. The acceptance of al-Zahrawi 
had caused a great deal of resentment among his compa­
triots and had practically split the whole movement of 
reform. While he defended his decision, other reformers 
were divided over this issue and some regarded his accept-
*1 p o
ance of the nomination as a betrayal.
This incident was a turning point in the history 
of tho Syrian reforn movement, and together with the 
realisation by the reformers that the CUP government was 
not ready to grant their demands, contributed greatly to 
the mood of despair and bitterness which marked the rela­
tions of tho Syrian Arabs with the government in the pe­
riod preceding the outbreak of World War I. The arrest
127* al-Zah.ra.wi was the only decontraliser among the six 
senators - For names See: Fata al-'Arab, No.21/1455 
of 7 Jan., 1914. al-Iglah, No.2ol'7l'396 of 7 Jan.,
1914.
128. See Thawrat al-'Arab, pp.99-102. al-Iglah, No.258/
15557 and 264/1859 of 16, 23 March, 1914? respectively. 
Fata al-'Arab, No.42/1476 of 2 Feb., 1914, and 
following numbers.
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of 'Aziz 'All al-Misri in February 1914^"^ had certainly 
added to the disappointment of the Arab leaders with the 
Unionist regime and had convinced tho extremists among 
then that the only alternative was separation from the 
Empire. The indifference shown by the Syrian leaders to 
tho parliamentary elections of April 1914 was also indi­
cative of a prevalent mood of dejection and disillusion­
ment. It was against this background that the relations 
between the Arab leaders and the Young Turk regime de­
veloped during the years of the war.
129- For a brief discussion of 'Aziz1s arrest see: Antonius, 
118-121. al-'Azani, Iv, pp.58-65. al-Islali, No.242/ 
1637 of 25 Feb,, 1914. al-MuqatfanT~ffo775'69 of 18 
Feb., 1914 and following numbers. Majid Khadduri 
'Aziz Ali". St. Antonyms Papers, 17? p. 144 and pp. 
148—151.
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CONCLUSION*
The period 1908-1914, which was characterised 
by an exceptional historical dynamism, narked the close 
of tho last chapter in the history of the Turkish-Syrian 
relations# The advent of the constitutional era was 
hoped to give the decaying Ottonan Empire a new lease of 
life and to regenerate it. However, it ended in the 
destruction of ik.*t Empire. Among the various reasons 
which caused the downfall of Ottoman power in Syria two 
were paramount. The first was the rising tide of nationa­
lism among the Syrians and the rest of the nationalities 
of the Empire and the second was the errors committed by 
the inexperienced Young Turks in handling problems and 
difficulties created by the rise of such nationalisms#
The attempt of the Young Turks to fOttonanise! all the 
national groupings in the Empire had produced the opposite 
results. It encouraged the separatist movements which 
were already in operation among the Christian ra1iyya of 
the Sultan. It stimulated the emerging Syrian movement 
and brought it to political maturity.
By persistently ignoring Syrian Arab rights, 
the Young Turks alienated most of the Syrian Muslim na­
tionalists, who until the entry of the Ottoman Empire into 
the First World War, never contemplated secession# Their
341
nearest move towards secession, however, was thoir agita­
tion for decentralisation. But not all the Syrian nationa 
lists were at one, some Christians arid a minority of 
extremist Muslims, had on m .re than ono occasion contenpla 
ted secession from the Empire, hut such attempts were 
sporadic, ineffective and unrepresentative of the hulk 
of the Syrian movement. Tho Syrian movement which re­
mained before 1908 largely Christian and separatist,
tvui ^
attract©-# little if any Muslim support,/underwent a ra­
dical change after that date. It became dominated by the 
Muslims, rather than the Christians, and it shed its se­
paratist tendencies* It became primarily a reforn move­
ment working for the redress of certain political grie­
vances which the Syrians cane to entertain against the 
Young Turk regime. In as far as the aims and aspirations 
of that movement were concerned, the Syrian Christian 
nationalists were relegated to the background, and were 
content either to collaborate with the Muslins or to 
withdraw from the field of politics entirely. The Maro- 
nites of Lebanon had no intention of abandoning their na­
tional and separatist attitudes. Some Christian nationa­
lists, however, maintained an opportunist attitude to the 
Muslim dominated Syrian movement*
Despite the domination of the movement by the 
Muslins there x^ras evidence to suggest that the Islamic
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bond which according to N. Zeine, held such a vital place 
in the relations of the Arabs and Turks, was weakening.
Men such as 'Abd al-ganld al-Zahrawi, a turbaned Shaylch, 
were able to detect this feature as early as 1913. The 
bond that held the Muslin nationalists to the Empire was 
one of political expediency. It was better for them to 
live under the rule of the Ottomans than under the yoke 
of a foreign European rule. This attitude which narked 
that of tho sober Muslin and Christian nationalists was 
not typical of certain extremists among both ranks.
Finally, it is my contention that any study of 
the Arab movement during this period of 1908-1914 is 
bound to be a study solely of the Syrian Arab movement.
The Syrian movement is not only representative of the 
entire pre-Var Arab movement but synonymous with it.
The Syrians, by virtue of their better education which 
contributed greatly to their national political con­
sciousness, created and dominated the 1908-1914 Arab move­
ment. This is not to say that other Arabs were not active 
in that movement. They did take part, but their partici­
pation was rather accidental and complementary to the 
efforts of the Syrian nationalists. The Hijaz, for 
instance, was too backward and too busy with its incessant 
tribal strife, to interest itself in an Arab movement. 
Sharif £[usayn ruled as the Sharif of Mecca and as a
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faithful client of the Young Turks until the eve of his 
revolt in 1916. Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Rashid, tho other 
important figures in Arabia, were too busy eliminating 
each other. Yemen was an abode of unrest and revolts 
for most of this period. Iraq, remained a backwater of 
the Arab movement. Egypt was under British occupation 
and was in the process of developing its own Egyptian 
nationalism. The Arab North African Provinces of the 
Empire had either passed under the foreign yoke or were 
on their way to doing so. The word 'Arab1 as used in 
the Arabic press of the tine was used to mean 'Syrians' 
rather than any other category of people.
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